


OUR
FIGHTING
SERVICES

Field-Marshal
SIR EVELYN WOOD
V.C



OUR FIGHTING SERVICES





HORATIO VISCOUNT NELSON

From the Painting by L. F. Abbott
in the National Portrait Gallery

409

Our Fighting Services

And How They Made the Empire

BY SIR EVELYN WOOD

Author of "The Story of the Cavalry",
"The Story of the Army", "The Story of the
Royal Air Force", and "The Story of the Royal Navy"

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(SOLUNT)

— (continued by M. J.
— (continued by M. J.)

409.

Our Fighting Services

And How They Made the Empire

BY

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EVELYN WOOD

V.C., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.C.L.

Author of "The Crimea, 1854-94," "Achievements of Cavalry,"
"Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign," "The Revolt in
Hindustan," "From Midshipman to Field-Marshal"

With Ten Photogravures and many Plans

CASELL AND COMPANY, LTD
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1916

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TO MY COMRADES,
OF ALL RANKS AND RACES, OF OUR
FIGHTING SERVICES;

TO THOSE OF THE PAST,
IN SINCERE APPRECIATION OF THE
DEEDS WHICH WON
THE EMPIRE;

TO THOSE OF THE PRESENT,
THE VALIANT MEN WHO HAVE GIVEN UP,
OR ARE ADVENTURING,
THEIR LIVES, IN HELPING TO DEFEND
A NOBLE INHERITANCE,
AND TO
UPHOLD A RIGHTEOUS CAUSE.



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Our Fighting Services

PART I

THE RISE OF THE NAVY AND ARMY, 1066-1803

CHAPTER I

FROM THE NORMAN INVASION TO THE TUDOR PERIOD

Wellington's Army Reforms—The Napier Family—Want of Public Interest in the Army—Battle of Hastings—Norman Organisation and Administration—Invasion—The Army under the Romans—Feudal System—The Navy under Alfred—Wardens of the Cinque Ports Created—The Rise of the Navy—Battle of the Standard—Strategy of Edward III.—The First Use of Cannon—Crécy and Agincourt—The Army under Henry V.—Wars of the Roses—Henry VIII. in France—Flodden Field.

IT is just a century ago that England's wars, which had then been waged for over thirty years, in the East, the West, and in Europe, but always on Lands and Seas far distant from the British Isles, came to an end.

The Duke of Wellington, Commander-in-Chief, realising that the House of Commons would, as it had always done, on the conclusion of Peace, disband the Army, prepared to face that eventuality. He recognised that the Auxiliary Departments, which he had organised, and perfected between 1810 and 1814, must be the first to disappear, and he designedly scattered the Three Arms by small detached units, in secluded barracks, to save them from extinction at the hands of Parliamentary Economists; he tried to preserve a small army by hiding it.

As a result, during the first twenty years of Queen Victoria's reign the Public knew but little, and cared even less for the junior Service. This is indicated by the meagre, impersonal, and unsatisfactory military Records of

Wellington's Army Reforms

Our Fighting Services

Public
Interest in
the Army

many regiments with noble traditions, but whose employment it seemed in 1851, the year of the Great Exhibition, would not be again required.

It is true that the Napier family had done much to raise the reputation of the Army. William had shown in stirring sentences "With what majesty the British soldier fights." His brother, Charles, had recognised as comrades in Peace, as in War, all well-conducted men; their appreciation of this fact is attested by the statue to the Conqueror of Scinde, in Trafalgar Square, erected mainly by the subscriptions of private soldiers.

It was, however, mainly due to William Howard Russell, the *Times* correspondent in the Crimea, to his moral courage, his eloquence, and to his graphic and truthful letters, that the soldiers of sixty years ago became known. Russell described not only the brilliant valour of the Rank and File, but also the patient, enduring heroism of our naked, starving remnants of battalions in the terrible winter of 1854-5.

Now that Counties have been given a direct interest in their regiments, and several millions of men have enlisted, the Soldier, like the Sailor, has become an integral part of the Nation. We, therefore, think that it is possible that some of the Public may wish to peruse a short history of the campaigns and battles fought, to extend and retain our possessions, by the predecessors of those valiant souls who are now striving to maintain the liberties of the Empire.

It will not in any way detract from the renown of our men when we show that the stubborn, innate courage of the British sailors and soldiers was not the only factor in many cases where victories were won against vastly superior forces. In addition to the inspiring example of self-sacrifice in all, superior administration, forethought, and tactical skill on the part of the leaders, together with better discipline in the ranks of the smaller force, often turned the scale in its favour.

Norman
Organisa-
tion, 1066

At the time of the Battle of Hastings, 1066, the organisation and administration of the Normans were certainly far superior to that of the Saxons. Although we cannot be sure that the invading force numbered 60,000 men, which is the usually accepted strength, yet, as the Normans were detained on the coast of France by contrary winds for a month, and remained on the Sussex coast for sixteen days after their

Stamford Bridge and Hastings

3

disembarkation, the supply arrangements must have been satisfactory.

Norman
Organisa-
tion, 1066

Moreover, about three thousand vessels, one-fourth being ships as large as any then built, carried the troops across the Channel without accident, which indicates careful preliminary plans and skilful execution.

There is a curious sidelight showing forethought in the Normans' plans, in that after the disembarkation they erected three wooden castles which had been brought over in pieces.

The Saxon fleet, on the other hand, after watching the south coast for six weeks, had dispersed, owing to want of provisions, shortly before the Normans crossed.

The point of concentration fixed upon by William of Normandy, was the mouth of the Dives, between the Seine and the Orme, and thence the armament was to sail in the middle of August. North-west winds delayed William till the beginning of September. Just at the time when Harold's presence was all-important on the south coast, he was called northwards to repel the Norwegian army which had landed under the banner of Harold Hardrada, at the invitation of the traitor Tostig.

Stamford
Bridge,
1066

After a fiercely fought contest, Hardrada and Tostig were slain, and the enemy completely dispersed. A few made good their escape by sea, but the vast majority perished by drowning, or by the sword.

Meanwhile, at nine o'clock in the morning of September 28th, 1066, the prow of the *Mora* touched English soil, and Duke William, first of all his host, leapt eagerly ashore.

Harold was at York when tidings of the invasion came. Many of his gallant leaders had perished at Stamford Bridge, and on mustering his forces Harold found them sorely diminished. He hurried down to London, where he received reinforcements. He remained there six days ere he marched "to a hill which men then called Senlac, whereon now is the town of Battle, and there he pitched his camp."

Hastings,
1066

The present aspect of the battlefield is very different from that which it presented on October 14th, 1066. Harold's standard waved on Senlac Hill, and on an opposite eminence was that of William. Between these a beauti-

Hastings,
1066

ful valley of green meadows and luxuriant woods now winds away in a south-easterly direction towards Hastings, where it meets the sea. In A.D. 1066 the plain was desolate and wild. Harold drew up his army in order of battle on a rising mound, with his flanks and front protected by deep trenches.

Precisely at nine o'clock the whole Norman army advanced with spirit and alacrity, and ere long the clouds of arrows and crossbows' bolts filled the air from both front lines. "God is our help!" was their cry, as they flung themselves against the palisades which fringed the edge of Harold's trench, and strove to tear them up and force an entrance for their cavalry.

Harold and his brother fought among the foremost. The King lost an eye by an arrow, and though consequently half blind and in agony he continued to fight.

The Normans were driven down into the ravine between the two hills, where men and horses, killed, wounded, or dying, rolled over each other. William had three horses killed under him. Aided by his half-brother, Bishop Odo, he rallied his troops, the palisades were torn up and an entrance forced for the living mass of men and horses that poured through.

In dense masses, however, and fighting desperately, the English formed around the Standard, and Duke William hewed his way towards it, intent on meeting Harold face to face—a result he never achieved; though Earl Gurth, who fought near his royal brother, hurled a spear at the Duke, who a few minutes after slew him.

Then four knights rushed upon Harold as he lay dying. They recognised him by his rich armour, and killed him, sorely mangling his body.

Still the fight was not done. No prisoners were taken, and by nightfall there lay on the field of Hastings 15,000 Norman dead, and a still greater number of the vanquished.

So ended the battle of Hastings, which made the Normans lords of England, from the Channel to the Border mountains.

The Anglo-Saxon Militia, the principle of which was maintained until the Territorial Forces replaced the Volunteers enrolled in 1859, was practically given up for

The Army Under the Normans 5

Expeditionary Forces soon after the Norman Conquest. Many of the Anglo-Saxon nobles fell at the battle of Hastings, and frequent and invariably unsuccessful revolts by the survivors, which generally involved forfeiture of their estates, made William I. the owner of about half the acreage of England. He granted estates liberally to his followers, and thus established a Feudal System with 60,000 military allotments, held under tenure of "Knights service." Some of the greater barons, as "tenants in chief" of the King, held hundreds of such allotments, and William, a few years after the Conquest, could assemble for a foreign expedition 60,000 knights and men-at-arms.

**The Army
under the
Normans**

This Feudal System was, however, gradually replaced by the custom of payment in lieu of personal service, and, under the later Plantagenet kings, the victorious British Armies in France were composed of hired English, Irish, and Welsh soldiers, who had proved themselves to be of better fighting value than the foreign mercenaries previously employed. Even allowing for the great difference in value of money in the fifteenth century and at the present time, the rates current in Edward III.'s force investing Calais seem to be low. A knight received 2s. per diem, a mounted archer, 6d., a foot archer, 3d., and a foot soldier, 2d. per diem.

**The Army
under the
Planta-
genets**

The inauguration, by the Conqueror, of the Feudal System did not for some time do away with the National Militia, which, existing from the time of King Canute, was allowed to continue for Home Defence. The High Sheriff could assemble all males capable of bearing arms, and this force under the Statute of Winchester, in the time of Edward I., was in some degree organised, its numbers and armament being determined, and provision made for its periodical inspection.

**National
Militia**

During the five hundred years which elapsed from the time of William I. to Charles I., there was no great change of principle; King Charles, indeed, endeavoured to enforce the feudal principle for a time, but later, by accepting the grievances in breaches of the law, as embodied in the Petition of Right, he put the maintenance of the Regular Army under the control of Parliament.

King Alfred (849-901), sometimes called "the First Admiral," fought many actions with the Danish invaders.

**King Alfred
(849-901)**

Our Fighting Services

King Alfred (849-901) It is said that in A.D. 897 he, with ten galleys, defeated 300 Danish pirate ships on our south coast.

He was personally engaged in fifty-six battles on land and on the seas, and is described by Freeman as "a saint without superstition, a scholar without ostentation, a conqueror whose laurels were never stained with cruelty, and a prince never cast down by adversity."

Sir James Mackintosh, Professor at Haileybury, wrote of him: "Although it be an infirmity of every Nation to ascribe their institutions to the contrivance of a man rather than to the slow action of time and circumstance, yet the selection of Alfred by the English People as the founder of all that was dear to them, is surely the strongest proof of the deep impression left on the minds of all of his transcendent wisdom and justice."

The Beginning of the Navy

From William I. (1066-87), however, who created the Wardens of the Cinque Ports, bound in times of national emergency to furnish fifty-two vessels, carrying in all 1,200 men, and to serve fifteen days, we may date the beginning of our Regular Navy.

By the end of the succeeding century the numbers had greatly increased, for King John is stated to have sent five hundred ships against Philip of France; and again, eighty years later, we read that the fleet of King Edward I., with 240 vessels, killed 3,000 of the enemy, seizing many ships, in one of which were four hundred dead bodies.

Tactical Principles of Henry I.

Henry I. (1100-35) adopted two tactical principles which were for many years successful: that the greater part of the troops should await the attack on foot, and that the charge of cavalry should be met by flights of arrows shot by archers.

Battle of the Standard, 1138

In Stephen's reign (1135-54) at the Battle of the Standard, in 1138, Henry's tactics were followed, and resulted in victory. In this reign tournaments became common, and, as they included not only individual combats, but also encounters between troops, they caused attention to be paid to drill, tactics, and discipline.

Sluys, 1340

When Edward III. (1327-77) ascended the throne he inherited a small and neglected Navy; he greatly improved it, but in the last decade of his reign it again sank in numbers and efficiency. In August, 1340, learning that the French intended to invade England, he collected a number

The Battle of Crecy Tactics

7

of merchant vessels, in which he transported his nobles and their vassals to Flanders. He found the French fleet, of two hundred vessels, moored, and chained together by groups. He attacked these groups in succession, killing 25,000 out of 35,000 of the enemy. These audacious and sustained attacks lasted from noon till long after the moon had risen; the great mortality is explained by the defeated knights being thrown overboard and drowned by the weight of their armour.

Sluys, 1340

It has been said that Edward III. was no strategist, but at Sluys, and six years later at Crecy, August 26th, 1346, he showed great tactical skill. He had landed in Normandy with 28,000, and as he marched through the country southwards, pillaged and destroyed all towns near his track.

Crecy,
1346

He had lost, or sent home, 5,000 men, and when near Paris learnt that King Philip, with an army of 75,000, was advancing against him. Edward retreated rapidly down the left bank of the River Somme, hoping to reach Flanders, where he had allies, but all the bridges and fords were guarded. Eventually he crossed the river at low water, eight miles below Abbeville, where it is tidal, and stood to fight between two little villages, Crecy and Wadicourt.

The country is an undulating plain. King Edward drew up his army on a low range of hills facing south-east; the right rested at Crecy, on the River Maie, and the left on the village of Wadicourt. There was a wood on the highest ground, behind the left rear of the army, between which and the troops he collected all the non-combatants and pack animals, throwing up a slight breastwork in front of the main position. The discipline of Edward's troops was as remarkable as was the indiscipline of the French nobles, whose headlong, uncontrolled, disconnected charges gave Edward so brilliant a victory as to raise England to a front place amongst the military powers.

In the battle cannon were used for the first time, but without producing much result. Up to the date of this bloody and decisive victory in which the French losses exceeded the total strength of the English troops, the power of knights in armour to ride down any number of foot soldiers had never been doubted. This victory, with those of the Black Prince at Poitiers, Sept. 19th, 1356, and in

Cannon
First Used

**Najara,
1367**

the little known battle of Najara, April 3rd, 1367, carried the fighting reputation of Englishmen on the Continent to its highest point.

At Najara Bertrand du Guesclin was taken prisoner, but the action is also remarkable because the tactics of the battle illustrate clearly the English system; which was to employ a few men only on horseback during the action, and using all mounted men to complete the victory.

The battle of Agincourt, October 25th, 1415, won by Henry V., resembled in its preliminary situation, and in its sanguinary results, that gained by his grandfather at Crecy.

**Agincourt,
1415**

While the fighting reputation of the soldiers of Henry V. was great, their humane discipline was of a high standard. The General Orders issued in the Agincourt campaign forbade plundering, or even interference with the agricultural pursuits of the inhabitants. Soldiers were forbidden to disturb a woman lying in childbirth by entering her house, and the commission of sexual outrage involved the penalty of Death, i.e. "smytyng of the head."

Later in the reign the efficiency of the army deteriorated.

**The English
in France
in the 15th
Century**

When Henry V. was on his deathbed, August, 1422, he charged those about him that no peace should be made with France until Normandy was handed over to England. In the next thirty years, however, England's power in France grew steadily less; Paris was lost, 1436, Rouen in 1449, and Bordeaux welcomed the French in 1453, when the hundred years' strife between England and France came to an end.

**Wars of the
Roses**

Englishmen having ceased to fight in France, began in 1455 the struggle called the "Wars of the Roses," caused by the quarrels for the Crown between the rival Houses of Lancaster and York.

Henry VII. was no sooner crowned in 1485 than he had to deal with rebellions, which broke out from time to time till the execution of Edward of Warwick in 1499, after which tranquillity reigned till the King's death in 1509.

When Henry VIII. came to the throne Calais was the only foreign fortress held by England. The young monarch added to the permanent personal escort, raised by his father, called the Yeomen of the Guard, by a second guard of nobles.

Henry VIII. in France

9

Henry VIII. sent an expedition to France in 1512, which was so badly armed, equipped, and provisioned that the men mutinied, and, the results of the campaign being unsatisfactory, the King took the field himself the next year and captured Théroutanne, a fort on the Lys River, Pas de Calais, which was destroyed later by Charles V.

Henry VIII.
in France,
1513
Flodden
Field, 1513

While the King was abroad the Earl of Surrey, with 26,000 men, crushed James IV. and 40,000 Scots in the decisive battle of Flodden Field. Henry VIII., who was stated to be the best shot with the bow in England, was an enthusiastic archer. He had previously followed his father in restricting the use of the crossbow, and the victory at Flodden, having been gained mainly by archers, his opinion was confirmed. He now forbade the use of the hand-gun, and dressed himself and his guard in green, the Archers' colour.

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNINGS OF THE ROYAL NAVY

Henry VIII. Creates Royal Navy—Queen Elizabeth—Commercial Enterprise—Frobisher, Hawkins, and Drake—Spanish Treachery at San Juan—The Babington Plot—Hawkins as Naval Administrator—The Slave Trade

Henry VIII.
Creates the
Royal Navy

WHILE Continental monarchs were raising standing armies, Henry VIII. (1509-47) was creating a Royal Navy. He instituted the Admiralty and a Navy Office, fixing salaries for Commissioners, and Executive Officers. He hesitated, as regards construction, for some time, between purely sailing ships, and vessels propelled by sails and by oars.

The King brought to England three Italian shipwrights to design vessels, and he himself invented and designed a rowing galley. At this period the Italians favoured galleys, and the English preferred larger vessels dependent for motion on sails.

Military officers fought the ships, the sailors placing them in position. The desired object was generally to fasten the ship by ropes, or grappling irons, with its broadside across the bows or stern of the enemy's vessels, which received a final discharge of all missiles great and small, and was then boarded, and captured by men fighting hand to hand.

The *Great Harry*, named after the King, Henry VII., of a thousand (approximate) tons, built in 1488, was the first ship constructed with two decks. The name was appropriate, as he founded practically the basis of our fleets. She was accidentally burnt in 1553, thus having a life of sixty-five years, so honest work must have been put into her. The *Great Harry* carried seventy-two guns, and a crew of 700 men. Her lower deck ports were perilously near the water; indeed, the *Mary Rose*, of six hundred tons, built at the same time, sunk at Spithead with all her crew of 500 men, being swamped in "going about," for her ports were only 16 inches above the water line.

Growth of the Royal Navy

II

These disasters did not check the growth of the Navy, for when Henry VIII., in order to unite the two nations, was trying to marry his son to the infant Queen of Scotland, daughter of James V., the Earl of Hertford was sent to the Firth of Forth with a powerful fleet carrying 10,000 men. It was Henry VIII. who originated Woolwich Dockyard.

Growth of
the Navy

Of Henry VIII.'s daughters, Queen Mary (1553-58) let down the strength of the Navy, and Queen Elizabeth (1558-1603) increased it materially, but mainly by the employment of private ships owned by adventurers. The persistence of these audacious corsairs eventually, in bringing about war, changed completely the political and commercial situations between England and Spain.

The three main causes of the quarrels were Religion, Politics, and the interests of Commerce pushed by enterprising merchants.

Quarrels
with Spain,
16th Cen-
tury

In Spain, Philip II., in his unrelenting zeal for orthodoxy, spared neither age, sex, nor nation, the Inquisition claiming jurisdiction over all foreigners who entered Spanish ports.

In England, Elizabeth (1558-1603), though Mass had been said at her Coronation, soon after it forbade the Elevation of the Host in her own chapel.

After her accession, Elizabeth advanced continually, though slowly, towards the re-establishing of the Protestant religion, in doing which, however, she discouraged impartially excesses in both contending parties. Her people were, nevertheless, much more in earnest, and regarded most questions as being bound up in the struggle of the Reformation against the Papacy.

Statesmen were bent on founding on the growing feeling of British nationality a bulwark against Spanish Empire, and English merchants had already in Queen Mary's short reign shown vigorous commercial enterprise.

Early in the reign of Elizabeth our merchants had become impatient of the restrictions which the Pope, at the instigation of Spain, had imposed on England, shutting her commerce out of India and America, and were determined to extend their voyages afar. Although King Edgar had (A.D. 965) claimed to be lord of the ocean surrounding Britain, yet it was these merchants and their adventurous

Enterprise
under Eliza-
beth

Our Fighting Services

**Martin Fro-
bisher
(1535-94)**

colleagues who raised England to her proud position on the seas, and it is therefore desirable to write somewhat fully of their deeds.

The better known of these enterprising seamen were Martin Frobisher, 1535-94; John Hawkins, 1532-95; and Francis Drake, 1545-96; who were all knighted.

Frobisher, an intrepid navigator, led three expeditions endeavouring to reach China by Greenland and the North-West. On his first voyage his two vessels were only of twenty tons burden.

**John Haw-
kins on the
Spanish
Main, 1562**

Mr. John Hawkins, of Devon, captain of a merchant ship, a distinguished seaman, and at that time England's greatest shipowner, made slave-trading voyages between West Africa and the Spanish Settlements of South America, with a profit of 60 per centum. He later commanded a squadron of six vessels engaged in this inhuman traffic, of which two belonged personally to Queen Elizabeth.

He sometimes kidnapped, and sometimes bought, negroes in the Gulf of Guinea and on the West Coast of Africa, selling them at a great profit to Spanish colonists.

The King of Spain claimed for his countrymen a monopoly of the trade, and had forbidden his subjects to purchase slaves from English or French traders. The Spanish governors were therefore obliged, at least ostensibly, to obey the King's commands.

Hawkins had, however, slaves to sell, and the Spanish colonists wished to buy, but at the lowest possible price. From this conflict of interests arose some curious results. Hawkins, at Rio de la Hacha, after much fruitless bargaining, landed with a hundred soldiers clad in armour, and fired on the Spanish troops without apparently hurting anyone. The Governor then came forward; there was a general reconciliation, and business was transacted to the satisfaction of all parties except the negroes.

Hawkins, now an Admiral, at the conclusion of the business of his third voyage, having landed his human cargo at various places on the Spanish Main, sought for a harbour sheltered from the north wind, where he might clean his ships' bottoms from the vegetation accumulated in a ten months' voyage.

He found a small haven at San Juan de Ulua, fifteen miles to the south of Vera Cruz, where a spit of sand with

Hawkins at San Juan de Ulua 13

a narrow entrance formed a small sheltered anchorage. Here he was surprised by the arrival of twelve Spanish men-of-war, escorting a new Viceroy for Mexico.

San Juan
de Ulua,
1568

Hawkins, unaware of the impending change of Viceroy, had written to the Government at the City of Mexico to report his arrival, declaring that he was in the King of Spain's harbour merely for the refitting of his ships which, England and Spain being at peace, he was entitled to carry out.

The Spanish Admiral was anxious to enter the port as it was the only safe anchorage in what was, with the prevailing north wind, a lee shore, but he regarded Hawkins as a pirate and was unwilling to make any arrangement with him. Nevertheless, on the fourth day the Admiral, doubting his power to force an entrance against the guns which Hawkins had put in position commanding the very narrow entrance, accepted the situation, terms were arranged, signed, and sealed by the new Viceroy, and an exchange of hostages thereon effected.

It is apparent that the Spaniards had intended treachery from the outset, and, indeed, their writers excuse the Admiral's and Viceroy's conduct by the allegation that they felt certain Hawkins would act treacherously, and therefore determined to forestall any such attempt. Hawkins's squadron had, however, been for days alongside two Spanish vessels laden with treasure, while the Viceroy sent for reinforcements the moment he saw the English squadron. After three days of apparently peaceful intercourse, the Spaniards treacherously attacked the English ships only twenty yards distant, while Hawkins was at dinner.

When the first shot was fired a Spaniard, who was dining with Hawkins, tried to stab his host, but an Englishman disarmed him as his master ran on deck and led boarders from the flagship, *Jesus de Lubek*, to the *Minion*, whose crew was being overpowered.

The decks of the *Minion* were soon cleared, and one of the first shots from her guns, lodging in the magazine of the Spanish Vice-Admiral's ship, blew her up, killing 300 men.

In the meantime the *Jesus* had been captured, then lost, and once again re-taken. Attempts were made to warp her out of the harbour, but the Spaniards had captured the

San Juan
de Ulua,
1568

English guns on the spit of sand, and were firing into the *Jesus* within 50 yards range. She was the private property of Queen Elizabeth, being lent to Hawkins by Her Majesty, and though old and scarcely seaworthy, being of 700 tons burden, at that time a very big ship, was valued at £5,000; moreover, she had in her hold a cargo of gold and silver equivalent to-day to £100,000.

Hawkins, who made several attacks, now saw that the *Jesus* was doomed. The *Minion* had slipped her cable and warped to the entrance of the harbour, firing on the battery as she passed.

She was followed by the *Judith*, of 50 tons burden, commanded by Drake, which was less damaged than the other ships, because when the Admiral saw the *Jesus de Lubek* could not be got out, he had her hauled close up against the battery so as to mask the guns.

A French ship tried to get out after the *Judith*, but was wrecked, and her men were received on board the *Jesus*. Just as the *Minion* was passing the *Jesus* the Spaniards sent down two fire-ships, and the *Minion* making sail, Hawkins scrambled on board as she passed his flagship.

The Englishmen had fought with undaunted courage for eight hours. It is difficult to estimate the number actually killed during the fight, as they cannot be separated from those who fell into the hands of the Inquisition, and from those sold into slavery.

The Spanish accounts state that 540 were killed out of 1,500 of their men. At nightfall 200 exhausted Englishmen, many of them wounded, were crowded on board the *Minion*. Next morning the *Judith* had disappeared. The narrative in Hakluyt merely records, "The same night the same bark lost us."

The *Minion* was overcrowded, and at last the want of food obliged her to make for land. The crew had eaten every mouse, cat, dog, parrot, and monkey on board, and had begun to eat the cargo of hides, when they reached the Panuco River, to the north of Tampico.

About half the men were disembarked of their own choice. The ship sailed with the remainder, and eventually reached Pontevedra, a little port 30 miles to the north of Vigo. They had suffered terribly from starvation; half of them had died, and the others had lived for seven days on one

The Catholic Insurrection

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ox's head. When fresh meat was procured several of the famished men died of surfeit from eating too much. At Vigo a dozen seamen were obtained from English ships, and the *Minion* reached Mount's Bay, Penzance, on January 25th, 1569. The *Judith* had reached Plymouth on January 22nd, three days before the *Minion* anchored in Mount's Bay. Drake went to London, and soon the inhabitants of every seaport in England were cursing the Spaniards for their treachery at San Juan.

San Juan
de Ula,
1569

The story of the sufferings of the prisoners, and of the men landed near Tampico gradually came to light. The master of the *Jesus*, who spoke Spanish, was having a friendly interview with the Viceroy when the attack was made; after a long imprisonment he was burnt as a heretic at the stake in Spain; others were sold as slaves, or imprisoned.

Hawkins became a hero in the minds of the public, and he represented Plymouth in Parliament two years after his return. He sent in a claim against Spain for losses incurred as the result of the treacherous attack at San Juan, and this being unanswered, he engaged with others in plundering Spanish ships in the Channel.

Hawkins
M.P.

He never rested until he had done all that was possible for the release of his crews left in Mexico, hoping that he might at the same time get back some of the money he had lost through the Viceroy's treacherous attack.

At the end of 1569, when he was about to sail with seven ships, a Catholic insurrection in the north of England broke out, and the Duke of Alba prepared in the Netherlands an invading force to assist the conspirators, so Queen Elizabeth ordered Hawkins's squadron to remain in the Channel for the defence of the Kingdom.

The
Catholic
Insurrec-
tion, 1569

The Catholic insurrection having been easily suppressed, the Admiral was just about to sail in August, 1570, when he was again stopped, this time to watch a Spanish squadron bound for the Netherlands with, it was apprehended, hostile intentions towards England.

Hawkins saw the Spanish squadron out of the Channel, but Elizabeth still hesitated to let him sail. Although she had been on the throne for ten years, yet she had only 12 "great ships" in the Royal Navy, and to the Queen and her Ministers the sense of danger was now acute.

Trouble
with Spain,
1570

**The
Catholic
Plot, 1572**

The Pope's Bull, deposing Elizabeth, had been nailed to the gates of Lambeth Palace; the Dukes of Alva and of Guise had agreed to co-operate to place Mary Stuart on the throne, as soon as Elizabeth had been assassinated, arrangements for which had been nearly perfected by Mr. Babington.

**Hawkins's
Crew
Released**

Early in 1572 Hawkins, still detained in England, learnt that many of his crew who had been sent to Spain were lying in dungeons, there awaiting the decision of the Inquisition, so that their release by force had become impossible. He waited on the Spanish Ambassador, and persuaded him to arrange to have the men liberated, undertaking to carry over to the King of Spain the Devon privateer fleet.

The King was less easily deceived than his Ambassador had been, and demanded that the Admiral should go to Madrid. Hawkins sent instead an agent named Fitz-William, and eventually nearly all the Englishmen still alive were sent home with a present of ten dollars apiece, and Hawkins received £40,000 compensation for his losses at San Juan. Hawkins and the privateer fleet of Devon remained in England. Mr. FitzWilliam, who was thoroughly trusted by the Spanish Ambassador, had, in the negotiations for the release of the men, obtained from him full details of the Babington plot.

**Hawkins as
an Adminis-
trator,
1573-83**

The Admiral was Treasurer of the Royal Navy from 1573 till about 1583, and by an extraordinary custom, common at that time, had, in addition to his official position, a contract with the Government for the maintenance of the Royal ships. He was a drastic reformer and a good administrator, and having not only a mathematical but also an inventive mind, effected many improvements during his term of office. He introduced better models which were so successful that a Spanish writer records that "one English ship is equal in value to four Spanish vessels." Copper sheathing for the hull had not then been invented, and our ships suffered greatly from the ravages of worms, which became common in our harbours, so the Treasurer invented some sheathing to protect the sides and bottoms of the fleet.

He was not only a thoroughly capable seaman but also a good navigator, leaving accurate charts of his voyages, and he was the first to challenge Spain's claims to exclusive

Hawkins and the Slave Trade 17

trade in the Gulf of Mexico. Hawkins spared the ten Spanish hostages on board the *Jesus* whose lives were forfeited by the Viceroy's treachery, and they were found unscathed in the hold of the ship.

The Slave
Trade

That his slave trade operations were not considered to be any blot on his reputation is shown by the coat of arms, granted to him by a patent of Queen Elizabeth, which represents the bust of a nude blackamoor, tied by a cord. Half a century earlier Charles V. of Spain had approved of the system of kidnapping African negroes to labour in the Spanish colonies, in order to mitigate the sufferings of the Indians, who were in danger of being exterminated. Even two centuries later the standard of feeling in England was not much better, as is indicated by Laurence Sterne, who, writing in "Tristram Shandy" A.D. 1760, makes Corporal Trim doubtfully ask his master, "A negro has a soul, an' please your Honour?" At that date the annual export of negroes from Africa to America was nearly 80,000, more than half these unfortunate creatures being carried in English ships, and the trade was not finally abolished until 1807.

CHAPTER III

SIR FRANCIS DRAKE

The Capture of Nombre de Dios—Drake Sights the Pacific Ocean—Spanish Treasure is Captured—Trial and Execution of Mr. Doughty—Drake Circumnavigates the Globe—Elizabeth and Drake—Two-Great-Power Naval Standard—Drake as Statesman—Philip of Spain's Treachery at Bilbao—Drake Captures Hispaniola—Cartagena is Taken—Drake Harries Spanish Coast—Takes Cadiz—Off the Azores.

A Dramatic Career

I HAVE relied mainly for my notes on Drake's career, which was so fruitful in establishing England's command of the sea, on Corbett's "Drake and the Tudor Navy," of which Lady Elliott Drake, in her book, after quoting several authors, writes: "Corbett's is the most accurate, and from every other point of view, incomparably the best."

The most remarkable of the sea kings of the sixteenth century was the son of a Devonshire yeoman farmer, a zealous Protestant, who, with others of his family, was persecuted during the reign of Queen Mary. Drake is the best known, possibly because his career was the most dramatic. He was, it is alleged, educated by his kinsman, John Hawkins.

Early Life of Drake

Francis Drake, later the "People's Admiral," went to sea very early in life, and must have been attractive as a lad, for the Master Mariner of the Medway, to whom he was apprenticed, bequeathed to him the vessel in which he had served his time. Drake fought gallantly at San Juan de Ulua, where he commanded the *Judith*, being then twenty-two years of age. He returned to England with a great reputation, but had lost the money which he had ventured in the slave-trading expedition. Soon afterwards it became known that the Spaniards had burnt at the stake Drake's cousin, Robert Barrett, master of the *Jesus de Lubek*, some of his companions saving their lives by abjuring the Protestant religion. Drake apparently never forgave this atrocious outcome of Spanish treachery, to avenge which he made several voyages of reprisals. We learn from

Drake on the Spanish Main

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Spanish accounts that when in command of the *Swan*, of 25 tons burden, he cut out in the harbour of Cartagena, the capital of the Spanish Main, a vessel of 180 tons.

Voyages to
the Spanish
Main,
1570-72

During his first voyage, however, his main object was to ascertain how Spanish Government treasure was brought from the mines of Peru to the Atlantic side of the isthmus. He learnt that it was carried in ships to Panama, and thence by road on mules to Nombre de Dios, information which he utilised in 1572.

England was not the only nation which plundered Spanish ships; from Havre, 20 privateers sailed one year.

On May 24th, 1572, Admiral Drake, of the *Pasha*, 70 tons, and the *Swan*, 25 tons, Captain John Drake in command, with Joseph Drake and a crew of 73 all told for both ships, left Plymouth to capture Nombre de Dios, situate about 40 miles to the east of Colon, now the Atlantic end of the Panama Canal.

He was joined at the Pine Islands, 150 miles to the eastward of Nombre de Dios, by another adventurer, named Ranse, whom Drake left there in charge of the ships; he took on in a pinnace 53 of his own and 20 of Ranse's crew.

Nombre de
Dios

They anchored six miles from the point on the far side of which lay the town of Nombre de Dios, and at night-fall, having sailed closer up, again anchored. The list of the weapons of the party is instructive: 24 men carried muskets, 16 had bows, and the others were pikemen.

Drake noticed two hours before daylight that the men were becoming nervous; he himself was endowed with that unusual gift, called by soldiers, "three o'clock in the morning courage," and declaring that the light of a silvery moon was the false dawn, ordered the men to get out the oars.

An alarm was raised as they landed, but the sailors advanced quickly, and despite overwhelming numbers, charged the Spaniards, who, throwing away their weapons, ran out through the gates of the town.

Drake would not allow the men to touch any of 350 tons of bar silver, found in the merchants' storehouses near the main square. He led them to the water-side, where stood the King's treasure-house, in which were gold and pearls.

While some of the men were trying to break it open, a negro told others that 150 of the renowned Spanish infantry were expected every moment to arrive from Panama. This

Nombre de
Dios, 1572

raised a panic, but Drake, reassuring his men, was leading a detachment back to the main square, when he rolled insensible on the sand. It was now daylight, and a stream of blood from his leg showed that he had successfully concealed a severe wound, until he fainted. When he revived, he ordered the party on, but in spite of his command, his men carried him on board the pinnace, declaring that he was worth all the gold of the Indies.

Several of the men had also been wounded, so Drake accepted the situation, and, after dispatching his brother to reconnoitre the Chagres River, returned to the Pine Islands, where he and Ransse dissolved partnership, the latter sailing for England.

Cartagena

Drake, having captured three, had now five vessels, with which he made for Cartagena, the capital of the Spanish Main. He anchored ten miles to the west of it, and entering the harbour in a pinnace, seized a large Spanish vessel. Next morning he captured two frigates, which had been sent to give the alarm of his presence on the coast. He landed all his prisoners, burnt his prizes, and disappeared, to give the idea that he had gone away for good. He had, however, no such intention, for he was planning a raid into the interior of the country. For such work, fully-manned pinnaces, adapted for sailing or rowing, were more suitable than even a new and fast vessel like the *Swan*.

John Drake, who commanded her, and the crew, being very proud of the ship, would have objected, and possibly forcibly, to her destruction; so Francis Drake had her scuttled secretly, and taking over one of the pinnaces, gave to his brother, as a consolation, the command of the *Pasha*, which he hid in a river in the Gulf of Darien. He built a fort for the ship's protection, landing its guns to arm the work.

The Admiral, now leaving John Drake in command, sailed to the eastward. On his return with much booty, he found another more secluded creek, to which he moved the *Pasha*, building another fort, and laying up five months' food supply, to be used while waiting for the annual treasure convoy, which he hoped to capture by an ambuscade between the Pacific and Atlantic.

Having organised and provisioned his depôt, Drake again harried the coast of the Spanish Main. He was

driven eastwards by strong westerly winds, and the crews of the pinnaces, being short of food, were only prevented from breaking out in open mutiny by the Admiral's unflinching tact, and decision.

Drake on
the Spanish
Main, 1573

Before the pinnaces got back to the depot, John Drake had been killed, when attempting, with what was practically an unarmed party, to capture a well-manned and equipped Spanish frigate.

In January, 1573, Drake's younger brother, Joseph, and many men died from an unknown disease. The Admiral, anxious to save the lives of other men, compelled his unwilling surgeon to dissect Joseph's body. The man, coerced by Drake, obeyed, and then committed suicide.

Shortly afterwards, Drake's friendly Maroons, a hybrid race, born of negroes and Indians, brought news that the Spanish convoy fleet was at Nombre de Dios. The Admiral could muster only 18 men for his ten days' march to Panama; of the 73 who had left Plymouth, 28 were dead, and many were still sick. It was, moreover, necessary to leave a guard for the depot, and to protect against the Maroons some Spanish prisoners, taken recently in a frigate.

On February 3rd Drake started, accompanied by 30 Maroons, who, to save the white men fatigue, insisted on carrying all the stores. On the fourth day, from the boughs of an enormous tree on a high ridge of the Cordilleras, the party saw the Pacific Ocean in front, and, looking back, the Atlantic.

Sight of the
Pacific

The Admiral, after getting within three miles of Panama without finding a convenient place for an ambush, retraced his steps to within six miles of Vera Cruz, which was guarded by Spanish soldiers.

The ambush failed from the rashness of a drunken sailor, who, by showing himself, warned the Spaniards, who put a provision-carrying section of mules in front of the treasure section, and thus no booty was taken. The Admiral, followed by his party, ran headlong at the Vera Cruz guard, and having dispersed it, hurried on to the Atlantic Coast by forced marches, where his men arrived bootless, and exhausted.

While Drake was waiting for another convoy to leave Panama, he captured several Spanish vessels, and some valuable cargo. He was now joined by a French privateer,

**Nombre de
Dios, 1573**

Le Testu, and 70 men. Drake did not want his company, but having only 31 men, could not refuse the offer. He stipulated, however, that the crews of the two nations should divide equally any captured treasure, irrespective of numbers. After giving the Frenchmen a week's rest, Drake took 20 of them, 15 of his own men, and the Maroons, and after a forced march of 20 miles in thick forests, ambushed the Panama road, just outside Nombre de Dios.

A convoy of 200 mules laden with gold and silver, escorted by 45 soldiers, was easily captured. Every man removed as much gold as he could carry, and the silver was buried. The party, after some vicissitudes, reached the depot with their immense booty. The Spanish official record states: "The English took great quantities of gold, silver, and merchandise, but not a single prisoner was ill-treated."

The Admiral ballasted two ships with bullion, and on Sunday, August 9th, 1573, anchored off Plymouth at sermon time, the news of his arrival clearing the church.

In the next four years, Francis Drake put forward many schemes to Queen Elizabeth, who hesitated continually between her desire to injure the King of Spain, her dislike of expense, and her dread of reprisals.

Drake never abandoned his idea of an expedition to the Pacific, although he had apparently settled down at his home at Plymouth.

**Drake's
Greatest
Voyage,
1577**

In December, 1577, after one disastrous attempt owing to severe weather, he sailed on his great expedition, during which he went round the world. Queen Elizabeth had 1,000 crowns in the venture, in which all her Ministers took shares, except Cecil. The Queen would not allow him to be informed of the scheme, as she knew that he would disapprove of the transaction. indeed Elizabeth told Drake that she would have the head of any man who let her First Minister know that the expedition was bound for the Pacific.

Drake left Plymouth with five ships. After a stay of some time in north Africa, and at the Cape Verde Islands, he crossed the Atlantic to South America, where he took some prizes, but his squadron was dispersed in a gale of wind. In the middle of June, 1578, it was reunited in San Julian's Bay, about four degrees north of the Straits of Magellan. Here occurred a tragedy which illustrates Drake's determined character.

Circumnavigation of the World 23

There were two brothers named Doughty in the expedition, the elder of whom had been a comrade and friend of the Commander in former years. He was now found guilty of disobedience of orders in "Breaking Bulk" while in charge of a prize, and of having pilfered the cargo for his own use.

The
Doughty
Tragedy

The Admiral had, moreover, suspected him for some time of tampering with the crew, and eventually tried him before a Court composed of 40 Adventurers, on a charge of "having worked against the leader and the objects of the Expedition." The Court unanimously found him guilty, and Drake sentenced him to be executed.

Doughty did not contest the evidence brought against him, but he denied the leader's power of executing death sentences, to which Drake replied that he accepted all responsibility. The prisoner desired to receive the Sacrament, and accepted the leader's suggestion that they should take it together, and then the Admiral gave him as good a dinner as could be served under the circumstances, the two drinking to the success of the expedition, after which Doughty was led off and beheaded. It appears from some Spanish correspondence that Drake himself acted as executioner; if so, it was probably that he might bear the entire responsibility.

It may be convenient to anticipate the course of events, and here state the end of the story.

After the return of the expedition, the younger Doughty prosecuted Drake in the Court of the Earl Marshal. Drake appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench for a stay of proceedings on the ground that the Earl Marshal's Court had no jurisdiction. The appeal was refused, in spite of Drake's great popularity, but nothing came of the lawsuit, for Doughty was put in prison for having induced a man to undertake to assassinate Drake, and thus earn the reward of £5,000 which the King of Spain had offered for his head. There were several reasons for hushing the matter up. The Queen did not want her Minister to know that she had authorised Drake's voyage to the Pacific, and Lord Burghley did not wish the Queen to know that Doughty had been encouraged by him to prevent Drake's squadron going farther than the Atlantic, should the attempt be made.

To return to the expedition. In the sixteenth century it was not understood by mariners that the midsummer season

Our Fighting Services

The Straits of Magellan of the English Channel was midwinter in the latitude of Cape Horn, and Drake's ships were terribly tossed by gales, accompanied by driving snow and sleet. The squadron had great difficulty in passing through the Straits of Magellan, where, in a heavy gale, the *Marigold* went down with "All Hands" just in front of Drake's flagship, the *Golden Hind*.

The two remaining ships got into the Pacific but encountered continuous heavy weather. Captain Winter remained in a haven for a month, and then worked his way back through the Straits, and returned to England.

Plundering the Pacific

Drake was driven down to Cape Horn, where he anchored, and then, with fine weather, he sailed northwards, and plundered all the towns on the western coast from Valparaiso to Lima. Later, he captured a very rich prize, called the *Cacafuego*, and learning that a Spanish squadron was waiting in the Straits of Magellan to intercept him, he crossed the Pacific Ocean, making for the Molucca Isles. The *Golden Hind*, striking on a rock near Celebes, hung for several hours in great peril with deep water on one side of the ship. Drake characteristically made "All Hands" receive Holy Communion, and then threw most of his guns and all cargo, except silver and gold, overboard. The wind was blowing strongly towards the deep water, and the ship thus lightened, suddenly slipped off, and floated without making any water.

Drake's Reception at Home, 1580

Drake, steering for the Cape of Good Hope, reached England in November, 1580, after an absence of three years. He brought back only one ship out of the five with which he had started, but that one was ballasted with as many bars of silver and gold as she could carry, worth nearly a million sterling, as was said at the time, although the actual amount was never known except to the Queen and to Drake.

His reception was at first doubtful, but sending to London several pack-horses laden with gold, and all his best pearls, he had an interview, lasting six hours, with the Queen. She waited four months before she received him officially, but then, after dining with him on board the *Golden Hind*, which was anchored off Deptford, she made her host a knight.

Sir Francis Drake was now in an entirely different position. He had been an Adventurer, or what his enemies called a pirate, but had now become a statesman and a great military leader. He served on a Royal Commission ap-

pointed to inquire into alleged abuses in the Queen's Navy, and to consider what should be its effective strength. The Commission listened to arguments on this subject very similar to those set forth in our Annual Navy Estimates of the present day.

The Navy
and Army.
1580

The two-Great-Power standard in ships was accepted as sufficient; but the Home military defensive force was to be kept always ready, and not, as recently arranged, to be effective only after six months of war.

Drake was elected Mayor of Plymouth in 1581, and later represented the town in the House of Commons. He obtained a lease of the town mills as a necessary step for his scheme of bringing in a fresh water supply, which when carried out later made his name "a household word in the borough."

Sir Francis, although in Parliament, was at the same time preparing another foreign expedition. His commission to command it was signed, but then the Queen drew back, and revoked it.

The King of Spain, however, at this time outraged the public opinion of the City of London by treachery so gross that the Queen was forced to go with her subjects. Santa Cruz, King Philip's Admiral of the Fleet, had been building ships for years, and organising an expedition to the Azores. He proposed to his monarch, after all questions with France and Portugal were settled, to deal with the heretic Queen.

Treachery
of the
Spaniards

Crops had failed in the north and south-west of Spain, so that there was no flour to make biscuits, and the King induced English merchants, under a special promise of protection, to send over a corn-laden fleet. As soon as the ships were in port, Philip confiscated them and their cargoes, and imprisoned their crews.

The perfidy of the King became known at once, owing to the escape of the *Primrose*. While she was unloading corn at Bilbao, the Sheriff of Biscay, accompanied by officers dressed as merchants, boarded her, followed by a pinnace-load of soldiers, similarly disguised. When they got on board, the master was seized and the crew ordered to surrender. Although greatly outnumbered, they fought fiercely, drove off the Spaniards, some into the boats, and some overboard. Those in the boats rowed away, leaving their friends to drown. The Sheriff and a few Spaniards who clung to the

Drake's
Attack on
Spain, 1581

Primrose, were saved by her crew, and were carried to London, the King's writ for the outrage being found on the Sheriff.

Queen Elizabeth now approved of Admiral Drake rescuing the imprisoned sailors and the ships seized at other ports. By the end of August he had 30 ships and 2,300 men ready to start.

Then the Queen hesitated again, changing her mind so frequently that Lord Burghley, in sending down sailing orders, wrote privately to Drake to get away at once, lest he should receive counter-orders.

Sir Philip Sidney arrived at Plymouth, and announced his intention of accompanying the Admiral. Sir Francis entertained his unwelcome guest lavishly, but reported Sidney's arrival to the Queen. Elizabeth sent immediately a messenger with three letters, one addressed to Sidney, ordering him to return; a second to Drake, forbidding him to receive Sidney; and the third to the Mayor of Plymouth, charging him to see her commands obeyed.

Drake sent a party of seamen to waylay the messenger outside Plymouth, but as all three letters were satisfactory to Drake, he allowed them to be delivered.

The Admiral eventually got his fleet away in September, his official orders being to recover the English ships which had been seized in Spanish ports. It is believed that nearly all had been released, but Drake had other plans. He plundered Vigo, captured Santiago, Cape de Verde Islands, and then, sailing westward to Hispaniola (Hayti), he captured it by a combined sea and land attack which necessitated a march of ten miles. He held it for a month, while negotiating with the Governor for ransom.

A negro servant-lad of the Admiral's, who had taken a letter to the Governor, was wantonly speared by a Spanish officer, and crawling back, died at his master's feet. Drake demanded the surrender of the culprit. The Spaniards agreed, but as delay occurred the Admiral hanged two friars, who were prisoners—a monastery being in his hands—and sent another friar with a message that two would be hanged daily until the officer was handed over. The culprit was surrendered, and Drake compelled the Spaniards escorting him to hang him in front of the Spanish lines. Negotiations were then resumed, but to quicken the Spaniards' action.

Capture of Cartagena

27

Drake had the city fired, and eventually left with about £14,000 of ransom.

Capture of
Cartagena,
1581

Cartagena, the capital of the Spanish Main, was the next prize, in the capture of which Sir Francis showed indomitable resolution. The city was covered on the north side by two impassable lagoons; on the west, or seaward side, where the water was shallow, the front was well defended by works; on the south side there was an inner and outer harbour, along which thick woods extended for two miles, while the narrow entrance to the inner harbour was covered by fortifications, and the fire of moored ships. Drake made a demonstration on the inner harbour with his ships, while Carleill, his land commander, landing at the south-east corner of the outer harbour, marched his troops through the woods till they came near the city, when they moved through the surf for some distance, and carried the city.

The Admiral having plundered three other towns, returned to England with £60,000 and 250 captured cannon. Drake made no money out of this success; indeed, he received £3,000 less than he had spent in equipping his squadron, but the result of his operations had shattered the King of Spain's financial credit. Although Antwerp had surrendered to Parma, he could get no money to pay his half-starved troops, for, as Lord Burghley wrote to the King of Spain, "Truly Sir Francis Drake is a fearful man."

Effects of
the Raids

Queen Elizabeth had signed the death warrant of Mary, Queen of Scots, just before the return of the Admiral. Although the Queen knew that Philip of Spain was preparing the Armada, yet she hesitated from day to day between open and veiled war. She sent Hawkins to sea, but would not let Drake go far away from the Channel.

Drake in
the Chan-
nel, 1587

In 1587 he was appointed to command a fleet made up of squadrons belonging to Her Majesty, to the Lord High Admiral, and to the City of London. The Government neither rationed nor paid the crews, who looked to those who employed them, and the employers looked to getting a profit out of the enemy.

Drake drafted practically his own orders for an expedition to the Spanish coast, but before he sailed the Queen in Council modified them, forbidding forcible entrance into the enemy's harbours or the destruction of his ships in them, but Drake was allowed under the revised instructions to

Drake's
Raid on
Spanish
Coast, 1587

capture treasure ships. This was indeed essential, for Sir Martin Frobisher, who had led a scientific expedition to discover the north-west passage to China, had seen his efforts on his first voyage degenerate later into a search for gold ore, which being fruitless, the shareholders and friends who had financed his expeditions were ruined.

Drake sailed on April 2nd, 1587, in a north-west gale. Before his fleet of 30 vessels was hull down, a Queen's messenger arrived at Plymouth forbidding Drake to hurt Spanish subjects.

If the Admiral had been worsted and taken prisoner, the Queen's revocation of her instructions would have rendered him, and all under him, as the Queen frankly admitted, liable to the fate of pirates. The Admiral was, however, beyond recall, and the dispatch boat sent to sea with the Queen's revised instructions never overtook him.

On the 19th the fleet was off Cadiz, and, in spite of the timorous protestations of the Vice-Admiral, Drake sailed into the harbour, where he remained for a fortnight, destroying all the Spanish ships, and leaving again without the loss of a man, or a boat. Drake had proposed to sail into the Tagus and cut out a squadron commanded by Recalde, one of the most efficient Spanish admirals. It was, however, safe under the guns of Lisbon, at that time the strongest fortified seaport in Europe.

Sir Francis Drake, sailing southwards, attempted to seize the small port of Lagos, to the east of Cape St. Vincent. He found that it was strongly fortified, so he re-embarked his soldiers, and then moved to Cape St. Vincent, where, to the consternation of his officers, he proposed to seize the castle of Sagres, which commanded the anchorage and "watering place." It was nearly inaccessible, for on three sides it was protected by cliffs with a sheer fall of 200 feet to the sea. On the fourth side its front of 200 yards was protected by a high loopholed wall, four towers covering the entrance to it. A forlorn hope of musketeers, having expended their ammunition, retired. Then Drake led forward a party carrying faggots smeared with pitch, which he personally placed against the gate. At this moment the Commandant was mortally wounded, and the garrison surrendered. Drake carried off all the guns, and those of two adjoining forts.

Capture of Treasure Ships

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The timorous Vice-Admiral, who was under arrest in his own ship, the *Lion*, in charge of one of Drake's friends, induced the crew to mutiny. They were nearly as frightened at Drake's audacious schemes as they were of the Spaniards, and putting the captain, who remained loyal to Drake, into a boat, they took the *Lion* to England.

Drake's
Raid, 1587

Sir Francis convened a court martial, which sentenced, in their absence, his Vice-Admiral, and the principal officers to death! Drake now steered with his reduced fleet to the westward, and on June 8th, near the Azores, captured one of the King of Spain's largest treasure ships, and on the 26th sailed into Plymouth Sound with £114,000 prize-money, equivalent in our money to about £1,000,000 sterling. The Queen took £40,000, Drake getting £17,000, and the shareholders the balance. This voyage of three months was very successful, for, besides the gold, in the captured ship were found details of the East Indies trade, hitherto a secret to Englishmen.

CHAPTER IV

FROM THE ARMADA (1588) TO THE END OF THE TUDOR PERIOD (1603)

The Menace of the Spanish Armada—Elizabeth's Treatment of the Navy and Army—Lord Howard of Effingham—The Spanish Armada—Lack of Powder Cripples English Ships—The Invading Troops under Parma are Delayed—Fire Ships—The Enemy's Bravery—The Defeat of the Armada—Spain Plans a Fresh Invasion—Death of Frobisher—Elizabeth Delays Drake—The End of Hawkins and Drake—Drake as Statesman and Strategist—Vere's Victory at Nieuport.

The Menace
of the
Spanish Ar-
mada, 1587

QUEEN ELIZABETH took £40,000 as her share of the King of Spain's treasure ship captured off the Azores, June 8th, 1587, but Sir Francis was ostensibly in disgrace, for just then the Queen was apologising to the King of Spain for his action at Lagos, near Cape St. Vincent. He, however, took to Theobalds Park, twelve miles to the north of London, where the Court was then staying, a casket of very beautiful pearls, and by the end of the year he was again in favour. In February, 1588, he was on the point of sailing to burn the Spanish fleets assembled for the Armada in their own harbours, when he received counter-orders. Then Queen Elizabeth and Her Council formulated in a minute, in Lord Burghley's handwriting, a plan of campaign designed to meet the impending attack of the Spanish Armada. All available ships were to be divided into eastern and western fleets; the former was to watch the Duke of Parma's army in the Netherlands and the Flemish navy, the latter was to guard the west of the English and St. George's Channels, with a detached squadron on the coast of Portugal.

Sir Francis Drake, on the other hand, with his sound offensive strategic views, urged that the western fleet should be reinforced, that it should seek out and destroy the Spanish naval fleets in their own harbours.

The Admiral pointed out at the same time that he wanted more powder, having a supply equal to one and a half days' requirements only. He had himself been buying

rations from his private resources, and pointed out that two months' supply, which was allowed by the Government, was insufficient for the ships to maintain an effectual blockade of the Portuguese and Spanish coasts. Elizabeth treated both Services alike; she let the troops in the Low Countries go naked, and starve; even when the Armada was in the Channel the troops at Tilbury Fort were kept short of ammunition, and of food. It is true that the Public revenue was small, but the Queen was parsimonious by nature, and, moreover, she always feared that if Drake had sufficient supplies he might upset her peace negotiations, which generally went on even during a campaign.

**Drake's
Offensive
Strategy,
1588**

The Ministers adopted part of Drake's advice, and strengthened the western squadron, but the Admiral, being still dissatisfied, wrote personally to the Queen, who summoned him to London to advise Her and the Council. He carried Elizabeth and the Council with him in his demand for an offensive strategy, and the Lord High Admiral was directed to carry out the plans his subordinate had suggested. Lord Howard of Effingham accepted his subordinate's advice, and gave him what was practically a separate command.

There had been some apprehension that Sir Francis might resent his supersession by Lord Howard of Effingham, who was Commander-in-Chief by virtue of his position as Lord High Admiral of England, to which post he had been appointed in the year when Drake was in the West Indies.

"The People's Admiral," however, behaved so loyally and tactfully that within a fortnight of his serving under Effingham, the latter wrote to Walsingham, describing Drake's attitude and bearing, and asking that a letter might be written to thank him.

If England did not fully realise who was in command, foreign monarchs did so, especially the Pope. It was fully understood abroad that Drake was the real Head of the Fleets, and some thought that as the Spanish Armada was commanded by a Duke, it was necessary that the English fleet should have at its head a peer of the realm.

Shortly before the Armada was ready to sail, Santa Cruz, Spain's best naval commander, died, and Philip appointed the incompetent Duke of Medina-Sidonia to

**The Spanish
Armada,
1588**

The Spanish
Armada,
1588

succeed him. "The Most Fortunate Armada" consisted of 130 ships, having on board 19,295 soldiers, 8,450 mariners, 2,088 galley-slaves, and 2,630 great pieces of brass; there were, moreover, 30 supply and dispatch vessels.

The Armada was between Rame Head, and the Eddystone, on July 21st, 1588—"With lofty turrets like castles, in front like a half moon, the wings thereof spreading out about the length of seven miles, sailing very slowly." The English ships, 34 in number, aggregating 12,600 tons with 6,300 men, lay between them and the entrance of the Sound—11 under Lord Howard of Effingham, a little ahead of them; the rest, under Drake, nearer inshore. The English had sighted their enemy the previous afternoon, and during the night had worked to windward.

In numbers the Spaniards were almost three to one; in size there was no comparison. The Duke of Medina-Sidonia made a signal to haul to windward and keep the two English squadrons apart. The English could, however, sail closer to the wind than he knew; and though their ships were smaller, their guns were heavier than those of Spain. Howard reaced away to windward and joined Drake; then, with the whole English line, swept down across the Spaniards' rear, and poured in broadsides that raked them with deadly effect, their ships being outside the range of the smaller Spanish guns. One or two of the galleons tried to close; their strength lay in close fighting, in which their tall sides and the number of soldiers they carried would give them an advantage. The English plan, on the other hand, was to keep out of grappling range and ply their heavier metal; and with their handy little ships they could engage or haul off at will, the English shot telling terribly on the Spaniard's crowded decks.

The action was maintained until four in the afternoon, when Medina-Sidonia signalled to bear away up Channel, the English following in their wake, two miles astern.

The ship of Juan Martinez da Recalde, one of the best Vice-Admirals, had been badly mauled by Drake's squadron. The Andalusian *Rosario*, when wearing to help him, fouled the *Santa Catalina*. The *Rosario* lost her foremast, and became unmanageable. She had 500 men on board, besides much treasure, including a chest of jewelled swords which Philip was sending over for the English Catholic peers.

The Spanish Armada

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The sea was rising and darkness coming on, and Medina-Sidonia, in spite of the protests of his admirals, left the *Rosario* to her fate. When "summoned," the mere mention of Drake's name induced immediate surrender, and he took 55,000 ducats of gold out of her, sharing them among his men. She also yielded a welcome supply of powder.

This was not the only disaster of the night. The soldiers and the seamen on Admiral Oquendo's ship quarrelled while he was away remonstrating with Medina-Sidonia for abandoning the *Rosario*. A man, having flung a torch into the powder magazine, jumped overboard. All the upper works were blown off by the explosion which followed, and the survivors abandoned the hulk, leaving 50 poor fellow-countrymen "miserably hurt." The ship, of 800 tons, was taken next day by Lord Thomas Howard.

On Monday morning, July 22nd, there was scarcely any wind.

Next morning (Tuesday, the 23rd) the Spaniards were off Portland. Wind sprang up from the north-east, giving them the weather-gage of the English. Howard was between them and a lee shore, and they at once stood in to press their advantage, but the result was the same as on the 21st. Howard could sail his ships round the huge Spanish vessels, which vainly tried to come to close quarters. Their shot, too, generally fell short or passed through the English rigging, while the English projectiles crashed into their opponents' towering sides. This time Medina-Sidonia's ship came in for rough treatment. The fighting lasted till sunset, when the English powder gave out. The Spaniards not only had the worst of the fight, however, but more serious than any damage done was the loss of confidence in their leaders. The Queen's parsimonious issue of powder prevented the English from pressing the advantage they had gained. The fleet was now divided into four squadrons under Lord Howard's chief command. He led personally the first squadron in the *Ark Royal*. Drake, in the *Revenge*, led the second, Hawkins the third, and Frobisher the fourth. The Spaniards sailed in close order.

The Armada was now abreast of the Isle of Wight. On July 25th, with a light wind to help him, Howard, in the *Ark Royal*, led his squadron straight on the Spanish

The Spanish
Armada,
1588

The Spanish
Armada,
1588

centre. The *Ark* outsailed her consorts, and was alone with the galleons all around her. At that moment the wind dropped. The Spanish boarding-parties were at their posts. The tops were manned with musketeers, the grappling irons all prepared to fling into the *Ark's* rigging. Eleven boats dropped from the *Ark's* sides, and took her in tow. The breeze rose again as she began to move. Her sails filled, and she slipped away through the water, leaving the Spaniards as if they were at anchor.

The battle was continued up the Channel, until once again the English powder supply gave out. For lack of it nothing could be done on the Friday. That day Medina-Sidonia was left alone to make his way towards Calais, the English, however, following in his wake. "All this day and Saturday, being the 27th of the month, the Spaniards went away before the English fleet like sheep." On Saturday, in the evening, Medina-Sidonia anchored off Calais. He had brought the great Armada in touch with the Duke of Parma, whose army was encamped on the Flanders coast in readiness for the subjugation of England. It now remained for Parma to carry out his part of the undertaking, but then a messenger brought word that Parma's army could not embark for a fortnight. The flat-bottomed boats were not ready for sea!

Howard, selecting eight vessels, emptied them of all that was worth saving, filled them with combustibles, and smeared their sides with pitch, resin, and gunpowder. That night there was no moon, and on a faint westerly breeze the ships drifted down upon the Spanish fleet. When almost in it a blaze sprang up from each. The Duke fired a gun to order the fleet to slip cables, and stand out to sea. The order was promptly carried out, and the fire-ships burnt harmlessly to the water's edge.

The fleet, when anchoring in the darkness, had divided into two bodies. The *San Martin* and 40 of the best galleons had brought up about three miles outside the harbour; the remaining two-thirds of the Armada had been lying-to during the darkness. Without perceiving their danger, they had drifted to leeward, and were now near Gravelines, a dangerous lee shore. The *Capitana*, with 800 men on board, had grounded on the sands and fallen over on her side. At daybreak Howard attacked her.

The Defeat of the Armada

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The Spanish
Armada,
1588

But Drake and Hawkins saw the enemy separated, and that, as the tide and wind stood, it was impossible for the stragglers to rejoin him. With the whole English fleet behind him Drake, with sound tactical instinct, bore down on the Duke and his forty ships.

There was no more fighting: sweeping round them, huddling them together like sheep, yet never coming within grappling range, the English poured their round-shot into the crowded decks. Until the powder supply was exhausted it was not spared. "We had such advantage, both of wind and tide, that we had a glorious day of them, continuing fight from four o'clock in the morning till five or six at night." "Never," says Froude, "on sea or land, did the Spaniards show themselves worthier of their great name than on that day. Their shot flew high over the English hulls, while they themselves were helpless butts for the English guns; yet not a single galleon struck her colours. One was on the point of sinking when the attacking English captain, admiring their courage, ran out upon his bowsprit and urged them to surrender, and save their lives. For answer they cursed the English for cowards because they refused to close. They shot the English officer. That shot was answered by a broadside which sent them to the bottom. The waters closed over them whilst they still defied the heretics."

Blood was pouring from the scuttle-holes of many galleons. In the afternoon most of them slackened fire; their powder was exhausted. Had the fight lasted two hours more, they must all have struck, or gone ashore. But the English powder also was spent, and regretfully Drake had to haul off, deprived by his Queen's insensate parsimony of another opportunity of annihilating the foe.

The wind changed to the south. The Spaniards had still 70 ships little hurt; but all their stomach for the fight was gone. Drake and Howard next day continued the chase again, though they had no ammunition for a battle.

Scotland was still in a turmoil over the execution of Mary Queen of Scots; and if the Spaniards turned into the Firth of Forth they might raise a blaze of insurrection. But Medina-Sidonia held on up the coast of Scotland, and Howard gave up the chase.

The worst of the sufferings of the unhappy Spaniards

The Spanish
Armada,
1588

was yet to come. The men had no clothing suitable for the cold of those latitudes. Food was scarce; the water casks were almost empty. Mules and horses were flung overboard; and the Scottish fishermen who followed the retreat reported that they had sailed for miles through floating carcasses. Taking some captured fishermen for pilots, the Armada sailed between the Orkney and Faroe Islands in a single body. Then the fog parted them, and each captain had to look out for himself. One or two were wrecked on the Hebrides; two on the coast of Norway. Between thirty and forty drew in on the Irish coast; but a storm from the south-west strewn the whole littoral between Donegal and the Blaskets with wrecks. Seven or eight thousand Spaniards struggled ashore—numbers of them only to be butchered by the wild Irish, or hunted to death with disgraceful cruelty by Sir William Fitzwilliam, the Lord-Deputy.

Of the whole Armada only 53 vessels, including the *San Martin*, with Medina-Sidonia on board, reached Spain again. On board of them, of the 30,000 men who had set out two months ago to conquer England, 9,000 only returned, and these so unmanned that they burst into tears as they felt once more the warm Spanish sun. The Duke resigned his command, and went home to his orange groves and fish-ponds. Admiral Recalde died two days after landing, and Admiral Oquendo went home to Santander, where he refused to see his wife and children, shut himself in his room, turned his face to the wall, and died of a broken heart. Philip's behaviour must be recorded to his honour. He received the calamity as a dispensation of Providence; pensioned the widows and orphans; and commanded thanks to be given throughout Spain to God, and the Saints that it was no greater.

It was long before all this was known in England, for news travelled slowly in those days. But it was soon known that the so-called Invincible Armada was in full flight in the North Sea. A great national thanksgiving was observed, the Queen went in triumph to St. Paul's Cathedral in a car decorated with the spoils of the enemy, and medals were struck in commemoration of the victory.

Until November, 1592, Sir Francis Drake remained at Plymouth, out of favour with the avaricious monarch; then,

Sir John Norreys at Crozon

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after three abortive expeditions conducted by the men who had replaced him in the Queen's favour in 1589, Elizabeth called him up to London. He and Sir Walter Raleigh were, as ever, advocates of offensive strategy, and as Spain was believed to be preparing another Armada against England, in 1593 a subsidy was voted in the House of Commons, after thirty-three days' debate, to enable effective steps to be taken against the Spanish fleet.

Drake's
Plans,
1589-93

The Spaniards had established themselves in Brittany at convenient starting-points for the invasion of England, for now Elizabeth and Henry IV. had concluded a defensive and offensive alliance.

Philip had fortified a post on the northern rocky point of the peninsula of Crozon, immediately opposite to the town of Brest, which was in danger of being captured.

Norreys at
Crozon,
1593

Sir John Norreys and his brother assaulted the Spanish port several times in combined naval and military attacks, but failed, after suffering considerable losses. Eventually, Frobisher and his sailors escalated the fort during a combined attack, in which the garrison, numbering 400, was put to the sword.

Frobisher, leading gallantly as ever, was shot at such short range that the wadding of the charge entered his wound, and being left there by an unskilful surgeon, the Admiral died soon after his return to Plymouth, having first received a letter of thanks from the Queen. He is described by Stow, a contemporary writer, as "Very valiant, yet harsh and violent." He made no mark when in command of a ship employed in defeating the Armada, but was a brave and skilful seaman.

In January, 1595, Queen Elizabeth signed joint commissions for Sir John Hawkins and Sir Francis Drake for the preparation of a large expedition. Drake hoped to carry out an idea which he had had in his mind for years, an attempt on Panama, while Hawkins was anxious to obtain the release of his son, Captain Richard, a prisoner in the hands of the Spaniards.

Hawkins's
and
Drake's
Commission,
1595

After Richard Hawkins had made some captures in the Port of Valparaiso, he was attacked by a squadron of six Spanish vessels. Their attack failed ignominiously; later, a squadron of eight ships with 1,500 men overtook the *Dainty*, and for three days and nights fired on her con-

The
"Dainty,"
1593

tinuously. Successive attempts to board her failed, though Hawkins himself, on the first day of the fight, was wounded six times, in two places severely. The captain, after the third day, suggested surrender, but Richard would not hear of it, and the fight went on for two days more, when the *Dainty* had no sails left, her masts were disabled, and she was water-logged with 14 shots below the water line.

When 30 of her crew had been killed and nearly all the rest were wounded, the Spanish Admiral sent his glove as a pledge that, if they surrendered, officers and men should be sent to England. The prisoners were taken to Lima, but the promise was disregarded.

Drake's
Last
Voyage,
1595-96

The dual command of Drake and of his less enterprising senior in the last expedition was not fortunate, but Queen Elizabeth was unwilling to trust the younger man when far away from England. When it was known that Drake was to command, so many volunteers flocked to Plymouth to join him that all the men pressed by the Queen's commands were sent home. On the Continent the effect of the news of the expedition was great, the City of Lisbon being practically abandoned, and in March and April some 8,000 Portuguese soldiers deserted.

There was great delay as usual in the preparations, and mutual recriminations passed between the Queen and her two Admirals, each laying the blame on the other, and long before the English fleet eventually left Plymouth the Spanish ships carrying the annual cargoes of treasure from the Gulf of Mexico had reached the Tagus.

The Queen, who had not signed the commission of the military commandant until May 22nd, was very angry at the refusal of the Admirals to accept her strategical ideas. She, however, modified her plans, but in July, a Spanish expedition having raided the country around Mount's Bay, Cornwall, Elizabeth again hesitated, and it was not until news arrived that a belated treasure ship was still in the West Indies that she sanctioned the departure of the expedition, which sailed on August 28th.

Hawkins, now sixty-three years of age, had lost his former buoyant spirit, for, as he wrote of himself, while still Comptroller of the Navy, "no man living hath so careful, so miserable, so unfortunate, so dangerous a life." Drake and he quarrelled before they left England, again

Death of Hawkins and Drake 39

off the Spanish coast, and on November 12th Sir John Hawkins died.

Death of
Hawkins,
1595

Everything went wrong in the expedition, and mainly because in the years Drake had been unemployed at Plymouth he had failed to realise the improvement which had taken place in the Spanish Navy. The command was too weak for its work, and Drake, with his unbounded courage, was for ever asking his followers to dare as he dared.

Eventually he, with many of his crew, died of dysentery, 20 miles from Nombre de Dios, on January 27th, 1595.

Death of
Drake,
1595

It is doubtful whether many Englishmen realise what Francis Drake did, not only in curtailing the power of Spain, and breaking down the restrictions which limited England's commerce, but also by his assertion of his country's right to trade all over the world, which was indeed the origin of England's world-wide Empire.

Drake's life was the most varied of any man of whom we have read: his mind was a curious mixture of piety, superstition—for he believed in witchcraft—of gentle courtesy, ruthless severity, and of a courage which only feared God.

With the exception of Nelson, no greater sailor than Drake lives in history. He was not merely a brave, enterprising seaman, and inspiring, tactical leader of men, but one of the greatest strategists ever known. He saw clearly that England, for her own safety, must be paramount on the seas. His judgment was sound until his last voyage. That the Armada was destroyed in the actual fighting, with trifling loss to the English, was due to Drake and to his school. With all his delight in personal combat, he realised that the English ships with their weak crews should avoid boarding, and by firing their shots into the Spanish ships overcrowded with soldiers, should "kill without being killed." All the Spanish accounts agree that the greater part of their cannon-balls went over, or fell short of, the English vessels. Drake was, on the question of gunnery practice, as in strategical questions, far in advance of his age. He had caused his crews to be exercised at targets while awaiting the arrival of the Armada, which brought on him the implied rebuke from his brave but ignorant

Drake as
Strategist

**Drake's
Character**

Admiral, Lord Howard of Effingham, that "Admiral Drake would do better to keep his powder for the enemy."

In Mr. Froude's picturesque studies of "English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century" Drake is described, at forty-three years of age: "A round face, the forehead broad and full, with short brown hair, curling crisply at the sides. The eyebrows highly arched, the eyes firm, clear and open. The nose short and thick, the mouth and chin hid by a heavy moustache on the upper lip, and a close-clipped beard, well spread over the chin and cheek. The expression is good humoured, but absolutely inflexible, not a weak line to be seen. He was of middle height, and powerfully built."

Even as the many streams brought by Drake's practical work still refresh his favourite town, Plymouth, so are the well-springs of our national repute fed to this day by the results of his genius and valour.

"The Thin Red Line" has made good our foothold round the world studded by our ensigns, but the sacrifices we make to the sea are both constant and unending, for, as Mr. T. B. Hennell finely writes in his "Lords of the Restless Sea":

"Our white bones lie 'neath the cloudless sky
Of the summer islands fair;
There is never a bay of the north-land grey,
But our British dead are there.
And scarce is born to-morrow's morn,
Ere a heavier toll pay we,
The flé and fee of our sovereignty,
The lords of the restless sea."

**English in
the United
Provinces,
1598**

With increasing years Queen Elizabeth grew still more penurious, and in 1598, to the great relief of all concerned, the States took over the payment of English troops lent for service in the United Provinces. It followed, naturally, that Englishmen had to take their orders from Dutch generals. Up to that time, Sir Francis Vere, supported by his two brothers, had 8,000 men under his command, and his trouble to get their pay out of Queen Elizabeth had been incessant. Corruption of all sorts, affecting the pay, clothing, and food of the soldiers, had been common for centuries.

The Queen, however, steadily discouraged the most

The Battle of Nieuport

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reasonable complaint. She preferred to accept the word of the Treasurer to the Forces; but eventually it was made clear to her that he cheated her and everyone else with whom he had any dealings.

Nieuport,
1598

Vere's victory at Nieuport, as told in Fortescue's graphic "History of the British Army," is so remarkable an instance of English tenacity and refusal to admit defeat as to claim notice; moreover, it marks the triumph of English footmen over the renowned Spanish infantry.

On July 2nd Sir Francis Vere, whose division of 4,500 men was leading that day, forded the estuary which flows through Nieuport, and sighted 12,000 Spaniards advancing along the shore to meet him.

Between the sea and the enclosed cultivated land were three parallel strips of country—the strand, lying between high and low watermarks, sand-dunes, and, farther inland, reclaimed grass land.

Vere posted half his division skilfully, but left 2,000 Frisians too far in the rear, a mistake which would have been disastrous but for the indomitable courage of his men.

Eight hundred men stood amongst the sand-dunes, with the other half in support. The States cavalry were placed on the grass land.

Prince Maurice, Commander-in-Chief, posted the other two divisions of 1,000 and 2,000 respectively in echelon to the Right rear.

The Front was necessarily very limited, and the Archduke's advanced guard, 500 of the celebrated Spanish infantry, fell on 250 Englishmen and 50 Frisians, advantageously posted behind sand-dunes. The Spaniards being repulsed, fell back, but were immediately strongly reinforced, and again pushed resolutely on; both sides fought furiously. The main struggle centred on a sand-hill, which was taken and retaken many times, and held alternately by each side; after incessant hand-to-hand fighting, it remained in the possession of the English.

The Archduke now tried to push in on Vere's Right, but Sir Francis gradually brought up the other 800 Englishmen, and sent many messengers to order the 2,000 Frisians to advance, who never, however, received the order, and an appeal for support made to Prince Maurice had no result. Vere, to encourage his men, went into the thick

Nieuport,
1598

of the fighting. He was wounded in the leg, and then again in the thigh, but concealed the fact. The English were driven slowly back on to the beach, and when retiring, Vere's horse, being killed, fell on him.

Three of his officers pulled him from underneath the dead animal, and he, mounting behind one of them, directed the retreat until he reached the main body of Frisians and two troops of English horse. Vere sent the horsemen to charge the Spanish cavalry, and Horace Vere, a younger brother, led forward 200 Englishmen in close support. These attacked so vigorously that the Spaniards were pushed back beyond the sand-dunes; then Sir Francis consented to have his wounds dressed.

The Archduke now massed 2,000 men, but as they came forward two of Sir Francis's brothers, leading forward Englishmen, charged headlong into the Spaniards, and the Commander-in-Chief, Prince Maurice, ordering a general advance at the same moment, the Archduke's troops were routed. They lost 3,000 men killed, 600 wounded, all their guns, and 120 stands of colours were captured. As Prince Maurice said, it was Vere's 1,600 Englishmen and the few Frisians fighting with them who had won the day; but with great loss, for six out of their eight captains were killed, and there were 800 other casualties.

It was thus that Sir Francis Vere and his no less gallant brothers, with their brave followers, took from the Spanish infantry the pride of place in public opinion on the Continent.

There are in Westminster Abbey memorials of many brave men, but there are, surely, none erected in honour of a more strenuous fighter than Sir Francis Vere.

PART II

FROM JAMES I. (1603) TO THE DEATH OF THE PROTECTOR (1658)

CHAPTER I

CHARLES I. AND PARLIAMENT

The Navy under James I.—The Civil War—Character of Charles I.—Archbishop Laud—The Petition of Right—The Long Parliament—Impeachment and Execution of Strafford—Charles at Nottingham.

JAMES I., A.D. 1603-25, took but little interest in the Navy under James I. Services, but in his reign the model of the fighting ships was improved, much of the top hamper being removed; ships were lengthened, and in 1610 the *Prince Royal*, of 1,400 tons, was built. Although the number of vessels in the Navy List was less, there was an increase of tonnage.

During the war between Royalists and Roundheads, there were many engagements which are unrecorded, but the principal battles are briefly described to illustrate the causes which brought about the change in our system of Government.

Baron von Ranke, 1795-1886, the celebrated historian, when alluding to his own works, wrote:

"My object is simply to find out how the things actually happened." In his English history he states that Cromwell, at the head of the Army, crushed King, Lords, and Commons, but when the Independents threatened to wreck all Civil institutions he became the champion of the rights of the lower clergy and of the people, and thus earned the title of "Protector."

This is my object in telling how the successive situations arose in which the Services were concerned. When the Army was striking down the King's power, the Navy, by going over with the Earl of Warwick to the Parliament, assisted the sister Service by preventing to a great extent

Charles I.
(1600-49)

the landing of foreign troops to fight for the doomed Monarch. It seems, therefore, to be desirable to show the steps taken by those who used the Services to kill the King, and subvert the monarchy.

While the Continental Powers were preoccupied by the Thirty Years War (1614-48), England was convulsed by Civil War between Royalists and Republicans.

Charles I. (1600-49) came to the Throne when he was twenty-five years of age. He was soon involved in quarrels with the representatives of the people, and within fifteen months of his accession had already dismissed two Parliaments. The King was impulsive, well-meaning, but weak in character; he had bad advisers amongst his courtiers, and his wife, Henrietta, his evil genius, often urged him from Paris to "Be a King, like the King of France." The refrain of her letters to her husband was, "So long as the Parliament lasts you are no King for me." She was physically as brave as, and much stronger in character than, her husband.

Macaulay wrote of the King: "Habitually untruthful, he was not only a most unscrupulous, but a most unlucky dissembler." "There was never a politician to whom so many falsehoods were brought home by undeniable evidence."

His partisans admit that he was weak and untruthful, but the main cause of his failure as a King, ending in his violent death, lay in the fact that he and his advisers, especially Strafford, who at one time dominated his will, failed to realise that the Tudor system of personal government was no longer possible in England. He alternated between concessions and arbitrary, unlawful acts, trying to govern without a Parliament for ten years.

The cause of the King's ruin lay as much in the circumstances of the time—the Church of England men, and the Puritans being in violent opposition—as in his unstable character, but his want of judgment, and unhappy self-confidence became more and more apparent as the Civil War went on. At one and the same time he was negotiating with the Independents, with the Catholic Irish, and with the Scotch Presbyterians. It is, indeed, astonishing that he should at the same period have relied

on Montrose, and on the Covenanters, between whom there was at that time the most deep-rooted hostility, ending with the death of the Marquis on the scaffold, on May 21st, 1650.

**Charles I.
and
Parliament,
1639**

King Charles was greatly in want of money in 1639. He had attempted to impose on Scotland a Liturgy framed by Archbishop Laud, who was the King's chief Ecclesiastical adviser. Being a thorough Churchman, Laud's influence tended to make all Churchmen Royalists, and to put all Puritans in the position of being obliged to look to the Parliamentary party. The Archbishop was detested by all lovers of liberty and by the enemies of Episcopacy, and moderate men were shocked by his work in the Star Chamber. The Scotch revolted, and, having invaded England, occupied Durham and Newcastle, and the King, in order to obtain funds to meet the expenses of the war, was obliged to abandon the despotic form of government by which he had ruled since 1629.

He summoned a Parliament, but as it began work again with the Petition of Right, it sat only three weeks. When the King's temper had cooled down, he realised that unless he called another Parliament, one might assemble without having been summoned, and he therefore accepted the situation. He and his advisers had but little political insight, for in the Long Parliament nearly 300 of the 490 former members came back to Westminster.

**The Petition
of Right**

Mr. (Lord) Morley writes that: "It was essentially an aristocratic House, made up of the very flower of the English gentry and the educated laity. The members generally had strong Conservative instincts, and were, on principle, attached to the Crown."

Since the days of the Stuarts, the Long Parliament has been overpraised, and as unduly abused. For the most part, those who condemn it forget that its more moderate members had been excluded by armed soldiers from service in the House, before the killing of the Monarch was decreed. Out of the 140 members nominated to sit on the trial of the King, 59 only voted for his execution, and the decision was only carried after earnest protests by Sir Harry Vane, an avowed Republican, who strongly opposed the action of his bosom friend, Cromwell. Mr. Algernon Sidney also in an impassioned speech urged that the so-

**The Long
Parliament**

Impeach-
ment of
Strafford,
1640

called Court was incompetent to try the King, or, indeed, any other man.

While we utterly condemn what was undoubtedly an illegal execution, we should remember that the Long Parliament gave us our much-envied constitution, a monarchy ruling by the co-operation of representatives freely elected by the nation.

On November 3rd, 1640, the King opened Parliament in a conciliatory speech; on the 11th, Mr. Pym impeached the Earl of Strafford of high treason. Strafford had returned from York—where he was representing the King with the Army—in spite of the earnest warnings of his friends, although the King and Queen had written to guarantee his safety. He was tried in March, and executed May 12th, 1641, on Tower Hill. When he first learnt that the King had consented to his execution, he exclaimed: "Put not your trust in Princes," but before he went to the scaffold he wrote to Charles a letter forgiving him for abandoning a faithful servant.

The Five
Members

There were continuous disputes between the King and Parliament, but the latter gradually obtained the upper hand, and on December 28th, realising the danger to some of its members, petitioned for a guard for the House of Commons, to be commanded by the Earl of Essex, one of the Parliamentary, or Reform party. The King, declaring that there was no danger for anyone, pledged his Royal word on January 3rd, 1642, for the security of all Members of the House.

That very day he accused five Members of high treason, and next day, going to the House with 500 soldiers, tried, though unsuccessfully, to arrest them. He had but recently promised some of his strongest supporters in the House, Colepepper, Falkland, Hyde (later Lord Clarendon), and others, that he would take no steps concerning the House without consulting them. This violation of his promise was a great shock to the Royalists, and the unconstitutional act was the actual cause of the outbreak of the war, which ended in the death of the King, and subversion of the monarchy.

All through the spring and summer of 1642, poets and writers engaged in warfare of the pen. At the close of 1641 the first newspaper reports of Parliamentary proceedings had been issued.

Royal Standard Hoisted

47

There were more writers for the Royalists than there were on the side of Parliament, but Milton, with his Republican ideas and sublime genius, probably did more for the party he espoused than all the writers on the other side. The Pamphleteers

Each side issued many leaflets, the King carrying his own printing press about with him. In the summer he summoned all his subjects on the Trent and to the north of it to aid him in suppressing rebels. This proclamation was aimed at Lord Essex, who was then preparing a force in London to march northwards.

The King having tried unsuccessfully to get possession of Coventry, hoisted the Royal Standard on Nottingham Castle, August 21st, 1642, which was practically a declaration of Civil War. It soon appeared that the Royal call to arms was not being readily obeyed, so the King tried to treat with the Parliament, but neither side would make the first concession. Nottingham, 1642

CHAPTER II

THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR

Outbreak of the Civil War—The Navy under Charles I.—Prince Rupert—The "Ironsides"—Oliver Cromwell—Lord Essex—Commissioners of Army—Ordinance of Militia—England during the Civil War—War Finance—The Two Forces—Men and Equipment.

The Rival Factions

WHEN Charles I. and his rebellious subjects took up arms in 1642, the Royalist partisans were the stronger in the north and west of England, and the Parliamentarians had the more adherents in London and in East Anglia, where but few responded to the King's summons. The King had 18 troops of horse, and 14 battalions of foot soldiery; his opponents mustered 80 troops and 18 battalions.

The Navy

The King had tried ever since his accession to improve the navy; in 1637 the first three-decker, named *The Sovereign of the Seas*, was launched, and for five years in succession before the Civil War two big ships were launched annually. The administration of the dockyards was, however, thoroughly corrupt.

The fleet, under the Earl of Warwick, was practically all Parliamentary, for the only five captains who demurred, in the first instance, from acting against their Monarch were easily coerced. This was a great drawback to the Royal cause, for with the fleet went naturally the seaports visited by the ships. Charles constantly had difficulties in maintaining communication with his friends on the Continent, from whom he hoped to receive men, muskets, and money.

Chester was, indeed, for a long time in possession of the Royalists, but it was difficult to get ships up the narrow Irish seas past Lord Warwick's fleet; therefore, when the Queen, having pawned the Crown jewels in Holland, wished to disembark with the money and a supply of arms in February, 1643, the Earl of Newcastle was obliged to wait in Yorkshire for her protection until she had landed at Bridlington.

Charles's sister's son, Prince Rupert (1619-1682), was the most prominent Royalist leader. A tall, active, handsome man, although only twenty-three years of age, he had enjoyed war experience with both the Dutch and the Swedes. Like his Royal uncle, he was possessed of undaunted physical courage, termed by Samuel Pepys, "the boldest attaquar in the world," but the military capacity of his brain did not equal the courage of his heart. By his reckless impetuosity, he often threw away the victory he had already half won. He made many friends and more enemies. He was generously appreciative of his enemy's valour, for it was he who, during the sanguinary hand to hand struggle on Marston Moor, July 2nd, 1644, gave his opponent, Cromwell, the suggestive nickname of "Ironsides," by which term later the troops raised by him were named.

Prince
Rupert
(1619-82)

That the Huntingdon gentleman-farmer well merited the designation is generally admitted, even by those who abhor his political career, and deplore his inhuman cruelty. Born in 1599, the son of a country gentleman, he represented Huntingdon in the House of Commons in 1628; he was returned again in 1639 for the Long Parliament, in which his cousin, Hampden, and seventeen other relatives or connections had seats. He was about 5 feet 9 inches in height, strongly built, with regular, though hard features, and his quick temper was generally under control. It is said that for ten years of his early manhood, while his powerful religious convictions were maturing, he was oppressed by deep fits of melancholy, which ultimately resulted in an open profession of Calvinism, and a steady adherence to the strict form of religion which men called Puritanism.

Oliver
Cromwell
(1599-1658)

Cromwell was deeply religious, and was probably sincere in saying, "I bless God I have been inured to difficulties; and I never found God failing when I trusted in Him." He felt certain that he and his party were possessed of the Truth, and of God's special leading, which by easy steps brings the conviction that "the end justifies the means." He had rough, coarse manners, was a fervent and occasionally a grotesquely violent speaker and writer, interlarding his involved, confused sentences with Scriptural texts, mostly from the Old Testament, and especially from those portions wherein the Israelites are described exterminating the heathen. The Bible was, indeed, the only book he knew well.

Oliver
Cromwell

and though his misapplication of Holy Writ must shock most of us, there are no adequate grounds for holding that he did not believe what he tried to express. Though often diffuse and nearly incomprehensible in the House of Commons, he spoke clearly, logically, and persuasively when addressing soldiers. After the battle of Naseby, June, 1645, he was nearly always the mediator and peace-maker between the Army and Parliament, which body treated the soldiers ungenerously. The supply of their equipment, boots, and clothing was disgraceful, and they were often for months in arrears of pay. When, at the conclusion of the First Civil War, several corps were to be disbanded, Parliament proposed to issue six weeks' pay in lieu of what was due, i.e. forty-three for cavalry, and eighteen for foot companies.

Until 1642, Cromwell had neither any military knowledge nor experience of war, but it is doubtful whether any Englishman has ever equalled him in ability as a cavalry leader. He was absolutely fearless in action; he was cautious in his conceptions, but energetic and resolute in their execution.

It is right to add that as he became more powerful, and proportionately more hated, he grew very nervous of being assassinated. There are many stories illustrative of this apprehension, but one of the most interesting and authentic is of a table in Stonyhurst College on which Oliver rested on August 16th, 1648, the night before he defeated the Scotch army at Preston. He had the table drawn into the middle of the room, and slept upon it with his sword and pistols at hand.

Parliament
and the
Monarchy

I shall revert to Cromwell later. Lord Essex was the first General of the Parliament, and the King having proclaimed him and his officers as traitors, the Parliament in return declared the King's Commissioners of Array, who were trying to raise troops for the monarchy, to be traitors. The Parliament had grounds for stating that the Commissioners' proceedings were illegal, for the Act of Edward VI., under which they worked, had expired at the end of Elizabeth's reign.

On the other hand, as by the Constitution the joint approval of Monarch and Parliament is essential for the making of laws, so the King having never assented to the Parliament's "Ordinance of Militia," all action under it was also illegal.

England during the Civil War 51

The word "Ordinance" had been used in mediæval times for a Royal edict issued without reference to Parliament, and the Long Parliament reversed the old procedure. The people generally obeyed, however, any order which appeared to be legal.

England
during the
Civil War

During the Civil War, law and order were generally maintained wherever the counties were free of troops. Judges went their rounds on Assizes, and County Courts were opened. Many unlawful acts were done, frequently in the name of some governing body, but the mass of the people were law abiding.

The profits made by the traders during Elizabeth's reign had reacted on agriculture, and both farmers and labourers were prosperous and contented.

In general, the higher aristocracy were Royalists; the lesser (the substantial freeholders and commoners) were in favour of Parliament, nearly all the members of which went home and worked in collecting money, recruits, and weapons, for each party struggled for possession of arsenals and fortified towns, mainly for the powder and weapons therein.

It is probable that the desire for liberty only would not have caused the rebellion, nor maintained it, but for religion. "There were some who, feeling unable to join either Political party, desired to leave England for a time."

The editor of Twysden's "Government of England," excusing these faint-hearts, wrote: "They felt it was impossible to serve a King who never spoke a word of truth in his life"; and yet they could not arm against him, or remain neutral between the two parties.

The Parliament assessed counties for war expenses as soon as no more money could be squeezed out of Royalists, but there was considerable difficulty in raising sufficient funds for the Government. The difficulties of the King in this respect were naturally still greater, for he had to rely on voluntary contributions from his supporters, and was frequently obliged to grant titles and commands for financial considerations rather than with regard to military aptitudes. As an instance of the former, Sir Richard Newport, on being created a baron, in October, 1642, paid into the Royal War Chest £6,000, equivalent now to between £35,000 and £40,000.

Foot soldiers were mustered by companies, horsemen by troops. All who could get them wore "pots," i.e. iron

War
Finance

**The Military
Forces**

head-pieces. Pikes were being reduced in length to 11 feet, the men in the field standing four deep. Hand-guns were often placed on tripod rests, their owners and pikemen carrying swords in addition. When, however, the King marched from Shrewsbury towards Wolverhampton, in October, 1642, but few of his pikemen had swords and some hundreds had only cudgels. Horsemen wore breast-plates and back-pieces, the former being twice as thick as the latter. In the Royalist cavalry a three-rank formation was adopted, but Cromwell's system, which later became universal, was to form two deep. Some Roundhead cavalry corps began the war wearing armour, but it was soon discontinued. Cannon, which 200 years earlier had been made of leather, and later of hammered copper, were now made of iron. The pieces, with the carriages and equipment, had become so cumbersome as to limit their use. Some of the heavier guns required 24 horses in draught; they produced but little effect during the Civil War, except at Roundway Down, Devizes, 1643, where their skilful handling contributed very materially to the Royalist victory.

After the first year's fighting, mainly owing to Cromwell the greater number of the privates in the Parliamentary Army were superior to those in the Royalist ranks; on the other hand, there was little difference in the social position of the regimental officers and men.

In the first months of the war their troops suffered from want of military teachers, of which Mr. Ludlow, M.P., later a regicide, gives an amusing instance. He was present as a volunteer in an action between the opposing mounted forces, on September 22nd, 1642, and wrote:

"The Lieutenant commanded us to wheel about, and we, not understanding what was intended, retired in a very dishonourable manner." Mr. Ludlow alludes to an incident in a reconnaissance, in which the opposing troops met outside Worcester, described further on.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1642-43

Charles I. Marches to Derby—Essex Seeks the Royalist Forces—Powick Bridge—Edghill—Peace Proposals—East Anglian Association—Queen Henrietta Lands at Bridlington—Death of John Hampden—Royalist Successes in 1643 Campaign—Peace Again Put Off—Charles and the Irish Catholics—Newbury—The Scotch Covenant—Cromwell Advocates Discipline—Irish Desert the Royalist Army—The Oxford Convention.

THE King, having only collected 10,000 men at Nottingham when Essex had 20,000 at Northampton, had marched on September 13th to Derby, in order to organise his levies in a district more loyal to his cause, and at the same time to keep open his communications through Chester with Ireland, whence he hoped to receive some English troops then under the command of the Duke of Ormonde.

As the King marched westwards, he disarmed those "Trained bands" (corresponding to our Militia of a few years ago) who were inclined to the Parliamentary party, thus obtaining some weapons for his followers.

Lord Essex was moving against the King, then at Shrewsbury, and on September 23rd was near Evesham, with an advanced guard at Pershore. Prince Rupert that morning had escorted a convoy of money and weapons, with a company of Oxford undergraduates, on its way to Shrewsbury, through Worcester, and had moved southwards to reconnoitre. Near Powick bridge, on the Teme river, Rupert came on a body of Parliamentary horse as it was deploying from a narrow lane. The Prince charged headlong into it, and killing Colonel Sandys and most of the officers, put the others to flight. They galloped wildly through Pershore, carrying with them Essex's picked bodyguard of 100 men, the frightened mob halting only when it reached the main army.

The physical results of this action were inconsiderable, and the Parliamentary force advanced next day and occupied Worcester, Rupert's men falling back on Shrewsbury. The moral results, however, were, for a time, very important,

Charles I. at
Derby.
1642

Powick
Bridge

Worcester

Edgill,
1642

for Rupert had not only beaten a much larger force, but had thoroughly frightened his mounted opponents.

The King left Shrewsbury for London, where he then had supporters, on October 12th, and marching via Birmingham, halted on the 22nd at Edgcot, a small village near Banbury, whence he detached a force to summon that town.

Lord Essex being very badly served by his mounted troops, was under the impression that the King was moving northwards on Bristol. The Parliamentary party, thoroughly alarmed, was trying to raise 18,000 more men, and sent orders almost daily to Essex to seek out, and fight the King's troops.

The Lord-General did move on October 19th, but although the two forces were only twenty miles apart, and after the 19th were moving on parallel lines, Essex did not learn, until he had quartered his mounted troops around him in the vicinity of Kineton on the 22nd, that the King's troops were close at hand.

King Charles had given to his nephew an independent command of the mounted troops, and Rupert refused to take orders from anyone but His Majesty. The Prince did very badly with his command, and it was only at midnight, October 22nd-23rd, that he informed the King of the arrival of Essex at Kineton. Next morning, Sunday, the 23rd, the King had his standard raised on the Edgill ridge.

Before he descended to attack Lord Essex—who was moving in the valley below, the greater portion of his artillery, one regiment of horse and two of foot, being a day's march in the rear—the King, wearing his Star and Garter ribbon on a black mantle over his armour, addressed his troops, and declared his love for the whole kingdom. He asserted his Royal authority as “derived from God, whose substitute and supreme governor, under Christ, I am.”

The Royal troops descended the steep hill with difficulty, having to unhook the gun teams, and let the guns down by hand; but they reformed without molestation, for Lord Essex's men were too untrained to attempt to manœuvre. The opposing forces had scarcely got into formation when Prince Rupert rode over the Roundhead cavalry. The effect of the skirmish near Worcester was immediately apparent. for Essex's mounted troops turned, and in their headlong flight knocked down many of their own infantry.



MAP OF ENGLAND ILLUSTRATING THE CIVIL WARS

The First Civil War began with raising the Royal Standard at Nottingham, August 22nd, 1642, ending on February 1st, 1647; the second lasted from April, 1648, to January, 1649

Edghill,
1642

Pursued and pursuers galloping on, met two bodies of Roundhead horse, which attempted to check the flight, but were carried away in a panic-stricken mob. After a gallop of three miles, many of Rupert's men stopped to pillage the Roundhead baggage, and when the Prince managed to collect some of them, and returned to the battle-field, he found that in his absence victory had been nearly turned into defeat. The King's Foot Guards had been repeatedly charged by Parliamentary horse and foot, and, refusing to yield, were being annihilated as they stood around the Royal Standard.

The King tried to induce Rupert's men to charge in relief of his Guards, but, making various excuses, they refused. Their presence, however, relieved the pressure on the King's men, and Charles, rejecting the advice of his followers, who urged him to retreat, re-occupied Edghill at nightfall, Lord Essex remaining in position on the battle-field until it was dark, when he returned to Kington. Next day, both armies being demoralised, were not in a position to fight, and Lord Essex moved back to Warwick, while the King proceeded to Oxford.

Peace
Negotia-
tions, 1642

In November, Lord Essex having reached the metropolis by a more northern route, a Peace party in London offered terms which the King, who was at Reading, accepted. On the 4th, while the King was at Colnbrook, and negotiations were proceeding favourably, although there had been no formal suspension of hostilities, Prince Rupert, moving in a thick mist to endeavour to surprise the Parliamentary artillery at Hammersmith, overthrew two regiments of foot at Brentford, to which place Lord Essex hastened with greatly superior forces. There had been no difficulty in obtaining men in London, for even the King's supporters were anxious to keep Rupert's undisciplined troopers out of the City.

Royal historians throw the blame of the attack at Brentford on Rupert personally, while Ludlow, the Roundhead writer, holds that the attack was due to the King's duplicity. The citizens were, however, frightened, and further peace proposals were made.

Lord Essex, although greatly superior in numbers, made no effort to attack the King's forces, and Charles marched back to Oxford.

General Baldock, in his interesting book, "Cromwell as

Impeachment of Queen Henrietta 57

a Soldier," fairly summarizes the characteristics of the principal leaders at this time: "The King, weak, vacillating, unable to co-ordinate the work of his inefficient generals; Prince Rupert, impetuous, restless, without control of himself, or of his men; Essex, cautious, slow, and without military insight."

East Anglia now formed an Association, of which Cromwell later became the dominant factor. He had been present with Lord Essex's army in the west of England without attracting notice. Now in proportion as he obtained an ascendancy, so did the war assume a more determined character, with a sharper division between classes of combatants.


East
Anglian
Association,
1642

In the spring of 1643, negotiations were proceeding between the King and a Commission delegated by Parliament to arrange a truce, and, if possible, peace; but no result was obtained, because the King, granting concessions one day revoked them the following morning; and eventually Parliament recalled its agents.

Peace
Negotia-
tions, 1643

Queen Henrietta landed on February 22nd, at Bridlington, bringing with her the moneys she had obtained by pawning the Crown Jewels, and 3,000 foot, 1,500 cavalry, foreign soldiers and some cannon, for which action Parliament impeached her.

Early in the year Sir William Waller beat the King's forces in the West Country, and Lord Newcastle neutralised Lord Fairfax in the



Plan of the Battle of Edgill, October 23rd, 1642

Campaign
of 1643

north of England. In Cornwall the Royalist troops worsted Lord Stamford.

As the summer came on Prince Rupert harried the Parliamentary detachments in Buckinghamshire, and on June 18th, John Hampden, one of England's greatest patriots, was mortally wounded in a skirmish on Chalgrove Field. Of him it was written, "He had the valour and energy of Cromwell, the discernment and eloquence of Vane, the humanity and understanding of Manchester, and the stern integrity of Hale; coupled with the morals of a Puritan, he had the manners of an accomplished courtier." Hampden's untimely death was a great loss to the Moderate Parliamentary party.

During the summer the Royalists were generally successful. Queen Henrietta advanced with 4,000 troops to Stratford-on-Avon, where she occupied Shakespeare's house, then in possession of his grand-daughter. On July 11th the Queen rejoined her husband at Edghill, and with him proceeded to Oxford.

Lansdown
and
Roundway
Down

The Royalists beat the Roundheads at Lansdown, in Somersetshire, and achieved, July 13th, 1643, an unexpected success on Roundway Down, near "The Devizes." Sir William Waller had pressed the town so closely that its commandant arranged to capitulate unless relieved within forty-eight hours. Waller wrote to the Speaker of the House of Commons that success was certain, and that he would report on the number of prisoners in a day or two. Next morning, however, 1,500 Royalist horsemen arrived from Oxford. They rode over Sir Arthur Hesilrige's armour-clad cavalry regiment, and slaughtered nearly all the Puritan footmen.

Bristol

Rupert then carried Bristol by assault after great losses on both sides. These successes encouraged the more moderate Politicians in the House of Lords, and with the assent of the House of Commons a scheme of arrangement more favourable to the King than the previous one was sent to Oxford. Now, however, the City of London, after tumultuous meetings, sent in petitions against peace which stopped the negotiation, and many Peers from the Upper House in consequence went over to the King at Oxford.

Unfortunately for the Royal cause, Prince Rupert now quarrelled with Lord Hertford over the nomination of a Governor of Bristol. If at this time Lord Newcastle had

marched southwards as the King asked him to do, he might possibly have regained his authority, but Newcastle would not serve under Rupert, so Charles, giving up his idea of concentrating his forces, turned to besiege Gloucester. The King was probably also influenced by the objection of the West Country Trained Bands, who had fought well for their Sovereign near Devizes, to go farther away from their districts.

Campaign
of 1643

The inhabitants of Gloucester behaved in the most heroic manner. They burned the suburbs which would have afforded cover for an approach to the walls, and successfully resisted all attacks from August 10th to September 5th, when Lord Essex arrived within five miles of the city with 14,000 men, and the King was obliged to raise the siege. He therefore made peace proposals to Lord Essex, who replied that he "had no authority from Parliament except to relieve Gloucester," which having done, and thrown into the city a supply of provisions, he marched towards London.

Gloucester

King Charles had for some time been negotiating with the insurgent Irish Catholics for cessation of hostilities for a year, and early in September they agreed to the King's terms, giving him £30,000, half in cash and half in cattle. Two months later the King, having appointed Ormonde Lord-Lieutenant, directed him to send over the English regiments which had been serving in Ireland. Many Royalists, resenting this act, left the King's party, but it must be remembered that Parliament was at the same time arranging with the Scots to send an army into England to fight the Monarch.

Charles and
the Irish
Catholics

On September 20th, an indecisive action was fought near Newbury. Rupert had attacked the horsemen of Lord Essex, who was obliged to halt near Hungerford. The London Trained Bands, mechanics and working-men, who had only been taken a few days from their civil employment, beat off the Prince's most determined attacks, and at nightfall the opposing forces remained on the field of battle. Lord Falkland and two other peers were killed in the action. Falkland, as a Secretary of State, held no actual command, but risked his life so recklessly on many occasions as to induce remonstrances from Hyde (later Lord Clarendon). On this occasion a large body of Puritan foot were in a field surrounded by quickset hedges. Colonel Byron, in command of Royalist

Newbury

Our Fighting Services


**Newbury,
1643**

Horse, was superintending the widening of a gap when his horse was shot, and while calling for another, Lord Falkland pushed through the narrow opening, and both rider and horse were killed.

The Parliamentarians were now in a depressed state of mind, for though they expected an army of 11,000 men, promised by the Scots, their cause languished. London was surrounded by a girdle of forts, which ran from the River Thames at Wapping, by Mile End, Marylebone, to Westminster, and thence on the south bank of the river to a point opposite Wapping.

**The Solemn
League and
Covenant**

Sir Harry Vane and Pym, after many months of renewed negotiations, which had indeed been proceeding since 1639, agreed with the Scots in a "Solemn League and Covenant to endeavour without respect of persons the extirpation of Popery and Prelacy," and that England should adopt Scotland's religious system. The historians of the opposing parties differ widely in their estimates of the number of Anglican clergy who were actually ejected for refusing to sign the "Covenant." The Churchmen allege that not only were churches defaced, but 3,506 parish clergy were ejected.



Plan of the Battle of Newbury, September 20th, 1643

Cromwell Advocates Military Discipline 61

The smallest estimate shows that one-fifth were turned out of their livings.

The Covenant was forced upon the English Parliament—whose leaders desired a Civil alliance only—by the Scots, who believed that in order to keep out Papacy, uniformity of religion for the English, Irish, and Scotch people was essential. Neither the English nor the Scots in arranging the treaty paid any regard to the feelings of the Irish, the great majority of whom were Catholics.

**Solemn
League and
Covenant,
1643**

Cromwell had been present in the western campaign with Troop No. 67, which was first noticed for its efficiency at Edghill, October 23rd, 1642. At the outbreak of hostilities he had induced a Dutch officer to teach him drill, at which he became later a proficient for practical purposes. He grasped the first principle that tactical efficiency of all troops is built up on the thorough training of each individual officer and man, and from what he saw in his first campaign, he realised the weakness of untrained troops, however great may be their enthusiasm. He wrote to his cousin, John Hampden, after the battle of Edghill, urging the impossibility of meeting successfully with their class of troopers the gentlemen followers of Rupert, who in many cases had landed proprietors serving as privates in the ranks. Hampden doubted the possibility of making any change, but Cromwell, spending £1,200 out of his small estate, recruited Puritan God-fearing yeoman farmers, imparting to them a discipline to which Rupert's men never submitted, and the want of which later caused their defeat.

**Cromwell as
Leader**

When Cromwell returned to Cambridge after the battle at Edghill, the eastern counties were in a state of confusion. Avowed Royalists were temporising, trying to save their property from enforced contributions, but ready at the same time to declare for the King on the first favourable opportunity. Many were neutral; but neither the gentry, who favoured the Royal cause, nor those who were supporters of the Parliament, would voluntarily pay to the war funds which were necessary to equip and feed the troops in the field. Cromwell himself was constantly writing to his friends, pointing out the difficulty of keeping troops in order unless they were regularly paid. From two letters written to the Mayor of Colchester in March and May, 1643, pressing for money, it is clear that he anticipated the disturbances

Our Fighting Services

**Campaign
of 1643**

would soon be over. It should be remembered to their credit that although the Parliamentary troops were left for months in arrears of pay, neither Cromwell's nor Fairfax's men, at least, were ever allowed to meet daily wants by promiscuous plundering. These two leaders were gradually drawn more closely together, and on May 21st, 1643, after a success obtained at Wakefield, Fairfax wrote to Parliament asking that Cromwell might be sent to join him.

**Atherton
Moor**

Cromwell had by the autumn of 1643 increased his Troop No. 67 to a force of 2,000 horsemen, later known as the "Ironsides," enlisting any Protestants of good repute, and his corps, although once checked, was never defeated. He had some minor successes in Norfolk and Suffolk, and after the defeat of Fairfax on Atherton Moor, when Lord Newcastle moved southwards against Gainsborough, then held by a small Parliamentary garrison, Cromwell advanced rapidly and interposed his troops between that town and the Royalists. He saw that their numbers were three times greater than his own force, but in spite of this fact, and that he had to advance uphill, he attacked and defeated them.

Horncastle

On October 11th, Cromwell, now a Colonel, led the advance of Lord Manchester's army into action near Horncastle. He was riding in front of his men all singing Psalms, when he had two horses in succession killed under him, but mounting a troop horse he pressed on, and the Royalists under Sir John Henderson being routed, were pursued, and slaughtered for many miles.

Nantwich

On November 18th, 1643, 2,500 of the English Protestant soldiers sent over by Ormonde had landed near Chester. After some minor successes they besieged Nantwich. Sir Thomas Fairfax, marching from Lincolnshire through Leicestershire, appeared before the town on January 25th, 1644, and succeeded in routing the Royalists, making George Monk (later Lord Albemarle) a prisoner.

Many of the soldiers who had come from Ireland were dissatisfied at being placed under the command of Catholic noblemen, their religious opinions against Papists having been accentuated during their service in Ireland, and 800 of them, signing the Covenant, went over to the Parliament service.

In the last week of the year 1643, King Charles, acting

The Oxford Convention

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on the advice of Hyde (Clarendon), issued a proclamation to all his adherents of both Houses to meet him at Oxford.

**The Oxford
Convention,
1643**

The first session was held on January 22nd, 1644. There were many members of both Houses absent, some being on the King's service, but 43 Peers and 118 Commoners signed a letter, addressed to Lord Essex, expressing a wish for peace. At this time a majority of Peers were with the King at Oxford, and the majority of the Commons still sat at Westminster.

As we have already shown, the strategical plans of the Royalists were hampered by the strong dislike of their men to leaving their own districts in the West of England. In East Anglia the energy, tact, and brilliant leading of Cromwell had not only immediate, but far-reaching important results.

On January 19th, 1644, the Scottish army, under command of Lord Leven, crossed the Border, and marching to Newcastle, summoned it to surrender. The garrison refused, and Leven, masking Newcastle, marched to the southward.

**Newcastle,
1644**

The King adjourned his Oxford Convention, sarcastically termed "The Mongrel Parliament," on April 16th. It had voted taxes which could not be levied, and loans which were not negotiable, and had, moreover, irritated the Monarch by refusing to endorse some of his edicts.

CHAPTER IV

THE COMMITTEE OF THE TWO KINGDOMS

The Parliamentary Forces—Prince Rupert's Successes—Marston Moor—King and Parliament at Uxbridge—The Rising of the Clubmen—Execution of Colonel Windebank.

THE Westminster Parliament now put the conduct of the war under "The Committee of the Two Kingdoms," which consisted of twenty-five persons—Peers, Commons, and Commissioners from Scotland.

Reading,
1644

When attempting to relieve Reading, King Charles and Prince Rupert were defeated at Caversham, and the garrison then surrendered to Lord Essex, "Marching out with the Honours of War," on April 27th, 1644.

The Parliamentary General, though ordered to advance, refused to do so on the ground of the inexperience of his troops, and his inaction encouraged the Royalists.

The Westminster Parliament, and later its troops, now subscribed to an oath binding them not to lay down arms until satisfactory terms for a Constitutional form of government were assured.

The
Parliamentary
Forces

In March the War Committee had four separate armies in the field, commanded by Lord Essex in the Home Counties; in the west by Sir William Waller; in East Anglia by Lord Manchester; and by Fairfax in the "clothing towns" districts, i.e. the western Midlands.

Waller, after some successes at Alton and Alresford, plundered Winchester, and later moved, in combination with Essex, towards Oxford, in order to hem in the Royal troops.

Queen Henrietta, who was expecting her confinement to take place in a short time, went to Exeter in April, and never met her husband again.

Rupert and
Charles at
Oxford,
1644

In the spring of 1644, Prince Rupert, returning from the Midlands, where he had fought some successful actions, discussed further operations with the King at Oxford. Many proposals for peace, made through different sources by foreign Courts, had failed, for neither the King nor his opponents would give way on any point of principle.

Charles Evades the Enemy 65

Rupert was finally sent into Lancashire to relieve some Royalist troops, and later marched towards York, which was besieged by Lords Fairfax and Manchester, and a Scottish army under Lord Leven; while King Charles, pivoting on Oxford, which was then girdled by a circle of defended towns, undertook to prevent Lord Essex and Sir William Waller from interfering with Rupert's operations, designed to raise the siege.

Campaign
of 1644

The important point for the Royalist cause was York but the King, instead of strengthening Prince Rupert's force, frittered away troops in order to help his brother Prince Maurice, then engaged in the siege of Lyme Regis, an unimportant small seaport on the Dorset coast, the capture of which was practically useless so long as the Royal Navy supported Parliament.

Siege of
York

During the night—June 3rd-4th—King Charles, riding out, passed through the armies of Essex and Waller; the latter followed the King into Worcestershire, and was at Evesham on the 12th, when the King marched to Bewdley as if he were about to join Rupert at York. Waller moved hastily forward to Bromsgrove, but the King, putting his infantry into boats on the River Severn, dropped down to Worcester, from whence he marched rapidly back to Oxford, and picking up his artillery and baggage train, moved by Buckingham towards East Anglia. Waller had been puzzled by the King's movements, and thinking he had gone into Wales, marched down the Severn River to Tewkesbury, and then to Banbury. On June 29th the opposing armies marched up the opposite banks of the Cherwell, within sight of each other, and Waller, attacking at Copredy Bridge, was repulsed with loss. The London Trained Bands now deserted by scores, and all being anxious to return to the City, practically enforced their will on the General, who marched, with all whom he could persuade to remain under Arms, to Towcester, which place he reached on July 2nd. He then wrote to the "Committee of the Two Kingdoms," pointing out the inefficiency of such troops, and urging that a Regular Army should be embodied.

Copredy
Bridge

Lord Essex was now moving on Exeter, and the King feeling equal to coping with either army when separated, marched also to the west.

**Campaign
of 1644**

Prince Rupert, who had left Shrewsbury on May 16th, captured Newport and relieved Lathom House; carried Bolton after a severe struggle; sacked Liverpool (then a small seaport); and thence moving to the eastward, met Cromwell's outposts near Otley, eventually reaching Knaresborough on June 30th.

**Siege of
York raised**

The Confederate Generals, Lords Fairfax, Leven, and Manchester, raised the siege of York, and on July 1st, moving out from the vicinity of the city, billeted in and around Marston, seven miles to the westward. Prince Rupert by rapid and skilful movements outmanœuvred the Confederate generals, and, without firing a shot, got possession of the bridges over the Ouse; he left his troops outside the city and rode into York to take counsel with Lord Newcastle. He, as usual, wished to temporise, but Rupert, quoting the King's commands, which implied that after relieving York, he was to go northwards, and fight the Scots, persuaded Newcastle to attack the enemy.

**Marston
Moor**

The Confederates, fearing that Rupert might go into East Anglia and then towards London, determined to retire, and left Marston Moor before daylight on July 2nd. The heads of their column had already got within two miles of Tadcaster when the Royalist troops appeared to the north of the village of Marston. The Parliamentary baggage train, Sir Thomas Fairfax, and Cromwell, with 3,000 horsemen, were still on the ridge east of Long Marston when Rupert, with 5,000 horsemen, came in sight.

The Parliamentary troops countermarching, came into position about 3 P.M., facing due north, with their Left on the village of Tockwith, and their Right on Marston, with a frontage of about a mile and a half. Both armies formed up as usual, the infantry being in the centre and the horsemen on the flanks. The Puritans numbered about 25,000 men, of which 16,000 were infantry. Prince Rupert had about 9,000 horsemen and some 7,000 infantry.


From 3 to 5 P.M. a desultory and ineffectual cannonade was carried on, but then died away. The harvest must have been early that year, for during a violent thunderstorm the Puritans sheltered under wheat stooks. Neither they nor the Royalists were anxious to fight, for all suffered from want of food and water, as the wells about Marston were dry. The Puritans passed the afternoon singing

The Battle of Marston Moor

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Psalms and hymns, and neither force moved. After seven o'clock, Rupert advised Lord Newcastle that there would be no fight that day; Newcastle then retired to his coach, while Rupert sat down to smoke a pipe. He had scarcely begun, however, when the chant of a Puritan War Psalm arose, and the Prince looking up, saw the Confederate line advancing.

Prince Rupert was then on the Right of the Royalist line, Newcastle in the Centre, and Lord Goring on the Left. The latter, with some 5,000 horsemen, charging at speed,



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MARSTON MOOR, JULY 2nd, 1644

rode over Lord Fairfax's cavalry, who, in their headlong flight trampled over some of their own infantry, and the whole of the Parliamentary right wing fled to the southward. On the extreme west Prince Rupert and Cromwell met, and after a severe struggle the Royalist horsemen were routed, mainly by a charge delivered by David Leslie with the Scottish horse against Rupert's squadrons' flanks while engaged with Cromwell.

Cromwell sent a portion of his command in pursuit, and, wheeling to the right, with the main body attacked the Royalist infantry. They, under Generals Lindsay and Maitland, stood up bravely. Lord Newcastle's white-coated Northumberland Regiment had sworn overnight that they

Campaign
of 1644

would dye their coats red in the blood of the Puritans, and none of them offered to give way, but, like the Royal Foot Guards at Edghill 2 years earlier, fought till they died.

Royalist
Defeat at
Marston
Moor

As the day faded into twilight, on the Royalist side Prince Rupert and Lord Newcastle were galloping northwards, followed by some of the Ironsides, while Lords Fairfax, Leven, and Manchester were galloping southwards pursued by Lord Goring's horsemen. Cromwell, who had been on the west of the Confederate line, facing north, when the battle began, after attacking the Royalist infantry in flank and rear from the westward, while it was pressed by the Confederate infantry from the south, now moved round to the eastward and formed up his squadrons on the ground occupied by Lord Goring at noon. From thence, before night closed in, Cromwell made a final and successful charge in a south-westerly direction on the Royalist infantry, which broke up. At ten o'clock darkness stopped the pursuit; 1,500 officers and men remained in Cromwell's hands; all the Royalist cannon, a quantity of powder, and 10,000 stand of arms were taken. The victory was due to Cromwell's brain power, nerve, and tactical skill, and to the wonderful discipline he had imparted to his Ironsides.

On July 3rd the Confederate Generals returned to the field; on the Royalist side, Lord Newcastle embarked at Scarborough for Hamburg, while Prince Rupert rallied 6,000 demoralised men outside York.


Surrender
of York

Cromwell, with 7,000 cavalry, pursued Rupert on the 4th, who had moved away in a north-westerly direction. The Prince was joined by the Marquis of Montrose with some horsemen on July 5th, and marched through Westmorland into Lancashire. Cromwell, finding that the Royalists had got too great a start of him, and were moving in enclosed country unsuitable for cavalry, returned to York, which surrendered on July 15th.

The difference in discipline between the Puritan troops raised by Lord Manchester and those raised by Cromwell is apparent from the Royalist records, for prisoners who were plundered and ill-treated by Manchester's men, gratefully acknowledged the good treatment they received when taken over by one of Cromwell's regiments under command of Major Whalley.


Incapacity of Roundhead Generals 69

The Roundhead Generals, after Cromwell's great Campaign of 1644 victory, showed the same incapacity for concentrated effort which had been so fatal to the Royalist troops. While Lord Leven marched northwards to besiege Newcastle, Lord Fairfax, stopping at York, reduced some fortified Royalist country seats, and Lord Manchester went back to the "Eastern Association" district. The "Committee of both Kingdoms" sent Lord Manchester reiterated orders to pursue Rupert, but Manchester, after consulting Lords Fairfax and Leven, who concurred with him, declined to do so.



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CHAPTER V

OPERATIONS IN THE WEST OF ENGLAND (1644) AND THEIR OUTCOME

Charles Marches for London—Parliamentary Leaders Disobey Orders—Newbury—Accusations Against Cromwell—The Self-denying Ordinance—"New Model" Army—Military Press-gangs—The Uxbridge Negotiations, 1645—The Rising of the Clubmen—Bletchington House—Execution of Colonel Windebank.

Plymouth

WE now turn to the operations in Devonshire and Cornwall. Lord Essex had marched westwards, and after raising the siege of Plymouth, and also driving off Grenville, reached Bodmin on June 29th. Lord Essex sent repeated requests to "the Committee of the Two Kingdoms" for help, but in vain. His information must have been bad, for the country was poor, and, the population being hostile, he had great difficulty in feeding his troops, especially when he was followed by the King.

The Royal troops moved on, being joined at Crediton by Prince Maurice, who had failed to take Lyme Regis, and surrounded Essex's army at Lostwithiel. They seized the fort commanding the little port of Fowey, twenty miles west of Plymouth Sound, thus closing the Parliamentary troops' supply of food by sea. Essex's men were now anxious to sue for terms, which, in any case, would have become necessary in a few days for want of food, but the General would not surrender, and escaped in a boat to Plymouth. Some of the horse under Colonel Balfour broke through the Royalist outposts, who were under the command of Goring, and General Skippon, after vainly endeavouring to induce officers and men to attack and endeavour to break through the Royalist lines, surrendered, with all arms and camp equipments, early in September. The men, released by the King, went eastwards by sea, most of them returning to their homes, though some joined the new "Model Army" in Windsor Park when it was formed later.

The Parliamentary Party in the House of Commons was much depressed when King Charles turned eastwards,

Lords Manchester and Essex 71

and ordered three armies to be raised, under Lords Essex and Manchester, and Sir William Waller, to oppose the King's advance on London. Manchester's force was at the time the best organised body, but he himself, as a soldier, was useless. When the "Committee of the Two Kingdoms" learned that Prince Rupert was moving southwards to join the King, they sent repeated orders to Manchester to move from Lincoln to Abingdon. The Committee were deeply irritated, as was Cromwell, by the inaction of this General, who is described as "a sweet, meek man." While he remained under Cromwell's domination they agreed, but now Major-General Crawford had become Manchester's Chief Staff officer. He was of the narrowest Presbyterian sect, which Cromwell disliked almost as much as he did Episcopacy, and their quarrels were incessant.

Operations
in the West,
1644

Quarrels
Between
Lords
Manchester
and Essex

Eventually, all three repaired to the House of Commons at Westminster, where a temporary reconciliation was effected.

The Committee, on October 11th, 1644, finding neither Lords Essex nor Manchester would obey orders, sent two Civilian Commissioners as their representatives to join the army, and finally Manchester, on October 17th, got to Basingstoke, Essex being that day at Alresford.

The King left Chard on September 30th, and met Rupert next day. The Prince had left 2,000 cavalry in Monmouthshire, and now, instead of joining the King with his troops, went into Gloucestershire. The King, on October 18th, drove Waller out of Andover to Basingstoke, where the forces of the three Parliamentary Generals, twice as strong in numbers as was the King's force, were concentrated.

Charles, on October 22nd, having marched northwards, was at Newbury, and the Parliamentary Generals following him, quartered their troops to the east of that town.

Newbury

The Parliamentarians, finding the King in a strong position, decided to send half their troops round and attack him simultaneously in front and rear. At 3 P.M. a struggle began with an advance from the westward, and was continued till nightfall, when the King, having stored his guns and train in and under the walls of Donnington Castle, marched across Lord Manchester's front, making for Wallingford. Charles, with a small escort, rode to Bath

Operations
in the West,
1644

to hurry Prince Rupert's advance with reinforcements, and eventually passed into Oxford unmolested by his opponents.

For various alleged reasons which appear to be inadequate, Manchester was very slack in his pursuit, taking two days to cover the distance which the Royalists marched in one night. Manchester then moved back again to Newbury, in spite of the remonstrances of Cromwell, who himself appears to have shown on this occasion a want of energy in following up the King's forces, though he declared that his horses had been overworked.

Donnington
Castle

King Charles, on November 7th, with 5,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry, moved by Wallingford and Ilkley without his advance being reported—as there were no Roundhead outposts in that direction—to Donnington Castle, from which he carried off his cannon and as much ammunition as his transport could load up.

There was an unimportant and badly managed fight to the westward of the castle before the cannon were removed, and when Charles formed up on Winterbourne Common, some two miles to the north of the castle, the Parliamentary troops, who had a fair chance of overwhelming the Royalists, refrained from attack.

There were many reasons alleged for this hesitation, but the strongest, although illogical, is shown in the remark attributed to Sir Arthur Hesilrige, who observed, when the Generals discussed the situation, that "If they beat the King, he would always remain King, whereas if they lost the battle they would be hanged"; to which Cromwell logically replied, "If such reasons prevailed, they ought never to have taken up arms."

Basing
House

Lord Manchester, in spite of all orders, would do nothing, declining even to prevent provisions being thrown into Basing House, the garrison of which was then in great want of food. Prince Rupert had sent 1,000 horsemen, each man carrying a sack of provisions, but when they arrived the investing force had fallen back, and both armies went into winter quarters, the King's troops in and around Oxford, and the Parliamentary forces on the Thames near Reading and Henley.

The "Committee of the Two Kingdoms" attributed the Royalist successes to a want of harmony amongst the Parliamentary Generals. Essex, an Episcopalian, had

quarrelled with Waller, who was a Presbyterian, in 1643, and they had never since been on good terms. Essex and Manchester desired a limited Monarchical Government, whilst Cromwell, who was an Independent by religion, wanted a Republic. When he was asked in Parliament to state what he knew of the removal of the Royalist guns from Donnington Castle, he roundly accused his General of being lukewarm in the Parliamentary cause. Next day the General, in the House of Lords, blamed Cromwell, accusing him of having said "He would as soon fight Scots who had invaded England merely to establish the Presbyterian religion, as he would fight King Charles." Lord Manchester went on to say he knew that Cromwell meant to form an army of sectaries which would coerce the Parliament.

Operations
in the West,
1644

The Lower House appointed a Committee to inquire whether the accusation against Cromwell in the House of Lords was not a breach of the privileges of the House. That evening a caucus of the Scottish party and of the leading Presbyterians met in Lord Essex's house, and secretly consulted two Parliamentary lawyers, Whitlock and Maynard, as to whether it would be possible to impeach Cromwell as an incendiary between the English and Scottish nations; but nothing came of it, probably from the fact that Cromwell was too strong to make it prudent for anyone to attack him.

Discussion
amongst
Parliament-
arians

In November, 1644, the House of Commons considered anxiously the condition of the kingdom with regard to the war. The "Committee of both Kingdoms" was ordered to present a report on the failure of Lord Manchester to prevent the removal of the Royalists' guns from Donnington Castle. Cromwell prepared a written statement for the House, in which he criticised Manchester's conduct, exposing all his errors in the campaign, and attributing them to a deliberate attempt to refrain from crushing King Charles. Lord Manchester, in his reply, accused Cromwell of various improper actions.

Cromwell, who had gained his point of enforcing on Parliament the necessity of having a properly disciplined and trained Army, made a powerful and patriotic speech, the keynote of which was, "Let us consider measures, not men." He strongly recommended that the House should

**Self-
denying
Ordinance,
1645**

concentrate its attention on the steps to be taken to assuage existing evils.

As a result of the charges and counter-charges, a "Self-denying Ordinance," initiated by Cromwell, was passed, excluding all Members of the two Houses from Civil or Military employment. The Bill, sent up on December 21st, was rejected by the Lords, and only eventually adopted by both Houses on April 3rd, 1645. Lords Essex, Manchester, and Warwick, Sir William Waller, and some of the senior aristocrats, resigned their commands, Lord Warwick's position as head of the Navy being taken over by Commissioners. Nevertheless, the majority of the superior officers still belonged to the upper classes, for we find three months later that, at the Battle of Naseby, 30 out of 37 generals and colonels in the Parliamentary Army belonged to the aristocracy.

**New Model
Army, 1645**

Simultaneously with the discussion of the "Self-denying Ordinance," the House, acting on the representations of Sir William Waller and Cromwell, which though hitherto ignored, had recently been brought into prominence by the surrender of Lord Essex's army in Cornwall, agreed to raise a force of 22,000 men, to be called the "New Model" Army, the Bill being passed by both Houses on February 15th. Sir Thomas Fairfax, on Cromwell's proposition, was nominated Commander-in-Chief; General Skippon was appointed to be Major-General, and twenty-four officers as colonels, the post of Lieutenant-General being left vacant.

The pay of the regimental officers was about the same as now, the infantry soldier received 8d., the trooper 1s. 6d., including forage allowance, and deferred pay at 6d. These rates were considerably above the current wages of mechanics and labourers, but, on the other hand, the troops were practically kept for months in arrears of their pay.

The "New Model" system followed that instituted by Cromwell. He and Sir William Waller, a man of very different class of mind, had repeatedly and simultaneously urged on Parliament that untrained men, unaccustomed to discipline, cannot fight successfully against soldiers. Cromwell had come to the same conclusion as Washington did a hundred years later, when he wrote in 1775, "a

mistaken dependence on Militia has been the origin of all our misfortunes."

The Trained Bands, 1645

It was indeed necessary for the Republicans to take immediate action if the party was to avoid disaster, for, in spite of Cromwell's decisive victory on Marston Moor, the Parliamentary cause was in danger of collapsing mainly from the unsatisfactory state of the Militia, Trained Bands, and other local levies, amongst which were 8,000 impressed recruits. One regiment in the West Country had recently killed an officer for rebuking an insubordinate private, and desertion became so common that Waller was able to convince Parliament its cause could never succeed under the existing conditions of its Army.

The Long Parliament had done good work in its first years by endeavouring to re-establish the Constitution, impaired by the King's ten years of despotic rule, but, like all deliberating bodies, it was incapable of commanding armies, and its marked incapacity was apparent in almost every step it took. When it eventually accepted Sir William Waller's advice, and decreed the raising of the New Model Army in Windsor Park, it ordered that the force should be ready to move within eight days! General Fairfax exerted himself strenuously, but nearly three months elapsed before he ventured to move the troops in order to relieve Taunton, then besieged by the Royalists.

Incapability of Long Parliament

When Lord Essex had severed his connection with the Army, Sir Thomas Fairfax went to Windsor to form the new force; General Skippon was sent to Reading at the same time, and on April 7th he disbanded five regiments. He was very popular and tactful; and promising, in the name of Parliament, a fortnight's pay of arrears down and debentures for the balance due, induced practically all the men to re-enlist. Those who did so received a bonus of a fortnight's pay, and were re-armed and clothed. Skippon received and deserved much credit for his tactful treatment of the soldiers, the favourable result of which fully justified Cromwell's forecast of the situation.

Sir Thomas Fairfax

Some of the men released by King Charles after their surrender at Lostwithiel joined the New Model Army in Windsor Great Park, but after many weeks only 14,000 had been mustered.

The same Parliament which had complained bitterly of

The
Pressgang,
1645

the King's use of pressgangs reverted to that system. It was always liable to great abuse. Forty years earlier, in Elizabeth's time, one Easter Sunday morning, the doors of the London churches were closed on the worshippers, and when they were opened all suitable adult males were pressed into the Army. Although nothing so outrageous was now done, yet the action of Parliament was violently resisted until two executions, following in quick succession, stamped out resistance.

The New Model Army, destined (from its discipline and the high tone imparted to it) to become the most formidable fighting force ever created in Europe, was at first despised by the Royalist officers. Commissioner Baillie, like most of the Presbyterian leaders, had a low opinion of it, and wrote: "It consists for the most part of raw, inexperienced soldiers; few officers are capable of their places: if the force does great service, many will be deceived." King Charles, therefore, again recommenced operations in 1645 confident of success, although, taken together, the New Model and the Army of the Scots were superior in numbers to the Royalists.

War of the
Religious
Sects

While the opposing forces were resting in their quarters during the winter, there was no cessation of the struggle of the opposing religious sects. The Presbyterians thought at first that they had obtained a decisive victory, and so long as the contest lay between them on the one hand, and Papists and Episcopalians on the other, this diagnosis was accurate, but as soon as they endeavoured to carry their principles into practice, the Independents, of whom Cromwell was the most remarkable personage, opposed them. At least two-thirds of the officers, and practically all the private soldiers, believed in Cromwell, and thus his position became daily stronger. His view as regards religion was one of complete toleration to all except Episcopalians and Papists, although later on he did not hesitate to act with prompt severity against the Levellers, whose opinions when carried into practice logically resulted in complete anarchy.

Uxbridge
Negotia-
tions, 1645

The conflict of opinions amongst the leading Roundheads induced a renewal of negotiations between the King and Parliament; which body sent six representatives of the two Houses to Oxford, and from January 30th until February 22nd, 1645, delegates from either party, meeting at Uxbridge,

discussed fruitlessly spiritual and temporal questions, with views so conflicting as to be incapable of reconciliation.

Charles I.'s
Double
Dealing.
1645

The King, while his delegates were treating for him at Uxbridge, was negotiating with the Court of France, with the Duke of Lorraine, and with the Irish Catholics, for a loan of troops. He wrote to his wife, Queen Henrietta, explaining to her that though while negotiating with the Parliamentary delegates, he, being unsupported by the views of those with him, had felt obliged to style his opponents "the two Houses of Parliament, yet his use of that expression need not bind him later to acknowledge them as such." It was during the Uxbridge negotiations that the victories of Montrose in Scotland, mentioned later, were reported to the King.

Colonel Cromwell went to Windsor on April 21st to surrender his commission, in accordance with the Self-Denying Act, and, while there, heard of a Royalist movement from Oxford to the West Country. Prince Rupert was advancing on Chester when he was recalled from Ludlow by a rising of Clubmen. These were country people who had become weary of the endless exactions from which they suffered at the hands of the opposing forces, who then were living in free quarters in the country where they operated. Dorset and other counties had upwards of 5,000 Clubmen, mainly armed with cudgels, to protect their homes, and the county of Worcester had at one time 14,000 assembled.

Rising
of the
Clubmen

When Cromwell arrived at Windsor, Fairfax had just received orders from the "Committee of the Two Kingdoms," which body was directing the war operations on behalf of Parliament, to endeavour to intercept a convoy which the King was about to send from Oxford to join Prince Rupert. Fairfax sent Cromwell on this duty with 1,000 horsemen. He attacked some Royalist troops at Islip, on the Cherwell, and then took Bletchington House, held by 200 men under Colonel Windebank.

Bletching-
ton House

Windebank—whose young wife, and several ladies in the house were overcome by terror—surrendered, for which he was shot at Oxford. Cromwell's brilliant raid, in the words of Lord Digby, the Royalist Chancellor, "totally disabled the King to move," for the Republicans had captured nearly all the draught horses Rupert had collected.

CHAPTER VI

THE OPERATIONS OF THE MARQUIS OF MONTROSE, 1644

Marquis of Montrose—Troubles in Scotland—Argyll Opposes Montrose—The Slaughter of the Campbells—Montrose at Dundee.

The
Marquis of
Montrose

WE must now turn to the Marquis of Montrose's operations in Scotland, the report of which had encouraged the Monarch during the Uxbridge negotiations.

John Graham, who was born in 1612, and succeeded his father, Earl of Montrose, in 1624, was, with the exception of Cromwell, the most remarkable soldier of the Civil War, as he was the unrivalled patriot and hero. Though dignified and somewhat ceremonious, he had a charming personality. He suffered in the estimation of his contemporaries, who did not realise how circumstances had changed since the days in which Montrose signed the first Covenant, and the period during which the Scots disloyal to Charles I., not content only with re-establishing firmly the Presbyterian religion in Scotland, were bent on enforcing its practice in England.

Montrose was a Loyalist by conviction, and yet he was the first to sign the Covenant protesting against Archbishop Laud's liturgy, February, 1638.

Scotland was suffering at the time under two tyrannies—the material domination of her nobles, and the moral despotism of the Kirk.

After a short experience of Argyll's intrigues, Montrose realised that the Royal power must be safeguarded to preserve Scotland from anarchy.

When Charles I. went to Edinburgh, August, 1641, Argyll and his party had managed to get Montrose and some of his friends imprisoned, and they were released only in March, 1642.

The Moderator of Scotland offered the Earl great pecuniary advantages in June, 1643, but he refused them, and as it now became evident to Montrose that Argyll, if not aiming at the Crown for himself, was certainly disloyal

to the Monarch, he definitely quitted the Kirk party. He saw Queen Henrietta at Bridlington in February, 1643, but she was then under the influence of Lord Hamilton, who had played a double game at Edinburgh, when acting for the King in the controversial discussions about Laud's liturgy, and the Queen induced her husband to reject Montrose's offer to raise Scotland in favour of the monarchy.

Montrose's
intrigues,
1643

In the summer, Montrose went to Oxford, where he stayed with the King for six months. Charles, who had now come round to Montrose's ideas, appointed him as his representative, and authorised Lord Antrim to proceed to Ulster, and send over some of his Irish retainers to help Montrose in Scotland.

In January, 1644, Antrim went to Ulster, and Montrose visited Lord Newcastle at Durham. The Earl, however, could only give him 100 horsemen, eight cannon, and 1,300 Militia, who deserted after a few weeks.

While Montrose was in the west of the Lowlands he received his patent of Marquis from the King, and a decree of excommunication from the Kirk! In May, Prince Rupert summoned him to York, but too late for the battle of Marston Moor, and the two leaders met at Richmond forty-eight hours after the defeat of the Royalists.

Montrose started to ride southwards, and, lagging behind his servants, returned to Carlisle, whence, disguised as a groom, he rode with two friends through the Parliamentary forces to Perthshire, where he arrived with no money, and with only four worn-out horses.

We may anticipate the sequel. The Marquis, by persevering, undaunted courage, by his genius, strategical and tactical skill, beat or outgeneralled all his enemies, and in a series of adventures reading more like a fairy-tale than ordinary military history, became master of Scotland in six months.

Alastair Macdonald, one of Lord Antrim's adherents, having landed in Ardnamurchan with 1,500 Irish Catholics, had plundered the Campbells, his hereditary foes. He was so near being exterminated that he marched towards the coast to re-embark his men for Ireland, but his ships had sailed, so he was thankful when Montrose summoned him to Blair Athole. There the Marquis hoisted the Royal Standard, and in a few days had collected 2,500 men around

Tippermuir
and
Aberdeen,
1644

him, armed, however, only with pikes and a few swords, many of them having nothing better than bows and arrows.

He defeated Lord Elcho, September 1st, at Tippermuir, five miles to the south-west of Perth, and having plundered the town, moved northwards. He frightened the followers of Lord Balfour of Burleigh from the Bridge of Dee, and entered Aberdeen on the heels of the fugitives. Then the Irish pillaged the town, murdering all they met in the next four days. They stripped their unfortunate victims of all their clothes to avoid spoiling the garments before they killed the owners. Argyll now appeared with a superior force, so Montrose moved northwards, but when marching up the Spey, seeing troops on the northern bank, he having buried his cannon in a bog, went on to the Badenoch mountains, and then, still pursued by Argyll, descended into Athole. Thence Montrose, crossing the Grampians, marched northwards, trying to raise the Gordons. He was heavily attacked and nearly surrounded at Fyvie Castle, 30 miles west of Aberdeen, but escaped during the night to Badenoch. Argyll withdrew to Inveraray, where he rested in imaginary security. But Montrose, marching by mountain paths, surprised him on December 13th, and the Irish and Scotch clansmen killed all the Campbells they could catch for the next two months, devastating the district the while, and Montrose then moved towards Inverness.

Inveraray

Inverlochy

Argyll, with 3,000 Campbells, was at Inverlochy, to the north of Ben Nevis, when Montrose, returning by mountain passes, fell on him on February 2nd, 1645, and killed 1,500 Campbells, more than Montrose's whole force. Their chief was ill from over-fatigue and from the effects of a heavy fall from his horse. He could not therefore bear arms, but witnessed the slaughter of his clan from a boat on Loch Linnhe. It was news of this victory which caused King Charles to harden his conditions during the negotiations at Uxbridge.

Dundee

Montrose, joined by the Grants and Gordons, now carried Dundee, but was driven back into Athole by superior forces under General Baillie, one of the Scots Commissioners. A force moving northwards under Colonel Urry—who had changed sides during the Civil War—was defeated by Montrose at Auldearn, and Baillie was later again beaten by him at Alford, west of Cluny Castle.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1643

Royalist Successes—Cromwell as Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom—Naseby—Barbarity of Parliamentary Soldiers—Royalist Disasters—George Digby, Earl of Bristol—Successes of Montrose in Scotland—The King's Faithlessness—Parliamentary Successes, 1643-46—Charles Held by the Scots—The King a Prisoner at Holmby House—End of the First Civil War—Dublin Given Up to Parliament—Presbyterian Form of Worship.

WHEN the campaign of 1643 began, the King's sway extended over about one-third of England, but he had the greater number of troops who, had they been disciplined, or he capable of controlling his generals, might have enabled him to break up the Parliamentary forces before the New Model Army was ready for service. The King's eldest son was in nominal command in the west, but the real power was in the hands of Prince Rupert, while Generals Goring and Grenville had separate commands in the extreme West Country. Charles, after relieving Chester, carried Leicester by assault, and the "Committee of the Two Kingdoms," fearing that the King might go into East Anglia, ordered Fairfax—who was besieging Oxford—to move northwards. Parliament was always nervous about public feeling in East Anglia, for although it was their stronghold yet there was a powerful Royalist undercurrent of opinion, which caused outbreaks at Colchester and elsewhere, and the Grand Jury of Essex at the end of May petitioned for the restitution of the King to the Throne.

Fairfax and a Council of War on June 7th, urged by cavalry officers, petitioned that Cromwell should be made Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, in answer to which he received an acting appointment for three months with permission, should it become necessary, to join Fairfax when the Lord General might require his services.

After his successes Cromwell had gone from the west of Oxford into Cambridgeshire, where he was concerting

Chester and
Leicester

Cromwell
Lieutenant-
General
of the
Kingdom

**Campaign
of 1645**

measures for the defence of the Isle of Ely, and raising troops for Fairfax's army.

The Lord General kept Cromwell informed from day to day of the King's movements, and when Cromwell realised that a battle was imminent, he marched with 600 horsemen as fast as they could travel, and joined Fairfax's head-quarters on the morning of June 13th, 1645, being received by the troops with enthusiastic cheers.

Naseby

The advanced portion of the Royal army had reached Market Harborough late on June 13th, the rear billeting at Naseby. Being advised of the approach of Fairfax, the Royalists got into position at Sibbertoft Hill, three miles to the north of Naseby, in the early morning of June 14th, and the King renounced his intention of proceeding to the north.

General Fairfax, moving at 3 A.M., on the 14th had halted before daylight on a ridge immediately north of Naseby, about two miles to the south of the Royalist position at Sibbertoft. At Cromwell's suggestion, he "changed position" a mile to the north-west of the village, forming up in fallow fields, and there placed his troops with infantry in the centre and horsemen on the flanks, on a frontage of a mile. The line stood on a gentle rise 20 feet above a hill opposite, with a boggy valley between, towards which gentle slopes led down on either side. Fairfax drew his troops back 100 yards from the crest of the nearly flat hill, which had the effect, as Rupert records, of causing difficulties to the Royalists in determining the strength and exact position of the Parliamentary forces. These numbered about 14,000 men, half being mounted troops. Cromwell commanded those on the Right, or eastern flank, the line facing nearly due north, and Colonel Ireton the Horse regiments on the Left, General Skippon being in the Centre. He was faced by Sir Thomas Astley, Sir M. Langdale being opposite to Cromwell, and Prince Rupert facing Colonel Ireton.

Most authors give the Royalist numbers as 7,500; it seems more probable, however, that there were about 9,000, but in any case, considerably fewer than those under Fairfax. Rupert had put his own Foot regiment and that of the King with two guns in a third line.


The Royalist infantry advanced about noon, and, having fired, engaged Skippon's Footmen in a hand to hand conflict, with such determination that the New Model infantry

gave ground. Colonel Ireton sent several regiments to assail the Right flank of the Royal infantry. While so occupied, they were charged by Rupert, with the result that Ireton's second line not supporting the first line in time, the whole of the Left of the force was driven back. He himself was wounded by a pike-thrust in the thigh and in the face by a halbert, and was then taken prisoner. His whole division was chased by Rupert's cavalry back to Naseby, where the Royal horsemen fell on the Parliamentary baggage train.

Campaign
of 1645

The infantry in the Centre were fighting stubbornly when Cromwell executed a brilliant tactical decisive movement on the eastern flank. He had left Colonel Whalley with a small part of the mounted troops opposite to Sir M. Langdale, while he, with the greater portion, moved out to his Right. Colonel Whalley charging down the slope, crashed into Langdale's horse before it moved up the hill, and immediately after the collision Cromwell, charging from the eastward on the Royalist Left flank, put all Langdale's squadrons to flight, and then leaving a part of Whalley's men to keep them on the move, he reformed the rest of his squadrons.

In the Left
Centre of the



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF NASEBY, JUNE 14th, 1645

**Campaign
of 1645**

Parliamentary New Model footmen, the officers, striving to keep their men firm under the impetuous onward movement of the Royal infantry, after failing to do so, stood to die with their Colours close to the Reserve.

Naseby

Cromwell, who had "changed position to the Left," charged down on the left flank of the Royal infantry, all of which broke, except one brigade, which though attacked simultaneously in front, in flank, and in rear, stood immovable with a grand courage, until Fairfax, calling up his own regiment of Foot, in combination with Cromwell's cavalry, beat down the devoted Royalists.

At this moment the King was rallying his horsemen, half a mile to the north, and Prince Rupert was returning from Naseby with his still breathless troopers. The Parliamentary Generals re-formed for a final attack. The King, leading a Bodyguard of 500 gentle-born troopers, galloped forward, when Lord Carnwarth seized his bridle-rein, and crying, "Will you go to your death?" turned his horse, shouting, "March to the right"; the whole of the horsemen following the King then broke into a wild flight.

The Roundhead casualties were comparatively trifling; but Charles lost his 14 guns, all the Colours, and practically all his infantry, for those who were not killed were taken prisoners. He and his cavalry continued their flight and went as fast as their horses could carry them to Leicester.

Barbarities

In those days victors showed but little mercy to vanquished, and the more religious men thought themselves to be, the greater barbarities they perpetrated on those they considered to be wicked, or on those holding different views of religion. The struggle had been fiercely contested with much hand to hand fighting; Fairfax had himself killed a Royalist officer who was defending his Colour; Skippon had been badly wounded, Ireton had also suffered, Cromwell had been personally engaged, and no doubt the private soldiers were much excited. Nevertheless, nothing can excuse the Puritans who mutilated the faces of the English women camp-followers of the Royal troops, so as to render them hideous for ever, and butchered in cold blood a hundred Catholic Irish women of the same calling. Mr. Whitelock, one of the more tolerant of the Presbyterian Members of Parliament, in alluding to this atrocious butchery, dis-

misses it with the observation : " Upon whom I fear the Ordinance against Papists pressed hard."

**Campaign
of 1645**

The result of the Battle of Naseby was momentous from several aspects. The King lost not only his troops and 8,000 stand of arms, but also his credit with many of his supporters. The whole of his correspondence with Queen Henrietta was taken, read in London, and eventually published by Parliament, indicating clearly the King's intrigues to regain his power by the help of foreign troops. To Cromwell the result was also very important, for it made him the most prominent man in England.

After the King's defeat at Naseby a succession of disasters fell on the Royal arms; Leicester surrendered on June 19th, and there were other defeats in Dorset and Wiltshire. The King, however, reached Hereford in safety, where he was joined by General Gerard with 2,000 men.

**Royalist
Disasters**

The opposing parties were now each troubled by the Clubmen, who demanded that they should hold all garrison towns, and maintain the Civil laws of the kingdom in districts unoccupied by troops, while the struggle lasted.

In the north, also, disasters had fallen on the Royal cause. Scarborough, Pontefract, and Carlisle surrendered, and the Scottish army which had been engaged in the siege of the last place invested Hereford.

The King, in writing to Lord Digby on August 3rd, made use of the remarkable expression : " If I cannot live as a King, I will, at least, die like a gentleman," a resolve which he nobly carried out in January, 1649.

George Digby, Earl of Bristol, was only twelve years old when, as a handsome and very clever boy, he presented a petition to the House of Commons in favour of his father, whom the Duke of Buckingham had sent to the Tower of London. The boy, and later the man, was unusually eloquent. He was well educated and possessed of a magnetic personality. He represented Dorset both in the Short and the Long Parliament, and was on the committee for the prosecution of Strafford, but both spoke and voted against the Bill of Attainder. Either from conviction or distrust of the leaders of the Puritan party he gradually went over to the Royal side. He was made a peer; advised King Charles well as to the choice of Ministers, but dishonourably and very badly in the matter of the arrest of the five Members of the

**The Earl of
Bristol**

**Campaign
of 1645**

House of Commons, for which attempted outrage he was chiefly answerable. Digby showed great courage at Edghill and at the siege of Lichfield, where he was wounded.

He and Prince Rupert quarrelled on nearly every occasion on which they were brought together, and his life was indeed a continuous series of contradictions.

Digby left England in 1642 for Holland, fearing that he might be impeached. He greatly assisted Queen Henrietta in obtaining money and arms in Holland. He went to York disguised as a Frenchman, but Charles sent him back to Holland, ostensibly to hasten the receipt of the supply of arms, but in reality because the King was then negotiating, as he hoped favourably, with his enemies, and Digby's presence was inconvenient, for he was one of the most unpopular men of the Royal party. His ship, being captured, was carried into Hull, and he was taken before the Governor, Sir John Hotham, who failed to recognise him in his disguise, until Digby threw himself on his mercy, and Sir John agreed not to betray him.

Hull

It is a curious indication of the divided state of feeling in England that the Parliamentary party, not trusting Sir John Hotham to hold Hull, sent there his eldest son to stiffen his convictions. Digby tried hard to persuade Hotham to hand over Hull to the King, but this he declined to do, when later Digby led a Royal force up to the walls.

**Montrose's
Successes**

The King, leaving Wales, went northwards to Newark, and being followed closely by the Scottish horse, made a raid in East Anglia, and from thence reached Oxford on August 28th. Here he received good news from Montrose, who, with 5,000 men, had overrun and devastated the country from the north to the Forth river; General Baillie was then in position at Kilsyth, to the north of Glasgow, and had he remained there, Montrose would probably have been forced to retire northwards for want of provisions. The Committee of Estates, however, insisted on his attacking Montrose, and while Baillie's men were changing position on August 15th—which was in effect a flank march in the immediate presence of an enemy—the Marquis and his wild clansmen charged and overthrew his horse, which trampled on the infantry: the whole of his troops, breaking, fled in disorder, and were pursued for fourteen miles, losing, it is alleged, 5,000 men. Glasgow and other cities surrendered, all Royalist prisoners

Prince Rupert in Disgrace

87

were given up, and Montrose called a Parliament at Glasgow. **Campaign of 1645**

On receipt of this news, General Leslie took the Scottish Horse from Nottingham back to their own country. King Charles, with 5,000 men, marched from Oxford and raised the siege of Hereford, and was advancing to raise the siege of Bristol when he learnt that Prince Rupert with its garrison had capitulated on condition of a safe conduct to Oxford. **Hereford and Bristol**

The King revoked his commission, and ordered him to leave the kingdom. The Prince, instead of doing so, went towards Newark, and although the King ordered him to remain where he was, he disregarded the command and rode into Newark, the Governor of which (General Gerard) and a hundred men went out as a guard of honour to meet the Prince. After a violent altercation with Prince Rupert, in which most of the King's principal officers took part with the Prince, he and his brother obtained permission from the Parliament to leave the kingdom. Of this, however, they did not avail themselves, and were later shut up with the King in Oxford. **Prince Rupert in Disgrace**

A Court of Inquiry which investigated the circumstances attending the surrender of Bristol unanimously acquitted the Prince of any failure of duty; indeed, Colonel Butler, one of the Parliamentary investing commanders, declared that the city could not have been defended with the numbers available.

While Charles was attempting to raise the siege of Chester he was beaten with a loss of 1,500 men, and retreating to Newark, remained there for a month, until, fearing he might be surrounded, he returned with 500 cavalry to Oxford, where he remained for the winter. **Chester**

On September 13th a great disaster had fallen on Montrose. Most of his Highland followers had gone back to the north, when he was suddenly attacked by General Leslie, near Selkirk, and totally defeated. His men were massacred after the action with barbarities greater even than they had perpetrated at Aberdeen. Montrose himself escaped to the mountains. King Charles's Chancellor, Lord Digby, went into Dorsetshire with 1,500 horsemen, and after some chequered successes in the west of England, reached Dumfries on the way to join Montrose, but hearing of his **Selkirk**

Campaign
of 1645

disaster, they disbanded. Lord Digby went to Ireland to raise troops for the King.

Intrigues of
Charles I.
with Irish

We have shown how the feelings of the Royalists were shocked by the disclosures made in the publication of the King's letters taken at Naseby, but now a further discovery of double-dealing was made known. The King having been disappointed in his hopes of receiving troops from the Duke of Lorraine, had carried on negotiations with the insurgent Irish for the loan of soldiers. They, influenced by their clergy, insisted on the re-establishment of their religion, to which Ormonde, Lord Lieutenant, a loyal supporter of the King, would not consent. Charles sent over the eldest son of the Marquis of Worcester (a Catholic, and a warm personal friend, whom he had lately created Earl of Glamorgan), with instructions to treat with the Irish. Glamorgan's orders had many blanks in them, which he was authorised to fill up, and he carried with him on April 30th, 1645, letters to Rinuccini, the Pope's Nuncio. Glamorgan communicated part of his instructions to Lord Ormonde, and in August concluded a treaty with the Catholics for the loan of 10,000 men and a subsidy, in return for which the Catholics were to have the free exercise of their faith. Lord Ormonde was at the time negotiating a public treaty, less favourable to the Catholics on the point of religion. On October 17th the Archbishop of Tuam was killed in a skirmish, and copies of all the documents, being found in his carriage, were sent to Westminster.

When Lords Ormonde and Digby heard of this, at Christmas, 1645, they proposed to arrest Glamorgan for high treason, and Lord Digby wrote a very strong protest to the King against his conduct. The King sent a message to the Parliament at Westminster, January 29th, 1646, solemnly disavowing Glamorgan's action, while to Ormonde he wrote evasively that he could not remember having given Glamorgan such a Warrant. The King's disavowal had no effect in England, as even his friends had ceased to believe his statements.

In the last quarter of 1645 and the spring of 1646, the whole of the south and west of England fell into the hands of the Parliamentary party, and in April General Fairfax brought his troops back to Newbury. The King's only hope now of regaining his power lay in the quarrels between the

Charles a Prisoner to the Scots 89

Independents and Presbyterians, which deepened daily. The actual numbers in Parliament were singularly level, decisions being given by a few votes on either side, and on one important occasion by one vote. The King intrigued with all parties in turn, writing to Lord Digby his hopes of being able "to draw either the Presbyterians or Independents to side with me for extirpating one or the other, and then I shall be really King again." He employed the French Envoy, Montreuil, to negotiate for him with the Scots, and his negotiations with the Parliament, together with their vote, December 1st, 1645, indicated that he was willing to make twenty of his opponents dukes, earls, or barons, the greater number of those selected being Presbyterians. They had a majority in Parliament and proposed to maintain and strengthen the King's power by the creation of nobles and promotion of others who had been fighting against the Monarch.

Campaign
of 1645

The Parliamentary troops closed around Oxford in the spring of 1646, and on April 27th the King quitted the town disguised as a servant. He stayed at Downham, in Norfolk, while Mr. Hudson, a clergyman, who had travelled with him, saw Montreuil at Newark. In accordance with their arrangements, Charles went with Montreuil to Lord Leven's head-quarters, May 5th, and was, for the remainder of his life, a prisoner. Lord Leven treated him with outward courtesy, but when the King—to test his position—"gave the parole" to the guard on his house, Leven, interposing, said, "Your Majesty had better leave that to me, as I am the older soldier."

Campaign
of 1646

The Scots having got possession of the King's person forced him to order Newark to be surrendered to them. The Scots immediately marched northwards, for the House of Commons at Westminster had passed a vote that "the King's person should be disposed of by both Houses, and that he be sent to Warwick Castle."

At Newcastle the King was respectfully treated, and he discussed with a minister the establishment of the Presbyterian form of religion, but nothing came of these discussions, and the Scots negotiating with Parliament, on August 12th, agreed to leave the kingdom if they were paid £400,000.

In August Parliament sent what were practically the

Charles
given up to
Parliament,
1647

Uxbridge articles of agreement, with limitations of Royal powers, which the King refused, and on February 1st, 1647, Charles was given up by the Scots, and conducted to Holmby House, Althorpe, Northamptonshire. Charles declared that he was "bought and sold." The first allegation as to the transaction was not accurate, as he went voluntarily to join the Scottish army, hoping to induce it to act against the Parliamentary party at Westminster. It should be said in extenuation of what, at the best, seems to be a mean transaction, that the Scots could not hope to fight with success against the New Model Army; and they were advised by the leading Presbyterians that they could never get the Independent army (the chiefs of which were the Monarch's most implacable opponents) disbanded until they had the King with them. The first Civil War was now over.

The Marquis of Montrose, on receipt of orders from the King to disband his force, retired to the Continent. Lord Ormonde concluded peace with the Irish Catholics, but the Pope's Nuncio, Rinuccini, and the priests, would not be satisfied with anything short of the suppression of Protestantism, so Ormonde, on February 22nd, 1647, handed Dublin over to the Parliamentary representatives.

The King had been supported for three and a half years by the generous, disinterested loyalty of the greater part of the nobility and upper classes, who had given their lives in many cases, and their property, in defence of the monarchical principle. The King had relied on aristocrats, and had enlisted Irish, Scotch, Welsh, Dutch, and soldiers from Lorraine, to fight his battles; while Fairfax and Cromwell had gained over the middle-class yeoman farmers and tradesmen—in a word, the English nation.

The Presbyterian form of worship was now established by Ordinance, but except in London and in Lancashire it was never brought into working order, for in England the mass of the people disliked the "ministers" more than they had objected to the bishops.

CHAPTER VIII

THE REPUBLIC

A Government without Power—The Army Turns Against Parliament—Cromwell Acts as Peacemaker—Ireton and Fleetwood—The Army's Demands—Petitions in Favour of the King—Negotiations with Charles—"Agreement of the People"—Cromwell Gains Over the Army—Charles Flees to the Isle of Wight—The King and the Scottish Commissioners—Cromwell's Army Reforms—Charles and the Scots.

THE new Ordinances, which were referred to in the previous chapter, instituted a Presbyterian Republic, but it was a form of Government without power, as, indeed, the majority in Parliament now realised, for it began to be seen that the victors of Marston Moor and Naseby were mainly Independents who were opposed to any form of State Church. The Presbyterians, to avert the danger impending from their opponents, voted that Fairfax and the greater part of the Army should go to Ireland to suppress the insurgent Catholics. But with a stupidity strange amongst men, some of whom were clever, Parliament delayed to adjust the soldiers' pay, and in the first instance proposed to disband with two months' pay all the men of regiments who were unwilling to cross the Irish Channel. The Army, on the other hand, besides the arrears of pay, wished for an Act of Indemnity for all deeds done during the war, and failing to obtain satisfactory answers from Parliament, advanced towards London. The House summoned to the Bar certain of the officers who were suspected of being ringleaders in the Army movements against Parliament, and resolved that three regiments, the officers of which were mainly Presbyterians, should be retained in England.

Two deputations went from the Houses of Westminster to the Army, which was, however, firm. Colonel Lambert, as the spokesman, stood out for the three main conditions, which had been demanded: "the arrears of pay," an "Act of Indemnity," and that the regiments going to Ireland should proceed as then organised. The House

A Presby-
terian Re-
public

Trouble
with the
Army, 1647

Our Fighting Services

Trouble
with the
Army, 1647

imprisoned some officers; ordered all to take no part with their men who might attempt to obtain redress of grievances, and reiterated the order that the men who refused to go to Ireland should be dismissed with six weeks' pay.

The attempt to separate the interests of officers and soldiers induced the non-commissioned officers, later called Agitators, to hold meetings, and the result was a peculiar system of military Parliaments, the Upper House being represented by officers, and the Lower House by private soldiers. The resolution of Parliament was ill-advised, for the keystone of an army is lost when the interests of the officers and men cease to be identical.

It was soon apparent to Parliament, from the outspoken statements of Fairfax, Cromwell, and Skippon, that the Army would not go to Ireland unless it was fairly treated, and three delegates from the Agitators by their demeanour frightened the House into a more reasonable mood. Cromwell now offered to interpose as a peacemaker, and the House sent him with General Skippon, and Colonels Ireton and Fleetwood, to effect a compromise with the troops then at Saffron Walden.

Henry
Ireton
(1611-1651)

Ireton had married Bridget Cromwell in June, 1645, when the Colonel was employed with the force investing Oxford, and Fleetwood, on Ireton's death in 1651, married his widow. Both men were intimate associates of Cromwell. Ireton, a country gentleman, had taken his degree at Oxford, and was a barrister-at-law. He was active, hard-working, and clever, an adept in the making of Constitutions, although somewhat verbose. Later, when the King for some time was a prisoner, Ireton worked honestly with Cromwell to effect a compromise in the direction of a Constitutional Monarchy, but in 1648, when convinced of the King's persistent insincerity, he became a strenuous advocate for his execution. He had great influence over his father-in-law, to whose command in Ireland he succeeded in 1650, when Parliament recalled Cromwell on being threatened by invasion by the Scots.

Ireton had many fine qualities, for although Cromwell gladly accepted a pension of £2,500, yet when Ireton, after his successes in Ireland, was offered a pension of £2,000, he absolutely refused it, saying that "Parliament had better pay its debts before it thought of giving presents."

Fleetwood, another influential Republican, was Governor of Bristol in 1645; he took an important part in gaining the victory at Dunbar in 1650. He became Lord Deputy of Ireland, in 1654, but although very brave in action he was irresolute and weak in council. Cromwell had taken the measure of his character, for when he became his son-in-law by marrying Bridget Ireton, he wrote to him, "Take heed of your natural inclination to compromise." He was ambitious of power, but yet scrupulous as to the means of gaining it; and though on Cromwell's death he angled for the accession to the Protectorate, yet he made only a half-hearted effort to supplant Richard Cromwell in that position.

Charles
Fleetwood
(d. circa
1695)

It is impossible to resist the conviction that Cromwell, Ireton, and Fleetwood pulled the strings of the Saffron Walden discussions. The Committee reported to the House of Commons "that they found in the Army no distemper, but many grievances," and the House thanked the Committee for its report.

The Saffron
Walden
Discussions,
1647

In spite of the approval of the House of Commons, it took no steps to remedy the alleged grievances, and on May 29th Fairfax reported to the Speaker that the Army could not be disbanded before it was satisfied. He at the same time, for his own safety, ordered it to concentrate nearer London.

Mr. Holles, the leading Presbyterian member of House, proposed a motion for Cromwell's arrest, but having been forewarned, Cromwell rejoined the troops, with whom he was incurring danger of his life, as they were blaming him, though unjustly, for not having supported with sufficient vigour their reasonable claims for arrears of pay. They stood for liberty of conscience, and so, for the sake of true religion, it was fortunate for the Nation that the Army at this moment was the all-powerful factor in England. The privates differed from those of any army ever seen before or since in the world. They comprised tenant-farmers, small traders who had subsisted for a long time at their own cost, their pay being months in arrear; yet they never pillaged or committed outrages on the inhabitants of the county in which they campaigned; although fanatical, and after a battle brutally cruel, yet they lived at other times—according to their lights—godly.

Cromwell
the
Army

Charles at
Hampton
Court, 1647

pious lives. Mr. Green, the historian, holds that the views of the New Model Army were as superior to those of the Parliament as their spokesman, Ireton, was in practical ability higher than any statesman then at St. Stephen's.

The Independents in the Army now learnt that the Presbyterian party were about to take possession of the King's person, for in England there was a deep if unrepresented monarchical feeling. During the night, June 3rd-4th, Cornet Joyce carried Charles off from Holmby House to Hampton Court. Cromwell was apparently then on his way to the Army, but there can be but little doubt of his having countenanced Joyce's action, and Charles himself apparently anticipated and encouraged it. Two days later the Army sent up a "solemn engagement" that it would neither disband nor reduce its numbers until it had obtained satisfaction. On June 14th the Army demanded, in a petition drawn up by Colonel Ireton, the expulsion of eleven Members of Parliament, with the name of Mr. Holles first on the list. In a heated argument in the House, Holles had struck Ireton in the face, and the other ten members had vilified the troops. With this demand were coupled many others, reasonable in themselves, for the amending of the Constitution, such as "a limitation of Parliaments," "religious liberty," and "auditing of accounts." On the 25th Parliament declined to expel the eleven Members, so the Army advanced to within a few miles of London, and the objectionable Members then left the House on leave of absence. They were replaced in their seats by a City mob which invaded the House, but eventually retired without doing any mischief.

The
Expelled
Members

Negotia-
tions with
Charles

Throughout the summer there were many petitions in favour of the King, who was allowed to receive his family, and with whom Fairfax, Cromwell, and Ireton had frequent interviews. It seems that at this time the Independent leading Army men anticipated the possibility of a Restoration. In conversation with the King, Colonel Ireton said bluntly: "Sir, you intend to arbitrate between us and the Parliament, but we mean to arbitrate between Your Majesty and the Parliament."

Fairfax, on July 8th, recommended to Parliament milder treatment of the Monarch; the Army submitted

Cromwell and the Mutinous Troops 95

recommendations drawn up by Ireton which were more favourable to the King than those previously put forward, but these propositions were rejected with scorn.

Negotiations with Charles, 1647

A mob organised in the City having invaded the Houses of Parliament, 14 of the Lords, and 100 of the Commons sought the protection of the Army then on Hounslow Heath. Fairfax replaced them in the House on August 7th, having marched troops up to the City, and was thanked by Parliament, who appointed him Constable of the Tower of London. Parliament now offered the King fresh terms, which he declined, preferring those drawn up previously by Ireton.

Charles was at the same time, however, negotiating with the Scots, who had protested against his abduction from Holmby House. This correspondence soon became known, and then the tone of the Army generally, and especially those representing the non-commissioned officers and privates, became sensibly harder against the Monarch.

On November 16th, 16 regiments put forward a document called the "Agreement of the People," apparently aimed at Colonel Ireton and Sir Harry Vane, the proposals of which were, however, of a more Republican nature than those previously submitted, and Parliament in consequence decreed, Cromwell and Ireton concurring, that there should be no further negotiations with King Charles.

The "Agreement of the People"

Fairfax, on November 8th, assembled officers and Agitators on Putney Heath. He forbade the latter to reassemble, or take steps to influence the men; he sent the officers back to their regiments to restore discipline, which had been seriously impaired by the action of a sect, later called "Levellers." He ordered the regiments to assemble in brigades, which had then recently been organised, and announced his intention of inspecting them in succession, that he might explain the political situation.

Cromwell and the Mutinous Troops

Fairfax and Cromwell met a brigade of three Horse and three Foot regiments near Ware; but two other corps under Harrison and Rainsborough, which contained a number of Levellers, came without being ordered to attend. Rainsborough's regiment had expelled all officers except one captain, and all the men wore in their hats documents called, "Agreement of People Soldiers' Right."

It is somewhat remarkable that Cromwell addressed the

**Cromwell
Pacifies
the Army**

regiments, although the Lord-General Fairfax was present. He gained over every corps, except that of Colonel Rainsborough's, the men of which remained defiant. Cromwell now directed that anyone with grievances should step forward; 14 men came to the front; three were tried by court martial and were found guilty, and one, selected by lot, was shot in front of the regiment. There is no doubt that Cromwell, in supporting the Ireton propositions for a compromise with the King, had risked his life and reputation with the troops, but he regained his influence with them to some extent when it became known that the night before these proceedings at Ware Charles had escaped from Hampton Court, fearing to be assassinated by Levellers, and had fled to Carisbrooke Castle, Isle of Wight.

In the House of Commons Ireton had just been excluded from the Council of Independents, and Cromwell had been threatened with impeachment. The whole situation was changed as regards Cromwell and Ireton, when in a short time it became known that while they were risking their lives for Charles he was conducting another negotiation with Parliament, arranging for a Royalist rising, and was treating with the Scots for the re-establishment of the Presbytery in England.


**Charles and
the Scottish
Commis-
sioners,
1647**

We are anticipating the course of events, but it is convenient to state here that under the agreement with the Scottish Commissioners, signed December 26th, 1647, the Scots undertook to reinstate the King, and he promised, while retaining the Church of England form for his own private devotions, to guarantee that his English subjects should follow the Presbyterian ritual for three years, although he had sworn at his Coronation to maintain the Established Church. He undertook also to suppress the Independents, of which sect Cromwell was the principal person.

When the King, riding off from Hampton Court, gave himself up to Colonel Hammond at Carisbrooke, the soldiers realised that their suspicions of Cromwell going over to the Monarch, and leaving them with their arrears unpaid, were unfounded.

Fairfax was still short of money to pay the Army, and in December ordered a battalion into the City to put pressure on the inhabitants for an instalment of pay long







OLIVER CROMWELL
From the Portrait by Robert Walker
in the National Portrait Gallery



The Scots Raise Troops for Charles 97

since due to the men. Cromwell, at the request of the House of Commons, induced Fairfax to countermand the order. He obtained funds and discharged a number of men, adopting a principle followed 250 years later by slightly increasing the number of Cadres and reducing the number of Effectives. By discharging the younger soldiers he minimised the total sum required to pay the arrears in full.

**Charles
Negotiates
with Parlia-
ment, 1647**

King Charles from Carisbrooke reopened negotiations with Parliament, and at the same time endeavoured to arrange terms with the Duke of Hamilton. He was now the head of the Moderate party in Scotland, and early in 1648, the King having promised the re-establishment of the Presbytery in England, the Scots began to raise troops to help him.

CHAPTER IX

THE SECOND CIVIL WAR

Royalist Outbreaks—Rage of Parliamentarians—The Country is Divided—Fate of Royalist Prisoners—Cromwell Threatens Scotland—"Pride's Purge"—Charles is Tried at Westminster—Execution of the King—Commonwealth Decreed—The Condition of England after Execution of Charles I.—Cromwell Puts Down Mutiny—Cromwell Accepts Command in Ireland.

Royalist
Outbreaks,
1648

KING CHARLES'S schemes bore fruit in May, 1648. There were outbreaks of Royalists in Essex, Kent, Hertford, and in Wales. The fleet in the Downs having landed those captains who were Parliamentarians, hoisted the King's flag and blockaded the Thames, eventually, however, sailing to Holland, the crews hesitating which party they should follow. The Scots seized Berwick and Carlisle.

These proofs of the King's double-dealing enraged the New Model Army, and before their leaders started to suppress the Royalist outbreaks, they held a solemn prayer-meeting, and resolved: "That it is our duty, if ever the Lord brings us back again, to call Charles Stuart, that man of blood, to account for the blood he has shed and the misery he has done against the Lord's people in this poor nation."

Fairfax, in a short time, dispersed the Kentish insurgents, and drove them and those in East Anglia into Colchester, putting down at the same time a rising under Lord Holland near London.

Cromwell suppressed the rising in Wales, and on July 11th, 1648, took Pembroke Castle. He then marched northwards to help Colonel Lambert, who with a few troops was facing the Scots, who were advancing, it was said, with 20,000 men, to be reinforced later by 3,000 English Royalists.

The Royalist and Parliamentary gentry in the North and Midlands had raised bodies of troops, mainly, however, for local services. The Scots and Royalists quarrelled.

The Scottish Invasion of England 99

and eventually they agreed to advance in separate bodies, the English Royalists leading. The Scots had crossed the border before they were fully mobilised, and advanced slowly while waiting for drafts.

Scottish
Invasion

On July 14th Cromwell marched northwards, three days after taking Pembroke. He had written for boots to be sent to meet him in Northamptonshire and got them on August 3rd. One regiment of Cavalry and 3,000 Infantry now received their first instalment of pay for many months. When Cromwell reached Doncaster his men had marched 320 miles, the first 10 over a mountainous country with bad roads which made it the more irksome, for many of the soldiers were barefooted. The garrisons of Scarborough Castle and Tynemouth declared for the King, but this action had little or no effect on the situation, and is mentioned merely to indicate the divided state of feeling in the country.

Cromwell's
March
North

Early in August the Duke of Hamilton, who believed Cromwell to be still before Pembroke Castle, was advancing with 23,000 men towards Lancashire. He had not followed the eastern, or more direct road, which ran through a populous district, because Newcastle and York were held for the Parliament. The road selected, through Carlisle and Westmorland to Preston, passes over a mountainous district in the latter county, with several steep passes. South Lancashire was then sparsely populated, and Hamilton, with the Cumberland mountains on his right and the Pennine range on his left, moved in a continuous defile. The line of advance, however, ran mainly through a Royalist district, and Hamilton expected a reinforcement of Royalist troops from Ulster to be landed in Morecambe Bay.

Cromwell having received some artillery from Hull, joined Lambert at Wetherby, mustering 8,600 men of all arms, but a few days later, finding great difficulty in transporting his guns, left them at Knaresborough.


Hamilton had billeted his troops on the evening of August 15th in Preston. Sir M. Langdale's force, in its position at Longridge Chapel, had, without any design, become a flanking screen for the Duke's advance. General Monro, with the Irish contingent of 1,200 horse and 1,500 foot, was a day's march in the rear. Hamilton, a brave though an incompetent general, heard that the Parlia-

Our Fighting Services

Preston,
1648

mentary troops were near Longridge Chapel, but continued his march towards Wigan, leaving Langdale with 3,000 foot and 600 horse to face Cromwell's troops.

Cromwell slept at Stonyhurst Hall on the 16th, and advancing before daylight, attacked Langdale's men, who resisted bravely during four hours, but were then utterly routed. When Hamilton arrived he led several charges in order to check the pursuit, and then escaped by swimming to the south bank of the River Ribble, and rejoined the Scottish



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF PRESTON, AUG. 17th, 1648

column. Cromwell killed 1,000, and took 4,000 prisoners, who were so demoralised that he considered it safe to leave them in charge of a very small guard, with strict orders to slaughter them, if Monro, coming up with the Irish contingent, should endeavour to release them.

The Duke of Hamilton, when Langdale was attacked, sent to recall Middleton from Wigan, but he, by marching on another road, missed his own army, and at daylight next morning faced Cromwell.

Hamilton's retreat was very badly managed. He had given instructions that the powder and trains were to be destroyed. The orders were not executed, however, and all fell into the hands of Cromwell's troops. Half of the Royalist foot straggled during the night and never rejoined their regiments. Sir James Turner gave a vivid account

of his experiences. He had formed a battalion of pikemen, standing closely together in the streets of Wigan to act as rear-guard, when somewhat later a body of Cavalry appeared fleeing from Cromwell's men. Turner ordered the pikemen to open out and let them through, that they might join the retreating army. He excuses his men as being demented, but two of them tried to kill him, and although by catching one pike in his hand he saved his chest, another soldier drove his pike two inches deep into Turner's leg.

Preston.
1648

Sir James, now in despair, ordered the horsemen to charge his own pikemen, but they refused, being afraid of the serried weapons gleaming under a bright moon. He then sent a man behind the horsemen to shout that Cromwell's men were coming on. At that the Royalist cavalry in their terror rode the pikemen down, and many others, as they galloped onwards in their flight!

Hamilton ordered General Baillie to make terms with Cromwell, who had pressed on in pursuit, while he with 3,000 cavalry endeavoured to retreat northwards. Cromwell took 10,000 prisoners in all. He sent Lambert to pursue the fugitives, and General the Earl of Callender was the only officer of note who escaped.

On the outbreak of the Royalist rising Parliament had passed an Ordinance on May 11th directing that no quarter should be given to anyone found bearing arms for the King. The prisoners who escaped death on the field were divided into classes. Those who had been impressed were discharged on promising never again to invade England; and those who had voluntarily enlisted were sold as slaves to contractors for resale, for the most part to planters in Virginia, and others to the Venetian Government for work as galley-slaves.

"No
Quarter"
Ordinance

In East Anglia Colchester Castle surrendered to Fairfax, who had the two senior officers, Sir Charles Lucas and Sir George Lisle, shot. They died with stoical courage.

Colchester

Cromwell, after giving orders for the disposal of prisoners and the pursuit of the Duke of Hamilton, who was taken and later beheaded, moved on to the north of England. The cavalry he found there had been greatly neglected. The men had not received any pay, ration, or forage money for months, and had not sufficient cash

Cromwell
in the
North

Our Fighting Services

**Berwick,
1646**

to pay for their horses' shoeing. In consequence, his pursuit of General Munro's force was necessarily slack. The English Royalist horsemen, with the Irish contingent, after being refused admittance into Berwick, dispersed. The Governor of that town refused Cromwell admittance a fortnight later, doubting which side was going to win!

Falkirk

General Munro joined the Earl of Lanark, the elder brother of Hamilton, near Edinburgh, and killed, as the Covenanters alleged, during a truce, some 700 of Argyll's troops near Falkirk. The Earl then begged for Cromwell's assistance, who demanded as a preliminary step the surrender of Berwick and Carlisle, threatening, unless they were given up, to invade Scotland. The forts were then handed over.

**Cromwell in
Edinburgh**

The country had been cruelly devastated, but Cromwell maintained strict discipline. In a newly raised corps some of the men took horses from farmers on the Tweed. Cromwell had the horses restored, punished the officers, discharged the culprits, and sent the regiment back to Northumberland in disgrace. On October 3rd Cromwell was received at Edinburgh as an honourable ally by Argyll and his party; Scotland, however, lost an instalment of £100,000 of the English war indemnity promised when the Scots handed over King Charles, but which was now deducted in consequence of Hamilton's invasion.

Pontefract

Cromwell failed to capture Pontefract, and returned to London, for it seemed the Independent party in the House of Commons was losing ground.

In July the King had been sanguine that he would regain his power, but the fall of Colchester, and the disasters at Wigan restored the confidence of his opponents, which was further increased by Cromwell's arrangement with Argyll, whose party was now dominant in Scotland, and who promised to penalise all those who had taken part in Hamilton's invasion.

**Affairs at
West-
minster**

While Cromwell and other members of the Independents were suppressing the Royalists, the Presbyterian party got the upper hand in the Houses of Westminster. After the Battle of Naseby small batches of writs had been issued from time to time, and 235 new Members had been elected whose views were distinctly more moderate than those of Cromwell and his friends. Thus the Presbyterian

party had now got a majority in the House of Commons. The eleven Members inimical to the soldiery were recalled from leave; the troops remained unpaid, and in spite of the previous votes declaring that no further negotiations should be entered into with the King, a treaty was commenced with him at Newport, Isle of Wight. It transpired also that many Presbyterians had countenanced the recent outbreaks.

Affairs at
Westmin-
ster, 1648

The Army head-quarters at St. Albans demanded that the King should be brought to trial, and Cromwell was sent for by his friends in the House, but ere he arrived drastic action had been taken by the Heads of the Army. The King, who on two different occasions had nearly escaped, and might now have possibly done so, was warned by his attendants that a force sent by Parliament was coming to arrest him, and was urged to leave Newport. He declined, because not only had he given his parole, but he had also promised the Commissioners to wait twenty days for the answer to his proposals. He was taken to Hurst Castle on November 30th. It was a moated residence built by Henry VIII. on the extreme point of a spit of sand on the north side of the Solent, five miles south of Lymington.

Charles at
Hurst
Castle

At the time of the King's removal the Army marched to Windsor, and some troops were sent to the vicinity of the Houses at Westminster. Nevertheless, on December 5th both Houses voted for acceptance of the terms of peace which the King had offered. Next morning, however, troops under command of Colonel Pride occupied Westminster Hall and all approaches to the House. The colonel had been furnished with a list of the Members who had voted in the majority the previous day, and with the assistance of a Peer to whom all were known he turned those back, and arrested all inimical to the Independents who tried to enter the House. The following day 40 more were put aside, and in all 143 members were excluded.

Cromwell arrived in London on the evening of the first day's outrage on the House—vulgarly called "Pride's purge"—and cannot, therefore, be held directly responsible for it. Nevertheless, there is no doubt of his views on the subject, for in May, 1647, when talking with Mr. Ludlow, M.P., about some violent scenes which had just then taken

Trial of
Charles I.,
1649

place during a debate, he observed: "These people will never leave off until the army takes them by the ears and turns them out of Parliament." When he arrived in London he approved of the exclusion, and undertook to maintain it.

What remained of the House of Commons, commonly called "the Rump," passed an Ordinance on January 16th, 1649, setting up a High Court of 150 Commissioners, selected from the House, and from the City of London, with the addition of three judges, for the trial of the King. The House of Lords, now only twelve in number, unanimously and passionately rejected the measure.

Later another resolution was passed, reducing the High Court to 137 and omitting the judges. Fifty-two members, including Cromwell, Fairfax and Ireton, attended the trial, and on January 26th, 62 being present, though Fairfax had absented himself for the last ten days, condemned the King to death, abolished the monarchy and the Upper House.

Execution
of the King

King Charles was beheaded on January 29th, 1649, behaving with perfect dignity and fortitude, thus fully redeeming the resolution he had expressed two years earlier in a letter to Lord Digby that, if such were to be his fate, "he would die like a gentleman."

Andrew Marvell, the Republican poet and Civil Servant (1621-78), in his Horatian ode on Cromwell's triumphant return after subjugating Ireland 17 months later alluded thus to "the Royal actor on the tragic scaffold":

He nothing mean nor common did
Upon that memorable scene;
But with his keener eye
The axe's edge did try:
Nor called the gods with vulgar spite.
To vindicate his helpless right;
But bowed his comely head
Down, as upon a bed."

The execution of the King caused in Great Britain a decided reaction in favour of the monarchy. The regicides doubtless felt that unless King Charles was killed they would lose their heads, but it was soon realised by all the King's opponents that they had committed "not only a crime but a blunder." The nation forgot the cruel tyranny of the previous decade and the despotic acts perpetrated

in the King's name; forgot the nose-splitting, ear-cropping of vulgar pamphleteers, who had coarsely assailed Episcopacy and its upholders. The King, by his dignified appeal against the grotesque illegality of his trial, by his protest against the interference with the people's Rights, and by his Regal indifference to the headsman's axe, caused the Nation to forget his persistent treacheries to friends as well as to foes, and amongst the mass of the people he got the credit of dying to maintain their liberties, which he had striven his utmost for ten years to destroy.

Reaction in
Favour of
Charles I.

It was not until May 19th that "the Commonwealth without any King or House of Lords" was decreed. Even those Presbyterians whom the Heads of the Army had replaced in power refused to accept the new form of government. Argyll and his followers in Scotland proclaimed Charles the Second King, and invited him to ascend the Throne. Ormonde, in the name of the Irish Catholics, proclaimed the Prince, inviting him to Ireland, and promising him a welcome from three-fourths of the people. The majority of the nominated Council of State refused to take an oath which involved approval of the execution of the King and support of the Commonwealth. Half the judges retired; thousands of clergy refused to support the new Government.

The
Common-
wealth
Decreed,
May, 19,
1649

The oligarchical Government soon after the King's death had trouble with the Army, the discipline of which Members of the House of Commons had undermined. Petitions from officers and privates were received calling for annual Parliaments, and complaining that the Self-Denying Act had been allowed to fall into disuse. This was a fact, for when its primary object—the removal of certain generals—had been gained, no further action had been taken.

Certain regiments under orders for Ireland, where Cromwell had been directed to take 4,000 men, became insubordinate. At the "Bull" Tavern, Bishopsgate Street, in the City, a troop of Colonel Whalley's regiment seized the guidon and refused to march. Fairfax and Cromwell went immediately to the City and tried certain of the ring-leaders by Court Martial, causing one to be shot in St. Paul's churchyard, although he had seven years previous good service. His comrades gave the corpse a military funeral, which was attended by thousands of people,

Mutiny in
the Army

Mutiny in
the Army.
1649

including many of the better classes, who strewed flowers on the grave.

Fairfax and Cromwell ordered their own regiments to parade in Hyde Park on May 9th, when Fairfax asked Cromwell, who was ten years older in age, and when talking to soldiers was a persuasive orator, to address the men. He made a powerful appeal to them, as citizens, showing how trade had been re-established, and mentioned the steps had been taken to dissolve the present Parliament. He then pointed out to them, as soldiers, the absolute necessity of discipline in an army, not only for the sake of the country but for the sake of the troops themselves. He gained over the majority as a strong-willed man generally can convince weaker minds, and as a good officer can persuade men he has personally led forward under fire. Cromwell realised better than any of his contemporaries the true definition of an army, which is "a collection of armed men obliged to obey one man." Only one trooper showed signs of insubordination, and he was made a prisoner, but on expressing contrition was pardoned. Mr. John Lilburn and five Levellers, who had instigated insubordination, were imprisoned.

There were, however, outbreaks in several regiments at different places. At Salisbury about 1,000 Cavalry mutinied. Fairfax and Cromwell on receiving the news, started immediately with the regiments which Cromwell had addressed in Hyde Park. They marched in the first instance to Alton, and then turning northwards, learnt at Andover that the mutineers had proceeded towards the Thames. When the mutineers heard of Fairfax's approach they also moved northwards, and crossing the Thames with some difficulty, reached Burford, to the west of Oxford, on May 13th. Fairfax followed in pursuit, and at nightfall sent Cromwell, as soon as the horses had been fed, in pursuit. Cromwell reached Burford at midnight. As all the Levellers were supposed to be equal, they had posted neither outposts nor guards, and having stabled their horses, were in bed. Cromwell guarded all the roads out of the town, and captured nearly all the mutineers with scarcely a struggle, taking 900 horses.

Next morning he tried every tenth man by Court Martial, all of whom were sentenced to death.

He had the prisoners collected on the top of the church, and shot a cornet and two corporals against its walls, who, expressing contrition, died courageously. Another cornet, having expressed sorrow and avowed the justice of his sentence, was with all the others forgiven. The men now petitioned Fairfax for pardon. He was in command of the Army, and so it was natural that the petition should be addressed to him. But it is probable that the men realised his nature was softer than that of Cromwell, who had said in Parliament before starting to pursue the mutineers: "I tell you, you must cut those people to pieces, or they will kill you." Fairfax and Cromwell now returned to London, after being feasted at Oxford, where both received the honorary dignity of D.C.L.

**Mutiny in
the Army.
1649**

The Commonwealth Government was in trouble, and was claiming the attention of the generals. Scotland had refused to accept the new Government of England on any terms, and Lord Ormonde in Dublin was equally opposed to it. Cromwell, having accepted the command of Ireland, insisted that the accounts for the campaign in the north of England should be at once audited. They were passed, but even when this was done he declined to quit London until he had received sufficient cash for the payment of the troops. He left on July 10th, in a State coach drawn by six horses; his bodyguard (80 in number) being all of the upper classes, and many senior Army officers accompanying him.

**Cromwell
Goes to
Ireland**

CHAPTER X

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRELAND, 1649-51

The Irish Situation—Prince Rupert Defeated by Popham—Royalist Vessels Defeated in the Channel—Cromwell Goes to Dublin—Barbarities in Ireland—Drogheda—A Ruthless Massacre—Battle of Rathmines—Wexford—Cork—Kilkenny—Cromwell Returns—Waterford—Cromwell's Successes in Ireland—Fall of Limerick.

The Irish
Situation,
1642-49

DURING the first Civil War the Protestants in Ireland had been divided into three groups: at Dublin, Belfast and Derry, and Cork. The Catholics had held all the centre of Ireland, and were also in three parties: in Ulster, Sir Owen Roe O'Neil; in the centre, Lord Preston; and there was a third division which was called the Pope's party.

In May, 1648, when the Royalist outbreaks constituting the Second Civil War occurred in Great Britain, Lord Inchquin and Colonel Monro declared for Charles II.

Lord Ormonde came back to Cork at the end of September, 1649, and entered into friendly relations with Lord Inchquin and Colonel Monro, while many of the Catholics, with Sir Roe O'Neil, sided with Monk. The situation was very complicated, for the Catholic confederates, in consideration of the grant of a Local Parliament and an unfettered religious system, agreed to furnish Ormonde with 15,000 Foot and 500 Horse.

Prince Rupert arrived off Kinsale from Holland with eleven of the Earl of Warwick's former fleet, which in the Downs had hoisted the King's pennant, and had harassed English commerce as it passed up the Channel. He was defeated by Captain Popham in May, 1649, with a squadron got together by the energetic exertions of Sir Harry Vane.

While Cromwell was still waiting at Bristol for the cash to pay and provision his troops, without which he declined to embark, he sent four regiments to Dublin to reinforce the garrison under Colonel Jones, who was besieged by Lord Ormonde. At this time the cities of Dublin and Londonderry were the only two places of im-

portance held for the Commonwealth. Jones, making a vigorous sortie early in the morning of August 2nd, utterly routed Lord Ormonde, commanding the investing force, in what was called the battle of Rathmines, taking all his guns. Rathmines,
1649

Cromwell reached Dublin on August 15th, having previously sent Ireton to Youghal, with orders to land there, but the garrison refused to receive him. At the end of August, Cromwell, having reorganised Colonel Jones's troops, concentrated 5,000 Horse and 10,000 Foot a few miles to the north of Dublin. When he arrived he found the garrison without discipline. Their enemies under Lord Ormonde had for a long time been acting like guerrillas. The English and Irish soldiers were serving without pay, and there were very few officers to maintain discipline. Lord Ormonde had many men, but no money to pay or subsist them. He had spent all his own fortune in the Royal cause, and could get no more money, and thus outrage succeeded outrage. There was, moreover, between the parties a bitter race hatred, dating from the massacres of November, 1641. The Irish Catholics, who had suffered unceasingly from land spoliations and confiscations ever since the ruthless suppressions of the natives under the officers of Queen Elizabeth, eventually rose against their oppressors. Successive immigration of English and Scotch colonists had pushed out the old owners. They were naturally embittered against men who had driven them off, and taken possession of the land, while the Scotch Presbyterians had been angered by the impending Episcopacy legislation, which they thought—and with reason—Lord Strafford intended to enforce on them. Cromwell
in Ireland

Thousands of murders of men, women, and even children were committed by both parties, Catholics and Protestants outvying each other in atrocious barbarities. It was estimated by Sir William Petty that 500,000 Irish of both creeds perished by violent deaths in ten years. Atrocities
in Ireland

On landing, Cromwell issued a proclamation promising protection to all non-combatants, and security to all who would bring produce into the camp markets. When, on approaching Drogheda, some of his men took to plundering, he promptly hanged two of them. His system of cash payments for all supplies answered so well that, later, when campaigning in the open country, his soldiers were given

Siege of
Drogheda,
1649

ration money, and bought their own supplies in the camp markets, to which the country people flocked in crowds, the troops receiving rations in kind only when in garrison. There was a marked contrast in the feeling of the country people in the vicinity of the opposing forces, the peasants concealing any supplies that they possessed from the Irish fighting for the Royal cause, whose movements were, in consequence, continually hampered by the want of food.

Cromwell, who had sent his battering-train by sea, marched to Drogheda and summoned the place, but in vain. He therefore erected breaching-batteries, and on September 10th breaches were reported to be practicable. Then 1,000 soldiers ran forward, but were met by men of courage equal to their own, and the Parliamentary leader being killed, his followers were driven back, and then outside the approaches.

Cromwell, standing in a breaching-battery, was an eye-witness of this repulse, and now showed the great quality by which he maintained the iron discipline he exacted from his men. He joked with them, he prayed with them, he preached to them, and though he fined them 10d. for every oath they uttered, yet, on the other hand, he ensured their being well fed and regularly paid. This does much to mould troops to a general's will, but above all he never cried "Go on," when men were falling in heaps of mangled bodies, but "Come on!" He ran down from the breaching-battery, and addressing the men cheerily led them to a second and this time successful attack. In his dispatch to Mr. Speaker Lenthall he does not mention his own action, writing: "Our men being encouraged made a second attempt, and God was pleased so to animate them that they got ground of the enemy."

It is sad to record that such a grand soldier should have been so inhuman, tarnishing by his actions not only his own name but that of every Englishman. Except about 120 Royalists who were taken later, and sold as slaves to planters in the West Indies, Cromwell ordered the whole garrison to be killed.

I suppose that there are few men who would attempt to excuse such unnecessary and revengeful slaughter by troops who only lost 100 men in the assault, for the massacre was continued for forty-eight hours.

Ruthless Barbarity

III

Such ruthless severity was common at the time, but there can be no soldier who will fail to condemn Cromwell for his atrocious bad faith as regards the killing of the Governor and his men who were in the keep.

Assault of
Drogheda,
Sept. 10,
1649

When the assaulting column, after having been repulsed and then gallantly led on by Cromwell, got inside the town, the men, being no longer led by their General, were repulsed at the citadel called the Mill Mount. It was difficult of access, protected by strong palisades, and to carry it in the face of brave men must have cost hundreds of lives. Some of Cromwell's officers induced General Sir George Aston to treat for surrender, and later when he had given up his stronghold and Cromwell heard of it, he caused him and his 300 men to be put to the sword. If we admit that all fighting men who surrender unconditionally are, by custom of war, liable to death, yet this understanding could not in any case have been fairly applied to those who had given up, on terms, a nearly inaccessible position. Any officer with a sense of honour would either have spared Sir George Aston and the garrison of the keep, or would have fought it out with them.

Although the times were admittedly cruel, the massacre shocked even some of Cromwell's strong-minded friends in the House of Commons. He attempted in his dispatch, dated a week later at Dublin, which was repulsive in its cruel tone, to justify his wholesale butcheries.

He declared, firstly, that the slaughter was "a righteous judgment of God on wretches who had imbued their hands in innocent blood"; and, secondly, that the "stern lesson would have a good effect in saving effusion of blood later." The allegation that the garrison was responsible for the shedding of innocent blood was an allusion to the massacre by Ulster Irishmen in 1641.

Cromwell could have had no proof, however, that the inoffensive friars, several English officers, and 3,000 soldiers, whom he had killed after the works had fallen, had taken any part in the Ulster massacres. Indeed, it seems from his official report to the Speaker, in which he mentions the names of several regiments in the garrison, that the majority were English Royalists, and it is now accepted by the best authorities that few, or none, of those killed were ever in the north of Ireland.

**Siege of
Wexford,
1649**

His repulsive severity did not have the effect that he alleged he anticipated from it. Although Dundalk and Trim were abandoned by Ormonde's people, yet the massacre in no way frightened the garrison of Wexford where 2,000 men were killed in the streets. It had no effect on the minds of the brave commanders of six other garrisons in the south of Ireland, who, while selling their lives dearly, fought on until they had killed hundreds of brave Englishmen.

Cromwell marched southwards on the coast road, the towns of Arklow, Ferns, and Enniscorthy surrendering as he passed. He was arranging terms with the garrison of Wexford, which stood on the south side of the Slaney river, when Lord Castlehaven reinforced it with 500 men from the north bank.

Siege-guns were landed as negotiations went on, and, according to Cromwell's report to Parliament, the Commissioners sent out by the Governor to arrange terms, being generously treated, fully intended to surrender. With this view some English soldiers were admitted into the castle, and when the Irish soldiers on the parapets of the town wall, looking, saw them on the castle wall, they left their posts. The English, who were standing ready to assault the town, planted their scaling ladders, and without orders rushed into the town, where, after a stern fight, a dreadful massacre ensued. This word adequately describes the situation, for 2,000 Irish perished by the sword or were drowned, while the English had but 20 casualties. Cromwell had given no orders on the subject, and, it is clear, had not foreseen the result. Nevertheless, in a later report he attempted to justify his soldiers' barbarity by allegations of cruelties committed by Catholics on Protestants. In this dispatch he states it is doubtful whether there were more than 20 householders left alive, and recommends that "honest people be sent over from England to settle in the town."

**Ulster
Catholics
and the
Royalists**

While Cromwell was thus occupied at Wexford, Lord Ormonde was treating with Sir Owen Roe O'Neil, for though he had previously concluded a treaty with Colonel Monk, the Westminster Parliament had refused to endorse it, and so the Ulster Catholics went back to the Royalist party.

Cromwell granted terms to the garrison of Ross on

Military Conquest of Ireland 113

October 25th, and about 500 Englishmen, who had originally served in Munster for Parliament, and later for the Royal cause, now returned to the former party and rejoined Cromwell in the Government service. Ross, 1649

The General granted unusually favourable terms to the town, but, in his decision, he showed the intolerance of the Independent party as regards religion. "Where the Parliament of England has power, the celebration of Mass will not be allowed."

Colonel Blake arranged the surrender of Cork and of all the other defended ports south of the Blackwater river. Cromwell had been very ill while investing Waterford, and the garrison of that town being reinforced, he abandoned its siege, and went into winter quarters. At the end of January, 1650, drafts having arrived, the cadres were filled up, and Henry, the most able of his sons, brought over a cavalry regiment. Surrender
of Cork

Cromwell took Kilkenny on March 28th, 1650, and captured a great number of castles. Kilkenny,
1650

While the General was engaged in the siege of Clonmel, a special messenger, who had been sent to Parliament in a man-of-war, arrived off the coast with a repeated request for Cromwell's return to Westminster. Clonmel

Cromwell, handing over the command of the troops to Colonel Ireton, reached London on May 31st, Fairfax and many members of the Government meeting him on Hounslow Heath. As a politician he left in Ireland an abiding sense of English injustice, but as a soldier his success had been remarkable. He had combined the resources of naval and military power to an extent previously unknown. He first seized the towns standing at the mouths of rivers; he then worked up the basins, and in August, 1650, when Waterford surrendered to Colonel Ireton, all the military forces of Ireland, except the valley of the Shannon, had been subdued. In October, 1651, the fall of Limerick completed the military conquest of the island, but many Irish remained elusive and could only be kept down by a Parliamentary army of 30,000 men. Waterford

CHAPTER XI

CROMWELL IN SCOTLAND

The Execution of Montrose—Cromwell Invades Scotland—Dunbar—A Momentous Victory—Charles II. tries to Escape—Surrender of Edinburgh Castle—Coronation of Charles II.—The Royalists March South—Siege of Stirling Castle—Battle of Worcester—Flight of Charles II.—Reception of Cromwell in London—The Military Genius of Cromwell.

Situation in Scotland

THE support of Cromwell's determined character was badly wanted by the Government at the time. The Council of State which ruled the country had no friends Abroad and few at Home, and was on the verge of war with Scotland, for in its composition the Council represented the victory of the Independents over the Presbyterians, culminating in the execution of a Scottish monarch. Scotland was divided in feeling between the Covenanters, and the Royalists. Although Hamilton was dead, the members of his party, however much they might detest Argyll's Covenanters, yet were united with them in hating the Independent leaders of the English Commonwealth.

The Scots had two great objects in view: National independence, for which they were determined to fight as they had fought in the days of Wallace and Bruce in the 14th century, and the imposition of the Presbyterian religion on England. The Commonwealth leaders, mainly Independents, on the other hand, realised that in order to crush the Royalists in England they must first beat down a hostile Scotland.

Execution of Montrose

Montrose, nominated by Charles II. Lieutenant-Governor of Scotland, had recently led a raid from the Orkneys into the north of Ross-shire. He was captured, and hanged in May, 1650. His head and limbs, in accordance with the sentence, were distributed to rot on the gates of Scotland's five principal cities. Charles II. repudiated Montrose's raid, and with cynical ingratitude for the great services he had rendered to his father, declared that the Marquis had acted contrary to his commands.

Charles II. in Scotland

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The Prince arrived at Edinburgh in the summer, where the elders of the Church inflicted on him a series of insults, to which in the first instance he refused to submit; the Covenanters, however, eventually obliged him to repudiate his father's religion, to condemn his mother as an idolatress, and later, under much pressure, he agreed to join the Covenant, but even this concession did not save him from virulent abuse, repeated Sunday after Sunday from the pulpit.

Charles II.
in Scotland,
1650

In London a difficulty arose as to the command of the troops destined for the invasion of Scotland. The Lord-General Fairfax, though he admitted that the Scots would certainly invade England, and would gain greatly by taking the initiative, declined to lead troops across the Border, as he scrupled to break the Covenant; and so Cromwell replaced him, and was at this time given St. James's Palace as a London residence.

It is probable that neither the Covenanters nor Cromwell wished to fight, and there was much wordy warfare before hostilities commenced. The English General had the best of the arguments when he pointed out to the Scots that while they wished to impose their King as a Covenanter on England, he had a Catholic army fighting for him in Ireland.

Cromwell crossed the Border on July 22nd with 16,000 well-trained troops. General Leslie had ordered all the country north of the Tweed near the coast to be devastated, and the Parliamentary troops marched up through a desolate land, all the inhabitants having fled, not only in obedience to Leslie's orders but also from fear of the advancing army commanded by a leader whose ill fame in Ireland had become notorious. After some months, however, the good conduct of the troops, and Cromwell's humanity to non-combatants, gradually reassured the unfortunate inhabitants. The Parliamentary troops had, however, at first to be rationed entirely from their ships, and suffered considerably from fever.

Cromwell
Invades
Scotland,
July, 1650

General Leslie had 22,000 soldiers, very inferior to his opponents both in training and in discipline, so he avoided battle by occupying strong positions from which Cromwell could not for a long time induce him to descend. The Parliamentary General offered battle on July 29th, on the historic field of Pinkie, where the Protector Somerset

Pinkie

Cromwell's
Difficulties
in Scotland,
1650

defeated the Marquis of Huntly on September 10th, 1647. The Scottish General would not, however, fight except on the defensive, and his position was so strong that Cromwell did not venture to attack it. Cromwell, being short of food, moved back to Musselburgh.

Leslie now corresponded with Cromwell, both being anxious to arrange terms of peace. Nothing came, however, of the negotiations, and as continuous bad weather rendered the landing of supplies difficult, Cromwell retired on August 6th to Dunbar, where for some days even the ships' crews were short of food. The General, in the interests of humanity, was obliged to issue corn and peas to save the inhabitants of Dunbar from starvation. When he had again received supplies he resumed his advance, but still the Scots could not be brought to action.

Cromwell on August 30th sent 500 sick men on board ship, falling back next day, so late in the afternoon that Leslie was unable to harass his retreat. The Scottish General was under the impression that Cromwell had embarked all his guns, and purposed to send his infantry back to England by sea. Leslie had blocked Cockburnspath, the only pass over the Lammermuir Hills, and it now appeared to Cromwell himself that nothing but a victory could save him from disaster, and he wrote to this effect to Sir Arthur Hesilrige, the Governor of Newcastle.

Dunbar

The morning of September 3rd dawned bleak and wet, as the previous days had been, and although Cromwell's men suffered from exposure, yet the Scots were in a still worse condition lying on the hills above them. That morning the Parliamentary foot numbered 7,500 infantry and 3,500 cavalry, while Leslie had 16,000 foot and 6,000 horse. Cromwell realising overnight that an attack was impending, had determined to forestall it. At 6 A.M. Colonel Lambert, who had been posting the troops on the extreme right of the Parliamentary position, came back just in time to head the advance, for the General had become impatient. Cromwell attacked the outer flank of Leslie's Right: the Scots being caught while manœuvring, their horsemen were overthrown, after beating Cromwell's horse, and some infantry. Then Cromwell himself, handling a brigade of infantry, exclaimed triumphantly in the words of Psalm lxviii: "Let God arise, let His enemies be scattered." In


The Battle of Dunbar

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an hour the Parliamentary army had conquered, taking **Dunbar, 1650** 10,000 prisoners, 30 cannon, and 10,000 stand of arms, with only about 40 casualties.

The fate of the prisoners was terrible, more especially that of 3,000 sent hastily into England, there being no food at Dunbar. Cromwell wrote to Heslridge, the Governor of Newcastle, urging that the prisoners should be well treated, but the rigid execution of Leslie's previous orders had cleared the country. The prisoners were reduced to digging up roots, and some 1,000 died of starvation. This, the most decisive of Cromwell's battles, won in 60 minutes, had momentous results. It destroyed the claim of the Covenanters to impose on the English people the acceptance of the Presbyterian religion, and it had the curious effect of pleasing the Royalist Scots, who rejoiced over the downfall of the arrogant leaders of the Kirk.

Nearly all the Scottish infantry were killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. General Leslie and 1,500 cavalry reached Stirling, on the Forth, where a work had been



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF DUNBAR, SEPT. 3rd, 1650

Our Fighting Services

**Cromwell's
March to
Edinburgh,
1650**

thrown up to defend the bridge. Some of the Kirk elders took refuge in Edinburgh Castle, which Cromwell did not venture to assault. He wrote to the Governor of Newcastle, on the 4th, 5th, and 9th September, for reinforcements, pointing out, in his practical way of looking at military matters, that now the Scottish army had been destroyed, it was unnecessary to keep more men for the garrisons of Berwick and Newcastle than were sufficient to deal with marauders.

Cromwell, leaving a brigade to besiege Edinburgh, marched over the historic battlefield of Bannockburn, but after reconnoitring Stirling Castle, decided to leave it alone, and then, having stationed a detachment at Linlithgow, he returned to Edinburgh.

**Charles II.
tries to
Escape**

Charles II., who was very weary of the insults he daily suffered from his patrons, the elders of the Kirk, who were at Perth, made two attempts to escape. Both plans miscarried, the Covenanters drawing out troops to arrest his flight, but the attempts showed plainly that he would not undergo further mortification, and the Marquis of Argyll, promising him, on the part of the Covenanters, more considerate treatment, persuaded him to return. These promises were redeemed, but only just in time, for the Highlanders, indignant at the treatment meted out to Charles, had just got to blows with Leslie's troops.

**Surrender
of Edin-
burgh
Castle**

Cromwell, who was besieging Edinburgh Castle, received many letters from Colonel Dundas, who, according to some authorities, "allowed the castle gates to be opened by a golden key." On December 24th the garrison "marched out with honours of war," the English obtaining 67 cannon, large supplies of ammunition, and stores. This surrender terminated active operations south of the Forth river, though marauders continued to give trouble.

**Coronation
of
Charles II.,
1651**

Charles II. was crowned on January 1st, 1651, at Scone, swearing on his bended knees, when the Marquis of Argyll placed the crown on his head, to maintain Presbytery, and to reign according to the views of his patrons; the minister named Douglas enlarging then, and often afterwards, on the sins of Charles's father and grandfather.

Many Scots now joined the Royalists, and in April 20,000 men had been collected, and were encamped under command of the King at Stirling.

The Invasion of England

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Cromwell, who had been very ill, mainly from over-exertion of mind and body, since the fight at Dunbar, recovered his health as the spring came on, and took steps to crush the Royalist army, striking, as usual, at the decisive point. He crossed the Forth river near the present bridge, and having reduced Fifeshire, entered Perth on August 2nd. Charles could not then remain at Stirling, for he was cut off from the Highlands, and so determined to march into England. Argyll, objecting strongly, was permitted to retire to Inveraray, and Charles left Stirling for the south on July 31st with 14,000 men.

Charles II.
Invades
England.
1651

Cromwell, on hearing the news, lost no time in sending Lambert to follow him up with 4,000 horsemen. He also ordered Colonel Harrison with 3,000 men to hang on the flank of the Scottish army, and, leaving Colonel Monk to besiege Stirling and complete the conquest of Scotland, marched as fast as his men could travel southwards, losing in consequence many who were worn out with exertion and could not keep in the ranks.

The Council of State at Westminster were terror-stricken by the news. They thought that the Presbyterians in England had connived in Charles's scheme: that all Royalists would rise, and in the first instance suspected Cromwell himself of treachery. In a few days the Council, regaining courage, took energetic steps against the invaders. They ordered Charles's proclamation to be burnt by the hangman, and directed the Lords Lieutenant of the western counties to assemble their Militia, and march towards Worcester.

Worcester,
1651

Colonel Harrison from Newcastle, and Colonel Lambert from Leith, who had joined forces on August 13th, south of the Mersey, were too late to prevent Charles's army crossing the river. He had been much disappointed as he moved southwards, few or no Royalists having joined his standard. For this failure the Kirk elders were partly responsible, for in their position as Commissioners in attendance on the King, they absolutely refused to allow any men to join the army who would not take the Covenant.

Cromwell, on the other hand, picked up troops as he moved southwards in greater numbers than he had lost from the men who had fallen out from exhaustion since leaving Perth, Fairfax and other local gentlemen helping him with

Our Fighting Services

**Worcester,
1651**

recruits from Yorkshire. He concentrated Harrison and Lambert's forces on August 27th, and just as Fleetwood joined him with several regiments of Militia, the Parliamentary army, on August 29th, reached Upton Bridge, eight miles south of Worcester; Charles, having arrived a few days earlier, had now entrenched a position.

On September 3rd Charles II., seeing from the tower of a church an apparently favourable opportunity, by the separation of the Parliamentary army on either side of the Severn river, decided to attack. He did so; in five hours his force was annihilated, and he became a fugitive, owing his safety from arrest to the generous loyalty of all sorts and conditions of men, beginning with the labouring class, of which the family of the Penderels was the first to harbour him. After many narrow escapes from capture, and two or three attempts at embarkation had failed, he eventually got away from near Shoreham, landing at Fécamp, in Normandy, on October 16th, on the same spot where William the Conqueror embarked in 1066 to invade England.

**Cromwell's
Reception
in England,
1651**

Cromwell, returning to London, was met at Acton by two of the Council of State, deputed by their colleagues to represent it. An incident at Acton indicates that the immoral tone of England on the question of slavery had not changed since the time of Queen Elizabeth. John Hawkins had made his fortune, and money for his Queen in slave-trading, and when knighted for his services in the defeat of the Armada, he took for his coat of arms a design which testified to the nature of the commerce in which he had become rich. Cromwell was very pleased at his reception, and now 100 years later showed his gratitude to the two Commissioners by presenting them each with a horse, and two Scots as prisoners. All the private soldiers taken were sold as slaves, 1,500 being shipped to the Gold Coast.

The General naturally had a triumphant reception in London, since he had saved the Commonwealth, to which the majority of citizens adhered. He must have had a sense of humour, for on a friend congratulating him on the vast crowds collected to see him, he replied: "Ah! but there would be even more come together to see me hanged!"

The limits of this work forbid the discussion of Cromwell's character as a politician, but it may here be remarked that there was little essential difference in his views of

Military Genius of Cromwell

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government by democracy from those which had influenced Charles I. The Monarch on going to the scaffold, enunciated his conviction that "The people's liberty lies in the laws, and not in their having a share in the Government, for that is nothing pertaining to them"; while Cromwell, as Protector, declared, speaking on the same subject: "The question is not what pleases the people, but what is good for them."

Military
Genius of
Cromwell

His record as a soldier is inspiring. For a man over forty years of age to work hard to acquire the rudiments of drill is in itself remarkable, but a perusal of the histories of his time shows a continuous improvement in his handling of troops, though he realised from the outset of his military career the importance in all cavalry combats of keeping a reserve in hand; thus, at Gainsborough, on July 28th, 1643, he held back three troops (really squadrons) until his opponents, having routed the Lincoln horse, were in disorder. Cromwell then charging, overthrew and pursued them for many miles, killing the General, Cavendish, and most of his followers. At Dunbar, even when Leslie's army was running away in panic-stricken crowds, Cromwell, after the first successful charge, rallied and re-formed his cavalry ere he permitted a general pursuit. In one of his first actions he made a mistake, which would have been fatal against a better-instructed enemy, for he awaited the attack, but this was a fault he never again committed.

Worcester was the climax of his career as a soldier. For nine years he had fought successfully, and although checked by fortresses, as at Stirling and at Waterford, where his sound judgment made him refrain from an assault, he was never beaten in the field. He instinctively embodied the true cavalry spirit, which, made up of two opposing characteristics, can seldom be present in one man. The perfect cavalry commander loves horses, and is continually watching them in peace, to ensure their being kept in good condition; but, on the other hand, when the decisive moment arrives for their use he never hesitates to expend their lives and the lives of their riders. In action against well-mounted, brave horsemen, success can only be obtained by the fullest venture of the lives of men and horses in cohesive ridden-home attacks delivered at high, but carefully regulated speed. Cromwell always remembered what his dashing

**Military
Genius of
Cromwell**

opponent, Prince Rupert, generally forgot, that in cavalry actions victory mostly remains with the leader who puts into the fight the last-formed body of troops.

The soundness of his personal teaching is shown by the remarkable difference on the battle-field of the squadrons raised by even such a good soldier as Fairfax, and himself. When, as often happened, their men were ridden over at first by Rupert's well-born horsemen, Cromwell's troops would rally, re-form, and await orders, while Fairfax's remained a mob.

Cromwell, with all his care of horses—as is indicated when he at the second battle of Newbury, 1644, retorted to Lord Manchester, his General, that he could have the horses if he wished to flay them for the sake of their skins, but that being overworked they could do no good service—yet never hesitated to ride them out when necessary. In October, 1649, after two long marches, when Fairfax halted on completing 50 miles, Cromwell went on for another six hours, and captured the 900 Levellers at Burford; and his march from Perth to Worcester, August 3rd to 29th, 1651, was a remarkable feat of endurance.

Cromwell's moral courage in accepting the Command in Ireland was great. He felt then as he did when starting the previous year to the west of England for the campaign which ended in the battle of Preston, that he was leaving behind him at Westminster many bitter enemies who were working for his downfall. He decided, however, that it was better for England to have a restoration of the Stuarts than a King imposed on his country either by Scotland, or by Ireland.

CHAPTER XII

NAVAL ACTIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH

Blake Pursues Prince Rupert to Portugal—George Monk, Duke of Albemarle—Battle off Dover—The Kentish Knock—Battle of Portland—Defeat of Van Tromp at Scheveningen—Peace Signed between the English and the Dutch.

WHEN we last mentioned Prince Rupert he was harassing England's merchant vessels at the mouth of the Channel with that part of the fleet which had gone back from the Parliamentary party to the Royal cause. Sir Harry Vane, with great energy, had equipped a fleet which was commanded by three soldiers, Colonels Blake, Deane, and Popham, and Rupert, being unable to fight such overwhelming forces, took refuge in Finsale harbour.

Prince
Rupert's
Fleet, 1649

Cromwell's victories in Ireland compelled Rupert to move; so, sailing out, May, 1649, he attacked and broke through the blockading fleet with a loss of three ships, which were captured by Colonel Popham. The Prince, with the remainder of his squadron, crossing the Bay of Biscay, sheltered in the Tagus river.

Blake arrived off Lisbon, March, 1650, but the King of Portugal resisted his attempts to attack Rupert for some time, though he was later compelled by his subjects, who suffered heavily at Blake's hands, to send the Prince away. He, after a piratical cruise in the Mediterranean and West Indies, eventually reached Nantes in March, 1652, when he sold the two remaining ships he then possessed of the 25 he had carried off from England, to the French Government.

Blake off
Lisbon,
1650

During the life of William II., Prince of Orange, the son-in-law of Charles I., peace between England and Holland was not attainable. When the Prince died in 1650, of smallpox, attempts were made by the House of Commons, represented by Mr. St. John, to reopen negotiations for the formation of an alliance. The Dutch raised difficulties until after Cromwell's victory at Worcester, when

Anglo-
Dutch
Relations

Anglo-
Dutch
Relations

they sent Ambassadors to London, but the English terms had then become more exacting; and the accumulative irritation created by the Navigation Act, the Right of Search, followed by the demand of the Commonwealth for the "Salute" to be rendered by all ships in the Channel, brought about the naval actions fought off Dover, May 18th, 1652, where the English fleet had the advantage; again, on September 28th, off the Kentish Knock, i.e. the mouth of the Thames, when darkness stopped the battle, the Dutch retreating next morning.

Battle of
Portland,
1653

Blake was severely wounded in the four days' fighting, February 18th to 21st, 1653, which, beginning off Portland, was continued to Cape Gris Nez. During these engagements Blake took 17 Dutch men-of-war and 55 merchant vessels. He reported his victory to Parliament, but was not able to go to sea and take part in the fight off the Gabbard, 15 miles east of Harwich, June 2nd-3rd, 1653.

The
Gabbard
Battle

It was fortunate for England that George Monk (later Duke of Albemarle) was available at this time, serving under his friend, now General Deane, to replace Blake, who suffered a good deal from his severe wound, although he continued "at duty." Monk was amusingly ignorant of seamanship and nautical language, but he was indomitable and in all respects "a born fighter," like his great Dutch opponent. He met Van Tromp off the Gabbard, the fleets of the rival nations each having 100 ships, June 2nd.

The enemy's first broadside cut General Deane's body literally into two parts. Monk, to whom he was speaking, was covered with his Chief's blood, but calmly unfastening his cloak, he spread it over the mutilated corpse, and gave his orders as coolly as if nothing unusual had happened. Van Tromp withdrew his fleet at night, but the wind falling light left the opposing fleets within sight of each other, and at noon next day a westerly breeze springing up enabled Monk to renew the battle off the North Foreland. Blake, who was lying sick in the Thames, heard the sound of the guns, and, sailing out, came up in the afternoon, and helped Monk to convert his victory over the Dutch into a rout.

Van Tromp tried, but in vain, to stop some of his faint-hearted captains who were trying to escape, actually firing on them. He laid his flagship, the *Brederode*, alongside

The Battle off Scheveningen

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Admiral Penn's flagship, and reached the deck of the *James* at the head of his boarders, but then the Dutch were driven back, and as they retreated were followed by the crew of the *James*, who cleared the *Brederode's* upper-deck. If she had surrendered, the war would have come to an end at that moment, but Van Tromp was personally unconquerable, and, setting fire to his magazine, he tried to blow up his ship. Its upper-deck went into the air, but the undaunted Dutchman, though badly burnt, escaped by a happy accident, and, the *Brederode* drifting away, avoided capture.

Gabbard
Battle,
1653

Monk refitted and re-provisioned his fleet at sea, watching the Dutch ships which were refitting under Van Tromp at Flushing and De Witt at the Texel. After some days the Dutch fleet came out and drew Monk southwards by pretending to fight a Rearguard action. When night fell Van Tromp tacked, and, passing Monk unseen, joined De Witt, the combined fleets numbering 130 ships. He and De Witt met Monk, who had but 90 men-of-war, and all with foul bottoms, off Scheveningen, i.e. The Hague.

Scheven-
ingen

The Dutch, being to windward, were able to use fire-ships, which were skilfully directed, and Admiral Peacocke, who saved his ship from being burnt, lost his life in doing so. The battle was bloody, short, sharp, and decisive. The British lost 400 killed, 800 wounded, and 2 ships; the Dutch lost 5,000 killed and wounded, 1,600 prisoners, and 26 vessels, making a total during the whole war of a loss of 1,122 ships; but their greatest loss of all was in the death of Van Tromp, shot by a bullet. He was the greatest naval adversary that our sailors have ever encountered.

After ten months of negotiations peace was signed, April 5th, 1654. The Dutch agreed to pass through the Straits of Dover only by permission, and to give the "Salute." They paid nearly £1,000,000 war indemnity and conceded equal trading rights in the East Indies.

Peace with
Honour,
1654

Cromwell abandoned the suggestion of amalgamating the two Republics, but the Stuarts were no longer to be given an asylum in the States.

CHAPTER XIII

CROMWELL AND THE PROTECTORATE

Cromwell becomes Protector—Act of Amnesty—Question of Form of Government—Parliament is Dissolved—Cromwell as Lord-Protector—Royalists Correspond with Charles II.—Cromwell Offered the Crown—Despotic Sway of the Lord-Protector—Cromwell's Death—Reputation of the Fighting Services—The Dutch Fleet off Sheerness—Monk Arranges the Restoration.

**Cromwell
Appointed
Protector,
1653**

CROMWELL had become Protector on December 16th, 1653, and it is desirable we should show briefly how he used the Army to help him to gain a position which was in all but name that of a monarch, and to make England one of the Great Powers.

The Council of officers had been re-established at Whitehall on the return of Cromwell after the Battle of Worcester, commonly called "the crowning mercy," September 3rd, 1651. He used the discontent of the senior officers for his own purposes, and carried in the House of Commons two Bills which he had originally promoted: an Act of Amnesty, which wiped out everything done against law up to the Battle of Worcester; and a vote for the dissolution of Parliament, to take effect November 3rd, 1654.

**Discussions
as to Form
of Govern-
ment**

In the winter, 1652-3, Cromwell convened a meeting of officers and members of the House of Commons, and requested their opinion as to the future form of government of the country. The soldiers were practically unanimous in favour of a Republic, but the lawyers desired a Limited Monarchy. Somewhat later the Protector sounded White-locke on the question should he, the Protector, take the title of King, but the lawyer's opinion was unfavourable to the idea, and he pointed out that it was doubtful whether an army which had fought against Stuart Kings would fight for Cromwell as a Monarch.

Cromwell and his party arranged to dissolve Parliament, April 20th, and to govern the country by a Council of Forty Members under the Protector. Sir Henry Vane early that morning was trying to carry a resolution for dissolution.

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but not on the lines which the Protector desired. Colonel Harrison, who was in the House, induced Vane to delay for a short time, while Colonel Ingoldsby hurried to Whitehall to warn Cromwell of Vane's action. The Protector ordered a company of musketeers to accompany him to Westminster, and, leaving the soldiers in the Lobby, entered the House. He spoke at first quietly, but soon lapsed into violent abuse of his personal opponents, finishing his speech by calling in the musketeers, whom he ordered to clear the House of the last Members of the Long Parliament.

**Cromwell
Dissolves
Parliament,
1653**

During the years subsequent to the execution of Charles I., Ireland and Scotland had been subdued, fleets had been equipped which beat those of Holland, and dominated the French and Spanish waters.

Cromwell, after ruling for some little time with seven officers and three civilians, in July, 1653, selected—with the aid of this Council—and assembled a Parliament of 120 "Saints," men "faithful, fearing God, and hating covetousness." They were impracticable creatures, and the Protector got rid of them December, 1653, Major-General Lambert announcing to Cromwell their voluntary dissolution.

**"Parliament of
Saints"**

Cromwell as Lord-Protector assembled his first Parliament, September, 1654. Although he had taken great precautions to keep out stanch Republicans, yet the attitude of many of the new Members soon showed that he had been unsuccessful. The House debated the question of Cromwell's power for some days, after which he turned out 150 Members, indeed all who would not acknowledge him as the supreme authority in the State.

**The Lord-
Protector's
First Parlia-
ment, 1654**

Nothing useful was effected by the House for three months, and then General Lambert proposed that the office of Protector should be established in Cromwell's family. The motion was defeated by 200 votes to 80. Cromwell made no immediate sign of anger, but learnt now that the Royalists and some stanch Republicans, including Colonel Harrison, Major Wildman, and Sir Arthur Hesilrige, were corresponding with Charles II., and thereupon he dissolved Parliament.

Cromwell, although supreme Dictator, after he had dismissed the first Parliament of the Protectorate in April, 1653, was in a precarious position, and during the next five

**Royalist
Rising,
1655**

years he was in danger not only of losing his power, but also of assassination. He spent large sums in Secret Service money, which enabled him to unravel and frustrate all the Royalists plots. There was an unsuccessful Royalist rising at Salisbury, March 11th, 1655, and the conspirators, who were tried by jury, suffered, some being executed and others sold as slaves and sent to Barbados.

**Rule of
the Major-
Generals,
1655**

Cromwell was now in great difficulties as to financial arrangements for the carrying on of the government of the country, and in 1655 he divided England and Wales into twelve districts, the government of which was placed under Major-Generals chosen from his own supporters. In addition to their civil and military duties, they were instructed to exact one-tenth of the income of all disaffected people, notwithstanding the amnesty which Cromwell had with some difficulty induced the Houses of Parliament to pass in February, 1652, and which had been framed to save the Royalists from further exactions.

**Cromwell
Refuses the
Crown,
1657**

The rule of the Major-Generals was naturally very unpopular, and during the debates on the judicial authority as exercised by the Houses of Parliament, Cromwell agreed to terminate the system, and brought in a Bill, January, 1657, confirming the past acts of the district Governors. The Bill was lost and Cromwell was invited to accept the title of King, March 31st, 1657. He found that his acceptance of the invitation would militate against his safety, and refusing the title definitely, May 8th, obtained supreme authority with power to nominate his successor.

**The
Protector's
Difficulties**

It may well have seemed at this time that he was invincible; his troops had been successful abroad, he held Dunkirk, his fleets had swept the seas; his favour was courted by all the Great Powers, and he was acting as arbitrator between contending States. At home, however, his financial difficulties were incessant. He had been obliged to raise money by ordinances, and in this matter became as despotic as Tudors and Stuarts had been. When the judges timidly reminded him of Magna Charta, he retorted that he had made them judges, and he removed those who would not obey him. But now he could no longer find money to pay his troops, those in England being five months in arrears, and in Ireland seven months. His personal safety depended on his keeping the troops contented, and

he had quartered most of the Army in the neighbourhood of London. He feared that the discontent of the soldiers in arrears with their pay might be fanned to danger point by the staunch Republicans, such as Lambert, who had given up his place with £6,000 per annum when he refused to swear fidelity to Cromwell. It is only fair to this great tyrant to state that he gave Lambert a pension of £2,000. The incessant anxieties of Cromwell's position, the ever-present dread of assassination which made him hold a pistol in his pocket when interviewing any stranger, and his family misfortunes accelerated his end, September 3rd, 1658. He died appropriately, ending his stormy life in a violent gale on the anniversary of his decisive victories at Dunbar, and at Worcester.

**Cromwell's
Difficulties**

When the Protector died the reputation of the English Fighting Services stood very high. Notwithstanding the many demands on Cromwell's time in re-creating and commanding the Army, and in averting domestic and foreign political difficulties, he paid attention to the Naval Forces from the date of his becoming Protector. He found 14 men-of-war of two decks carrying 40 guns in our Service. Within 5 years we had 150, of which 50 were two-deckers, and there were 20,000 seamen afloat.

**The
Services
under
Cromwell
and
Charles II.**

As regards the Army, its great reputation dated from his own creation of the Ironsides; the Navy had won glorious victories under his rule, and its successful history was continued until the Restoration. The worthless voluptuary then placed on the Throne, who, besides being guilty of the infamy of accepting a pension from England's enemy, the French King, left his sailors in arrears of pay, spending the money which had been voted for the Navy on his numberless concubines, had brought the country down to the depths of degradation. In 1667, there being no money to pay the crews of the Royal Navy, they were dismissed and the dismantled ships laid up in harbour, while the Dutch dominated the Channel, and in June, taking Sheerness, sailed up the Medway, and having burnt eight men-of-war off Upnor Castle, took away the *Royal Charles*, in which the King had come back to England.

When the Dutch fleets appeared off Sheerness, Monk was sent for. After the victories off the Hague, July, 1653, he had been recalled by Cromwell to pacify Scotland. He

**General
Monk**

was as successful as an Administrator there as he had been as an Admiral. Later he brought about the dissolution of the Rump Parliament, and arranged the Restoration.

Charles II. always regarded him with respectful consideration, and he became the "handy-man" of the feckless Monarch. When the Plague broke out, June, 1665, he was made Governor of London. He was sixty years of age when, hearing of the National danger, for all London was trembling with fear, he hurried to Chatham. He saved the Dockyard, and about two-thirds of the ships in the Medway. He made heroic but ineffectual efforts to board the *Royal Charles* to prevent the Dutch from removing her, and when their fleets had returned to Holland he did what was possible in reforming the administration of the Army.

PART III

FROM JAMES II. (1685) TO THE PEACE OF RYSWICK

Sedgmoor—William of Orange Lands—War Declared against France—The Jacobites—Killiecrankie—James II. in Ireland—Siege of Londonderry—Schomberg Denounces Malpractices in the Army in Ireland—The Boyne—Aughrim and Limerick—Military and Political Situation—The Flight Off Beachy Head—The Army in Holland—Battle of Steinkirk—James II. Organises an Invading Force—Battles of Cape Barfleur and La Hogue—William III.'s Dissatisfaction with the English—The Capture of Namur—Treaty of Ryswick—William and the Army—Parliament and the Army.

IN the short reign of James II., the Army fought only at Sedgmoor, July 6th, 1685, where, in spite of the incapacity of Lord Feversham, its general, it slaughtered without difficulty a mob of workmen and peasants armed for the most part with scythes and billhooks.

The Army
under
James II.

James II. imagined that he as King was above the law, and in 1688 ordered a Declaration of Indulgence to be read in all churches on two Sundays in June. Seven Bishops who petitioned the King to be excused from reading it were sent to the Tower; were tried, and acquitted amidst great popular rejoicing.

William of Orange, Stadtholder, was invited, June 30th, to bring a Dutch Army to England to save the Constitution, and the Established Religion.

Landing of
William of
Orange,
1688

He landed, November 5th, in Brixham Harbour, Torbay, and was joined by his sister-in-law, later Queen Anne, by Colonel John Churchill, who was the Commander-in-Chief of James's Army, and by many of the King's courtiers. James II., escaping to France, was kindly received by Louis IV., who gave him the palace of St. Germain as a residence, and an income of £45,000 per annum.

The family relationships of those about the Throne in this period of our history being intricate, it may be well to explain them. William III., Prince of Orange, was the eldest son of Princess Mary, daughter of Charles I., who had married William of Nassau, Prince of Orange, and the

**Family of
William III.**

Stadtholder was therefore a grandson of the monarch put to death by Cromwell, and his friends.

This William of Nassau, "Dutch William," as he was called in England, had married his first cousin, Mary, who was the eldest daughter of James II. Mary's mother was Anne Hyde, called in Court circles, "Ugly Anne." She lived for some time with James II. as his mistress before he married her. Her father, Mr. Hyde, was later created Lord Clarendon. The second daughter of James II. (who succeeded to the Throne as Queen Anne), married Prince George of Denmark, and bore to him seventeen children, all of whom died when young.

**The Bill of
Rights,
1689**

William of Orange rejected a proposition of the leading English nobles that he and his wife should act as Regents, saying humorously that he "had no desire to become a warming-pan," and they were crowned, April 11th, 1689. He and Queen Mary had signed the "Declaration," which, as the "Bill of Rights," became law in the following October. By the provisions of this Bill the theory of the Divine Right of Kings was abandoned; the Sovereign must thenceforth it decreed be a Protestant, and Parliament, and not the Sovereign, became thenceforth supreme in England.

**War with
France,
1689**

William III., whose political insight and determination were as remarkable as was his physical courage, induced Parliament to declare war against France, May 13th, 1689, a month after he and Mary had been crowned, and before he had undertaken the subjugation of the Jacobites in Scotland and Ireland. As Stadtholder of Holland he was determined not to allow Louis XIV. to acquire the Spanish Netherlands, which was practically the country which we now know as Belgium, and somewhat later the King with great diplomatic address combined nearly the whole of Europe against France.

**Jacobite
Rebellion**

The struggle of the Jacobites in Scotland soon ceased. In a military point of view it is remarkable for the disaster of Regular troops sustained at Killiecrankie, when some wild Highlanders ran over two Regular regiments. The defeat, caused mainly by the bayonets being inserted in the muzzles of the muskets, which prevented their use as fire-arms, was productive of an improvement being made to allow the bayonets to be affixed outside the muzzles.

At Dunkeld, a little to the south of the scene of this

disaster, a new levy, now the 1st Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), defended during four hours both the church and town against Highlanders in numbers four times greater than its own with marvellous courage and determination. The men were inspired by religious fervour, and by the glorious example of their officers. The seniors when shot down, as they were early in the action, were succeeded by men as brave, and the result of their strenuous defence was the ending for a time of the Jacobite cause in Scotland.

Jacobite
Rebellion,
1689

James II., having obtained money, arms, ammunition, equipment, and some French officers from Louis XIV., landed in Kinsale harbour, March 12th, 1689, with 1,200 British soldiers, and entered Dublin, March 24th.

James II. in
Ireland,
1689

Londonderry and Inniskillen were the only towns which resisted the King's progress. He tried, but in vain, to carry Londonderry by assault, returning to Dublin, May 7th, to open Parliament. The unsuccessful assailants lost 7,000 men, the garrison losing 3,000, just half its numbers. The defence of Inniskillen was equally successful.

The Irish Parliament declared the country independent of England; forbade the exercise of the Protestant religion, and condemned to death, by Proclamation, 2,500 leading Protestants who had renounced allegiance to James II.

William III. sent the Duke of Schomberg, with five horse regiments and 18 infantry battalions, to Ireland, August 16th, 1689, to succour the besieged Protestants.

Campaign
in Ireland,
1689

Mr. Fortescue, in his graphic and interesting "History of the British Army," gives a painful account of the sufferings of the troops who were sent to assist the Protestants. The two battalions first embarked were so crowded that the men could not lie down; the biscuits were mouldy, no drinking water had been provided, and the beer was putrid.

When Schomberg, now 80 years of age, but still effective, landed, he found that the officers were useless, the men so ignorant that they did not know how to load their muskets, which, as well as the guns, were worn out, and fell to pieces after a few shots had been fired out of them. The arrangements for the horse transport were so bad that the "Bays" lost every horse in crossing the Irish Channel. The Commissary-General had collected some indifferent quality of supplies, but had arranged no means of transporting them to the troops, who were so ignorant and shiftless that they

**Campaign
in Ireland,
1689**

died by hundreds for want of cover, being unable to erect huts similar to those which their Dutch and Huguenot comrades, taught by their experience in Flanders, put up for shelter. There were no hospitals and no medicines, and Schomberg wrote to William that he "never knew such wicked officers, the colonels being the worst offenders." The Commissary-General bought salt for his own profit at ninepence a pound and sold it at four shillings. Later, when he was tried at the instance of the House of Commons, many Members of which were equally dishonest, he escaped punishment. In a few weeks, 6,000 out of 14,000 of Schomberg's soldiers perished from neglect and starvation.

The Army was suffering from the irreligion and profligacy of the Court circles, and governing classes, which had become prevalent since the Restoration in 1660. William III. despaired of finding an honest Englishman, and it is not surprising that he preferred to employ Dutchmen, although this course naturally alienated even honest Englishmen from him; and the great majority of those who had become corrupt under the later Stuart rule were unable to realise how rotten the state of the governing classes had become.

**William III.
in Ireland:
The Boyne,
1690**

William III. fully understood that, although he was at war with France, it was essential to subdue Ireland as a preliminary measure to effective operations on the Continent. He crossed over the Irish Channel, and, concentrating all available troops from Londonderry and Inniskillen, 36,000 men, fought and beat James II., who had taken up a position near Drogheda on the right bank of the Boyne, June 30th, 1690. The previous day, when reconnoitring, he was wounded in the right shoulder, but this in no way impaired his imperturbable courage, and his troops, inspired by his heroism, forded the Boyne with water up to their armpits. O'Neil's men on the left flank, behaving heroically, died in heaps to defend Slane Bridge, but when the dense column of Dutch Guards (Blues) wading ten abreast, reached the south bank, the Irish there, breaking up, fled. James II. fled to France, re-landing at Brest, July 10th. The retreat of the Irish army was covered by the determined stand of 6,000 French troops under Marshal Lauzun.

Macaulay contrasts the physical conduct of the two Kings. William III., weak, sickly, wounded, stumbling out of the muddy Boyne at the head of his cavalry, with his

sword in his left hand, and guiding his horse with the reins passed round his bandaged right arm; and James, who after watching the battle from an eminence in the rear of his troops left them to die for his cause, while he sought safety in flight. Duke Schomberg, 83 years of age, fell while rallying a brigade. Mr. Walker, the heroic Governor of Londonderry, and many other brave men were killed.


**The Boyne,
1690**

William III., after an unsuccessful assault on Limerick, returned to England, September 5th. General John Churchill (Duke of Marlborough), who was in Flanders at the time, had proposed the capture of Cork and Kinsale, which operation was entrusted to him, and which he carried into effect in October, the French troops leaving Ireland. Churchill governed England during the first eight years of the reign of Queen Anne, and I give some indications of his character in recounting the campaigns of that epoch.

**John
Churchill in
Ireland**

In the battle of Aughrim, July 12th, 1691, General Ginckel defeated St. Ruth in a decisive victory, but the most striking episode of the war in Ireland was the courageous defence of Limerick under Patrick Sarsfield. When he entered the town Marshal Lauzun had ridiculed the idea of defending it successfully, declaring that a discharge of

**Aughrim,
1691**



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF THE BOYNE, JULY 1, 1690

**Pacification
of Limerick,
1691**

rotten apples would be sufficient to demolish the works. Nevertheless, Sarsfield, in what was called the Pacification of Limerick, gained a safe conduct to France of 1,100 Irishmen, whose successors, as the Irish Brigade, showed equal intrepidity at Fontenoy, 1745, as their forefathers had shown sixty-five years earlier at Limerick.

**Beachy
Head, 1690**

William III. incurred grave risks by leaving England when an invasion was impending, but it was essential for his success that King James II. should be driven out of Ireland, for until that happened it was only possible to spare but few troops for operations on the Continent. When William III. was reconnoitring the banks of the Boyne river near Drogheda, June 30th, our fleet, under Admiral the Earl of Torrington, was being defeated off Beachy Head in the Channel.

Admiral Comte de Tourville (1642-1701), one of the ablest and bravest seamen France has produced, had 70 effective men-of-war under his command. When William III. crossed over to Ireland he took the squadron of Sir Cloudesley Shovel as escort. Another squadron had been sent to the Mediterranean to intercept a French fleet which had been ordered from Toulon to Brest, and thus it happened that Lord Torrington with a combined fleet of Dutch and English ships had fifteen less than his opponent.

Torrington, who was by far the ablest naval strategist and tactician of his age, would have waited for Sir Cloudesley Shovel's squadron to rejoin had he not been practically ordered to fight at all risks by Queen Mary, the Regent, who feared an anti-Dutch insurrection in London.

**Military and
Political
Situation**

To make the military and political situation clear, it is necessary to go back for two years.

Captain Edward Russell visited the Hague on a political mission to the Stadtholder, William of Orange, in 1686, who had declined to invade England then, and still hesitated, in May, 1688, until Admiral Herbert (created Earl of Torrington in 1689) brought him a letter from seven of the principal noblemen in England. The Stadtholder's primary object in accepting the offer of the English Throne which he had received, was to obtain England's aid in opposing Louis XIV. William, however, was obliged to secure his own position by suppressing rebellions in Scotland and Ireland before he could help Holland.

The Naval Action Off Beachy Head 137

It is a matter of dispute whether William was at heart a Tory or a Whig. He tried at first to form a Ministry from both parties, but apparently the idea in his mind at that time was to endeavour to govern as far as possible without the interference of Parliament. He had come to England on the invitation of the Whigs. When he crossed over to Ireland early in June, 1690, he left Mary, his wife, as Regent in London, supporting her with a Council. Mary was in a difficult position. If an invasion became only temporarily successful it was probable that the Government would fall, for London was full of men who felt bitterly antagonistic towards the Dutch. The Queen in her perplexity concerning Torrington's attitude, consulted Russell, now an Admiral, and who was very jealous of Torrington, having been superseded by him in the appointment of Naval Commander-in-Chief. Russell, who, if not then, was very shortly afterwards in correspondence with King James, told the Queen that he, Russell, would fight the French if their fleet numbered 1,000 ships.

Politics of
William III.

Notwithstanding Lord Macaulay's adverse criticism of Torrington, it is now clear, mainly owing to the carefully stated arguments of Captain Mahan, the great naval historian in the United States, and of the late Admiral Colomb of our own Navy, that Torrington was absolutely right in desiring to avoid a fight against a very superior force, except under favourable conditions.

An invasion was apparently imminent. It could not be undertaken until the Allied fleets were beaten. Therefore, Torrington desired to wait for Sir Cloudesley Shovel's squadron, or until Admiral Killigrew's squadron had joined him from the Mediterranean.

Queen Mary's letter was, however, so emphatically worded that Torrington fought off Beachy Head, June 30th. Unfortunately for his reputation the Dutch squadron, under Admiral Evertsen, bore the brunt of Tourville's attack, and the Allied fleets were saved only by darkness coming on, under cover of which they drew off up Channel, sinking 10 ships to avoid their being captured. Torrington sailed up the Thames. He was committed to the Tower of London, tried by court martial and honourably acquitted, but was never again employed by the King, who knew as little about naval warfare as did Napoleon I.

Beachy
Head, 1690

Our Fighting Services

**The Navy
and Army,
1690**

The victory of William III. on the Boyne, twenty-four hours after Tourville had defeated Torrington off Beachy Head, coupled with the flight of James II. to France, dispelled for a time the fear of the impending invasion.

Parliament, however, resolved to maintain adequate naval and military forces. The Government ordered 27 line-of-battle ships to be built, voting £4,000,000 for the upkeep of the Fighting Services. There were small British contingents in Flanders in 1689-90, but Ireland absorbed most of England's available troops.

William III. spent some months in Holland at the beginning of 1691, where there were then 20,000 British and as many foreign troops as could be supplied by the rulers of eight different kingdoms, who were, however, naturally more anxious for the safety of their own dominions than they were for those of their allies, and nothing of importance happened.

**Netherlands
Campaign
of 1692**

The King crossed over to Holland again, March 4th, 1692, taking the field in May with 23,000 British and 17,000 auxiliaries of other nations.

That William III., in leaving the United Kingdom, incurred considerable risk of losing his throne, there can be no doubt. It was more dangerous even than when he left England for Ireland, for he had made many enemies in London, and no friends. Cold, reserved, naturally taciturn and with incomplete mastery of our language, he spoke very little, for he recognised that many of those around him were selfish intriguers, and was consequently ungracious even when he did speak. He inspired no personal loyalty, for those about the Court never saw him on the battlefield, where he was at his best; supremely indifferent to personal danger, he became bright and serenely attractive when facing Death.

**Namur,
1692**

Louis XIV., while besieging Namur, was covered by Marshal Luxembourg, the most capable of the French Generals at that time. Namur surrendered after a feeble defence, June 5th, and the King moved to Paris.

William III., August 3rd, at 11 A.M., surprised Marshal Luxembourg at Steinkirk. The King's dispositions were very faulty; although he had intended to fight a battle with infantry he had got all the cavalry of his Right wing in front, and when he closed on the French position, could

not bring up his Infantry through the Horsemen, which blocked their way. Six battalions had, however, by accident got near the front of the cavalry, and at 12.30 P.M. an attack was launched by the Duke of Wurtemberg with six battalions, the 1st (Grenadier) Guards, Royal Scots, Royal Scots Fusiliers (21st), and Cameronians (26th), and two battalions of Danes. This force was somewhat later supported by six more battalions, when the leading six battalions pressed forward under a heavy fire of batteries at close range.

Steinkirk,
1692

The combatants were separated only by a thick hedge. Lord Angus, who had raised the Cameronians three years earlier, the pious Mackay who had rallied the 13th Light Infantry at Killiecrankie, July, 1689, led well in front of their men, in sight of all of whom Angus fell dead.

Mackay, a very brave man, had sent word to General Count Solms that to carry the position in face of the opposing numbers was impossible, to which Solms replied "Advance," and Mackay saying, "God's will be done," marched on in front till he fell dead. The British broke through, and, pressing on, made a deep gap in the centre of the French line, pouring in steadily so dense a fire that the interval remained unfilled. The French officer in command ordered, entreated, implored his men to advance and follow him, but nothing would induce them to move into that blaze of death. He fell dead, and the gap remained unfilled.

Then Marshal Luxembourg sent down the slope against the few attacking battalions seven regiments, each of 3 battalions, of French and Swiss Guards, led on by the flower of the aristocracy. They came forward in dense columns without firing a shot, and pressed back the 1st Guards (Grenadiers), who though reduced to half their numbers, stood up undauntedly, but had nevertheless to give ground. The Royal Scots retired, contesting every foot of ground, taking advantage of each hedgerow. As they fell back, the leading Frenchmen, penetrating an opening in the hedge, carried off a Colour. The Colonel, Sir Robert Douglas, running back alone, passed through the gap, recaptured the Colour and was taking it to the battalion when he was hit, but, as he fell dead, with an expiring effort, tossed the flag over the hedge to his men.

Steinkirk,
1692

The remnant of British battalions now fell back, after having fought 57 battalions and seven regiments of Dragoons, who were too much shaken to press the retreat, which was covered by a regiment of Horse Grenadiers (Guards), The Buffs, Lincolnshire Regiment, 4th Dragoons (4th Hussars), and Danes, who now by a counter-attack gave William time to disentangle the confused mob of regiments in which he and the incompetent Dutch General Solms had mixed up the troops.

The Allies lost 400 officers, 7,000 men, 10 guns and seven stand of Colours. The French casualties were about the same, but 620 officers had fallen trying to encourage their men to fill up the deadly gap made by the heroic British and Danish battalions. Marshal Luxembourg retired, his troops being shaken by the losses they had sustained. There can be but little doubt that if Marlborough had been present with the army the British troops would have won a victory.

Netherlands
Campaign
of 1693

In the spring of 1693 the opposing armies were again in the field. William III. was at Brussels with 60,000 men, Luxembourg with 80,000 opposite to him. After the commanders had looked at each other for a month, the French Marshal began to manoeuvre. William III. detached the Duke of Wurtemberg to attack the French lines on the Scheldt, where he had a brilliant success. William then becoming nervous for the safety of Liège, sent 20,000 men to reinforce its garrison and that of Maastricht, and Luxembourg, realising his opportunity, attacked William's army, which was in position between Neerwinden, and Landen.

Neerwinden

William III. had 50,000 men, but had taken up an unfavourable position; its frontage being too extended for his force, and moreover with insufficient depth, and there was an unfordable river behind it. Luxembourg attacked with 80,000 men, and in spite of the heroic courage of the defenders, they were defeated, the King's courage being as remarkable as was his tactical incompetence. The 19 British battalions lost 135 officers. The Allies lost 12,000 men, 80 guns, and many Colours. The French, however, lost 56 Colours and 10,000 men. William retired in good order and Luxembourg made no attempt to follow up his victory.

James II. Plans Invasion 141

While William III. and the Duke of Luxembourg were campaigning in the Spanish Netherlands, James II. was organising another attempt to regain the English Throne, having assured Louis XIV. that all the English seamen and two-thirds of the people were awaiting an opportunity to declare for him. Jacobites and Catholics enlisted men in England. Churchill—who had deserted James II. in 1688—and Admiral Edward Russell assured the ex-King of their goodwill, the latter flattering him with the assurance that the English sailors still recalled with great pleasure his gallantry and skill shown as Duke of York in the victory off the East Coast between Harwich and Lowestoft, June 3rd, 1665. The Princess Anne, influenced by Churchill, wrote to her father to implore his forgiveness, which step, as he thought, had been prompted by the High Church party in England. Louis XIV. lent him some troops, which, with exiles from England, Scotland, and Ireland, made up nearly 20,000 men, who were encamped at Cape La Hogue, to the north-west of Cherbourg, with a fleet of transports anchored in the bay ready to convey them across the Channel.

**Declaration
of James II.,
1692**

James then issued a Declaration of his intentions to be carried into effect when he regained the Throne. Many of the leading Whigs were to be executed; all sorts and conditions of men were threatened, even down to certain countrymen who, standing in a crowd, had been rude to the Monarch as he passed through Sheerness during his flight to France. The Declaration was distributed by secret agents, but when the Government got hold of a copy they had it republished and distributed all over the Kingdom, for it formed an effective weapon against the Restoration.

Early in May, 1692, the Allied fleets of 99 ships, carrying 7,150 guns, were at St. Helens, off the Isle of Wight. The Government were nervous, being uncertain of the loyalty of many of the naval officers, and James II. calculated that he might safely reckon on being joined by Admiral Edward Russell, the Commander-in-Chief, and two-thirds of his command. This assumption was not unnatural, for the Admiral had frequently assured King James of his devotion, but the feeling in Russell's mind was less one of regard for James than it was of strong dislike to William

**Naval Un-
certainty.
1692**

Naval
Affairs,
1692

and all Dutchmen. The Admiral, however, strongly disapproved the minatory Declaration. Russell, indeed, told Mr. Lloyd, a Jacobite agent, that he would fight the French, even if King James were on board their fleet. He was not a Jacobite, but an Anti-Dutchman. Queen Mary, however, put it out of his power to take over the fleet to the enemy even if he had wished to do so; for she wrote by Lord Nottingham's hand a tactful letter to the Commander-in-Chief, mentioning the adverse reports she had heard of certain officers, but avowing her full trust in their loyalty, skill, and courage.

The Admiral read this letter to the captains assembled on the quarter-deck of his flagship, the *Britannia*, July 15th, and it provoked an outburst of enthusiastic loyalty expressed in an address to the Queen. The illogical Commander-in-Chief visited every ship in the fleet, urging on them the necessity of patriotism, ending with the exhortation, "If your officers play false, overboard with them, and with me first of all."

Battle of
Cape Bar-
fleur, 1692

Admiral Tourville came up Channel with 44 line-of-battle ships soon after sunrise, May 19th. He had been ordered to cover the transports conveying the invading army, at all risks, and had moreover incurred a severe reprimand from Louis XIV. for not having annihilated Lord Torrington's fleet off Beachy Head, June 30th, 1690. The Admiral realised the inferiority of his numbers, but hoped, and not unreasonably, that many of Russell's crew were half-hearted, and would desert at the critical moment.

At 11 A.M. Tourville attacked; but Admiral Carter broke the French line at the opening of the action, and was the first English officer to fall. A splinter torn by a round-shot from a spar ripped open his side from hip to shoulder, and he fell back upon the deck dying. Immediately a little group gathered round him, anxious to take him below, but he ordered the men aside. For three or four minutes he sat propped against a coil of rope, watching the fight, encouraging his officers, cheering his seamen. Presently he sank slowly forward, and then, with the faintly uttered words, "Fight the ship, my lads, as long as she will swim," he expired.

The wind was at first favourable to the French, and

Barfleur and La Hogue

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Russell's flagship was heavily engaged for an hour against five line-of-battle ships. About 4 P.M., Admiral Tourville, after a gallant fight, carried out with great skill, hauled out of action in a dense fog. Tourville had fought his own ship, *Le Roi Soleil*, grandly; though surrounded by enemies firing broadsides into her, she never ceased hurling death from all her ports, and eventually, though a bloody wreck, she reached Cherbourg, with two other three-deckers. When *Le Roi Soleil* became unmanageable, Tourville shifted his flag to *L'Ambitieux*. Admiral Delavault, of Russell's Red Squadron, followed *Le Roi Soleil* and two of her consorts. He found them hauled up in shoal water outside Cherbourg, and with his boats and a fire-ship burnt them to the water's edge.


Barfleur,
1692

Admiral d'Amfreville, the next senior French officer, was arranging to beach 20 of the smaller men-of-war, when an intrepid local pilot, Hervé Riel, offered to guide the squadron through the perilous "Race" of Alderney, so vividly described by Victor Hugo. He said, "Put me on board the biggest ship, and let the others follow me," and in darkness, accentuated by a thick fog, he conducted the 20 vessels through the boiling Race, and reached St. Malo in safety, the English pursuers not venturing to follow.

Twelve French men-of-war, which had escaped Russell's fleet, anchored in the Bay of La Hogue immediately under the camp of the French Expeditionary force; they were covered by two forts, six men-of-war lying under the protection of either fort, with James's army drawn up on the beach behind the centre.

La Hogue

When Admiral Russell's fleet arrived off the bay, he sent Captain Rooke in to destroy the enemy's



SKETCH-MAP TO ILLUSTRATE BARFLEUR AND LA HOGUE

La Hague,
1692

ships. James II., knowing how the English sailors could fight, begged Admiral Tourville to reinforce the crews by detachments of soldiers, but the Count scouted the suggestion as being a slur on his profession.

During the afternoon, May 23rd, Rooke pulled into the bay with 200 boats. They were fired on from Fort Lislet, but without being hit. Admiral Tourville manned his ship's boats, and led them out against Rooke's oncoming flotilla, but the French sailors, thoroughly demoralised, turned, and, in spite of their Commander's orders and entreaties, pulled for the beach, which the soldiers quitted after firing a few shots. Rooke burnt six men-of-war, and without losing a man! He withdrew late at night on the ebb tide, but returned at 8 A.M. on the 24th, and having captured the six other ships, turned their guns on to Fort St. Vaast, and silenced its armament. Rooke having burnt the six line-of-battle ships, and eight more ships which were lying in an inner basin, then took his boats back, the crews singing in derision, "God Save the King," as they left the inner harbour, and rowed out in view of King James's camp.

The result of the five days' fighting was that the English lost one fire-ship; 16 French line-of-battle ships, the best of France's fleet, which had been created by the financial genius of Colbert, disappeared from the face of the water, and with their loss the struggle for the English Throne was practically finished. Admiral E. Russell, and Captain George Rooke somewhat later, were knighted. London went wild with joy. Two Whigs and a Tory peer carried £37,000 as a present to the victorious crews at Portsmouth; 50 surgeons with dressings for the wounded were sent down to the ships, and St. Bartholomew's and St. Thomas's, the only two hospitals then existing in England, were utilised to receive the worst cases. Queen Mary gave up the Royal Palace of Greenwich for use as a temporary hospital.

William III.
and the
English

Queen Mary died of smallpox, December 28th, 1694, aged 33, regretted by all except her rancorous father, James II., who begged Louis XIV. to forbid mourning being worn for her. It seemed for a month that William III. would soon follow Mary to the grave. He was thoroughly disgusted with the higher ranks of Englishmen, and especially with both Houses of Parliament. The

Assault of Namur

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governing body in England was suffering from the follies and wickedness of Charles, and his courtiers of the Rochester type. As Macaulay wrote of the Court, "From the Restoration (1660) to the Revolution (1688) neglect and fraud had been almost constantly impairing the efficiency of every department." "Contracts, pardons for all crimes, were sold at Whitehall as openly as herrings were at Billingsgate." The naval administration was rotten. The military administration, if possible, was still worse. The courtiers exacted bribes from the colonels, who cheated their soldiers. The Commissaries were paid for supplies which had never been furnished. The Ordnance officers sold stores, and pocketed the proceeds.

William III.
and the
English

It was not surprising that William III. was glad to get back to Holland and live with soldiers on service; and having been reconciled to the Princess Anne, with whom he had quarrelled, he crossed the North Sea, and, after some clever strategical manœuvring, in company with his Allies, the Elector of Bavaria, and the Dutch, under the Earl of Athlone (Ginckel), against Villeroy and Boufflers, he invested Namur, July 3rd, 1695, which was then the strongest fort in Europe.

Namur,
1695

Villeroy advanced with 80,000 men to its relief, but retired without fighting, and the town and citadel were then assaulted by the Bavarian, Dutch, and English troops. They were carried with a loss of 2,000 men, the garrison of 5,000 men being allowed to march out with "the Honours of War."

In the assault the 1st (Grenadiers) Guards gave another remarkable exhibition of determined courage. On the 6th the brigade marched up to the palisades of an outwork, put their muskets through, and, after firing a volley, charged and drove the French from outwork to outwork in succession until they reached the gates of the town. The Guards Brigade lost 32 officers; the Royal Scots charged with equal courage and success; but the Allies lost heavily. Next day the counter-guard in front of the St. Nicholas Gate (where Uncle Toby, see "Tristram Shandy," was wounded) was carried with a loss of 800 men. Then the assault of the citadel over half a mile of open ground failed, but later the Guards carried the breach where another column had been repulsed, and

**Treaty of
Ryswick,
1697**

the citadel surrendered. The 18th Foot gained their honourable title of the Royal Irish on this occasion. The war dragged on until September 21st, 1697, when Louis XIV. made peace, and in the Treaty of Ryswick, signed in November, acknowledged William III. as King of England, and restored all the territory won since 1678, except Strasburg.

**Parliament
and the
Army**

During the war abuses in the military administration had been constantly before the Houses of Parliament at Westminster, and especially during the last three years. Officers were kept for a year or more in arrears of pay, and capitalists grew rich by advancing money on the officers' pay sheets at exorbitant rates. These money-lenders found it more profitable to make advances so well secured than it was to lend money to Government even at 7 per cent.

The petitions to Parliament on the subject of the non-receipt of pay were endless. William III. disbanded 10 regiments within three months of peace being signed, hoping to disarm opposition in the Houses of Parliament.

In 1700, while the House of Commons was inquiring into the claim of the Army for arrears of pay, and into the disposal of Irish forfeited estates, it came to light that William III., in direct violation of his promise, had granted part of the forfeited Irish estates not only to soldiers in satisfaction of their claims, but also to Elizabeth Villiers, his discarded mistress (Countess of Orkney), and had made grants also to some favourite Dutch officers. This nearly caused another revolution.

The King met a new Parliament, December 30th, 1701, when he returned from one of his frequent visits to Holland, but then fortunately for him another Continental struggle, called the War of the Spanish Succession, which lasted for eleven years (1702-13), was occupying its attention.

PART IV

MARLBOROUGH'S CAMPAIGNS

CHAPTER I

JOHN CHURCHILL'S EARLY CAREER

Outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession—Death of James II.—John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough—Monmouth's Rebellion—The Army Reorganised—The King and Marlborough—Marlborough is Arrested—Release of Marlborough—Death of William III.—Marlborough as Commander-in-Chief of the Troops of the Grand Alliance.

CHARLES II. of Spain, though twice married, was childless. The Emperor Leopold and Louis XIV. had both married daughters of the reigning House of Spain, who on their marriage had renounced all claims to the Spanish Throne for themselves, and for their successors.

**The Spanish
Succession,
1698-1700**

William III., 1698, realising that the Westminster Houses of Parliament would not help his views, in order to safeguard as far as possible the safety of Holland, had agreed that when Charles II. of Spain should die, France and Holland should partition the Spanish dominions. This arrangement, made without any regard to the wishes of the Spaniards themselves, was upset by Charles II., who in his last will left all his dominions to the Duke of Anjou, the second son of the Dauphin of France, and grandson of Louis XIV., who was proclaimed King in Madrid, May, 1700.

Although the French Monarch had pledged himself to the arrangement with William III., this temptation was too great for his code of honesty, and having tried, but in vain, to obtain the concurrence of England and Holland, he moved his troops by forced marches to the barrier fortresses, of which Antwerp and Namur were the principal strongholds, and made prisoners of the Dutch troops, their garrisons.

Our Fighting Services

**The Spanish
Succession,
1698-1700**

Holland appealed to England for the contingent of 10,000 men she was bound by treaty to supply, an arrangement dating from 1668, and the House of Commons had to raise battalions of recruits to replace the trained soldiers which had recently been disbanded.

William III. was greatly helped by an imprudent act of Louis XIV. at this time, which, by inflaming the temper of the Houses of Westminster against the French, converted an unfriendly assembly into loyal English subjects.

**Death of
James II.,
1701**

James II., the exiled King, died September 16th, 1701, and Louis XIV. recognised his son as King of England, thus going back on his solemn agreement when peace was made in 1697.

Troops were ordered to reinforce those in Holland, the whole contingent being under Marlborough, who had at first 12 battalions, to which were added later eight cavalry regiments and six more battalions.

**John
Churchill
(1650-1722)**

It is necessary to go back now for some time to explain the early career of John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough (1650-1722), who after the death of William III. controlled English foreign policy for some years.

John Churchill was born at Axminster in 1650; he had few educational advantages, but acquired a good colloquial knowledge of French. His elder sister, by two years, was appointed, when about seventeen, Maid of Honour to the Duchess of York, known as "Ugly Anne Hyde" (Clarendon). It was not long before Arabella Churchill became the Duke's mistress.

When Churchill was on service his calm yet audacious courage made him remarkable even amongst brave men.

In February, 1672, Louis XIV., through his agent, the Duchess of Orleans, who came over to Dover, paid £200,000 down and made an annual grant of £240,000 to Charles II. to induce him to declare war against Holland, and to furnish and pay 6,000 troops.

Captain Churchill, who had served in the fleet as Captain of the Marines in the action against the Dutch in Sole Bay, May 28th, 1672, was employed later in the English contingent in Turenne's army. Louis XIV., to please his pensioner, Charles II., selected the Duke of Mounmouth, Charles's son by Lucy Waters, and who had a command in the contingent, for a dangerous duty in the siege of

Maastricht, 1673, which was to storm an important outwork. Monmouth succeeded, but next day the Dutch, exploding a mine, recovered the outwork by a counter-attack, driving out the French guard and holding the position.

**John
Churchill
(1650-1722)**

Marshal Turenne made a bet of a dinner and a quantity of wine that "the handsome Englishman" (Churchill), with troops numbering only half of those which had abandoned the work, would retake it. The Marshal won his bet. Churchill was severely wounded and Monmouth declared that he had saved his, the Duke's, life. Louis XIV., who witnessed the attack, thanked Captain Churchill on the spot before all the officers. Churchill often deliberately risked his life at this time in order to make a reputation, and he succeeded.

The future Commander-in-Chief married Sarah Jennings (1660-1744) in 1678; she was one of twenty-two children, a beautiful woman, who had lived at Court from twelve years of age. She survived her devoted husband for twenty-two years.

When the new Parliament met at Oxford it was more aggressively Protestant than the previous House had been, and Charles, having now got a subsidy from Louis XIV. large enough to last him for three years, refused to assent to the Bill of Exclusion, which was aimed at his brother, and dissolved the House seven days after its meeting.

The Princess Anne on her marriage to the Prince of Denmark, in 1683, made Sarah Churchill a Bedchamber Woman, and James induced his brother to make Churchill a Scotch peer, as Lord Churchill of Eyemouth.

Charles II. died February 6th, 1685, and was succeeded by James II., who promised the Privy Council "to maintain Church and State as by law established."

The Duke of Monmouth landed in Dorsetshire, June 11th, 1685. Brigadier-General Churchill was sent to the West in command of the troops, but James superseded him a few days later, and in order to oblige Louis XIV. appointed Lord Feversham (Louis Duras), an incapable glutton, whose skull had been trepanned two years earlier for a serious injury. Churchill really commanded the troops in the action at Sedgmoor, July 6th, 1685, for Feversham was shaving and dressing for an hour and a

**Monmouth's
Rebellion,
1685**

Sedgmeer,
1685

half after the action commenced before daylight. James realised the position, and appointed Churchill Colonel of the Royal Dragoons. He was severely tried by the King's rabid intolerance of Protestants, for the three dominant characteristics in Lord Churchill's life were his love for Sarah, his regard for the Protestant religion, and his avarice.

Churchill
and
James II.

When James II. was trying to take away the liberties and religion of his subjects, Churchill and half a dozen other peers plotted with the Prince of Orange, to whom Churchill wrote, May, 1687, that as regards religion "he would be a martyr for it." Somewhat later he warned King James of the danger that he was incurring, and he appears at this time to have been in fact loyal to his King, so long as the latter was loyal to his Coronation oath. When Churchill was sent into the western counties to oppose William III. he went over to the invader, writing to his Monarch that he was doing so from "the inviolable dictates of his conscience."

Churchill's
Vacilla-
tions

In February, 1688, William III. appointed Lord Churchill Lieutenant-General, directing him to reorganise the Army, which Lord Feversham had disbanded without settling up the arrears of pay on the flight of James II., in order to embarrass the Protestant Party.

Churchill made large sums of money by the sale of commissions and promotions. He became an Earl in the spring of 1689, two days before the Coronation of William and Mary. The Earl commanded an expedition to the Netherlands that summer with a success which was acknowledged by William III. with, for him, unusual warmth.

The popular opinion about the operations in Ireland, as recorded at the time, was that Marlborough "had achieved more important results in one month than the King's phlegmatic Dutch friend had done in two campaigns."

Marlborough, after his command at Cork, became discontented because the succeeding operations in Ireland were entrusted to General Ginckel, and he treacherously entered into correspondence with James II. at St. Germain while writing in warm terms to William III.

In January, 1691, he implored forgiveness, and got a

pardon from James II. As a member of the Privy Council, he received the information which it had of the Jacobite plots and movements, and, breaking his oath, passed it on to James. A little later he offered the ex-King to bring over to his cause the British troops then in Flanders.

Marl-
borough in
Flanders,
1691

William III. took Marlborough with him to Flanders in May, 1691, but the General returned in October, nothing of importance having been accomplished, for William III., though a great man and remarkably brave, was a poor general. When Marlborough returned to England he asked the King to make him Master-General of the Ordnance, at that time a very lucrative post, but William III. gave it to Viscount Sidney, a civilian, and refused to listen to the entreaties of the Princess Anne, his sister-in-law, when she reminded him of his promise to give the Garter to Marlborough for his services in Ireland.

Both Lord and Lady Churchill were very imprudent in conversation, most of which passed round to the King. Sarah was especially vituperative when she was angry, for she then lost control of herself; one day she quarrelled with Churchill, and though she loved him before God, or her children, yet in order to vex him she cut off all her hair, the beauty of which was remarkable, and placed it on his dressing-table. The peer made no remark, but after his death the hair was found, where it had been put carefully away, in one of his secret drawers. Marlborough, not content with talking violently against the King, remonstrated with him for his lavish grants of Crown property to Dutchmen.

At the end of 1691, while William III. was planning to invade France, Louis XIV. was arranging to carry out a scheme drawn up by James II. for the invasion of England, and it is somewhat remarkable that, in spite of all the traitors on both sides, neither monarch knew of the intention of the other.

In January, 1692, just after Marlborough had been more than usually indiscreet in conversation in society when animadverting on the Royal preference for Dutchmen, the Queen quarrelled with her sister, the Princess Anne, and next morning Marlborough was dismissed, not only from all his appointments, but also from the Army. The late Field-

Dismissal
of Marl-
borough,
1692

Dismissal
of Marl-
borough,
1692

Marshal Viscount Wolseley, in his interesting life of Marlborough, shows that his dismissal from the Army was partly due to the disclosure to the French of an attack which William had arranged that Marlborough should make on Dunkirk. When the King taxed Marlborough with having let out the secret, he admitted he had told his wife, to which the King replied somewhat bitterly, "I did not tell mine." The retort, though quick, was illogical, as the King had a mistress! Lady Churchill corresponded frequently with her sister, Lady Tyreconnell, who was living in France, and it was probably through her that the French were warned to strengthen Dunkirk.

Danger of a
Restoration

A counter-revolution was imminent early in May, 1692: bread rose from 9d. to a shilling a loaf, and meal in proportion, but danger of a Restoration was dispelled by the battle of Cape Barfleur, and La Hogue, May 20th-24th.

Arrest
of Marl-
borough

William III. suspected Marlborough and other leading men of trying to induce his resignation. He was very unpopular, and some hoped that by their supporting the Tories in opposing the War the King might be forced to make way for Anne. He sent over from Holland a command for the arrest of Marlborough and other peers, which was carried into effect, May 3rd. Nevertheless, his sister-in-law, Anne, whose bitter quarrel with Mary had arisen over the Marlboroughs, man and wife, declined to dismiss Sarah, in spite of the Queen's command. The King resented Marlborough's conduct deeply, saying, "If we were private persons the sword would have to settle between us."

It is remarkable that Marlborough and Russell, the two most prominent military and naval commanders, were both corresponding at this time with James II. The principal accuser of Marlborough, named Young, however, confessed at the end of May that he had committed perjury, and the Grand Jury found a true bill against him for forgery. He was flogged and pilloried, and Marlborough was released on bail, June, 1692.

Lord Wolseley, in his "Life of Marlborough," shows clearly that though he communicated the impending attack on Brest, which failed disastrously, June, 1694, the proposal had been revealed to Louis XIV. some months earlier.

When Queen Mary died in December, 1694, the Marlboroughs induced the King's natural successor, Princess

Anne, to write to William a letter of condolence, but he still refused to re-employ Marlborough as he had been urged to do by many persons, for Marlborough's daughters had all been married to persons of great influence.

Marl-
borough
and the
Army

William III. appointed, though unwillingly, Marlborough, in 1698, to be Governor to the boy Duke of Gloucester, only surviving child of the Princess Anne, and when William III. went to Holland in July he made Marlborough one of the Lords Justices to administer the Government during the King's absence.

The King in his resistance to the resolution of Parliament for the reduction of the Army, was supported by Marlborough, who supported the Monarch also when he was attacked in the House of Lords. The Earl knew the danger to England of the proposed reductions, and the King felt so acutely on the subject that he contemplated resignation of the Throne, and discussed the subject with Marlborough.

In June, 1701, when the contingent under treaty was ordered to Flanders, William III., feeling that his health was unequal to a campaign, sent Marlborough in command, nominating him also as Ambassador Extraordinary. He realised that the Earl was the only man who could maintain the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV.

Marl-
borough in
Flanders,
1701

The King, who was in a bad state of health, broke his collar-bone, February 21st, 1702, his horse having fallen when galloping in Hampton Court Park. He was up and out-of-doors, March 2nd, but died a week later. "The asthmatic skeleton," as he was called, was much disliked by all classes in England on account of his marked preference for Dutchmen, and also because of his cold, ungracious manners, accentuated by his imperfect command of our language.

Death of
William III.

The Services had no cause to admire him, a Sovereign under whose command the practices of flogging in the Army, and keel-hauling in the Navy had been introduced; but the soldiers who had witnessed his reckless bearing in action at the Boyne in 1690, and at Neerwinden in 1693, where he apparently left unnoticed the many bullets which pierced his clothing, respected his imperturbable courage.

His want of tactical skill for a soldier who had fought so many battles was extraordinary, and he lost in defeats

**William as
a Soldier**

so many stands of Colours, that the Prince of Condé gave him the nickname of "The Upholsterer of Notre Dame," from the number of banners taken from his troops which were used later for the decoration of that sacred edifice. Queen Anne endorsed William's recommendation of Marlborough to be Commander-in-Chief of the troops of the Grand Alliance.

**Troops of
the Grand
Alliance**

The Emperor provided 90,000 men, England 40,000, of which half were to be British and half Continental mercenaries. Holland undertook to provide 10,000 Dutch, and pay 12,000 Danes, and Prussia promised 15,000 men. Under the Conventions arranged by William III. the total at the disposal of the Allies was 230,000; but France had 30,000 more, and the advantage of homogeneous armies, while the difficulties of commanding the much-mixed force of the Allies were obviously great.

CHAPTER II

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1702-3

Vigo Bay—Marlborough at The Hague—Dutch Deputies Foll Marlborough's Plans—Taking of Venloo and Liège—Marlborough Honoured—Fall of Bonn.

WAR against France was declared simultaneously at The Hague, London, and Vienna, on May 4th, 1702. William III. had planned a combined naval and military attack by the Dutch and English forces on Cadiz, the chief naval Arsenal in Spain, and Base for the Transatlantic colonies. The expedition, however, was not well planned, and the force was badly handled. It finally left the coast of the south of Spain in September.

Failure of
the Attack
on Cadiz,
1702

As the Allied fleet sailed northwards one of Rooke's captains learnt from a French consul at Lagos, near Cape St. Vincent, that a Spanish treasure fleet, under command of the French Admiral Chateau-Renault, was lying in Vigo bay.

This creek is on the north-west coast of Spain, about half-way between Corunna and Oporto, running up 20 miles inland from the Atlantic. The town of Vigo stands on the southern shore of the inlet, which is there four miles across; but three and a half miles higher up, i.e. to the east, the waters narrow to 800 yards, and there the entrance to the inner harbour of Redondela, which is three miles by two miles in extent, was closed by a boom. The boom was defended at either end by batteries of 20 and 40 guns respectively standing above it, and also by a line of battle-ships moored at either end; and immediately inside the obstacle five ships were moored broadside on, there being in all 24 men-of-war lying in the harbour. The boom itself was unusually formidable as an obstacle, being composed of a mass of ships' masts, planks, and casks chained together, in all thirty feet in circumference.

When Rooke arrived off Redondela bay, which is to the east of Vigo, some of the treasure-ships had been already discharged, and the bullion removed inland. The Admiral

Vigo Bay,
1702

landed 5,000 troops under the Duke of Ormonde, and sent in for the attack 25 of his lighter men-of-war under the command of Admiral Sir Thomas Hopsonn in the *Torbay* (built to commemorate William's landing there in 1088).

Ships were told off to engage the batteries defending the ends of the boom, and after sundown, October 11th, Rooke visited all the ships detailed for the attack, encouraged the crews, and explained how it was to be executed.

Next day, when the British flag was seen flying on the Redondela fort, indicating that Ormonde's soldiers had done their part, Sir Thomas Hopsonn drove his ship, carrying all plain sail, against the boom, the impact breaking it, though the *Torbay* remained fast, entangled in the wreckage of the materials of which the boom was composed. There the ship became a target at close range for seven men-of-war and two shore batteries. The *Torbay's* casualties were terrible, and while she was still entangled by the wreckage of the boom, dismasted and her sails and rigging lying in heaps on the deck, the French Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Chateau-Renault, sent down a fire-ship, which had been converted to its self-destructive task from a snuff-laden vessel. Its blazing decks ignited the heaps of sails lying on the deck of the *Torbay*. When the fire-ship burnt to the water's edge, it blew up, causing terrible suffering to the eyes and noses of the survivors of Admiral Hopsonn's ship, some of whom jumped overboard in their agony. The burning snuff, however, extinguished the fire on board the *Torbay*, and thus saved the remainder of her crew.

Admiral Hopsonn's other ships were now all surging against the boom, which was broken up by the efforts of axemen, and a passage cleared through the wreckage, Hopsonn transferring his flag, and sailing up the creek in the *Monmouth*.

Chateau-Renault tried to burn his ships, but before he could do so the English, pressing on, secured 13 men-of-war and several treasure galleons which contained over 2,000,000 sterling.

The nation was delighted with the success, but the Government tried Rooke for the failure before Cadiz. The Admiral was honourably acquitted, the crews of his fleet were given a gratuity, Admiral Hopsonn was made a Knight

Taking of Venloo and Liège 157

Commander of the Bath, and London named a new street off Regent Street as Vigo Street.

The Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the Grand Alliance was for some time engaged with diplomatic work at The Hague, and General Ginckel commanded in the field. Marlborough had great trouble with his subordinate generals and their very mixed forces, but by the end of July had concentrated 60,000 men; although the French had not quite 40,000 men in the field, opposite to the Allies, the Dutch Deputies were unwilling to sanction an advance, and objected to an attack being made on the French troops under Marshal Boufflers.

Later, when the French Marshal made an imprudent move, Marlborough ordered an advance, but General Opdam, commanding the Dutch troops, refused to move; and yet a third time near Liège, when Marlborough had a favourable opportunity of attacking the French, the Dutch Deputies refused to allow their troops to fight.

Marlborough took Venloo, September 18th, and Liège in the last week of October, but when the troops went into winter quarters, and

Marlborough's
Troubles
with Sub-
ordinates,
1702



SKETCH-MAP TO ILLUSTRATE VIGO BAY

Mark
borough's
Successes
(1702-3)

he returned to England, he was much disappointed at the wanty success of his operations, although the possession of Liège had cut the French armies off from the Lower Rhine, and had freed Holland from the danger of invasion.

The Duke crossed over to The Hague, March, 1703, having been raised to the highest rank in the peerage. He proposed to the Allies to capture Antwerp and Ostend, but the States-General objected, unless Bonn and Cologne were first captured. Bonn fell in May, but when the troops retired to winter quarters the only result of the year's operations had been the capture of a few minor fortresses.

CHAPTER III

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1704

Marlborough's March to the Danube—The Schellenberg—Marlborough's Reputation in Europe—Blenheim—Marlborough Gains His Victory by Use of His Cavalry—Marlborough as a Statesman—The Nation's Thanks—Gibraltar.

FROM 1701 the fortune of war had alternated between France and the Coalition, but in 1704 Marlborough, by his astounding success, established a European reputation, first, as a strategist; secondly, as a ruthless leader, who reckoned no loss too great if the object to be attained was worth it; thirdly, as a tactician; and fourthly, as a diplomatist.

Marlborough's Reputation in 1704

He had seen through the plans of Louis XIV. and his object, which was by occupying Vienna to compel his principal opponent in the Grand Alliance to make peace, after which he anticipated but little difficulty in crushing the confederate armies in the Netherlands. Marlborough skillfully concealed his own schemes from friends and foes. The French King imagined that he would advance from Mainz into Alsace; the Dutch agreed to their troops going as far south as Coblenz, thinking that they were to operate in the valley of the Moselle.

March to the Danube


None of Marlborough's friends suspected his designs, until his troops, having crossed the Neckar, marched in a south-easterly direction. He had long felt no great results were obtainable in the Low Countries, where the delays caused by the fears of the Dutch were as great obstacles to military successes as were the numberless fortresses spread all over the country, and he had determined to join Prince Rupert in the valley of the Danube.

The Duke had all the roads leading to the Danube reconnoitred, and had formed supply depots on the routes he intended to follow capable of subsisting 90 squadrons and 50 battalions. The troops, under perfect discipline throughout the operations, paid for every article consumed, to the surprised delight of the inhabitants.



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**Marl-
borough's
Great
March,
1704**

The English troops left Roermond, on the Maas river, May 19th, 1704, the Danish, German, and Prussian contingents being ordered to join on the march. The artillery train and baggage columns were sent up the Rhine by water to Mainz.

The Margrave of Baden, who was senior as a general to Marlborough, gave him some trouble, but was persuaded to share the command of the Allied armies, each commanding for twenty-four hours at a time. Marlborough neutralised the disadvantages of this clumsy arrangement by practically though unostentatiously retaining all power in his own hands.

**The Schell-
enberg**

Prince Eugene, Marlborough's friend and sympathetic colleague, was left to watch Marshal Tallard and his 40,000 men then in Alsace, while the troops under Marlborough marched on Donauwörth, on the north bank of the Danube, where General d'Arco stood behind fortifications, which he had constructed on the Schellenberg.

When the opposing forces met, it was the turn of the Margrave to command, but he declined to assault the formidable position.

The bloody engagement which ensued resulted in a striking victory for Marlborough, whose troops carried the entrenchments, after three assaults, with a loss of 5,000 men. He pursued the enemy for many miles, driving them towards the Danube. There a dreadful catastrophe occurred, for the pontoon bridges broke under the rushing crowd of fugitives, who perished by hundreds in the deep river. Eventually only one-third of their numbers reached the entrenched camp overlooking Dillingen.

The Bavarians had lost heart, and the Elector, burning all his stores and equipment at Dillingen, retreated to Augsburg. A vigorous pursuit was maintained up to the gates of Munich, the whole intervening country being devastated in order to compel the Elector to sue for peace, but he would not break his engagements with Louis XIV.

The Elector was now joined by Marshal Tallard, and determined to fight. Marlborough had got rid of the Margrave of Baden, inducing him to go three marches down the Danube with 16,000 men to besiege Ingolstadt; and Prince Eugene, having deceived his opponent in Alsace by masterly manœuvres, joined Marlborough.





HIS GRACE JOHN, DUKE OF M. RLBOROUGH
After the portrait by Sir G. Kneller

The Battle of Blenheim

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After some clever strategical movements executed by both armies on the north and south banks of the Danube, Marlborough, crossing and recrossing, he drew up his army, August 10th, 1704, on the north or left bank.

Blenheim,
Aug. 13th,
1704

The combined French-Bavarian army, 60,000 strong, took up a position also on the left bank, being under the command of Marshal Count Tallard; General Clairambault stood in the village of Blenheim, Count Marsin in the Centre, and the Elector with 18 battalions on the extreme Left, the whole facing north-north-east.

Marlborough and Eugene, August 12th, at 2 A.M., in a dense fog, moved with 52,000 men towards it in nine columns.

Field-Marshal Count Tallard had placed his troops with their Right resting on the little village of Blenheim. It stands on the Danube, which, with a general course from west to east to Blenheim, from a mile up stream of the village, runs from South to North. West of the village, the Nebel river, ten feet wide, meanders in three courses to the Danube. Between Blenheim and Höchstädt, three miles farther West, there are five other streams, rendering the country near the north bank impracticable for troops.

Count Tallard, when we previously mentioned him, was in Alsace, but had now by forced marches joined the main army. He was a good strategist but an indifferent tactician. The Centre under Marshal Marsin was unfortunate in that its leader had never commanded more than a battalion under fire, and he made the mistake, which had disastrous results, of placing the Centre of his front too far away from the Nebel, which gave Marlborough's troops space on which they, after crossing, were able to re-form.

On the extreme Left or north-west flank, in and about Lutzingen, were 18 battalions of Bavarians under the Elector, and some squadrons of cavalry were still farther out on the flank, but the greater numbers of horsemen stood along the Front, which was about four miles in extent.

When Tallard had put 18 battalions and 1,500 dismounted Dragoons into Blenheim, he rode along the Front to see how the Elector had disposed his troops, and, noticing that between Blenheim and Oberglaun there were only cavalry and a screen of infantry, he directed Marsin to place his reserve in the centre of his part of the position. Marsin had, however, already moved it to the left, where he thought

Blenheim,
1704

it was required, and it did not get back until after the catastrophe.

Marlborough's intention was to make his main attack on the French Right, posted in Blenheim, and he detailed Lord Cutts to lead the assault on the village.

Five pontoon bridges were thrown across the Nebel, but the river itself was scarcely more of an obstacle than the marshy ground on either side of it. The fog cleared off at 7 A.M., but Marlborough waited for many hours for Prince Eugene's troops, which had to traverse difficult, broken ground.

At 12.30 P.M., the artillery having opened fire, Lord Cutts advanced his first line, consisting of the Guards and (what are now known as) the Lincoln Regiment, Royal Scots Fusiliers, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and South Wales Borderers. The second line, composed of Hessian troops, came next, and a third line, composed of the Royal Scots, the Liverpool Regiment, Bedfordshire Regiment and Lancashire Fusiliers, having struggled through the swampy ground, followed on. General Row, who was in command, left the Hessians under cover of a slope of the ground, and marched forward, the British Brigadier having given orders that not a shot should be fired until he stuck his sword in the palisades which had been erected for the defence of the village. He was obeyed, and fell mortally wounded as he did so; a lieutenant-colonel and major being killed while trying to carry him away.

From the distance of 30 yards up to the palisade in front of the village, Row's men fell in heaps under the terrible fire which they encountered, but they closed in without flinching, and advanced until one-third of the brigade had fallen. As the suffering troops then staggered back, they were attacked by eight squadrons of French Corps d'Élite, which, emerging from between the Danube and Blenheim, charged the troops as they were retiring. The cavalry then galloped on, but, meeting the Hessians, who stood firm, were beaten back.

Lord Orkney then led forward two brigades under Ferguson and Hulsén. They struggled through the marshy ground with much difficulty, but though Ferguson's men attacked with great determination, they were repulsed as Row's had been. Then Marlborough realised the practical

The Victory at Blenheim

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impossibility of carrying Blenheim, and he ordered Lord Cutts to demonstrate only against the fortified village. The infantry covered the crossing of the cavalry, which was effected with difficulty.

Blenheim,
1704

Before Marlborough's cavalry had time to re-form, the French first line of horse came down the slope at the gallop, and broke the disordered regiments, and if the second line had but charged at this moment, the British squadrons must have been pushed back into the Nebel. Marlborough, however, brought forward some Danish and Hanoverian squadrons, which had crossed higher up the river, and charged the French squadrons, which had been in the meantime heavily fired on by Cutts's infantry, and drove them back, thus giving the British cavalry time to re-form.

Prince Holstein-Beck with 11 Hanoverian battalions attacked Oberglau, but as the division was struggling out of the marshy ground, the Irish Brigade, in the pay of France, supported by several French battalions, at 3 P.M., charging down the slope, broke up the leading Hanoverian battalions. Marlborough, however, led up some fresh artillery and infantry, and drove the Irish Brigade back into Oberglau, thus securing a passage over the Nebel.

Prince Eugene at three o'clock was still unable to gain ground, although he had personally, and with heroic courage, led three successive attacks. Marlborough, who had now got all his cavalry across the Nebel, formed them up in two lines to attack the French Centre.

Marshal Tallard, foreseeing the impending attack, sent forward from the second line nine battalions to resist it. The French infantry behaved grandly, though their ranks were mown down by artillery and musketry fire, yet they continued to advance. Tallard, seeing that the infantry, unless succoured, must break up, ordered his cavalry to extricate them by a charge, but the horsemen would not "ride home," and Marlborough's squadrons, riding over the remnant of the nine brave but unsupported battalions, destroyed them.

The cavalry on Marsin's Right flank, seeing the destruction of the infantry, "changed position Right back," making a big gap between Marsin's troops and those in Blenheim.

Count Tallard, now realising the impending catastrophe, ordered Marsin to move to his right and the Blenheim gar-

Blenheim,
1704

rison to detach troops to its left to fill up the gap, but it was too late. Marsin was heavily engaged, and the order, indeed, did not reach him until the action was over.

Marlborough, who had formed his cavalry for attack, now personally led them up the slope. The French horsemen, instead of riding forward to the encounter, fired feebly from the saddle, and, then turning, fled. Thirty squadrons made for the Danube, west of Blenheim, pursued by the Prussian cavalry.

Tallard was taken prisoner when trying to pass into Blenheim, where Marlborough made prisoners of 24 battalions and four regiments of dismounted Dragoons. The Allies lost 4,500 killed and 7,500 wounded. The officers who were in front during the attack suffered very severely; for example, the 26th Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) losing 20 officers.

The actual fighting in this battle was chiefly remarkable for the unusual use of cavalry in piercing the French Centre, but it could not have been successful had the centre of the position been adequately occupied by infantry sufficiently advanced to fire on Marlborough's troops before they could re-form after struggling out of the marshy ground. Marlborough's rapid decision in changing his plan of attack when he found that the village of Blenheim was practically impregnable, saved many lives, but the casualties were painfully numerous.

The Franco-Bavarian armies lost nearly 28,000 men, counting killed, wounded, and those taken prisoners, 124 guns, nearly 300 Colours and cavalry Standards, and the whole of the camp equipment.

The political and moral effects of the battle were great, for, as Sir Archibald Alison wrote in his "History of Europe," the decisive blow of Blenheim "resounded throughout every part of Europe."

The Elector of Bavaria was crushed; was compelled to disband his army, and to declare himself neutral.

The Emperor had secured Vienna, the French power in the valley of the Danube disappeared, and Louis XIV. was now obliged to stand on the defensive.

Marlborough went to Berlin as soon as his presence with the troops could be spared, to endeavour to induce the King of Prussia to help the Duke of Savoy with troops.


The extraordinary ability of Marlborough as a statesman was now fully acknowledged by his most implacable foes, and the sanguinary battles on the Schellenberg, and Danube, indicated clearly that great as he was in diplomacy he was still greater in strategy and in action, for although fifty-two years of age, in the midst of death he showed the audacious courage of a young man.

Marlborough's Statesmanship

In spite of the Duke's world-wide fame, for German poets were composing songs in his honour which were sung throughout Germany, his enemies in England, and he had many, pretended to doubt whether Blenheim had been a victory. A Member of Parliament who hazarded this opinion in the House was silenced by the rejoinder that "Louis XIV. at least had no doubt on the subject."

The Duke landed in England in December, and was rewarded as no other general has ever been. The Royal Manor of Woodstock, Crown property, was given to him, and Queen Anne ordered Blenheim Palace to be built on it. It cost the nation £240,000.

While Marlborough was gaining renown by the brilliant strategical and tactical operations, which culminated in the



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF BLENHEIM, AUG. 13th, 1704

Naval
Strategy
in 18th
Century

decisive victory at Blenheim, Admiral Sir George Rooke captured Gibraltar, a feat which was singularly little appreciated at the time, except by sailors. They had always felt the want of a naval Base in the west end of the Mediterranean.

Rooke's dashing attack on the fleet guarding the treasure-ships lying in Vigo bay had caused Portugal to abandon the alliance with Louis XIV., so Lisbon became available as a harbour to the British fleet, but it is too far distant from the scenes of action in the centre and east of the Mediterranean for effective use by England in war.

It was intended at one time to render Tangiers, on the construction of the mole, on which over £2,000,000 sterling was spent, a Base for the Navy. When it was abandoned, Admirals Rooke, Cloudesley Shovel, and Torrington had protested, but unavailing, to the effete Government, in 1684, against its retrocession.

Capture of
Gibraltar,
1704

When Admiral Sir George Rooke, in May, 1704, was passing Gibraltar, Admiral Sir John Leake suggested its capture, and the idea was eagerly accepted by Rooke.

The Rock of Gibraltar is 1,400 feet high, three miles long from north to south, and three-quarters of a mile across. It is precipitous on the north and east sides, sloping down to the west. It offers a stiff climb on the south end, which is 14 miles from Africa, the shortest distance between any two points being about nine miles. The Rock which, with Spain, was held by the Moors for 700 years, was taken possession of by the Spaniards when Granada fell, 1491.

Cromwell, with his intuitive strategical aptitude, had the idea that it might be converted into an island by cutting a canal through the neck which joins it to Spain at the north end.

Its capture was hazardous, but Rooke was an excellent tactician, never leaving anything to chance. He detailed 27 men-of-war to bombard the works, and landed between 2,000 and 3,000 men to the north-west of the Rock. The inshore squadron opened fire at daylight, July 23rd, bombarding the forts. When the captain of a small vessel was reconnoitring during a temporary cessation of the bombardment, to ascertain the amount of damage, the captains of the inshore squadron sent on shore an attacking force in boats, and the small garrison, numbering only 470 men, capitulated.

CHAPTER IV

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1705-6

Results of the Blenheim Victory—Marlborough's Troubles with Obstructive Dutch—The French Present an Opportunity—Battle of Ramillies—Effects of Marlborough's Success at Ramillies—Capture of Louvain, Brussels, Malines, Antwerp, and Ostend—Marlborough's Diplomacy.

THE year 1704 had been unfortunate for Louis XIV., whose schemes had failed in every direction, and after it he was reduced to act for the most part on the defensive. Marlborough's Plans, 1705

As a result of the decisive Battle of Blenheim the French had to abandon the Elector of Bavaria and to recross the Rhine, and the Elector was compelled by the conditions of Peace to disband his army. Marlborough's aim in 1705 was to expel the French from the fortresses they had seized in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Ryswick, and he manœuvred, trying to bring the French armies to action, but in vain. His brilliant scheme to capture Saarlouis before the French could concentrate for its defence, by operating in the valley of the Moselle while Prince Eugene moved down the valley of the Saar to join him, failed, because the Emperor Leopold and the German Princes, once relieved of the French invaders of their country by the results of the Battle of Blenheim, had relapsed into their usual state of apathy, and both the British, and Dutch Governments were obstructive.

On Marlborough's return to Holland, April, 1705, he persuaded the Dutch to agree to his schemes for invading France, but Eugene had now been sent to northern Italy, to operate against the Duc de Vendôme, and so was no longer available.

When Marlborough took the field in the valley of the Moselle he had only 40,000 men, but Marshal Villars, though he greatly outnumbered him, fell back to a position whence he could cover Thionville, Luxemburg, and Saarlouis. It Valley of the Moselle

French
Lines
Forced,
1705

was too strong for Marlborough's numbers, and he waited for reinforcements from Germany.

General Overkirk, left in charge of the defence of the Netherlands, had been obliged to retreat inside the entrenched position of Maastricht. Marlborough, by a very long and rapid march, carried out in a deluge of rain, completely deceived Villars, who lost touch of him, and the Duke joined Overkirk, July 2nd, and then took Huy within a few days.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allies, by a skilful strategical movement, penetrated the French fortified lines which ran from Antwerp to Namur, a distance of 50 miles, breaking through at Tirlemont, but the Dutch then, and again later in August, declined to utilise the favourable position which the Duke by his strategical skill had obtained.

Dutch
Insubordin-
ation,
1705-6

During the winter Marlborough visited Berlin, Hanover, and Vienna, but failed to induce the respective Governments to undertake any common action. The Dutch had refused to allow their troops to serve out of the Netherlands, and at last Marlborough threatened the States-General that he would withdraw the British contingent; this step they knew would involve the breaking up of the Coalition. They then gave way, and suggested not only that Marlborough should select the Dutch Representatives who always accompanied the Allied troops, but that moreover those Representatives should have secret instructions to comply with all his orders. Marlborough was, nevertheless, doubtful of the possibility of success when working with such Allies, but just then Villeroi gave him an opportunity of gaining a great victory.

The French Marshal, although ordered to await the arrival of Marshal Marsin, who was advancing from the Rhine, before undertaking any operations, thought that the Allies were marching on Namur before they had effected their concentration, and he moved out of his entrenched lines behind the Dyle river, hoping to crush his foes before they were ready to receive him. Marlborough, however, had concentrated his army, and, seizing the opportunity, advanced.

Ramillies,
1706

Colonel the Earl of Cadogan, Quartermaster-General to Marlborough's British troops, rode forward at 1 A.M. on May 23rd, 1706, in order to lay out a camp at Ramillies, two miles from the river Meuse, a tributary of the Meuse. From a hill near Merdorp Cadogan sighted the French

The Battle of Ramillies

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troops at 10 A.M., when a thick mist clearing away under a bright sun, disclosed an army of 60,000 men coming on to the Ramillies plateau. The country unpaved roads were from constant rain very deep; the Allies' guns were often up to their axletrees in mud, so Cadogan halted the head of the column to allow it to close up.

Ramillies,
1706

The ground on which Villeroi elected to fight is a slightly elevated tableland in a flat country, on the slopes of which three streams rise: the Meuse, flowing eastwards, passes the village of Tavers, two miles lower down, where the stream is 12 feet broad. The Great Gheete, rising close under Ottomond's tomb, flows in a north-westerly direction; the Little Gheete oozes out of the ground at Ramillies, flowing in four small branches, generally in a north-easterly direction, past Offuz and Anderkirk. We are writing from memory, but, after careful inspection fifty years ago, are under the impression that the undulations on the battle-field are not greater than those from the Marble Arch across Hyde Park to Victoria Station, London.

Villeroi put his Right in Tavers and a hamlet a little to the east of it; his Right Centre stood at Ramillies, his Left Centre at Offuz, and his Left at Anderkirk, the two flanks being half a mile in front of the Centre, all facing eastwards, on a frontage of about four miles.

Marlborough's tactical skill in grasping the disposition of an enemy's troops was as remarkable as was his strategical insight, and he noticed immediately the weakness of Villeroi's position, in that the posts of Tavers and Ramillies were too far distant to allow the guns in those villages to cross their fire on an assaulting column, and that, moreover, though his Left in and near Anderkirk was secure, yet the troops on that flank could not advance for a counter-attack without much difficulty in consequence of the three streams of the Little Gheete flowing across their Front. The Duke, therefore, decided to demonstrate against Anderkirk, hoping to induce Villeroi to strengthen his Left. For this purpose an advance was made on the extreme Right of the Allies by the British contingent, which moved forward formed in two lines as if about to attack. Some time later these lines retired, the proper front line up to the top of a rise of ground, where it halted; the rear line, after passing out of sight, and turning southwards, marched rapidly to re-

Ramillies,
1706

inforce Marlborough's Centre. The ruse had the desired effect, for Villeroi, who had already occupied Anderkirk and Offuz strongly, now withdrew troops from his Right to his Left, going there himself. Ramillies was entrenched, and held by 20 battalions with 24 guns.


When Marlborough's army was ready, he advanced the infantry of the Allies' Right in two lines, on a frontage of about three miles.

At 1.30 the artillery opened fire, four Dutch battalions carried the hamlet in front of Taviars, gaining that village, which was defended by several batteries and a battalion, after a severe struggle; while 12 German battalions attacked Ramillies, which was stoutly held by the Irish Brigade of the French Army.

General Overkirk moving up on the left bank of the Mehaigne, charged as soon as the capture of Taviars enabled him to pass that village. He routed the front line of French cavalry, destroyed two battalions of Swiss, but was then driven back, being saved from destruction by fresh squadrons, which were led forward by Marlborough in person. In the hand to hand fighting which ensued the Duke was surrounded, and being recognised by French Dragoons, was attacked by several men, and fell from his horse when attempting to cross a ditch. His example, however, had greatly encouraged his squadrons, which closed up around the Commander-in-Chief.

Now 20 fresh squadrons coming up from the Mehaigne bank, Marlborough led them in a charge on the French Right, and drove all the cavalry away, leaving their infantry alone. These were now ridden over and destroyed. The Irish Brigade defending Ramillies, which had hitherto fought hand to hand heroically, on seeing this disaster gave way. When Villeroi saw that his Right flank was turned he gave orders, "Change front, Right back," pivoting on Anderkirk, and trying to re-form his Right on Gerompont. His baggage, however, which had been parked there, prevented the troops from getting into the desired position.

The leading British regiments, up to this time halted on the slope to the east of Offuz since the battle began four hours earlier, were now allowed freedom of action. They forded the Little Gheete, and carried Offuz with a rush. This disheartened all the French troops near at



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF RAMILLIES, MAY 23rd, 1706

hand, and even some battalions which, having retreated earlier, were moving back in good order, were now ridden over by Marlborough's victorious squadrons, and sabred. The fugitive army fled to Jodoigne, and the British troops pursued them, the cavalry only halting at Meldert, 15 miles from the battle-field, at 2 A.M. next day.

The French casualties were over 13,000, in addition to 2,000 men made prisoners during the pursuit, while the British losses were only between 4,000 and 5,000 men.

The effects of this disaster were great. Louvain fell twenty-four hours after the battle, and then in succession Brussels, Malines, and later Antwerp. Marlborough's troops levied forced contributions in French Flanders, and Ostend surrendered July 6th.

The Duke had led his triumphant troops in one month from the Meuse to the sea, and when the armies went into winter quarters France retained only Charleroi, Luxemburg, Mons, and Namur.

The successes of Marlborough in 1706 set the Allies quarrelling for the fruits of victory, and Louis XIV., thus encouraged, negotiated secretly with the States-General of

Ramillies,
1706

Marl-
borough's
Later
Successes,
1706

**Marl-
borough's
Diplomacy**

Holland. The Dutch Ministers, well informed as to political parties in London, realised the possibility of Marlborough being driven from power, and foreseeing the probability of the dissolution of the Grand Alliance, thought that it might be expedient to come to terms with France.

The Emperor, after the Battle of Ramillies, offered to Marlborough the position of Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, with a salary of £60,000 per annum. The Dutch Ministers, however, opposed the idea bitterly, so Marlborough declined the offer, the country he had conquered being handed over to a mixed form of Government, under which the inhabitants of Bruges and Ghent became thoroughly disgusted with their Governors, and in the following year opened their gates to the French army.

Marlborough had further difficulties arising from quarrels between the Emperor Leopold and the Duke of Savoy, which induced the Emperor to negotiate with Louis Quatorze. Then Charles XII. of Sweden, arriving at Dresden with his victorious army, frightened the Emperor and the German Princes. Marlborough, who had gone to Dresden to ascertain if Charles XII. meant to support the falling fortunes of Louis XIV., with great tact and diplomatic ability put an end to all these negotiations.

From a variety of causes, but mainly from the silly opposition of the Dutch Deputies, nothing was effected in the Low Countries for some time, to the great disappointment of the people of England. Members of Parliament tried to hold Marlborough responsible, not only for the want of success in Flanders but also for the repulse of Prince Eugene's expedition to Toulon, and still further for Lord Galway's (2nd Marquis Ruvigny) defeat by Marshal Berwick, son of Arabella Churchill by James II., and therefore the Duke of Marlborough's nephew. The first accusation was absurd, as Prince Eugene had gone from Italy to the South of France without Marlborough's interference.

CHAPTER V

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1707-8

The Battle of Almanza—Elector of Hanover Causes Difficulties—Oudenarde
—The French Routed and Demoralised—The Investment of Lille.

GALWAY'S defeat at Almanza, April 25th, 1707, was peculiar in that the beaten Anglo-Portuguese force was commanded by a Frenchman, and the French conquering troops were led by an Englishman. Almanza,
1707

Although the British public did not appreciate the fact, there was no disgrace to our arms, for our soldiers behaved grandly. The Portuguese infantry did well until they were outflanked, but the Portuguese cavalry fled early in the battle, and it was impossible for 15,000 infantry, badly commanded, to stand up on a plain against 25,000 effective Frenchmen. When Galway was temporarily blinded by sabre cuts over his eyes, there was no one at hand to replace him.

The British regiments left no guns behind them, and a remnant retired steadily and in good order for 20 miles. The four British cavalry regiments lost their commanding officers, and in several battalions there were only one or two effective officers out of the twenty-five who had gone into action. The total loss of the Allies was 4,000 killed and wounded, and 3,000 prisoners.

The discontent caused by the necessity of imposing fresh taxation for war expenditure rendered Marlborough's position insecure, until he could win another victory, so when he met Prince Eugene at the Hague in April, 1708, he discussed a well-thought-out scheme for the invasion of France; but as regards its execution endless difficulties arose. Many were caused by the Elector of Hanover (later George I.), who was jealous of Prince Eugene, and by the Prince Elector (later George II.), who was on bad terms with his father, and who joined Prince Eugene in order to annoy his father. Marl-
borough's
New Plans,
1708

The Duke of Marlborough met Prince Eugene at the

Oudenarde,
1708

Hague, April, 1708, and they elaborated a scheme for the invasion of France, but Prince Eugene's army was, as usual, late in assembling, and the Elector of Hanover and the States-General were, as usual, obstructive; moreover, now some of the great cities were no longer loyal to their own people, and later the cities of Bruges and Ghent admitted French troops. The citadels, however, of both cities where the Allies had assembled their parks of artillery, remained in the hands of the Allies.

Marlborough now became seriously ill from anxiety and overwork, General Overkirk acting for him. Prince Eugene riding on in front of his army with an escort of cavalry from Maastricht, reached the camp at Assche, July 7th. This was fortunate for the Allies, for the Prince was an ever loyal, helpful colleague of the Duke.

Marlborough, foreseeing Vendôme's intentions, had recently strengthened Oudenarde, which from its small garrison, and the dilapidated state of its defences, had been in danger. Vendôme, who had hoped to surprise the garrison and capture the fortress, found on approaching that not only had the garrison been reinforced, but even after a march of 28 miles the Allies had got within supporting distance.

Vendôme, deciding to wait for Siege Artillery for which he sent to Tournai, then retired in a North-Westerly direction, intending to cross the Scheldt at Gavre, six miles below Oudenarde, and was followed up by Marlborough.

Lord Cadogan, Quartermaster-General, with 11,000 men, marched at daylight, July 11th, and, crossing the Scheldt at Eyne, one and a half miles below Oudenarde, his cavalry met Vendôme's foraging parties, which had crossed at Gavre, and were moving without precautions up the left bank of the river.

The town of Oudenarde lies on low ground in the valley of the Scheldt, which flows here from South-West to North-East. The Norken River, which rises near Oycke, runs nearly parallel to the Scheldt, which it joins below Gavre. From Oycke, which stands on the highest ground of the battle-field and about three miles to the West of Oudenarde, two small streams rising near the Norken run nearly at right angles away from it, and through Eyne into the Scheldt.


The Battle of Oudenarde

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There is a succession of hamlets facing the Scheldt and parallel to it, Mooreghem, Bevere, Groenewald, and Heurne, the former being a mile upstream of Oudenarde, and the latter three miles down the Scheldt, all about a mile from the water-line.

When Marshal Vendôme learnt that the Allies' cavalry were across the Scheldt, he directed that all the hamlets facing the Scheldt should be occupied, sending 7 battalions to hold Heurne.

Fortunately for Marlborough the Duke of Burgundy, heir to Louis XIV., and Commander-in-Chief of all his armies, was present, and, exercising his powers, he determined to form a line of battle on the left bank of the Norken, two and a half miles from the Scheldt. The seven battalions ordered by Marshal Vendôme to hold



SKETCH-MAP OF THE BATTLEFIELD OF OUDENARDE, JULY 11th, 1708

Oudenarde,
1708

Heurne marched in error to Eyne, three-quarters of a mile farther South.

The advanced guard of the Allied infantry reached the Scheldt at 2 P.M., crossing by the Oudenarde bridge and pontoons, which had been thrown over the river by Lord Cadogan. A brigade, under General Sabine, consisting of the Liverpool Regiment, Royal Welsh and Inniskilling Fusiliers, attacked Eyne vigorously in front, and the cavalry which had passed through Oudenarde, forming up in the rear, so demoralised the seven battalions that three surrendered, four broke up, and were pursued and slaughtered by the cavalry under Prince George of Hanover (later George II.). He having broken also some French squadrons, drove them across the Norken.

At 4 P.M., while the Allied infantry were still crossing the Scheldt and Cadogan had only two battalions in Groenewald, one mile in advance of Eyne, the Duke of Burgundy advanced his Right Wing, and Marshal Vendôme conforming, brought forward his Left, but the Duke ordered him to halt and entrench.

Marlborough sent up 12 battalions to Groenewald, and the Prussian cavalry formed up to the North of Heurne, the British infantry occupying Bever, on the left flank, at the same time.

The two battalions of Prussians, although attacked by 30 of the French, held on with grand courage in Groenewald until supports came up, which prolonged the line to Schaerken, on the Left or South flank, where much hand to hand fighting took place, in which the Royal Scots (Lothian Regiment) and the Buffs (East Kent Regiment) were hotly engaged.

The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene had ridden together so far, but the Duke now sent his colleague to command on the Right, supported by Count Lottum and 20 battalions which, having pierced the French first line, were supported by several Prussian squadrons. The horsemen broke through the French line, and pursued for a mile towards Huyshe, until the cavalry were received by a deadly volley poured in by men lying behind banks and hedges, and while somewhat shaken, were charged by the French Household Cavalry and driven back until they reached Count Lottum's infantry.

The Victory at Oudenarde

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While Prince Eugene was engaging the French troops about Groenewald, Marlborough was attacking those at Dippenwald, on the higher ground to the Westward overlooking Schaerken and Groenewald. There the French beat back all the attacks.

Oudenarde,
1708

The Duke of Marlborough now moved General Overkirk under cover of the hill near Bevere, called Boser Couter, as far West as Oycke, well outside the Duke of Burgundy's Right flank, and falling on it, and also on the rear, surrounded the troops.

Marshal Vendôme, seeing what was occurring, tried to help the troops on the right by advancing from behind the Norken, leading himself in front; but at 9 P.M. the Allies' flanks had so surrounded the French that Marlborough and Eugene had to cease fire for the safety of their own men.

Marshal Vendôme endeavoured to keep his men together till daylight to act as a Rear-guard, but the Duke of Burgundy ordered a retreat, and the men streamed away to the north in the darkness making for Ghent. They had lost cohesion, and escaped only with their lives owing to the fatigue of the Allied troops, who had marched 50 miles in 60 hours, besides crossing the Scheldt; moreover, effective pursuit was not practicable until dawn. The Allied losses were less than 3,000; the French lost 6,000 killed and wounded, and 9,000 prisoners, including 700 officers.

At daylight 40 squadrons of the Allied cavalry, chiefly British, which had only been slightly engaged in the battle, pursued the French, who were thoroughly demoralised.

Two days later Marlborough encamped on French territory, on the inhabitants of which he levied contributions. This victory at Oudenarde re-established for a time the Duke's position in England, and consequently also the Grand Alliance on the Continent.

Results of
the Victory

In the autumn the British Government organised an expedition to invade Normandy under General Erle, and the Duke of Marlborough proposed to co-operate with it by masking Lille by a containing force. The Dutch were, however, frightened at the idea of Marlborough leaving their country, for the French still held Bruges and Ghent. It was eventually decided to capture Lille, the centre of defence of the north frontier, as a preliminary step to an advance into the interior of France.

**Campaign
of 1708**

This serious operation required a large siege-train, to haul which 16,000 horses were collected at Brussels, the train later having to march 75 miles, and cross the Dender and Scheldt rivers. Moreover, Marshal Vendôme was at Ghent, only 25 miles north of a direct line from Brussels to Lille, and Marshal Berwick was at Douai, 30 miles south of that fortress. Marlborough's arrangements were, however, so perfect that the siege-train was carried across what is now Belgium without the loss of a wagon.

Lille

The Duke covered the investment of Lille from his cantonment at Helchin, and offered battle to the combined forces of Berwick and Vendôme, who advanced their troops as if about to fight, and then retired their 110,000 men, although they had positive orders to engage the Allies, who numbered only 70,000. Marlborough would have forced on an action, but that the Dutch Deputies objected to the risk.

Prince Eugene later assaulted Lille, he personally leading the assault, and was wounded in carrying one of the outworks. The French fought with great determination, and were eventually allowed to surrender; marching out with the "Honours of War," December 9th.

**Bruges and
Ghent**

The cities of Bruges and Ghent soon submitted. The total losses of the Allies at Lille alone were 20,000, of which 12,000 were killed and wounded, and 7,000 died of sickness. The French lost 8,000 men.

CHAPTER VI

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1709

Situation in France—Marshal Villars's New Army—Malplaquet—Valour of the Prince of Orange—Marshal Boufflers—Capitulation of Mons—Marlborough as a Strategist—Marlborough in Disgrace—Peace of Utrecht.

THE situation of the people in France during the winter 1708-9 was terrible. The Government was bankrupt, and the British Navy, dominating not only the Channel, but also the French coasts west and south, prevented imports of food being landed.

Situation in
France,
1708-9

Louis XIV. endeavoured to utilise the dissensions of the Confederate Powers, trying to negotiate with each separately, and offering an immense bribe to Marlborough for help in negotiating terms. The Duke did his utmost to induce the States-General to accept reasonable terms of peace, but they, and indeed all the Allied Powers, who had become arrogant with success, insisted on terms too humiliating for France's acceptance.

Louis XIV., never deficient in courage, now showed all his best qualities: he sold his Household furniture, melted down his table plate and pinched himself as he had distressed his people, on whom he called in a patriotic proclamation, and they nobly seconded their Monarch's efforts. Marshal Villars within a few months transformed a number of half-starved, desperate men into an enthusiastic army of 90,000 men.

Villars's
New Army

The Marshal took up a position between Bethune and Douai, which he strengthened by numerous redoubts and by making inundations, which some time later extended his fortified line 12 miles eastwards, from Douai to Conde, on the Scheldt river.

The Allies advanced June 23rd, and Marlborough, finding Villars's position too strong to warrant an attack on it, marched up the lines to induce Villars to weaken the garrison of Tournai. This he did, and after dark Marl-

Tournai,
1709

**Tournai,
1799**

borough, seeing that Villars had moved his troops, marched rapidly to his left, and at 7 A.M., June 24 h, surrounded Tournai, the garrison of which, after a gallant defence, capitulated September 3rd, Marlborough having then lost 5,000 men.

The Duke now determined to capture Mons, and established his head-quarters south of that fortress, cutting it off from the interior of France.

Marshal Villars determined to fight in order to save Mons, and, September 4th, his advanced troops met a force detached from Marlborough's army under the command of the Prince of Hesse-Cassel, but, thinking it was in touch with the main army, the Marshal hesitated to attack, and thus lost a great opportunity.

**Malplaquet,
1709**

Villars advanced to within 10 miles of Mons, and took up a position on the south side of the two great gaps in the dense forest which then covered the elevated plateau between the Hon and Trouille rivers.

The advanced guards of the opposing forces came in contact in the afternoon of September 7th, the Allies bivouacking five miles north of the little village of Malplaquet. The Duke wished to attack before the French could do more work in throwing up obstacles, but the Dutch Deputies urged, and obtained some delay.

Marshal Villars availed himself of the intervening time to add greatly to his defences. He had concentrated his army guarding the Bavay-Mons and Bavay-Maastricht roads, to the south of the two openings. In the highest point of the main gap, which was there about a mile and a half from east to west, he constructed a triple line of strong fortifications, in front of which stood nine Redans, and immediately in front of the works was a battery of 20 guns.

The Right rested on the wood of Laignières, inside which there was a long line of abatis. The west front, i.e. the left side of the gap, had two lines of fortifications facing half inwards to flank the line of advance up the gap, and the extreme Left of these works rested on a swamp. Behind all these obstacles, and to the south of Malplaquet hamlet, there were more entrenchments.

On September 10th Villars had 95,000 men in position, covering the roads to Maubeuge. Marlborough, who was

The Battle of Malplaquet

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about to attack him, had 93,000 men, but rather more artillery. Malplaquet,
1709

At 7.30 A.M. the fog and mist, which till then had been dense, lifted, and the Prince of Orange led 30 battalions and 20 squadrons, mainly Dutchmen, against the French Right; and Count Lottum advanced with 28 battalions against the entrenchments, which faced inwards—that is, north-east—on the western side of the gap. General Schulenberg's forces were led personally by Prince Eugene, on Count Lottum's right, through the Sart wood, and still farther to the westward General Gauvain guided 2,000 men to out-flank the French Left. Still farther to the westward General Withers moved with five British battalions and 14 Continental battalions to make a circuit and pass round by the village of La Folie, which was well outside the French Left, through an opening, the Trouée de Louvière.

Lord Orkney deployed 15 British battalions, ordered to advance straight up the gap in a south-easterly direction, as soon as Schulenberg on his Right, and the Prince of Orange on his Left, had closed on the enemy's works.

As the Austrians, led by Eugene, went slowly forward, much hampered by the rough ground, which was serrated by scoured-out streams and covered with brushwood, they met with no opposition till they came within 50 paces of the French works, when they were received with so deadly a volley that they staggered back, and though, by moving to the right, they joined hands with Gauvain, yet the two forces even when combined could not gain ground.

Count Lottum, to whom Lord Orkney had lent the Buffs and Bedfordshire Regiment, had no more success, and, despite all the efforts of the Allies, the French held on to their entrenchments. While the Buffs were wading through a deep swamp, 12 French battalions ran forward to receive them on the southern end of it, and the battalion must have been annihilated had not Marshal Villars at that moment caught sight of the Duke of Marlborough advancing at the head of several squadrons, and recalled the 12 battalions. The Buffs, who were on the left of the line of Lottum's advance, turned the French entrenchments, and Lottum, attacking in front at the same time, after heavy fighting succeeded in entering the works, which had been held by the Picardie Regiment, but after retiring for a

Malplaquet,
1709

few minutes, and fighting from tree to tree, the Picardie men came back and reoccupied the works.

The Prince of Orange, losing patience, converted his intended demonstration into a real attack on the French Right posted in the wood of Laignières. The Prince personally led his Left, composed of Tullibardine's and Hepburn's Regiments in Dutch pay, the young Marquis going on well in front of his clan. Alongside the Scots went forward the Blue (Dutch) Guards. As the attacking force closed on the works nearly all the Staff of the Prince of Orange were shot down, and his horse was killed, but he went on in front of his men, and, though whole ranks were swept away by the French, carried the first entrenchment.

The French at this point were commanded by a remarkable man, Marshal Boufflers, aged sixty-seven, and crippled by gout. The old man rallied the troops behind the entrenchment which Orange's determined courage had gained, and then advancing, drove back the Allies, annihilating the Dutch Guards, who lost 6,000 at that place, the Scots suffering nearly as severely. Tullibardine died in the works which his courage, to a great extent, had enabled the Prince of Orange to capture. The Prince, though young and incompetent, was brave, and seizing the Colours of a regiment, he advanced almost alone up the enemy's front, but his men did not retake the work.

The Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene now rode up and restored order. Villars had been pressing Boufflers for help, but he was too much occupied in repulsing the Prince of Orange's attack, to spare any troops, and while Count Lottum's and Schulenberg's men were slowly gaining ground General Withers was turning the extreme French Left flank. Marshal Villars sent the (French) Irish Brigade and some French regiments from the centre of his position to meet this outflanking movement. They charged, and drove Withers into the forest, where, however, losing their formation, they were no longer effective.


Prince Eugene hastening up to rally General Withers's column, was shot in the head but did not quit the field. Withers brought up the 18th Royal Irish against the French Royal Regiment of Ireland, beat it back, and pursued it for some little way. Prince Eugene and Marshal Villars now met; the latter was hit, and Boufflers assumed command.

The Victory at Malplaquet 183

The Duke of Marlborough then sent up at "the trot" a 40-gun battery, which came into action within the French lines just as Lord Orkney's British brigade carried the Redans and Auvergne's Dutch cavalry passed through the entrenchments. The captured batteries were now brought into action against the French.

Marshal Boufflers then personally led forward 2,000 of the French Gendarmerie, and catching D'Auvergne's squadrons as they were re-forming after passing through the lines of entrenchment, drove them back in disorder. Lord Orkney's infantry, however, lined the French entrenchments on the reverse side, and held them against three determined attacks. Marlborough bringing forward British and Prussian horse, was attacked by Boufflers, who upset the first and second lines, but Prince Eugene came up with the Imperial Horse, and with the Prince of Hesse attacked Boufflers so vigorously that at 3 P.M. he ordered a retreat on Bavay.

The French lost 12,000 and 500 prisoners, the Allies lost 20,000. Mons capitulated October 20th.



PLAN OF MALPLAQUET, SEPTEMBER 11th, 1709
By permission from "Marlborough's Campaigns" (G. Allen & Co.)

CHAPTER VII

CAMPAIGN OF 1711

Marlborough's Strategical Skill—Villars's "Ne Plus Ultra" Lines—Marlborough Breaks the Lines—Marlborough's Defeat by Unscrupulous Statesmen—Charges against the Duke—Dismissal—Reappointment as Commander-in-Chief—Marlborough as Administrator, Strategist, Tactician.

Marl-
borough
as a
Strategist

THE Battle of Malplaquet was Marlborough's last fight, but he gave in the summer of 1711 a remarkable proof of his strategical skill, and the marvelous marching powers and endurance of his troops.

Marshal Villars had constructed a fortified line of defences which stretched from Etaples on the English Channel, at the mouth of the Canche river, up to its source to the south of St. Pol; thence, by the Gry and Scarpe rivers by Arras; by the Sensée to Bouchene, and the Scheldt to Valenciennes. The headwaters of all the rivers from the English Channel to Valenciennes were utilised to form inundations from Valenciennes to the Sambre; and thence to Namur there were lines of fortification, forming a defensive front from the Channel to Namur of about 160 miles.

"Ne Plus
Ultra"
Lines

The headwaters and their inundations near Douai were passable only by roads led across causeways on the Douai-Cambrai and Douai-Bapaume main roads.

The causeway on the main road between Douai on the north and Cambrai on the south was closed by a fort at Arleux, and there were practically no means of taking troops across the inundations except on these two roads.

Marlborough, by the distribution of the army, mystified not only his opponents but also his own Staff and troops. He sent away nearly all his artillery to the rear, and a large detachment to Bethune, and then detached Prince Eugene for work outside the zone of operations he was about to conduct, in order to penetrate the lines proudly designated by Marshal Villars, the designer, as "Marlborough's *ne plus ultra*."

Marlborough when ready marched his army two miles to the westward, and, as if about to cross the inundations near St. Pol, ordered the cavalry to cut and collect an immense supply of fascines, and then, calling his generals and Staff together to accompany him, he indicated where they were to lead their troops against an inundated and apparently impregnable front. The generals thought that their great Chief had taken leave of his senses, for they knew that a few days previously Marshal Villars had, to his great delight, captured the garrison of the fort on the crossing between Cambrai and Douai, two marches farther to the eastward. While Marlborough was taking his generals round to look at what was really an impregnable position, Lord Cadogan, who had dropped back unobserved, was galloping away to Douai, where the force under General Hompesch had been made up to 10,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry.

**Campaign
of 1711**

Before sunse that evening the Duke moved his cavalry out of his encampment far away to the westward in sight of the French outposts, but at 9 P.M. the Horsemen returned, and then the whole force, which was standing ready under arms, moved off to the eastward, Marlborough riding in front of the leading battalion.

**Forcing the
"Lines"**

At 5 A.M. next day the head of the column had covered 15 miles, where they found pontoons laid, by which the field artillery crossed to the southern bank.

Now the Duke received a written memorandum, and passed down the column: "Lord Cadogan and General Hompesch having marched from Douai, crossed the causeway at Arleux at 3 A.M., and are now within the enemy's lines. The Duke desires the infantry will step out"; and they did!

Marshal Villars heard at 11 P.M. that Marlborough's troops lying opposite to him on the north bank of the river had decamped, but it was 2 A.M. next day before he realised the situation. He then galloped fast at the head of some squadrons of Household cavalry to the eastward, so fast indeed that all but 100 of the best-mounted men fell out, and the excited Marshal never drew rein until he went headlong into a screen of the Allied cavalry, which captured all his followers, he only escaping by the fleetness of his horse.

Campaign
of 1711

Meanwhile the Allied infantry pressed on. Hundreds fell from exhaustion, and were left to recover or die. At 4 P.M. the head of the infantry column crossed the marshy inundation, having covered nearly 40 miles in 18 hours. The leading infantry were now within striking distance of Arras, Bouchain, and Cambrai, but only half the men who started at 9 P.M. overnight came in, for the others were stretched along the road; some, indeed, did not rejoin till the third day. Bouchain was captured September 14th, though Marshal Villars had more men at hand than had the Allies.

Political
Defeat of
Marl-
borough

This remarkable feat closed the Duke of Marlborough's active career. Although "he had never fought a battle without gaining a victory, nor besieged a fortress without taking it," yet he was now to be beaten by unscrupulous statesmen. The Duchess, his hot-tempered, domineering wife, had ruled the Queen for many years. Lady Marlborough, retiring in 1698 from her post of Lady-in-Waiting to "dear Mrs. Morley," out of kindness of heart placed Abigail Hill, an impecunious girl, at the time lady's maid to Lady Rivers, in the Queen's service. Abigail Hill eventually supplanted the Duchess in the Queen's affections.

Her Majesty, a weak, unstable, obstinate woman, had been steadied by her phlegmatic, dull husband, Prince George of Denmark, but he had died in 1708. While Sarah Churchill's influence with the Queen lasted, and Sunderland, Marlborough's son-in-law, was Head of the Government, the Duke was well supported; indeed he did what he thought was best for the country, for he was not only Commander-in-Chief, but also Foreign Minister.

In 1710 Mr. Harley and a Tory Government had come into power; Marlborough was then in danger, and in 1711 the House of Commons voted for an inquiry into his misuse of public funds.

Charges
against
Marl-
borough

When Marlborough got back to The Hague after the great feat of outwitting Marshal Villars in penetrating the "*ne plus ultra*" lines, he found awaiting him charges of disgraceful conduct in financial affairs. He was accused of having received an annual sum from the bread contractors, and two and a half per cent. from the pay of Auxiliary troops furnished by the Allies, amounting in all to £280,000. The Duke clearly proved that the bread

contracts percentage had been a perquisite of the General-Officer in command of the Low Countries for 20 years, and that the princes of the Grand Alliance which had furnished auxiliary troops had voluntarily granted the Commander-in-Chief two and a half per centum of the troops' pay for use as Secret Service money. It had been given to William III. and had been continued to Marlborough under a Royal Warrant. The Ministry had, however, a majority in the House of Commons of 100, and created twelve new peers, Abigail Hill's brother being one, and the Houses then voted that the bread perquisite was illegal, and the percentage of pay was Public money which should be brought into account. The Queen ordered her Attorney-General to prosecute Marlborough, and although nothing came of this Command, he was dismissed from all his appointments, December 31st.

Dismissal of
Marl-
borough,
1711

In January, 1712, the House of Commons decided that the acceptance of both perquisites by Marlborough was illegal, but a few days later, when appointing the Duke of Ormonde to succeed him, allotted to the new Commander-in-Chief the perquisites for the acceptance of which Marlborough had just been disgraced.

Reappoint-
ment, 1712

The Duke was re-appointed Commander-in-Chief by George I. He had been handsomely rewarded in a pecuniary sense, for, exclusive of Blenheim Palace, of money gifts from time to time, of portions to his daughters on their marriages, he had an income of £54,000, and his wife of £9,000 until she was dismissed by the Queen. The latter's rancour later was extended to officers who had done most to assist Marlborough in his great victories, for the indomitable and energetic Cadogan was removed from the Lieutenantancy of the Tower of London when the Duke ceased to be Commander-in-Chief. While we deplore his avarice, dishonesty, and treachery, we are bound to admire his marvellous energy, his undaunted courage and the diplomatic skill with which he forged the bonds of the Grand Alliance, for the British troops in the field did not average over 20,000 men. He led, indeed, all troops with unfailing success, and if we consider him as an administrator, as a strategist, a tactician, and a leader of the Three Arms—Horse, Artillery and Foot—he stands out above all our generals.

PART V

THE BATTLES OF DETTINGEN, 1743, AND FONTENROY, 1745

The Peace of Utrecht—The Austrian Succession—The Pragmatic Sanction—
Battle of Dettingen—Military Incapacity of George II.—Fontenoy—
—The Young Pretender—Culloden Moor.

**The Peace
of Utrecht,
1713**

AFTER the Peace of Utrecht, 1713, marking the termination of the wars of "The Spanish Succession" England's Army did not fight on the Continent till 1743, for although France and Spain combined in 1733 to suppress England's commercial and maritime rapidly growing trade, the war of 1739, known as that of Jenkins's Ear, waged most unwittingly by Walpole, a "Peace at any Price" minister, was carried out by the Navy, for the most part unsuccessfully.

**The
Austrian
Succession**

Charles VI., Emperor of Austria, spent the last twenty years of his life endeavouring to secure the peaceful succession of his daughter, Maria Teresa, to the throne, and had induced all the Rulers on the Continent, except the Elector of Bavaria, to sign an agreement, known as the Pragmatic Sanction, binding them to support the young Empress.

**Dettingen,
1743**

When the Emperor died in 1740, Frederick of Brandenburg, afterwards of Prussia, seized Silesia; France and Spain attacked the Empress, and only England, Hanover and Holland maintained their agreements.

England subsidised Austria heavily, and later sent a small force which, combined with the Hanoverian Force, fought at Dettingen, June 27th, 1743, and when the military incapacity of George II., who was in command of the Allied troops, had, in the words of the opposing General, Count Noailles, "placed them in a mouse trap," they were rescued by the steadfast courage of the British Infantry, which repulsed the French attacks, made under the command of the Duc de Grammont, who, fortunately for England, was even more ignorant of tactics than was our King.


The Battle of Fontenoy

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
Further successes resulted in the submission of Bavaria, and in the spring of 1744 the Allies agreed to attack France. Before this was carried into effect the Allies were defending the Belgian provinces of the Empress, Maria Teresa, against the Maréchal de Saxe. He was besieging Tournai when Prince the Count of Waldeck, and the Duke of Cumberland, our King's son, advanced to relieve it. Marshal Saxe put his army in a line of woods—his right flank in the village of Fontenoy—strengthened by fortifications, in a position not far from Malplaquet, and somewhat similar in its strength to that carried by Marlborough in 1709.

Fontenoy,
1745

While Waldeck, on May 11th, 1745, skirmished with the wings, Cumberland went headlong into the centre of the French position. He broke through two lines, cutting Saxe's force into two portions. The enduring courage of our brave Infantry, in spite of the tactical errors of the courageous but incompetent Duke, had nearly won a costly victory for our troops, especially the Guards and the Black Watch, had been great. After many hours' fighting, however, the Irish Brigade, under Colonel Dillon, the descendants of the faithful Catholics, who had left Ireland with James II., were brought forward. They attacked with such vigour and determination that even after having



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF DETTINGEN, JUNE 27th, 1743



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF FONTENAY, MAY 11th, 1745

Fontenay,
1745

suffered a loss of one-third of their numbers, they drove back our sorely tried troops.

The campaign then languished, for the greater part of our troops were recalled to meet the wild attempt made by Charles Edward Stuart, son of the "Old Pretender," to invade England.

Preston
Pans and
Culloden
Moor

Charles Edward routed General Cope at Preston Pans, and advanced to Derby where his effort petered out, though 5,000 men stood up to be slaughtered on Culloden Moor, April, 1746.

In the spring of 1748 the belligerent Governments assented to the cession to Maria Teresa of the greater part of her dominions.

PART VI

THE ENGLISH IN INDIA, 1644-1757

The English and French in India—The Black Hole of Calcutta—Robert Clive
—Negotiations with Suraj-ud-Daula—The Nawab's Duplicity—Chander-
nagore—Major Eyre Coote—Clive Forms the Indian Empire.

THE English East India Company, founded A.D. 1599 (Queen Elizabeth), was occupied for 150 years solely in trade, but local anarchy and active rivalry of the French East India Company eventually led to political intrigues with native princes and the employment of armed forces by both trading companies.

The East
India
Company

The English and French Associations, that of Colbert dating from 1644, were friendly in Hindustan even while their respective parent Governments were at war in Europe until 1774, when Governor Dupleix, of Pondicherry, initiated a scheme for creating a French Empire in the Dakhan.

England
and France
in India

In the hostilities of fifteen years, during which both nations were assisted by native allies who occasionally changed sides, though the companies fought with varying fortunes, the French were finally defeated. Under the peace arrangement made at Paris, 1753, they were permitted to reoccupy the sites of their ruined settlements.

Their desultory efforts to regain their former position, although continued till 1802, were fruitless, and the long struggle has culminated in the British Monarch ruling from the Indus River to the Malay Peninsula.

Ali Vardi Khan, the Mogul's Viceroy of Bengal, died in 1756, and was succeeded by his grandson, a degenerate, named Suraj-ud-Daula. He marched with an army against Calcutta. In Madras the servants of the Company had learned, from constant strife with the French, to become soldiers. In Bengal they were still merely traders; and at the approach of the Nawab's army the majority fled from the town in shameless panic, and took refuge aboard ships in the river.

Calcutta,
1756

The Black
Hole of
Calcutta,
1756

The few who remained behind, on June 20th, 1756, after a few days' siege, surrendered.

Despite the Nawab's solemn promise that the lives of the garrison should be spared, the British captives were secured in the guard-room of the fortress. The room was 18 feet long and 14 feet wide, and was ventilated only by two gratings. Into it the Nawab's officers crowded 145 prisoners. When day broke only 23 emerged from the prison-house. The remainder were dead.

Robert
Clive
(1725-74)

An avenging expedition under the command of Admiral Watson—900 British Infantry, mainly composed of the (39th) Dorset Regiment, and 1,500 Sipahis under Robert Clive, a Lieutenant-Colonel—sailed in October, but did not reach the coast of Bengal until the end of the year.

Robert Clive (1725-74) landed in Madras as a clerk in the service of the East India Company in 1744. He distinguished himself by his military ability and extraordinary courage on many occasions, but especially in defending Arcot, obtaining great influence over natives notwithstanding his ignorance of their language. He had just returned from England, landing in time to join the Hugli expedition.

Chander-
nagore

Suraj-ud-Daula treated, and Clive, apprehensive of an attack by the French, with whom Great Britain was then at war in Europe, opened negotiations.

The Nawab intended his overtures merely as the means of gaining time to correspond with the French authorities at Chandernagore and enlist their help. This soon became known to Clive. He attacked that station which is 20 miles above Calcutta before the French troops stationed there could be reinforced. The fort, the garrison, the artillery, and military stores, all fell into the hands of Clive; and Suraj-ud-Daula now put forward his peace proposals seriously.

Clive's
Intrigues

Clive, having vanquished the French, conceived the idea of overthrowing the Nawab, encouraged by having learned of a formidable confederacy then being formed against the Nawab among the latter's officers. Foremost among the conspirators were Mir Jafar, the principal leader in the army, and Babu Omichund, a wealthy banker. With these two men Clive entered into an intricate intrigue; and while writing to the Nawab in terms of friendship, secretly agreed to do everything within his power to assist Mir Jafar to

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Our Fighting Services

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1919-1920
1921-1922

1923-1924

1925-1926

1927-1928

1929-1930

1931-1932

1933-1934

1935-1936

1937-1938

1939-1940

1941-1942

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2009-2010



ROBERT, LORD CLIVE
After a portrait by Gainsborough




usurp the Throne in return for extensive privileges and concessions. At the critical moment Omichund, who had managed the negotiations, raised his terms, and demanded £200,000 sterling, threatening that unless this sum were guaranteed he would betray the plot to the Nawab.

All the conspirators were aghast at the danger which threatened them except Clive, who now sullied the character of a great Englishman by outdoing Omichund in duplicity. Omichund had stipulated that a clause guaranteeing his price should be inserted in the treaty between Mir Jafar and the British Governor. To this Clive agreed; but he had two treaties drawn up—one fictitious, the other real. The former only contained a reference to Omichund. Admiral Watson declined to sign the treaty, but connived at Clive's action in having it signed in his name.

Clive then wrote to the Nawab demanding immediate redress for all the wrongs which the British had suffered, adding that, since the rainy season was at hand, he would move forward with his troops, and in person to wait upon His Highness for an answer.

On receiving this communication Suraj-ud-Daula set out to meet the Englishman. Clive, however, relying on the



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF PLASSEY, JUNE 23rd, 1757

Plassey,
1757

secret treaty with Mir Jafar, continued his advance, on June 17th, 1757, with 2,000 Natives and 1,000 Europeans, and took possession of the town of Kutwah.

Fifteen miles on the other side of the River Hugli, in a strongly entrenched camp near Plassey, Suraj-ud-Daula assembled 36,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry, with 50 large pieces of ordnance, and several smaller guns, the latter being under the direction of a few French Auxiliaries.

That Clive, with a handful of men, should have been able to defeat this vast host may well seem incredible; but the Nawab's army was seething with treachery and discontent; and in point of equipment, discipline, and training it was immeasurably inferior to the British force.

The Indian princes of the 18th century had only a crude knowledge of the art of war as understood in Europe. Their infantry was so inefficient as to be almost useless. It was, indeed, no more than "a multitude of people assembled together, some with swords and targets, some with matchlocks, some with lances." And "as each man provides his own horse, it is the interest of the rider to fight as little as possible, for if his horse is killed the owner is ruined." The artillery could be fired once only in half an hour.

Clive had advanced counting on the co-operation of Mir Jafar, who had undertaken to bring his division over to the British force. But now he wavered, and to the British Commander's remonstrances sent evasive answers.

The Englishman was then in a critical situation. Without Mir Jafar's help the enterprise was hazardous; and he hesitated to cross the river and so bring on a battle, when defeat would prove fatal to British influence in Bengal.

He, the only time in his career, called a Council of War. Twenty officers attended the meeting, and thirteen of them pronounced against fighting, Clive himself casting his vote with the majority. The remaining seven, however, strongly urged immediate action. Their spokesman was Major Eyre Coote, and so convincingly did he plead their case that, after the meeting had broken up, Clive, much impressed by his colleague's words, retired to the shade of some trees, and there sat for a long time wrapped in thought. As a result of this solitary deliberation he gave orders for the passage of the river at sunrise. By 4 P.M. the troops had formed on the farther side; thence, after an arduous march, they reached

The Battle of Plassey

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Plassey, weary and exhausted, one hour after midnight, and bivouacked in a mango grove—surrounded by a bank of earth which formed a breastwork—one mile distant from the Nawab's camp. Plassey, 1757

Soon after daybreak Suraj-ud-Daula put his army in motion, the troops moving forward in divisions of 4,000 to 5,000 men with detachments of artillery between each, intending to surround the British force.

The huge masses of men, as they streamed out of the camp, covered the entire plain; and the guns, each tugged by a team of white oxen, were pushed from behind by elephants.

When the rear of the host was clear of the camp the army halted. A small party of Frenchmen, however, continued to advance with a few guns, and having got within easy range of the British position, opened fire.

St. Frais, the French officer in command, called on the Nawab's troops to follow, but "such was their mistrust of each other, that no commander dared to venture on singly, for fear some other commander, suspected of attachment to us, should fall on him." After half an hour Clive, who had lost 10 Europeans and 20 Sipahis killed and wounded, withdrew his men into the grove from which they had advanced earlier in the morning.

The enemy moved their guns nearer, but the British, now concealed under the bank surrounding the grove, had no further casualties.

At noon rain fell heavily, and put the enemy's guns out of action, since the gunners made no endeavour to protect their powder. When the rain ceased Mir Mudeen, the most faithful and able of the Nawab's generals, directed his cavalry to charge the British position.

The horsemen were received with a steady fire which emptied many saddles, the Mir himself being among the first to fall. Then his followers turned and the whole of the artillery, save the few guns in St. Frais's command, followed this craven example. The Frenchmen presently, attacked by a party of British troops under Major Kilpatrick, finding themselves unsupported, retired.

Suraj-ud-Daula, influenced by the advice of Mir Jafar and another traitor, gave orders for the army to retire into the camp; while he rode away to Moorshedabad, his capital. Clive by 5 P.M. carried the camp.

Plassey,
1757

Only the small French contingent offered any serious resistance. The main body, demoralised by the flight of the Nawab, was easily routed.

For six hours a British force in the command of Major Coote continued the pursuit; 500 of the enemy were slain, their camp, baggage, guns, and cattle all fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Clive at one stroke had subdued a populous and wealthy province larger than Great Britain, at the cost of 72 casualties in his force.

Mir Jafar, on the morning following the battle, presented himself at the British camp with grave misgiving. Clive, however, soon set his mind at rest; welcomed him, and saluted him as Nawab of Bengal. He saw that Mir Jafar would be a convenient puppet through whom the British could administer the province, and, as soon as possible, had him enthroned with all ceremony at Moorshedabad.

Clive's
Policy

Then Clive turned to one of the servants of the Company, and said in English: "It is now time to undeceive Omichund." The interpreter, speaking in Hindustani, explained how Omichund had been duped; whereupon the Bengali fell insensible into the arms of his attendants; he never regained his reason, and died a few months later an idiot.

No success, however great, can justify Clive's dealings with Omichund. The policy which directed them, irrespective of morality, was a mistake. British supremacy in India, as Clive himself subsequently came to see, is based not only on force of arms, but mainly on the fact that a British officer can be depended on to keep his word, and that, as an administrator, he is above corruption.

Clive was soon asked to help in maintaining Mir Jafar in power against his own insubordinate princes, and again, somewhat later, against Shah Alum, son of the Great Mogul. That prince moved his troops from Delhi southwards, to the consternation of Mir Jafar, but when they reached Patna, and Clive advanced against them by forced marches, they fled.

The Nawab in his gratitude granted Clive the revenues of a district amounting to £30,000 per annum, which the Court of Directors some years later, when Clive was living in England, attempted unsuccessfully to appropriate.

Clive and the Directors had quarrelled; their views were antagonistic. Mr. Sullivan, the chairman, and his friends, supported by Lord Bute, wished India to be managed with a view to commerce, while Clive, supported by Mr. Pitt, thought mainly of the extension of the Empire.

Clive's
Reforms in
Bengal

During Clive's five years absence from India anarchy prevailed in Bengal; chiefs revolted against their princes; many of the English oppressed, and plundered the natives. There arose a universal demand from the best of the English and Bengalis that Clive should come back to Calcutta. The Board of Directors, abandoning their claim to the revenues granted by Mir Jafar, implored him to go out. He assented on the condition that Mr. Sullivan should vacate the chair of the Board of Directors. This was arranged. The hero of Plassey had a further testimony to his merits, for Mir Jafar, who had recently died, left him £60,000. Clive transferred this sum in trust to the East India Company for invalided soldiers of all Ranks.

When the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Bengal landed for the last time in Calcutta, May, 1765, the Civil and Military officials resisted his reforms, but Clive crushed all opposition and carried out his salutary measures, which were based on the payment of adequate salaries, the suppression of bribery, and just dealing with Natives, principles which have been maintained to the present time.

Lieutenant-Colonel Clive found Bengal a ruined commercial agency in 1756; before he finally left India in 1760 he had founded a powerful Empire.

PART VII

ANNUS MIRABILIS, 1759

CHAPTER I

THE BATTLE OF MINDEN

The Peace of Aachen—The Seven Years' War—The Convention of Kloster-Seven—Pitt—Bautzen—Bergen—Minden—Dismissal of Sackville.

Seven
Years' War

THE Peace of Aachen, 1748, was effective only in Europe. The antagonistic interests, culminating in military operations in America and in India, brought about a Declaration of War between England and France in 1756, when our country with Prussia—under Frederick the Great (1717-86), who had succeeded his flinty-hearted father in 1740—stood against Austria, France, Russia, Saxony, and Sweden.

Convention
of Kloster-
Seven, 1757

The Convention, by some called Capitulation, of Kloster-Seven, made in September, 1757, by which Hanover was abandoned to the French, was later repudiated, and the Duke of Cumberland, who had signed it, was recalled in disgrace by his father, George II.

Pitt and
the War

Mr. Pitt was at the end of 1756 forced by Public opinion on George II., who disliked him, as the colleague of the incapable Duke of Newcastle. Pitt practically took over the Hanoverian troops by a Treaty signed in London April 11th, 1758, England promising a subsidy of £600,000, and the aid of a British Auxiliary Force. Nevertheless, the year 1758 was unfortunate for Frederick the Great. He allowed himself to be surprised October 13th near Bautzen, had to abandon his camp equipment and 100 guns, and as a result England and Russia offered to treat for peace. France, having no object to gain except the opportunity of humbling England by annexing Hanover, would have agreed had it not been for the opposition of Maria Theresa. In the spring of 1759 Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, being

The Battle of Minden

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assisted financially by England, attempted to surprise the French troops in their winter quarters, but was defeated, April 13th, at Bergen; and after some months of manœuvring, the French, 60,000 strong, under Marshal Contades, advancing took Minden, in Westphalia, July 9th, thus obtaining access to Hanover by the bridges over the Weser. Bergen,
1759

Prince Ferdinand with 45,000 men had endeavoured to cover both Osnabruck and Minden.

It became necessary for the French Marshal to strike a blow at Ferdinand in order to take off the pressure in rear of the French position, occasioned by the troops who, detached by Ferdinand, had got across the French lines of communication. Minden,
1759

At midnight, July 31st—August 1st, 51,000 men with 162 guns were put in motion, in a heavy gale of wind, towards the bridges, which had been thrown across a morass behind which stood Ferdinand's Army.

Lord George Sackville, the General of the British Column, could not be found when the "Rouse," followed by the "Boot and saddle," was sounded, and there was much confusion. The second column was composed of German artillery.

The third column, under command of Major-General Spoerke, consisted of the 12th (Suffolk) Regiment, 20th (Lancashire Fusiliers) Regiment, 23rd (Royal Welsh Fusiliers) Regiment, 25th (King's Own Scottish Borderers) Regiment, 37th (Hampshire) Regiment, and 51st (Yorkshire Light Infantry) Regiment.

There had been much delay in Contade's columns, as his men were not sufficiently trained for night work, and even by day the difficulty of passing bodies of men over temporary bridges is considerable. This gave Ferdinand time to repair many grave errors of the Prince of Anhalt, who was incredibly slow and incapable.

The net result of the formation of the opposing forces for battle was that the mass of French cavalry was in the centre with infantry on either flank, and Ferdinand had his infantry in the centre and cavalry on the flanks. At the opening of the battle the leading British brigade formed of the 12th, 37th, and 23rd Regiments, after an advance, halted behind some fir trees, and the second brigade, composed of the 20th, 51st, and 25th Battalions, was moving up to it. The

Minden,
1759

first brigade then moved on, with drums beating and well dressed lines, direct upon the French cavalry in its front.

The second brigade followed, closing up as rapidly as it could, the nine battalions taking apparently no notice of the fire of 60 French guns, though for 200 yards of the advance it tore great openings in the ranks, which closed steadily to the centre. The French cavalry remained motionless for some time, and then rode straight at the leading brigade. The battalions held their fire until the enemy were within ten yards of them, then pouring in one volley which strewed the ground with men and horses, they drove the squadrons in confused fragments back on their supports, and continued the advance.

Prince Ferdinand sent an aide-de-camp with orders to Lord Sackville to charge and complete the rout of the French cavalry. He argued for some time; then advanced a short distance and halted, and would not even advance a yard farther when a second aide-de-camp gave him the repeated order.

Ferdinand later sent another aide-de-camp to Sackville, but he would do nothing but talk, and the Prince then moved some fresh battalions up to support the Right of the British brigades. As the supports were coming up the French Gendarmerie and Carabineers of the King's Household troops, "riding home," broke through the leading British brigades of infantry, but were then routed by the second line. Ferdinand sent a fourth order to Sackville, but with the same result. The Prince then sent a fifth aide-de-camp to Lord Granby, who commanded the second line of cavalry, and he was advancing when he was stopped by Lord Sackville who, riding up to the Prince, asked him what was wanted!

By 10 A.M. the French, being routed, retired on Minden and towards their bridges over the morass.

The casualties in the army of the Allies were 2,000, of which the larger proportion occurred in the six British and three Hanoverian battalions on which the stress of battle fell. The two British brigades went into action 4,400 strong, losing 30 per centum killed and wounded, in all, 1,400 out of the 2,000. The battalions on the right of the first and second lines, that is, the 12th and the 20th Regiments, lost respectively 300 and 320 men.


Heavy French Defeat

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The French left 10,000 to 11,000 on the field, 43 cannons, 17 stand of Colours, and all the baggage which had crossed over the Weser and Bastau rivers. **Minden, 1759**

This battle is remarkable for the unique attack by infantry in line on a mass of cavalry, which although supported by a great number of guns, was nevertheless defeated with heavy loss.

General Lord George Sackville was sent home, tried by court martial, and "dismissed from the Army as unfit to serve the King in any military capacity."



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MINDEN, AUG. 1st, 1759

CHAPTER II

QUEBEC

Pitt Changes the Situation—Major-General James Wolfe Commands Troops Invading Canada—Captain Cook—The French Troops Exhausted—The Heights of Abraham—Wolfe Mortally Wounded—A Naval Triumph.

Pitt's
Reforms

ALTHOUGH the Peace of Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), 1748, officially terminated the war between England and France, our sea-board Colonies in America fought continuously with the French over the question of the Ohio valley, which became later a struggle for Canada.

There was also desultory fighting in India, and war was declared in 1756.

All the warlike operations undertaken by the incapable Duke of Newcastle had been unsuccessful, but as he nominated a majority of Members of the House of Commons, it was powerless to alter the situation.

Eventually public opinion compelled King George II. to take back Mr. Pitt, whom he had driven from power, nominally as a joint leader.

Pitt soon made a change in the situation; he employed young and capable men as generals. Louisbourg, and Fort Duquesne, on the Ohio, were seized in 1758, and although the Marquis of Montcalm beat our troops at Ticonderoga in July, 1758, it was taken twelve months later, and in September General Wolfe captured Quebec, and with it Canada.

Major-
General
Wolfe
(1727-59)

Pitt, having decided to invade Canada, selected Major-General James Wolfe (1727-59), for the command. He was unusually plain in face, highly educated, with cultured tastes; always delicate in health, suffering from rheumatism and other diseases, but endowed with marvellous courage.

Wolfe left England in February, 1759, in a fleet of 21 sail of the line, having on board 7,000 troops to reinforce those already in America.

By the plan of campaign while General Wolfe assailed Quebec with these forces. Sir Jeffery Amherst, with 12,000

men, having reduced Ticonderoga, 300 miles to the south of Quebec, was to march to the river St. Lawrence, and then co-operate in the attack upon the capital of the Canadas. Wolfe in Canada

The pilotage up the St. Lawrence was admirably done, line of battle ships sailing up where French coasting schooners had seldom ventured without an accident. The credit belongs to a Canadian pilot, who had been taken prisoner, and a "master" in the Navy, who 10 years later became famous as an explorer—Captain James Cook, the navigator.

The Expeditionary troops were the 15th (1st East Yorkshire), 28th (1st Gloucestershire), 35th (1st Sussex), 43rd (1st Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry), 47th (1st North Lancashire), 48th (1st Northamptonshire), 58th (2nd Northamptonshire), 60th (King's Royal Rifles), and 78th (2nd Seaforth Highlanders) Regiments. Towards the end of June these regiments, the whole force numbering 8,000, were landed on the Isle of Orleans, in the River St. Lawrence, a few miles below the City of Quebec.

Strong by nature, the city is built upon a steep rock on the northern bank. To the west of the city is a rugged chain of hills—the Heights of Abraham—the scene of Wolfe's great exploit. Across the peninsula between the two Rivers, Montmorency and St. Charles, was a line of fortifications, 8 miles in extent, strongly held; a garrison of 2,000 occupied the city. The Marquis of Montcalm, with 14,000 bayonets, was in command.

Wolfe had been promised 12,000 troops from Guadeloupe, but they were not available. As, if Quebec was to be taken, it was essential to capture it before the Canadian winter set in, so General Wolfe, occupying three isolated positions, tried to goad his adversary into action, but Montcalm remained inactive. Wolfe then tried to seize one of the French redoubts near the Montmorency river, but the attempt failed. General Wolfe became seriously ill, August 20th, suffering from fever and gravel, but resumed duty September 2nd.

The British position was one of considerable danger, for they were greatly outnumbered, and when facing Quebec to the east had a French force behind them at Montreal.

The General, September 3rd, withdrew all the troops from the Montmorency camp and embarked, September 7th, seven battalions on Admiral Holmes's squadron.

Quebec,
1759

The French outpost line, extending from the citadel of Quebec on the north bank of the river, about 12 miles, was under Monsieur Bougainville. Montcalm had enjoined on him the greatest activity, and he wore his troops out in the execution of these orders. Admiral Holmes's squadron drifted up-stream on the flood-tide daily, and demonstrated against Cap Rouge. The troops were placed in boats which rowed up and down as if about to effect a landing, and then the ships dropped down the river on the ebb. The Admiral, by frequently manning the boats, as if about to effect a landing, caused the French troops to march up and down the bank until they were exhausted.

At 2 A.M. September 13th, Wolfe and his Staff got into a boat and, followed by the whole flotilla, dropped down-stream to a spot which the General had himself selected, a mile and a half from the city.

Wolfe was the first ashore, and looking at the precipice which towered away above them into obscurity, he turned to a Highland officer, and said :

" I do not believe, sir, there is any possibility of getting up, but you must now do your best " ; and the escalade of the heights was begun.

Slinging their muskets, and climbing, the men scrambled up the steep and woody precipice, grasping the roots of trees, the tufts of grass, the rocks, and whatever might aid their ascent, till the summit was won ; and rushing on, they dislodged a captain's guard in a redoubt near it, and seized a narrow path which enabled their comrades to reach with less difficulty the plateau which stands 250 feet above the flowing river.

Following the Highlanders, Wolfe was soon on the plateau of the precipice, and formed his troops in contiguous columns of regiments as they came toiling up ; and ere the sun rose he had 4,500 men marching along the Heights of Abraham. To hold the redoubt covering the landing-place, he left two companies ; and then descended the green slopes towards the city.

The Marquis of Montcalm hurried from his camp at Beaufort, and formed up facing Westwards about midway between Wolfe's troops and the city, while the British halted about a mile from the ramparts, with their right flank resting on the edge of a steep precipice that overhangs the river.

The Death of Wolfe

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The caution was heard plainly : " Soldats, marques bien les officiers! " Quebec
1759

By Wolfe's order his whole line held its fire until within forty yards of the enemy's bayonets, when it poured in a destructive volley upon the French, whose advance was at once arrested by the heaps of killed and wounded that fell over each other, making big gaps in the ranks.

Montcalm now menaced the British Left; but on being roughly repulsed, his troops began to waver. It was at this critical moment that Wolfe was mortally wounded, while standing on the extreme Right Flank, near the front of the 28th Regiment. There the conflict was close and desperate; and his position, somewhat in front of the line, rendered him fatally conspicuous. A shot struck him in the wrist. Wrapping a handkerchief round the shattered limb to stanch the blood, he headed a bayonet charge, when a second shot pierced his abdomen, and a third his breast. With the blood pouring from three wounds, staggering back towards the Gloucestershires (28th), he leaned on Captain Currie, and then sunk upon the sward, dying.

" They run! See how they run! " exclaimed Captain Currie, who still supported his shoulders.

" Who run? " asked he, seeking to prop himself on his elbow. " The French—they are giving way in all directions," said those about him.

" Then send a battalion to hold the bridge over the Charles, and cut off their retreat," and, sinking back, he exclaimed : " Now, praised be God, I die happy."

He turned and, with a spasm, expired.

By this time the Marquis of Montcalm had fallen, his thigh smashed by a shot.

The Marquis, just before he died, exclaimed :

" Thank Heaven, I shall not live to see the capitulation of Quebec! I have got my death fighting against the bravest soldiers in the world."

Four days later Quebec was formally surrendered, on a promise that all the rights and liberties of the inhabitants should be respected, and that all prisoners taken should be sent to France. The loss of the British in killed, wounded, and missing was only 57 officers and 591 soldiers; whilst that of the French was about 200 officers and 1,200 men.

A monument at Westminster, a cenotaph on the Heights

The Navy
at Quebec,
1759

of Abraham, and another in his native village of Westerham, were raised to the memory of the soldier to whom Britain owed the conquest of Canada.


The victory was greatly due to the Royal Navy.

It was unfortunate for Vice-Admiral Saunders and his subordinates that General Wolfe died before he was able to testify to the fact that Quebec could never have been captured but for the inestimable and loyal co-operation of the Navy.

I have mentioned Captain Cook who piloted the Fleet without accident 300 miles up the St. Lawrence River, but that was comparatively simple to the river difficulties above the city.

When the local nautical authorities declared that the depth of water in the North Channel would only float a boat, Admiral Saunders sent his favourite junior officer, John Jervis (later Earl St. Vincent), in the sloop *Porcupine*, to run her up through the shallow waters, and cover the landing of our troops.

By the middle of July Saunders had got some vessels, commanded by selected officers, into the upper reaches of the river. That evening Montcalm sent down the narrow channel a flotilla of fire-ships, but the sailors in boats towed them away from their vessels. Then Wolfe employed the ships to engage the attention of the enemy, and his masterly tactics completely outwitted the foe.



PLAN OF THE ACTION ON THE HEIGHTS OF ABRAHAM. SEPT. 13th, 1759

CHAPTER III

NAVAL VICTORIES OF 1759

A Glorious Year—Admiral Boscawen—Naval Victories—Hawke's Victory in Quiberon Bay.

THE sailors in H.M.S. *Queen*, in which I served, were singing nightly in the waist during the Crimea War David Garrick's patriotic song, written in this year of victories :

A Glorious
Year, 1759

"Come cheer up, my lads, 'tis to glory we steer,
To add something more to this wonderful year."

And 1759 was indeed crowned with victories. First came Minden, then Lagos Bay, Quebec, Wandewash, and Quiberon Bay.

Admiral Boscawen (1711-61), known as "Old Dreadnought," was remarkable for courage even amongst a crowd of brave men, and he, at Lagos Bay, destroyed the French Mediterranean Fleet as thoroughly as Hawke shattered their Atlantic Fleet when it ran for shelter in Quiberon Bay. France lost in the years 1758-9 65 battle-ships, and as a Navy was not able to put to sea again during the war.

Minden, August 1st, opened the long list of victories; and then came Boscawen's pursuit of the French into Lagos Bay, the scene of Sir Francis Drake's audacious exploit in 1587.

Boscawen was refitting his fleet at Gibraltar when the French Admiral, who had been ordered to pass through the Straits and concentrate with the Atlantic Fleet in Brest in order to cover the crossing of an invading French Army over the Channel, tried to steal past Gibraltar by hugging the African coast. Many of Boscawen's ships were dismantled, but the Admiral followed as quickly as possible, accompanied by some of his vessels. De La Clue was speedily overhauled, for he would not leave the *Souverain*, a very slow sailer. Boscawen laid his flag-ship, the *Namur*, across the bows of the *Océan*, carrying De La Clue's flag.

Lagos Bay,
1759

She suffered a heavy loss, but her fire, purposely directed on the *Namur's* rigging, speedily dismasted her. As Boscawen was rowing away from the *Namur* to hoist his flag on another ship, a shot went through the side of his barge; snatching off his wig he rolled it into a ball, and with it plugged the hole through which water was pouring in.

At sundown the gallant French Admiral had only four ships left out of those that had been in action, for some had dropped astern, and they were all taken or destroyed in Lagos Bay. The *Occ'an* struck on some rocks as she entered the bay, and Boscawen, disregarding the neutral waters, burnt her, and the *Redoubtable*, capturing the *Modeste*, and the *Temeraire*, August 19th, which ship later had a glorious career in our Navy, notably at Trafalgar.

I digress for a few minutes to narrate a story which is probably unique in annals of war. Boscawen took prisoner Monsieur de Hocquart, the Captain of the *Medea*, in 1744, and again in 1747, when de Hocquart commanded one of the ten ships captured in an action off Cape Finisterre, in which Boscawen was wounded, and the Frenchman was again captured in 1755, when Boscawen defeated the French North Atlantic Squadron, capturing two line-of-battle ships with crews of 1,500 men.

Wandewash,
1759

I have described briefly the capture of Quebec. Colonel Sir Eyre Coote defeated General De Lally at Wandewash, in the Carnatic, at the end of the year. Quebec was the most conspicuous success, for in that momentous battle Wolfe practically conquered America.

Admiral
Hawke

I mentioned above that Boscawen in August was watching the French Mediterranean Fleet, and that Hawke was blockading the French Atlantic Fleet in Brest. He was a man of unusual force of character, being as fearless of the Admiralty as he was of the French. Throughout a very tempestuous summer he kept his Fleet in good order. He sent back two battle-ships at a time to England that they might be re-watered, re-victualled and cleansed thoroughly, while their crews were given leave of absence. When he received sour beer, he ran it into the scuppers and demanded more. When he got bad beef he ordered fresh cattle, and eventually, on his peremptory demand, the Victualling establishment at Plymouth was reorganised.

Hawke had ascertained that the French Government was

The Battle of Quiberon Bay 209


concentrating at Vannes, in Brittany, 20,000 men for the invasion of England.

Quiberon
Bay, 1759

In October a wind forced the Fleet to run for Torbay, but it resumed its station off Brest before its absence was observed. Hawke was driven off again in November, and while he was away the French West India Squadron arrived and got safely into port.

On the day Hawke left Torbay to return to his station off Brest Admiral Conflans in the *Soleil Royal*, with 20 line-of-battle ships and several frigates, left Brest for Belle-Ile, an island 15 miles long, which forms a natural breakwater to the indifferent anchorage in Quiberon Bay. The day broke, November 20th, dull and grey, with a strong Westerly wind blowing in squalls. Commodore Duff, with a small squadron, who had been watching the bay, met Admiral Conflans, who, having been driven down to the southward, was sailing northwards for Belle-Ile. Duff and his squadron must have been captured or sunk, but at the critical moment Hawke came up from the westward.

Admiral Conflans formed a line of battle, and then, re-



SKETCH-MAP OF THE SCENE OF ADMIRAL HAWKE'S VICTORY,
QUIBERON BAY, NOV. 20th, 1759

Quiberon
Bay, 1759

membering that his primary duty was not to fight but to escort an invading force across the Channel, decided to shelter in the Bay, which, though obstructed by rocks, did not offer for him insuperable difficulties of navigation, as every ship carried a Breton pilot, and the Admiral intended to fight Hawke if he should enter the rock-strewn Bay.

It was 2 o'clock in the afternoon when Admiral Conflans in his flag-ship rounded the Cardinal rocks, which extend to the South-East of Belle-Ile, his rearmost ships being still some way behind.

The wind had by this time increased to a gale; rain fell in torrents, but Hawke was determined to destroy the foe, and signalled "Close Action." The Captains of his ships, in spite of the gale, shook the reefs out of their top-sails and pressed on through the surging waters which, by oscillating the rudder very violently, required eight men to control the wheel.

Captain Howe (later Lord) steered his ship so close to the *Formidable* that he scraped off her ports as the ship forged ahead; the gallant Captain Du Verger, though mortally wounded, continued to fight his ship from a chair until he died, and she surrendered to the next oncoming British vessel.

Captain Keppel closed on the *Thésée* and sunk her, for her brave Captain opened her lower deck ports to use his heaviest guns and was swamped. Keppel's ship also was waterlogged, and nearly shared the fate of the *Thésée*.

Hawke followed the *Soleil Royal* inside the Bay. The *Superbe* interposed to shield the Admiral, but the *Royal George*, closing on her with one broadside at close range, sent her to the bottom with All Hands. The Master of the *Royal George* respectfully pointed out her danger, but Hawke replied, "You've now done your duty, lay my ship alongside the *Soleil*," and he did, just as night fell, soon after 4 o'clock. The French Admiral, however, edged away in the darkness, and Hawke signalled to his fleet to anchor.

At daylight, November 21st, Hawke's flag-ship was off the mouth of the Vilaine river; half his Fleet was inside the Bay, but two were on the rocks. He burnt the *Soleil* and the *Héros*. Seven French ships-of-the-line, by throwing overboard guns and stores, got over the bar of the river, but they running aground broke up; seven more got away in safety

The Spirit of the Navy

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to Rochefort. The British casualties were only one Officer and 300 men killed. Quiberon Bay, 1759

While Hawke and his Fleet were daring all for England the people of London, mad with terror of an impending invasion, and believing that he had failed in his duty of blockading the French Fleet in Brest, burnt him in effigy!

Neither the Government nor the Public realised that Hawke, the precursor of Nelson, was "the spirit" of the Navy he was striving to regenerate.

PART VIII

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY WAR

CHAPTER I

THE COMPARATIVE STRENGTH OF THE FORCES

Preston and Sheriffmuir—Social and Military Conditions—Outbreak of the French Revolution—The Growth of the Navy—The Condition of the French Navy—The Rival Navies—Wellington Assisted by the Navy.

Rebellion
of '15

AFTER the brilliant battles won by the Duke of Marlborough, the British Army was not employed on the Continent for many years except at Dettingen, 1743. Fontenoy, 1745, and at Minden, 1759. At home, however, there were the battles resulting from the Rebellion of '15, which was put down by the victories gained at Preston and Sheriffmuir, 1715. In 1739, despite the great efforts of Sir Robert Walpole, there began a series of wars which lasted, almost without cessation, until 1815—wars in which England was almost always concerned. For the purposes of this work I need only deal with those conflicts with France, which gave England India, and Canada, and later with Revolutionary France which had their sequence in the Peninsular War, and their climax at Waterloo.

Situation in
Britain

Prior to the French Revolution the social and military condition of Britain was prosperous, and was daily improving, except as regards the Navy, to which I turn farther on, while that of France was gradually becoming worse. Captain Mahan, the great naval writer, sums up her condition in the sentence, "France was moneyless and leaderless."

For two centuries France had been misgoverned under a feudal regime, and at last the agricultural and trading classes revolted against the nominal government of the well-meaning but feeble Louis Seize, and the whole social fabric of France fell to pieces.

During the thirteen years William III. was on the throne

Outbreak of French Revolution 213

(1689-1702), in spite of his ignorance of Naval affairs, the tonnage and fighting efficiency of our Fleet was nearly doubled.

Early in Anne's reign, 13 line-of-battle ships were wrecked in a gale, but the loss was soon made good.

Our naval power remained stationary during the reign of George I. (1714-27), but under George II. it was increased, and from the outbreak of the French Revolution it continued to grow with glorious successes at sea, until in the great battle off Cape Trafalgar, October, 1805, it became supreme.

A Parisian mob, June 20th, 1792, invaded the Louvre Palace, insulted the Royal family, and made the King put on a red cap. The mob, August 10th, stormed the palace, killing the Swiss Guards, and three days later imprisoned the Royal family. A provisional Government, formed from some of the lowest classes, executed Louis XVI. and perpetrated innumerable butcheries on the upper classes.

The French Ambassador in London, who had been in an ambiguous position since the Revolutionary parties had seized the reins of government, when the death of Louis XVI. became known, was ordered to quit the kingdom, and then France, on bad terms with Russia, Spain, and Sweden, and already at war with Austria and Prussia, declared war against Great Britain and Holland.

Neither the Revolutionists at the head of the Government, nor even the great child of the Revolution, the future Emperor, had any knowledge of the conditions of sea life. They supposed audacious courage to be the only requisite quality for a naval officer.

Napoleon, repeating the errors of his class, said, "The English will become very small when France shall have two or three admirals willing to die." Great genius as he was, he did not realise that naval victories are won by cannon-shots accurately thrown into the vital spot of an enemy's ship, and to so place them requires good seamanship, skilled gunnery, and discipline, in order to exert in the supreme hour the fullest effect of destructive weapons.

The Navy had been mainly officered from the upper classes, many of whom were murdered or exiled.

All the attempts to reconstitute an efficient officer class failed, and, January, 1793, just before the war with Great Britain, the National Convention decreed that admirals

British
Navy,
17-18th
Century

Outbreak of
Revolution,
1792

The French
Navy

**The French
Navy, 1792**

might be taken from the list of any captains of one month's seniority as such. As regards the men "before the mast," France had possessed before the Revolution 6,000 trained seamen-gunners. These were dismissed in 1794, the National Convention decreeing that "it savoured of aristocracy that any body of men should have an exclusive right to fight at sea."

The effects of this folly were soon perceived in the results of naval actions. H.M.S. *Alexander* fought three French ships of her own tonnage for two hours, and the average loss of each of the French vessels equalled that of the *Alexander*.

In August of that year the Paris Committee of Public Safety ordered an admiral to remain with his fleet at sea, but the crews declined to obey, and notwithstanding the order of the senior officers returned to Brest.

Now, however, the extreme party in Paris had got possession of the Government, and strongly disapproving of the mutiny of the seamen, executed some of the officers, dismissed others, to frighten the insubordinate sailors, and intimated plainly that insubordination would in future be put down with a strong hand.

It should be understood that the men were very badly treated, and although the fleet was on a home station, the crew suffered from want of fresh meat, a great number being tainted with scurvy. When the men were wet to the skin they had no change of clothes, and even ten years later, 1805, the year of Trafalgar, neither clothing nor bedding was issued regularly to the crews.

**Ascendancy
of the
British Navy**

These conditions of the French Navy explain to some extent how it came about that Great Britain, with only two-fifths of the population of France, and with a disaffected Ireland close at hand, was able to stand up alone against Napoleon, for as England's allies were successively beaten to the ground by the Emperor, they sued to him for peace.

Thus it was that the ascendancy of the British Navy, and the uprising of the Spanish people enabled the small army under Wellington to defy Napoleon in Portugal and Spain. Later, when the Emperor had exhausted the moral and physical forces of the French nation, Wellington invaded France, and co-operating with the European coalition armies drove him from his Throne.

Comparative Strength of the Navies 215

Captain Mahan, accepting James's statement of the comparative strength of the Navies of England and France, which statement was, moreover, endorsed by the French Admiral La Gravière in his "*Guerres Maritimes*," puts the British Navy as being one-sixth more powerful than the French. Other writers state that England had 115 ships mounting 8,700 cannons, and France had 75 ships with 6,000 guns.

The Navies,
in Figures

Spain had 56 effective line-of-battle ships, but the crews were wretched in composition and discipline. Officers were untrained; even the larger ships had only 30 seamen or so-called sailors, the remainder of the complement being manned from the streets and jails, supplemented by recruit soldiers.

However inhuman the regicidal Government in Paris were, it must be admitted that they were courageous, for they faced not only the opposition of a nearly united Europe but the prospect also of starvation, since bad harvests and the troublous times causing the land to go out of cultivation, indicated clearly the prospects of a famine.

CHAPTER II

NAVAL AFFAIRS FROM 1794-98

The Glorious First of June—Build of British Vessels Inferior—Captain Horatio Nelson in the Mediterranean—England's Isolation—Admiral Jervis's Task—The Spanish Fleet Manned by Landsmen—Nelson's Rise to Fame—Camperdown—France prepares to Invade England—Admiral Duncan's Audacity—Napoleon's Plans to Invade Egypt—Nelson Pursues Napoleon—Battle of the Nile—Aboukir Bay.

Conditions
in the
British Navy

WE now come to the first great victory of the British Fleets gained over the Republican Navy.

Lord Howe, First Lord of the Admiralty, who had resigned when the Annual Estimates were cut down in 1790, was appointed to the command of the Channel Fleet, and hoisted his flag on the *Queen Charlotte* in 1793, when 68 years of age, on the outbreak of war with France.

Ship for ship the French were the more powerful in tonnage and in weight of metal. "Never before," wrote the *Moniteur* before the fleet set sail, "did there exist in Brest a fleet so formidable and well disposed as that now lying there."

Neither the work of our designers nor that of the builders was equal to the results achieved in the foreign navies. In the War our best sailing vessels were those captured from the French and Spanish navies. Several of our vessels had to carry ballast stacked on one side to keep them upright, and in many instances when the ships designed to carry sixty guns were launched they could only carry fifty.

The supply of British oak had been nearly exhausted, so recourse was had to Germany; it was unsatisfactory, the timber decaying within twelve months. The bolts worked loose in the rotting wood, and each watch had to pump water out of the hull. Water leaked in half a foot in fine weather and in a gale as much as 4 feet. It was not uncommon for a three-decker to roll away her top-masts.

Howe had 26 sail of the line and seven frigates; the French Admiral, Villaret-Joyeuse, who shared his authority with Saint-André, a Deputy from the Convention, on the

The Glorious First of June 217

Jacobin, had the same number of ships of the line and five frigates off the coast of Brittany.

The
Glorious
First of
June, 1794

On May 28th, when the French fleet, which had been sighted nine miles to windward, hauled to the wind, tacked and hove to, it became evident that the enemy was declining an engagement, so Howe gave the signal for a general chase. In a running fight the *Révolutionnaire*, after losing 400, reached Rochefort in a crippled state. Lord Howe's flag-ship did most of the fighting on the 29th. The French Admiral skilfully extricated three of his disabled ships, as he did again on June 1st.

Owing to fogs nothing decisive happened either on this or on the two succeeding days; but at 7 A.M., June 1st, Howe signalled that he intended to break through the enemy's lines and engage to leeward, ordering each ship to steer for the ship opposite to her, and fight "yard-arm to yard-arm."

All did not obey the order literally, but in the action, which resulted in a series of duels, most of the captains, not content with one antagonist, fought one on either side at the same time, and Admiral Gardner, in the *Queen*, engaged ten before the battle terminated.

Lord Howe laid his flag-ship, the *Queen Charlotte*, alongside the *Mountain*, of 800 tons greater burden, and waiting until the ships almost touched, with one broadside struck down the Captain and 300 of the crew, making a hole 12 feet wide in her stern galleries; then he drew up alongside the *Jacobin*, carrying the Deputy of the Convention, passing so close that the *Charlotte's* jibboom almost touched the mizen rigging. When the *Charlotte*, making sail, drew ahead of the *Jacobin*, she was practically a sheer-hulk, and the Deputy was sheltering below the water-line.

The *Duke of Brunswick* and the *Vengeur du Peuple* were locked together for three hours, and during the incessant fighting the laced hat was shot off the figure-head. A Bluejacket, objecting that a Royal Duke should remain uncovered before a Republican, borrowed the Captain's hat, which the ship's carpenter nailed on to the head.

When the ships drifted apart the *Brunswick's* mizen-mast had fallen overboard, and a large gap was showing in the stern of the *Vengeur*, whence the rudder had been knocked away. She was slowly sinking, but her signals

The
Glorious
First of
June, 1794

of distress were not noticed for some time, when all seaworthy boats from Howe's two nearest ships removed 200 men, but all the severely wounded and many others went down in the ship.

Pakenham (*Invincible*) had silenced his opponent's guns, and hailing, asked, "Have you surrendered?" The Frenchman replied, "Non, monsieur, non!" and Pakenham shouted, "Then, damn you, why don't you go on firing?"

By noon, when the firing had slackened, the British had eleven, the French twelve dismasted vessels, which were captured by 2.30 P.M., and then Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse steered for the harbour of Brest.

That day's British casualties were 222 killed and 700 wounded, and the total number was 1,148. The French total loss was 7,000 men.

Lord Howe had not turned in for five nights, and had to be supported by his officers: he went to sea again, but exercised merely a negative control over the fleet. Portsmouth was now in connection by semaphore with the Admiralty, and thus arose a system, from facility of transmitting orders, of keeping the fleet at Spithead. It had the unfortunate result, with the prevailing westerly winds on our southern coasts, of stationing the fleet too far to the east to control the French ships in Brest harbour.

Republican
Successes,
1794-5

The Republican Army, by continued successes, in the autumn of 1794 had overrun the United Provinces, and January 29th, 1795, Pichegru entered Amsterdam, and Great Britain's ally, going over to the Republic, became an enemy.

Naval
Operations,
1795

The Dutch men-of-war remained in port during 1795, except one squadron, which, sailing by the north of the Orkney Islands for the Cape of Good Hope, was captured in Saldanha Bay. Ceylon and Malacca also fell to our ships.

The British naval operations in the Mediterranean during 1795 suffered from want of an enterprising commander-in-chief, but Captain Horatio Nelson did all that was possible in helping the Austrian army operating against the Republic.

The French Government now decided to keep their big ships in harbour, and harass British commerce in the Colonies and on the high seas by the employment of fast frigates.

Admiral Sir John Jervis, who assumed the command in the Western Mediterranean early in December, 1795, was born 62 years earlier. He was endowed with remarkable moral and physical courage; he was a calm but ruthless suppressor of insubordination, maintaining discipline while displaying the polished courteous manners of a high-bred aristocrat, and wielding his power with an iron hand. Captain Mahan states that he had a cool, sound, rapid professional judgment, a steady, unflinching determination to succeed, combined with absolute fearlessness of responsibility. He possessed also the highest form of genius in his capacity for taking trouble. He gave the most minute attention to all important details, and having under his command some excellent captains then in the prime of life, the stern though aged Admiral, and his equally determined subordinates, made the Mediterranean fleet a model for all time.

Earl St.
Vincent

As Mahan in his eloquent book states: "Sir John Jervis cannot be compared with Nelson; indeed St. Vincent himself summed up the characteristics of our greatest naval leader in the cryptic expression, 'There is but one Nelson.'" If this be granted, St. Vincent, after him, stands next in our naval history.

When Jervis, later Earl St. Vincent, had repaired and refitted his fleet in the Tagus, he blockaded the Spanish vessels which had taken refuge in Cadiz, and hemmed them in there for nearly two years. It was at this time that he stamped out mutiny of the ships under his command by drastic measures, which neither the imperturbable Lord Howe nor the intrepid Duncan attempted in the Channel and North Sea, an outline of which we give from Tucker's "Memoirs of Earl St. Vincent," and shall allude later to the mutinies in the Channel fleet.

Blockade
of Cadiz

The news of the mutinies at Spithead and at the Nore had reached St. Vincent's fleet, but nothing untoward happened until two ships joined the fleet from Spithead. When the *Marlborough* arrived, with the character of the worst disciplined crew in the Channel, she was ordered to take her berth in the centre of the fleet, and a court martial was assembled for the trial of a man who had endeavoured to protect a Bluejacket who had been condemned to death. St. Vincent, in confirming the sentence, to be carried out the following morning, added, "and by the crew of the

Mutiny at
Spithead

**Mutiny at
Spithead**

Marlborough alone. No part of the boats' crews from the other ships, as has been usual on similar occasions, to assist in the punishment." The captain expressed his conviction to the Admiral that his crew would never permit the man to be hanged on board the *Marlborough*, and St. Vincent explained to him that unless the *Marlborough's* men hanged the culprit, the captain, ship, and All Hands would go to the bottom of the sea. Next morning the launches of every line of battle-ship, with a loaded cannon, surrounded the *Marlborough*, with their guns laid on the waterline. At 8 bells the prisoner was placed on the cathead with a halter round his neck. As the last stroke of eight bells sounded the flag-ship fired a gun, and the man was lifted off his feet, but he dropped back again, and the sensation throughout the fleet was intense. It was only an accident however, of the noose slipping, for a few moments later the prisoner was run up to the yard-arm, Lord St. Vincent exclaiming, "Discipline is now preserved."

Though Lord St. Vincent felt obliged to hang several mutinous seamen, he watched over the interests of all good men, doing much for their comfort, and when the price of tobacco rose so high as to be prohibitive, he caused it to be sold at the ordinary rate, paying the difference from his own income.

**Naval
Unrest,
1797**

Early in 1797 there was a decided unrest in the Royal Navy, for which the men had many valid reasons for complaint, which came to a head in the excitement produced by the French Revolution. The greater part of Ireland was seething with discontent, and many of her sons were corresponding with the enemies of England, and arranging an insurrection which was to be coincident with the arrival of a French invading army. It was at this critical time that the British Government was scared by the concerted and nearly general mutinous feeling in the fleets at Spithead, and at the Nore.

As we have stated, the sailors had many good grounds for complaint. The pay was absurdly small, being at the same rate as it was a hundred years earlier, and the haphazard method of issuing it rendered its receipt not only irregular but uncertain, while the cost of all necessaries of life had risen. The pension was similar to that in the time of Charles II., though the soldiers' had been in-

creased. Moreover, if a sailor was in hospital, say from scurvy, contracted from want of proper food, his pay was stopped. At the end of the ship's commission, which usually lasted from three to five years, the Bluejacket got a ticket redeemable on shore. Immediately the tickets were handed over Jews attended, in bumboats—that is, the boats bringing provisions—and often bought up these tickets for trifling sums of ready money. If a sailor posted his ticket to his family they could realise its value in London only, and as the journey was but seldom possible, Jews and other speculators bought tickets at about one-tenth their value.

Naval
Unrest,
1797

In the matter of provisions he was worse off than the ordinary pauper. He was in the hands of the purser, who in those days was often a man of the lowest business morality. The food supplied was abominable in quality; while as to quantity, fourteen instead of sixteen ounces went to the navy pound. Scurvy was common from the ships being months at sea and the crews rationed on decaying salt beef and salt pork; the biscuits were full of maggots and weevils; the water was often putrid, with an odour like that of rotten eggs, from decomposition in wooden casks, for iron tanks were not used until after 1815. The purser usually retired on a competency, after a life spent in swindling the defenders of his country, who, had they received everything they were entitled to, would still have been poorly paid and rationed. Peculation extended even to such details as shortening the allowance of grog by the insertion of the purveyor's thumb into the pannikin. Moreover, the discipline of those days was terribly severe; and as one evil breeds another, the state of things on board obliged the captains to refuse leave ashore, when in harbour, for fear of desertion. Finally, the custom of sending criminals into the Navy accentuated the evils. "It is notorious," says James, "that a custom had long prevailed for the London police, when a culprit possessed wit enough for his roguery just to elude the letter of the law, rather than discharge him that he might commit fresh depredations upon society, to send him on board a ship of war. He was often a plausible fellow, with a smattering of learning, a knowledge of the world, and could expound Acts of Parliament to the sailors, and told them where they were wronged."

Naval
Unrest,
1797

England at this time was permeated by secret societies, the offspring of the French Revolution, and all opposed to monarchy. Many members of these societies who were convicted in numbers, were, with fatal blindness, sent to sea as a punishment. These men became the natural ring-leaders of mutiny.

Even a greater grievance than bad food was the practical imprisonment on board ship. When a vessel returned to port after a cruise no leave was given lest the sailors should desert, and 42,000 of them did so during the wars of the French Revolution. This is not strange to anyone who understands the system of manning a ship in those days. A captain on being appointed to commission a man-of-war advertised for volunteers, enlarging on the certainty of prize money and a liberal allowance of grog. When this failed to complete the complement, press-gangs under lieutenants and able seamen swept all the haunts of sailors in the ports.

There can be no doubt that the effects of the French Revolution were felt by all European nationalities, but the actual outbreak at Spithead was occasioned by the gross stupidity, and bad faith of the Government.

Spithead,
1797

Early in January, 1797, the Bluejackets of four ships anchored at Spithead wrote to "Black Dick," Admiral Lord Howe, statements of their grievances, but the Admiralty, during Howe's illness, pigeon-holed the petition, and ordered Lord Bridport, who commanded the Channel Fleet, to put to sea. The sailors refused to heave up the anchors, and hoisted the Red Flag.

A Government committee sent from London promised all the concessions demanded, but took no steps to carry their promise into effect. Secret instructions were sent, however, to facilitate the issue of ball ammunition for the marines to shoot insubordinate sailors. Although the order was suppressed, it leaked out, and the sailors demanded of Lord Bridport a copy, threatening to flog the captain of their ship unless it was produced. The order, which was then published, had a bad effect on the fleet.

Early in May another violent scene occurred on the flag-ship. Delegates from other vessels came on board in spite of orders, and after much altercation one of them was training a gun on the officers standing on the quarter-deck, when Lieutenant Bover ordered the man to desist.

He refused, and the officer, firing, killed him. General Spithead, firing then ensued. Two officers and many men were wounded, but the men from their numbers obtained the mastery of the deck. Then Bover was tried by a drum-head court martial. While being prepared for execution with a rope round his neck, he never ceased to revile the crew as mutinous scoundrels. He was about to be run up to the yard-arm when Admiral Colpoys, making his voice heard, shouted that he had given him the order to fire, and that he only was answerable for the death of the Bluejacket. He would probably have taken Bover's place inside the halter, but that a diversion was created by a foulmouthed Bluejacket, who poured on him such a torrent of obscene language that the crew ordered him to "stow it," or they would chuck him overboard.

Spithead,
1797

The mutinous crews imprisoned all the officers, and Lieutenant Bover was summoned to attend a coroner's inquest on shore. The crew were at first disinclined to let him go free, but he assured them that in any case he would return. The verdict was "justifiable homicide," and when Bover pulled off to the ship he was cheered by the crew.

King George III. asked Lord Howe to intervene in this serious matter. He was still a cripple, walking with the help of sticks, but acting firmly with the Government, he obtained full power to treat with the men as regards pay, and on all other points. He visited every ship, accompanied by the delegates, being so infirm that he was necessarily helped up the side, and was received everywhere with touching, affectionate respect. On May 16th the Spithead fleet returned to duty.

Admiral Duncan, who lay off the mouth of the Texel, at first with two ships only, was at Yarmouth revictualling his flag-ship, H.M.S. *Venerable*, when, April 30th, the crew, on hearing from the fleet at Spithead, were induced to mutiny.

Mutiny at
Yarmouth,
1797

The Admiral was on the quarter-deck when the men suddenly broke into tumultuous cheering. Duncan sent for all the officers, ordered the Marines to fall in armed, and then walked forward alone. A man of immense stature, 6 feet 4 inches in height, and of proportionate breadth, his very size and mien inspired awe. He asked at first quietly what had induced them to commit such a breach of dis-

Mutiny at
Yarmouth,
1797

cipline. The men hung their heads and were silent. The Admiral, selecting five whom he suspected, from their demeanour, of being ringleaders, sent them aft to the poop. There they were kept until all had had time for reflection. Then the Admiral piped "All hands," and with the marines on the poop with loaded muskets, the officers on the weather side of the quarter-deck, and the Bluejackets to leeward, he addressed the crew forcibly and to the point, that no one should lower his flag from the masthead, and "Piped down."

On the following Sunday, just a week later, he piped "All Hands," and made them an equally powerful speech, which induced from the men a remarkable letter, in which they deplored their act of indiscipline, begged for forgiveness, and protested their loyalty and willingness to obey every order. This promise they nobly redeemed, even when nearly all the rest of the squadron mutinied.

The crew of H.M.S. *Adamant* mutinied. This was on May 13th. The Admiral, going on board, spoke to the men, stating plainly that he would personally kill the first man who defied his lawful authority, and then challenged anyone to dispute it. A sailor, pushing his way through the crowd of men assembled on the quarter-deck, said insolently, "I dispute it." The Admiral, with his immense height and breadth, seizing the man by the collar with one hand, lifted him off his feet, and holding him at arm's length over the side of the ship, called out, "My lads, look at this fellow who wants to deprive me of my command."

The crew of the *Adamant* remained loyal, with that of the flagship *Venerable*, but though when delegates came from the ships at the Nore to seduce the fleet, the Admiral was able to make them prisoners, yet some few days later, when he signalled to the fleet to weigh anchor, all the others except the *Adamant* refused to sail, and Duncan, with supreme audacity, took those two battleships and the *Circe* frigate, whose mutinous crew was dominated by the captain, to confront 95 Dutch men-of-war lying inside the narrow entrance to the Texel, which he continued to guard until, the mutiny having been suppressed, the Admiralty was able to send him a reinforcement.

When Lord Howe had brought the Spithead fleet back to its duty, another mutiny broke out at the Nore, organised








ADMIRAL JERVIS, EARL ST. VINCENT

From the Portrait by Sir William Beechey, R.A.



by a seaman named Parker, who had been drafted as a minor offender in a quota from the *County of Perth*. He had been a midshipman, but had been dismissed from two ships in succession, and eventually had been dismissed from the service. Nevertheless, he corrupted all the crews of the ships at the Nore in his first attempt, and made fresh demands on the Admiralty. The squadron blockaded the Thames, and Consols fell to 49. Active steps were, however, taken. Public feeling was very much against the sailors, and at the end of June the mutiny was suppressed, Parker and eighteen others being hanged.

Admiral Sir John Jervis, early on February 14th, remarked to one of his officers: "A victory is very essential to England at this moment."

The situation was indeed critical. Spain had joined France; Austria only of the Continental Powers remained true to her engagements with England. Jervis had been obliged to withdraw from the Mediterranean; the English fleet in the Channel had failed to interfere with General Hoche's expedition to invade Ireland, which had left France on December 16th. The British seamen were discontented with regard to their pay, rations, and conditions of service, and were about to break out in mutiny. An invasion of England was feared, and the financial position was so alarming that the Bank of England was about to suspend cash payments, as it did a fortnight later. The French Government arranged to combine their northern fleet with the Spanish fleet in Cadiz harbour, and if it had succeeded in getting up to Brest the Allies would have so greatly outnumbered the British ships that the blockade of Dutch and French ports must have been raised.

The battle of St. Vincent, which greatly enhanced one naval commander's reputation, and established the fame of Horatio Nelson, was indeed opportune. England stood almost alone against Europe. Her American colonies were on the verge of revolution; Ireland was restive; and France the all-conquering was doing everything in her power to defeat our little nation.

Admiral Jervis, then commanding the British fleet at Gibraltar, was ordered to make towards the Tagus, and prevent the junction of the Brest and Cadiz fleets of France and Spain, then united in an offensive alliance.

Mutiny at
the Nore,
1797

Battle of
St. Vincent,
1797

Battle of
St. Vincent,
1797

The odds were greatly against Jervis at this period: his force was reduced to sixteen ships, but his spirit manifested itself in the order which he at once issued, that the entire fleet must be refitted and ready to proceed to sea within a week of its arrival off Lisbon.

When the *St. George*, a ninety-gun ship, grounded, and was compelled to return to dry-dock, this left Jervis only eight sail of the line with which to engage a fleet of from twenty to forty ships, every one of superior tonnage and weight of metal to his own. On the day before he left the Tagus, Jervis received information that the enemy's ships had left the Mediterranean, and were proceeding towards Brest. He sailed to meet them, and being joined by seven ships of the line, then had fifteen. The largest was the *Victory*, his flag-ship, of one hundred guns, the smallest, of sixty-four guns.

Jervis took up his position off Cape St. Vincent, stationing look-out frigates to report on the enemy's movements. On February 13th, Commodore Horatio Nelson joined, and hoisted his flag in the *Captain*. Jervis made the signal, "Close order and prepare for action," and at dinner on February 13th proposed as a toast: "Victory over the Dons to-morrow in the battle from which they cannot escape."

He was always taciturn; one who unbent but seldom: a man who made his personality felt through every unit of his command—a born leader. That night he was sterner than ever, because he knew that victory must wait upon his endeavours on the coming day. Defeat would be fatal to England.

The hostile fleet soon after daylight, February 14th, was reported in sight. "Sir John, there are twenty-seven sail of the line; nearly double our own." "Enough; if there are fifty, I'll go through 'em."

The Spanish vessels were better sailers, especially on a wind, but their crews, as seamen, and as gunners, were very inferior to Jervis's men, who had been cruising for months, with constant gunnery practice, off Toulon, while the Spaniards lay in Cadiz harbour.

Close-hauled on the starboard tack, the *Victory* swept forward towards that great fleet of forty vessels. The Admiral's keen eyes had noticed a fact that was vitally

The Battle of St. Vincent


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to affect the issue of the day. There was a wide gap between the two halves of the Spanish fleet.

He signalled, "Pass through the enemy's line, and engage it to leeward." Without seeking to deviate in the least, Captain Troubridge, the flag captain, held on his course until his men could see the faces of the Spanish gunners over their guns at every port in the towering side. They heard indeed the straining of the tackles as the Spanish guns were pointed for a broadside—which was, however, never fired! For the order was given, and the *Culloden* discharged two double-shotted broadsides so rapidly that the Spaniard, raked through and through, was thrown into such confusion that she came up "in irons," and then went about without firing a gun.

The Spanish fleet was indifferently manned, for even in the flag-ships not more than eighty of the crew were seamen, the remainder being landmen and soldier recruits. After

Battle of
St. Vincent,
1797



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT, FEB. 14th, 1797

**Battle of
St. Vincent,
1797**

the ships had received the first broadside none of the crews would go aloft to repair damages, and though the officers shot some, and wounded many, the others fell on their knees and said they preferred death where they knelt to going aloft.

The leeward division of the Spanish fleet recognised the appalling disaster that had befallen it, in that it was severed from its weather half, and endeavoured to retrieve the disaster by breaking through the British line.

And now Nelson made himself famous. He attacked, on the *Captain*, the *Sanctissima Trinidad*, carrying nearly twice the number of guns, although she was supported by five other ships all bigger than his own ship. Nelson was soon succoured, and carried by boarding the *San Nicolas*, and *San Josef*, after the *Captain* had lost all her spars.

At five o'clock the Battle of St. Vincent was over; the Spaniards were in full retreat, leaving four of their finest ships in the victors' hands. The French fleet off Brest had been deprived of supports required to obtain command of the Channel.

The victory cost England three hundred officers and men killed or wounded; the losses of the enemy were never known in entirety, although aboard the captured ships alone the casualties totalled seven hundred.

Sir John Jervis was created an earl, with a pension of £3,000 per annum.

**Effects of
St. Vincent**

The statements preceding the narrative of the battle of Cape St. Vincent, February 14th, 1797, indicated England's critical position at the beginning of the year.

Sir John Jervis, by his brilliant victory on St. Valentine's Day, muzzled effectually the Spanish fleet, and about the same time General Hoche's expedition for the invasion of Ireland, straggled back to Brest, only about half of it having reached Bantry Bay. France, however, concentrated on the Texel 30,000 men for General Hoche's renewed attempt, for which the Dutch prepared twenty battle-ships as escort for the transports.

The Nore mutiny broke out on April 30th, on board the *Venerable*, Admiral Duncan's flag-ship, and was followed at intervals of about a fortnight by risings on board the *Adamant* and *Circe*. These the Admiral suppressed by his personal influence, shifting his flag to each mutinous ship

in succession. On May 28th the remainder of the fleet refused to follow the Admiral to sea, and with his three ships he blockaded for months ninety-five in the Texel. The Dutch Admiral was ignorant of the mutiny in the English fleet, but made some attempts to get to sea, eventually coming out on October 9th.

Texel
Blockade,
1797

Fifteen sail were the Dutchmen bold,
Duncan he had but two,
But he anchored them fast where the Texel shoaled
And his colours aloft he flew.
"I've taken the depths to a fathom," he cried,
"And I'll sink with a right good will,
For I know when we're all of us under the tide,
My flag will be fluttering still."

—Newbolt.

Great Britain in 1797, deserted by her allies, who had gone over to the enemy, stood alone against all the Powers of Europe. So menacing was the outlook that the Bank of England stopped cash payments. There seemed to be every probability that in a short time an overwhelmingly powerful force, composed of the armies of Holland, France and Spain, would descend upon these shores. This in spite of the prowess of our Navy, for mutiny was so rife among the ill-paid sailors upon whom the task of defending these shores devolved that the Admiralty could scarcely depend upon a single ship. That these grievances were well founded may be gathered from the fact that, at one point in the story of that year, 40,000 men were concerned in the mutiny, the disaffection spreading to many foreign stations.

Britain's
Isolation

The French, relying on the mutinous state of the English fleet, anticipated little difficulty in transporting their army across the Channel. At the time "Admiral" Parker was threatening to sack London, the news reached Downing Street (in May, 1797) that the Dutch Navy was ready for sea.

The North Sea Squadron was refitting and provisioning at Great Yarmouth when Admiral Winter with 24 sail left the Texel, October 7th, unseen by the British "Look-out" ship *Circe*. Two hours after the news was received on the 9th Admiral Duncan put to sea, and sighting the enemy on the 11th signalled "General chase."

Escape of
the Dutch
Fleet

Camper-
down, 1797

We have shown above how the undaunted Duncan imposed on the Dutch for five months without striking a blow, during which time Parker was hanged, the mutiny suppressed, and many grievances were redressed.

Later Duncan fearing that the Dutch ships, which were built for their own shallow seas, might get so close in shore that he could not follow them, signalled "break the Dutch line, and engage to leeward"; and by these means he got between them and the land, 5 miles distant. His officers nobly seconded his efforts, and between 1 and 4 P.M., with a loss of 8 officers and 173 men killed, 37 officers and 800 men wounded, he had captured Admiral Winter and broken up his fleet. The Dutch losses were 8 ships captured, 1,100 killed and wounded, and 6,000 prisoners.

The ships captured were seven sail of the line, and two large frigates; the *Delft*, fifty-six guns, foundered.

On October 16th the Admiral anchored with his prizes at the Nore. Next day His Majesty created him a peer of Great Britain.

French
Invasion of
Ireland,
1798

Admiral Winter, when captured, was bound for Ireland to assist a French invasion, which was to be combined with a rising of the Irish nation. The discovery of a list of the principal conspirators in May, 1798, caused a premature outbreak, mainly in Wexford, which was crushed at Vinegar Hill, June 26th, the vanquished being treated with ruthless severity. A small French force, which was landed after a minor success surrendered.

These misfortunes of England's enemies lessened materially her dangers, but, on the other hand, General Bonaparte, after a succession of victories unparalleled in war, had dictated, and enforced a humiliating peace on Austria a week after Admiral Duncan's victory.

The young General had an enthusiastic reception at Paris, when his treaty of Campo Formio was formally presented to the nation by the Directory, which after the ceremony decreed the formation of a force to be called The Army of England, and nominated Bonaparte as its Commander-in-Chief.

The danger of an invasion was, however, less imminent, for as Bonaparte wrote to the Directory, "To make a descent upon England, without being master of the sea, is the boldest and most difficult operation ever attempted."

and so he now prepared to invade Egypt. "The time is not far distant," he wrote on August 16th, 1797, "when we shall feel that, truly to destroy England, we must take possession of Egypt."

Napoleon's
Plans, 1798

On March 5th, 1798, Bonaparte submitted a plan to seize Malta and Egypt. The Directory appointed him Commander-in-Chief, and issued decrees constituting a commission on the coast defences of the Mediterranean. This was the pretence under cover of which preparations were pushed forward. At Toulon a fleet of men-of-war and transports was fitted out, and troops were concentrated there from all quarters of the Republic. Admiral Brueys was sent with his squadron from Brest to Toulon, and, arriving there on April 2nd, took command of the naval part of the expedition, consisting of 13 ships of the line with smaller vessels.

Bonaparte himself, keeping up the pretence of invading England, remained at Paris till May 3rd, arriving at Toulon on the 8th, and sailed on the 19th.

Malta was surrendered by the Knights of St. John after some little show of resistance. Bonaparte garrisoned the island with 4,000 men, and left on June 19th for Egypt. He was followed by the greatest naval commander in the history of the world, who a year earlier had been the idol of the London mobs, and now, because he missed the French expedition, was reviled by them as incompetent.

Horatio Nelson, born 1758, went to the West Indies in 1770, in a merchant ship, apparently "before the mast." On his return he entered the Royal Navy, and showing almost immediately, and indeed continuously until his death in 1805, audacious courage and extraordinary aptitude and enthusiasm for his profession, commanded a 24-gun frigate before he was twenty-one years of age, and became Rear-admiral after only twenty-seven years' service.

Horatio
Nelson,
1758-1805

He lost an eye in the batteries at Calvi, and an arm at Teneriffe. In the Battle of St. Vincent he precipitated and did much to win the action by anticipating the Admiral's orders. Nelson, after capturing the *San Nicolas*, from her decks had boarded and captured the *San Josef*.

He hoisted his flag on board the *Vanguard* in January, 1798, and joined Lord St. Vincent at Cadiz on the 30th.

Nelson's
Chase of
French
Fleet, 1798

The British Government had information of an expedition being prepared at Toulon, but not of its objective.

Nelson left Cadiz on May 2nd, and reached Gibraltar on the 4th. On the 17th he captured a French corvette leaving Toulon, from which he learned particulars of the strength of the enemy but nothing of his destination.

In the Straits of Messina, he was told by the British Consul that Malta had fallen. On June 22nd, off Cape Passaro, at the south-east of Sicily, he spoke a Ragusian brig, and learned that the French had quitted Malta. Nelson now convinced that Egypt was the enemy's destination, steered south-east, crowding all sail.

On the 28th the fleet came in sight of Alexandria. Bonaparte, from Malta to Alexandria, had sailed along two sides of a triangle, while Nelson was hurrying along the base, and thus reached Alexandria while Bonaparte was still off Candia.

Nelson sailed from Alexandria on the 29th, for Caramania. Bonaparte's expedition anchored off Alexandria two days after Nelson had quitted that port.

Nelson's forecast was right as to Egypt being the objective. He failed in not trusting his judgment a little farther; but in a gale of wind on May 20th, which dismantled one line of battle-ship and nearly wrecked another, the frigates of the fleet parted company, and thus there were no "Look-out" ships available. He arrived off Alexandria August, 1798, and in the afternoon the French fleet being reported 15 miles to the northward, sailed for Aboukir Bay.

Admiral Brueys had moored his fleet alongside a shoal, but not sufficiently close to it, nor the ships to each other, to prevent a daring seaman like Nelson getting round them. This indeed happened, for when the *Goliath* engaged the *Guerrier* on its shallow water side, her decks being encumbered by furniture on the shore side could not be brought into action. The Republic's Representative with Brueys had reported that "the fleet was so moored as to bid defiance to double its numbers." The Deputy had not reckoned on Nelson's audacity. Although the sun was nearly down, and four of his ships were still far in rear, he sailed on into the bay of which he had no chart, the ships feeling their way by the lead, and with the enemy as their beacons.

If his fleet had been concentrated it would have been

The Battle of the Nile

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
equal in ships to Admiral Brueys' command, but the French had 180 more guns, and 3,000 more men.

Battle of
the Nile,
1798

The fading light prevented Nelson's exact intentions being carried out, and the *Culloden* grounding, remained fast, and out of action till next day. At the beginning of the fight each British ship, dropping ahead of its selected opponent, veered cable till it was alongside, and then engaged it at the closest range. All Nelson's vessels flew Colours in six different parts of the rigging to provide against error in case of Flags being cut away by fire. The *Bellerophon*, attacking the huge *Orient*, soon became a wreck, but not before it had severely crippled its opponent.

From soon after sunset the British ships anchoring in succession were engaged throughout the night. At 10 P.M. the *Orient*, after being on fire for an hour, blew up. The captain, Casabianca, and his 10-year-old son, immortalised by Mrs. Hemans, perished, 70 of the crew only being saved in spite of the efforts of British seamen. The shock of the explosion suspended all firing for ten minutes.

The French fought gallantly. Admiral Brueys, although three times wounded, remained on deck until he was killed. The *Tonnant*, although dismasted, engaged by the *Majestic* as well as by the *Swiftsure* and the *Alexander*, brought down the *Majestic's* mainmast and mizen-mast. Soon afterwards



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF THE NILE, AUG. 1st, 1798

**Battle of
the Nile,
1798**

all three of her own masts went overboard, disabling many of her guns; but, still refusing to strike, she veered away her cable and drifted to the end of the French line. Her Captain, Dupetit-Thouars, had been killed. When both his arms and one of his legs were shot off, he had himself deposited in a tub of bran, where he continued to give orders until he became unconscious from loss of blood. He had had the flag nailed to the mast, and with his dying breath ordered that there should be no surrender.

Two of the enemy's battle-ships were burnt, and nine taken, and two out of the four frigates destroyed. On our side not a vessel was lost, though all but one were in various degrees disabled. Our loss was 218 killed and 677 wounded; the enemy's loss in killed and drowned is said to have been upwards of 5,000. The prisoners taken out of the prizes, to the number of more than 3,000, with all their personal belongings, were sent ashore and set free on the condition that they did no further service again until they had been regularly exchanged.

On October 6th the *Gazette* announced Nelson's elevation to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile and of Burnham Thorpe.

Lords Hood and St. Vincent spoke of the Battle of the Nile as the greatest naval victory ever achieved. Its effects were of the widest importance, for the Mediterranean passed for the time under England's undisputed control, and India had nothing more to fear from Bonaparte's designs.

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF ALEXANDRIA, MARCH 21st, 1801

Napoleon in Egypt—British Expeditionary Force in Aboukir Bay—Death of General Abercromby—Battle of Copenhagen—England Stands Alone—Sir Hyde Parker's Command—Nelson's Opportunity.

THE brilliant victory won by Nelson in the Bay of Aboukir on August 1st, 1798, cut off the Expeditionary army from France; but Napoleon, nevertheless, led it in 1799 across the desert to Palestine. He took Jaffa by storm, and laid siege to Acre, where, however, he was repulsed by the British sailors and Turks under Sir Sidney Smith. Subsequent to this, news from France showing that the power of the Directory was crumbling caused him to hurry home, leaving his troops in Egypt.

**Napoleon
in Egypt,
1798**

General Sir Ralph Abercromby had been with 20,000 men sent wandering about the Mediterranean, and sailing June 10th on December 29th, 1800, landed in Marmorice. Turkish horses were purchased for the cavalry, gunboats were procured to cover the landing of the troops in Egypt, and a plan of co-operation was arranged with the Turks. After many delays the Expeditionary fleet anchored in the Bay of Aboukir, with 15,330 men, March 1st, 1801.

**British Ex-
peditionary
Force in
Bay of
Aboukir,
1801**

Squally weather rendered any attempt to land impracticable for a week, but on the evening of the 7th the wind abated; and, accompanied by Sir Sidney Smith, Sir Ralph Abercromby reconnoitred the coast. The troops landing under heavy fire early March 8th, suffered many casualties, but drove the French back, and on the 12th encamped near the Tower of Mandara. On the 13th the army came into action in three columns against the foe.

The 2nd Gordon Highlanders, being far in advance of the line, were exposed to a fire of grape-shot, and at the same time were attacked by the 61st demi-brigade, but they continued the advance up to the muzzles of the enemy's guns, taking two field-pieces and a howitzer, and completely routing their escort. The 90th Light Infantry, wearing

Battle of
Alexandria
1801

brass helmets, the only head-dress available when the battalion left England, were mistaken for dismounted dragoons, and were charged with confident dash by the French, who were, however, badly beaten. During the struggle Sir Ralph Abercromby's horse was shot under him, but he was rescued by the devoted courage of the 90th Regiment.

On March 21st, an hour before daybreak, the French columns attacked vigorously.

The 28th (1st Gloucestershire) Regiment were standing in line in part of some ruins on the extreme right of the British position when a column of Grenadiers, designated the "Invincibles," passed through the British position on the left of the ruins, while another column attacked it in front.

The battalion stood in line, awaiting the approach of the first column of the "Invincibles," which had broken through the front of the British position, when suddenly the thick smoke lifting a little, a second column appeared immediately behind the battalion. Colonel Paget, who was in command, gave the order, "Rear rank, Right about face." There ensued a long and bitter struggle; both sides showed great bravery, but the Gloucestershire Regiment beat back the hitherto "Invincibles," and then lent its aid to the 42nd (Black Watch) Highlanders, who were surrounded by dense columns of the enemy. "The Invincible Legion resisted 650 of them had fallen, when the survivors, about 150 in number, threw down their arms, delivering up their standard to Major Stirling, of the 42nd."

General Menou, finding all his attempts unsuccessful, fell back after a last attempt to carry the position by a charge of cavalry, supported by three Divisions; but the brigadier was killed, with many other gallant officers, and the French cavalry was completely broken.

By 8 A.M. our troops had expended their ammunition, but while the enemy still hung on their front, they stood on the defensive with their bayonets. The French were repulsed, but occasionally when skirmishers drew near the British line, the empty muskets were brought to the "present." Later, when a supply of ammunition was brought up, and the guns reopened fire, the French re-entered Alexandria.

In the action General Abercromby, after a personal en-

The Battle of Alexandria


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counter with two French Dragoons, was mortally wounded, and died a week later.

**Battle of
Alexandria,
1801**

The total British loss was 70 officers, 1,306 rank and file, with killed, and wounded. The loss of the enemy was 3,000 men. Alexandria, with its garrison, 12,000 men, surrendered, as did the French troops at Cairo. In September the army returned home.

The 28th (1st Gloucestershire) Regiment has since worn a double-front head-dress, called by the men "The back number."



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ALEXANDRIA, MARCH 21st, 1801

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2nd, 1801

Cause of the Battle of Copenhagen—The Triple Alliance Broken—England's Demand of Denmark—Parker at Copenhagen—Nelson's Opportunity—The Victory.

Of Nelson and the North,
Sing the glorious day's renown,
When to battle fierce came forth
All the might of Denmark's crown,
And her arms along the deep proudly shone;
By each gun the lighted brand,
In a bold determined hand,
And the Prince of all the land
Led them on.

—Thomas Campbell.

Commercial
and
Political
Situation,
1801

THE interests of commerce caused the Battle of Copenhagen. In 1790 a coalition of Neutral States had successfully resisted the claim of belligerents to search neutral merchant vessels at sea for contraband cargo. England lost thereby much of her carrying trade, but at the time was unable to defend what she considered to be her just rights.

Until the return of Bonaparte from Egypt, Austria, Great Britain, and Russia had combined against France. Bonaparte, on regaining France, reversed the situation. Austria, after a disastrous defeat by Moreau at Hohenlinden, on December 3rd, 1800, made peace with France, and Russia, displeased at not receiving Malta as a gift, withdrew her support from Great Britain, which now stood alone.

In spite of this combination of the Northern Powers, Great Britain called on Denmark to withdraw from their coalition, and a fleet was fitted out to enforce the demand under Sir Hyde Parker's command. It consisted of 53 sail, and a small Land force. The force available in the Baltic to oppose the British was estimated at 41 sail of the line, made up of Russian, Swedish, and Danish ships. The

The Battle of Copenhagen

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Blanche frigate sailed in advance of the fleet, carrying an envoy, with powers to treat with Denmark; but the Danes, far from yielding, were defiant.

Copen-
hagen.
1801

There are three passages into the Baltic, formed by two islands; these entrances are known as the Great Belt, the Little Belt, and the Sound, the two latter being very narrow, while the former, though apparently wide, is studded with shoals and rocks.

On March 21st, Sir Hyde anchored at the entrance of the Sound, and on receiving the Danes' refusal summoned a Council of War. It was suggested that Copenhagen was too strong to be attacked. This Nelson denied, and being given the command, he undertook to carry out the attack.

The fleet got through the Sound without mishap on March 30th, the batteries on the Swedish coast being silent, and by keeping over to that shore, the ships were out of range of the Danish batteries at Kronenberg and Elsinore.

The entrance to the harbour of Copenhagen was defended by the two heavily armed batteries called the Tre Kroner (Three Crowns); these were supported by two 74-gun ships anchored near, and the narrow channel leading to the inner harbour was barred by two line of battle ships, 15 small vessels, and a row of floating batteries, old line of battle ships, etc., mounting in all 628 guns, was moored along the western edge of the inner channel. Inside this formidable line of defence were several shore batteries, the fire of some of which was, however, masked to a great extent by the ships.

The inner channel was not more than a quarter of a mile in width at the southern end, though extending a little as it ran northwards; to the eastward there was a shoal. Both channels were intricate for navigation; and from both the Danes had removed the buoys which marked the passage.

Nelson's division, piloted by the *Amazon*, ran down on the outer side of the Middle Ground shoal, and anchored after dark near the south end of it.

That this was accomplished in safety was due to the personal exertions of Nelson, who, with some of his officers, had spent the greater part of the preceding night in sounding and marking the passage; an operation which now had to be performed, at far greater risk, in regard


Our Fighting Services

Copen-
hagen,
1801

to the inshore channel, lined on one side by the enemy's flotilla. However, Captain Hardy, using a long pole, discovered that the water was rather deeper on the west than on the east side of the shoal.

The twelve line of battle ships were to run up the channel and anchor in succession by the stern, each one as nearly as possible opposite a designated ship in the enemy's line; the frigates, under Captain Riou's orders, were to attack the ships and batteries outside. The bomb-vessels were to anchor on the edge of the Middle Ground, and pitch their high curved shell over the other ships on the enemy. The plan was interfered with by three ships grounding, but the remaining vessels were successfully navigated.

At 11.30 A.M., April 2nd, 1801, all the effective ships were engaged, Nelson's ship at 200 yards range. About 1 P.M. Sir Hyde Parker, seeing three ships flying "Dis-



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF COPENHAGEN, APRIL 2nd, 1801

(Inset is a plan showing the approach to Copenhagen.)

Victory at Copenhagen

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Copen-
hagen,
1801

treachery," and "inability to engage," considered that he might with advantage make a signal which would enable Nelson, if he wished, to haul off without discredit; and accordingly hoisted No. 39, signifying, "Discontinue the engagement." The hoisting of this signal is not mentioned either in Nelson's report to Parker, or in the latter's covering dispatch to the Admiralty, so that it was probably intended to afford an honourable excuse for Nelson and his battered ships, Sir Hyde thereby generously accepting all responsibility. Nelson acknowledged receipt of the signal, but did not repeat it to his command, which fought on under his signal, "Close action," which remained hoisted.

The southern portion of the enemy's line suffered so severely that soon after two o'clock most of the ships had struck their Colours. The Commodore's ship broke away, a blazing wreck, and drifted northwards; several ships were riddled hulks, the batteries and British ships exchanging shots over, and through them.


Some of the Danish vessels, battered in pieces as they were, and showing no colours, yet refused to allow the British boats to approach them and take possession, the shore batteries assisting in this proceeding, and firing on our boats. Nelson thereupon sent a message to the Crown Prince of Denmark:

If the fighting is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson will be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, without having the power of saving the brave Danes who have defended them.

NELSON AND BRONTE.


The Crown Prince then gave orders to the batteries to cease fire; and the Battle of Copenhagen thus ended.

The Czar Paul was assassinated March 25th. His son, Alexander, abandoned the League, Russia and Denmark making peace with England.



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CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCTOBER 21st, 1805

Napoleon Accepts Crown of Italy—Nelson's Chase to the West Indies—Napoleon Plans Invasion—Napoleon Taunts Admiral Villeneuve—The Allied Fleet Puts to Sea—The *Victory* in Action—Nelson's Death—"There is but One Nelson."

**Napoleon
Accepts
Crown of
Italy, 1805**

IN March, 1805, a deputation from Milan on behalf of the Republic offered to Napoleon the Crown of Italy. He took the emblem out of the hands of the Pope, and crowned himself, May 26th, and on June 5th incorporated Genoa and the Ligurian Republic with France.

**Nelson's
Chase**

He calculated that Admiral Villeneuve, who had lured Nelson to the West Indies, would now be ready to cover the crossing of the "Army of England" from Boulogne to the Sussex coast, and leaving Milan secretly by night, reached the great camp during the night, August 2nd-3rd.

**Action off
Ferrol**

Villeneuve, on his return to the waters of Europe, met off Ferrol the fleet of Admiral Sir Robert Calder, who had five ships less than had the French. In an indecisive engagement Calder captured two line of battle ships, and Villeneuve got into the harbour under the shelter of the fortifications. Both the English and the French Governments were dissatisfied with the result of the action. Sir Robert Calder, who had distinguished himself in the victory of Sir John Jervis off Cape St. Vincent, was severely reprimanded by a Court martial composed of officers of his own class who had grown accustomed by the tactical successes of their heroic leaders, from Blake and Duncan downwards, to gaining victories over very superior numbers; and orders were issued to recall Villeneuve to Paris, but these were not received by him until after he had experienced another and yet more disastrous defeat.

The French Admiral remained under the fortifications of the remarkable natural harbour of Ferrol for eleven days, in spite of the stringent orders he had received to reach Boulogne, and when on sailing he learnt of the approach

The Battle of Trafalgar

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of an English fleet, instead of steering northwards to the English Channel he turned to the southward and harboured under the guns of Cadiz, where he was blockaded by Sir Robert Calder's fleet, which had now been reinforced by 25 ships under Admiral Collingwood.

Trafalgar,
1805

Napoleon wrote to his Admiral taunting him with cowardice, and declaring that the failure of his plans for the subjugation of England was due to Villeneuve's reluctance to fight. This letter caused the Admiral to leave Cadiz, and the result was the Battle of Trafalgar.

Admiral de Villeneuve led the fleet of French and Spanish battleships under his command out of the harbour of Cadiz on October 19th, 1805, but the wind falling light, it was not until the 20th that the combined fleets got into the Atlantic, in all 33 sail of the line, besides smaller craft.

The English look-out ships signalled the movements of the enemy to the British fleet, still out of sight, under the command of the most skilful seaman of all time—Horatio, Viscount Nelson.

The British crews were typical of their time. There was the marine, a pipeclayed, pigtailed soldier with skin-tight garments. There was the foremast hand, often captured by a pressgang from a crimp's house, usually a seaman by experience, and a fighting man by instinct; and at his best, the finest exponent of his trade which the world has ever seen. All his officers, too, were not what we should call refined, educated men nowadays. But they were skilful in their profession.

The fleet lay pitching on the green Atlantic swell, when the signal was made: "The French and Spaniards are out at last; they out-number us in ships and guns and men." Lord Nelson's instructions had been given; they ended thus: "In case signals cannot be seen or clearly understood, no captain can do wrong if he places his ship alongside of an enemy."

Nelson's intention of isolating the dozen leading ships of the enemy was fulfilled, for they did not come into action until after the battle was decided. Shortly before the fleets became engaged, at midday Signal-Lieutenant Pascoe, on going below, found the Admiral on his knees. He had written the following memorable words: "May the great God whom I worship grant my country, and

Trafalgar,
1805

for the benefit of Europe in general, a great and glorious victory."

Admiral Collingwood early in the action ranged his flag-ship, the *Royal Sovereign*, so close alongside the *Santa Anna* that their guns nearly touched muzzle to muzzle. He had trained the crews of his previous ships to get three broadsides on targets within $3\frac{1}{2}$ minutes.

At the end of 70 minutes the *Santa Anna's* masts were all over the side, but it was not until 2.15 P.M. that she struck her Colours. The *Royal Sovereign* herself was in little better plight than was her prize. The mizen-mast had already fallen, when the mainmast, going over the starboard side, tore off two of the lower deck ports. With foremast shot through in ten places, and rigging in tatters, the victor was almost in as unmanageable a plight as the three-decker she had so gallantly fought and captured.

We now turn to the *Victory*. When she was 2,000 yards distant from the Allied line, heading for the *Santissima Trinidad*, all telescopes were searching for Villeneuve's flag-ship, which, owing to the dense smoke of the guns, no one could locate, but which Nelson believed to be the *Bucentaure*, which he personally desired to engage if his surmise were correct.

At 12.30 P.M. the *Bucentaure* sent a shot through the *Victory's* mainsail: there was a pause for a minute in the cannonade, and then seven line of battle ships opened fire on her as she forged slowly ahead to break the Allied line. For three-quarters of an hour she made no reply to the hail of projectiles, which tore through her sides, decks, and rigging, killing 20, and wounding 30 of the crew.

There was now a forest of masts around her. When she got within a quarter of a mile of the *Bucentaure*, the mizen-topmast was cut in two; the wheel was shattered, and she was steered by tiller ropes from the lower deck.

At 1 P.M. the *Victory* passed slowly within 30 feet of the *Bucentaure's* taffrail, the yard-arms grazing her mizen rigging; as from bow to stern the *Victory's* guns in succession bore on the quarter galleries of de Villeneuve's ship, it was torn from stern to bow by double-shot projectiles which smashed her decks, 20 guns, and 400 men.


The *Victory* and *Redoubtable*, now locked close together by the fouling of their rigging, moved slowly to the south-

The Death of Nelson

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south-east. The crews fought their guns with the yard-arms interlocking with yard-arms, and many men fell.

The gun-crews and "small-arm" men of the *Victory* were doing all they could to beat down the fire of their adversary, while Nelson and Hardy walked up and down on the port side. The mizen-top of the *Redoubtable*, filled with picked shots, was about 50 feet above them. For a quarter of an hour the struggle had continued, when just as Nelson and Hardy were reaching the usual forward place of turning about, Nelson, who was on Hardy's left hand, fell. Hardy turning at the same moment, saw the Admiral on his knees, as he fell on the spot where his secretary had been killed an hour earlier. To Hardy's natural inquiry, he replied: "They have done for me at last," adding "Yes, my backbone is shot through." Within a few



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, OCT. 21st. 1805

Trafalgar,
1805

minutes the *Redoubtable's* top-men had shot down 40 officers and men, and the French, seeing the upper deck clear of all but dead or wounded, tried to board her. The bulging-out sides of both ships left, however, so wide a gap between their respective upper decks that men could not cross from ship to ship, as the vessels rose and fell in the heavy swell.

The hour following was the climax of the battle. Nelson's determination to sacrifice the leading ships of his columns in order to break through and destroy the enemy's fleet succeeded, but the casualties on board the four leading ships were one-third of the total losses of the 27 ships engaged.

The resolute captain of the *Redoubtable* surrendered to the *Téméraire*, having only the stump of one spar left. The *Belleisle*, although a battered hulk, maintained her fire with the few guns still intact.

A light breeze now springing up brought the *Neptune*, *Leviathan* and *Conqueror* on to Villeneuve's flag-ship, and the Admiral surrendered. The *Achille* took fire and sank under command of a midshipman, her flag still flying, while our boats tried to save the survivors.

Horatio, Viscount Nelson, the greatest sea-warrior ever known, died at 4.30 P.M. An hour later the last of his 18 prizes struck their flags.

Nelson's funeral anthem proclaimed: "His body is buried in peace, but his fame liveth for evermore." This prediction is apparently accurate. The refrain of the favourite song fifty years later, on board our ships before Sebastopol, was, "And nations yet unborn shall transmit what Nelson's done." Perhaps, though the briefest, his fittest epitaph was that uttered by Lord St. Vincent: "There is but one Nelson."

The sea power of France and her Ally was broken at Trafalgar. The victory was due to the genius of one man, and to the disciplined courage of a fleet of sailors inspired by him. He died at the zenith of his fame.

How different a fate was that of the man who fought against him! De Villeneuve lay a prisoner in England till 1806, and then obtained his freedom. On his journey to Paris he stopped at Rennes to learn how the Emperor would receive him. On the morning of April 22nd he was found dead in bed, with six knife-wounds in his heart.

PART IX

THE ARMY IN INDIA, 1803

The Marátha Dominion—Madhaji Scindia—Lake and Wellesley—Battle of Assaye—General Lake at Laswari—Expansion of Indian Empire.

AT the beginning of the nineteenth century what was known as the Marátha Dominion had reached its zenith in India, and the progress of British policy brought the two Powers into conflict. The Maráthas are a Hindu people whose home was on the tablelands of the Dakhan. During the middle of the seventeenth century, under the guidance of a great National leader called Sivaji, they became a martial race, and ultimately one of the main factors in the downfall of the Great Mogul, as the titular head of the Mohammedan Empire over Hindustan was called.

The
Marátha
Dominion

In 1803 the Maráthas were masters from Delhi in the north to the confines of Hyderabad and Mysore in the south, and, excluding the Ganges provinces, from Cuttack in the east to the sandy deserts of Rajputana in the west. Their districts of tributary possessions were five times greater than those of the English. The government was merged in a Confederacy of five powerful chiefs, of whom the principal, called the Peshwa, held his Court at Puna. Their national characteristics were strongly marked; for, although constantly warring with one another, it needed but the presence of a foreign foe to create union in their ranks. Each of these great chiefs maintained a feudal army of predatory horsemen, and could bring thousands of them into the field to carry on the system of guerilla warfare which enabled them to sustain their rule of terror. They were nomads; their saddle was their home; they slept in the open, their horses tied to their spears stuck in the ground, ready to march at a moment's notice.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century one of their chiefs, Madhaji Scindia—a shrewd statesman, an experi-

**The
Marátha
Dominion**

enced soldier, and the greatest Native of his epoch—changed his nation's method of making war. He spent thirty years trying to unite it in a combined effort against the growing power of the English. He had observed, during campaigns against them, the superiority in battle their disciplined ranks of infantry gave them, and how easily their small but compact bodies of foot repelled the attacks of the freebooting lancers, who never dared to come to close quarters. He began, therefore, to create a regular army of his own, under the command of a remarkable soldier of fortune named De Boigne, who entered his service as a generalissimo in 1784, and raised and drilled troops for him after the European fashion—an example which was soon followed in a lesser degree by other chiefs in the Marátha Confederacy.

De Boigne and his brigades won many battles for their master in Central and Western India. When he left Scindia's service, in 1796, his command passed to another Frenchman named Perron, who increased the regular army to 40,000 infantry, 5,000 cavalry, and 464 guns.

**English and
French
Rivalry**

Scindia's army, detachments of which were stationed on the British frontiers, was a menace to our power, and overawed the Peshwa, who was constantly embroiled in troubles with his subordinate chiefs until his nominal ascendancy became a mockery, and it was they, not he, who dictated his policy. The Peshwa, in 1803, threw himself on the protection of the English; and the Marquess Wellesley, the Governor-General of India, seized the opportunity to disband these standing armies of regular troops, and crush the French interest that controlled them and so, by direct intrigues with France, made them a source of grave political danger.

A treaty was made with the Peshwa by which he became dependent on the English, who, in return for a large cession of territory, undertook to furnish him with troops for his protection. Scindia and the other Marátha chiefs, called on to acquiesce in the new political arrangement, insolently refused, and accepted the gage of war.

General Lake, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces, and Colonel Arthur Wellesley, a younger brother of the Marquess Wellesley, and afterwards the great Duke of Wellington, conducted our military operations.


Scindia's influence extended from the Dakhan to Delhi, where General Perron governed Upper India in his name, as the nominal Vice-Regent of the Great Mogul, represented at this time by a harmless, blind old man, kept secluded in the citadel of Delhi. Scindia had 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry in the vicinity of the Mogul capital, 14,000 infantry near Puna, and an additional 6,000 marching thence to reinforce Upper India. The total Marátha force amounted to 150,000 men, of whom a third had enjoyed an almost uninterrupted career of victory for twenty years. The strength of the British and Auxiliaries amounted to 50,000 men, distributed in five armies over India. Lake in the north, and Wellesley at Puna, were at the head of the more considerable divisions, numbering about 11,000 men each.

Scindia's
Influence,
1803

When Scindia took the field General Arthur Wellesley advanced; crossing the Godavari river to the north-east of Puna, he learned at Aurangabad that Scindia had entered the territory of the Nizam, after evading Colonel Stevenson, who, with 7,000 men, was watching the Ajunta Pass. Wellesley then proceeded south to intercept the enemy before they could reach Hyderabad. Whereupon Scindia, whose scouts kept him well informed, retraced his steps, and managed to elude his pursuers for three weeks.

Wellesley, after a march of twenty-two miles, at one o'clock on the afternoon of September 23rd at the Kaitna river, came upon the foe drawn up on the opposite side of the stream to dispute his passage.

The General determined to attack him without waiting for Colonel Stevenson, who, having separated to pass over some hills, was still twelve miles off.



MAP OF THE MARÁTHA CONFEDERACY

Assaye,
1803

The Maráthas had taken up their position facing south, and in a triangular piece of ground formed by the junction of the Rivers Kaitna and Juah, which flow from west to east, the former intervening between them and the English, and the latter protecting their rear. Wellesley, reconnoitring the position, perceived two villages almost facing each other on opposite banks of the Kaitna, and rightly surmised that a ford communicating between them must exist, in spite of the assertion of his guides that none existed. He made a flank march of four miles across the front, and in immediate presence of the enemy, who did not, however, defend the ford which the Highlanders waded, waist deep, at 3 P.M. Crossing it, with little or no loss, he formed line of battle, facing westward. This necessitated a corresponding move on the part of the Maráthas, whose line had been facing south, and they "changed front," until their Left rested on the village of Assaye and the Juah river, whilst their Right extended to the banks of the Kaitna. Thus situated they faced the British, who were between the two rivers, whose confluence was at their rear, but the river protected their flanks against the hordes of Irregular Cavalry.

The Maráthas numbered 50,000 with 100 guns. Wellesley took only 5,000 men into action, and had to leave his 17 guns behind at the river, where the draught bullocks were killed.

The 2nd Highland Light Infantry, from artillery fire at Assaye, had 11 officers killed and seven wounded out of 19, and nearly 400 casualties out of 560 men. They were charged in flank by Marátha Horse, but the survivors stood around the Colours. Then the 19th Hussars (Dragoons) rode home in a vigorous charge, and the 2nd Seaforth (78th) Highlanders, carrying the village of Assaye with the bayonet, by 6 P.M. had routed the enemy.

Wellesley, who several times personally led his troops into action, had two horses killed under him—one shot, the other by a pike.

The British had 1,900 casualties, the Marathas lost their guns and 1,200 men killed.

Delhi, 1803

While Wellesley was breaking the power of the Maráthas in the Dakhan, General Lake shattered it in Hindustan. Gerard Lake had advanced against Delhi. The fortress of Aligarh surrendered after 2,000 of the garrison had

The Battle of Laswari

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been slain. Delhi fell a week later, after an obstinate battle fought in sight of its minarets, in which 3,000 of the enemy were killed or wounded, and 68 of their guns taken; and within a month Agra, at that time the key of Upper India, was captured after 1,000 of the garrison had been slain. Agra, 1803

The fugitives from the three places concentrated at Laswari, where General Lake, at the head of three regiments of British Dragoons and five of Native Horse, arrived at sunrise on the morning of November 1st, 1803. Laswari, 1803


Notwithstanding that the Maráthas, over 14,000 strong, were advantageously posted, he determined to attack without waiting for his infantry, and rode at the enemy's position.

He broke through their first line, but it was at a heavy loss of life. Their guns had been chained together, one battery to another; and these impeded Lake's cavalry, who blundered on to the unseen obstacles, for the grass of the plain was high, and before they could recover their horses they were slaughtered in numbers.

Grape shot mowed down whole troops, as a sweeping storm of hail levels growing crops of grain to the earth. But notwithstanding this iron tempest, nothing could repress the ardour of our cavalry: having penetrated the enemy's line they immediately re-formed and charged backwards and forwards three times.

Nevertheless, in the face of this sustained resistance Lake retired, and waited for his infantry and guns to come up.

They arrived about noon, after a forced march of twenty-five miles, during which the sound of battle in front had quickened their footsteps and impelled them to extraordinary exer-



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ASSAYE.
SEPT. 23rd, 1803

Laswari,
1803

tions. The brigade consisted of one battalion of European and five Sipahi infantry with a few light guns, the greater part of their artillery having been unable to keep up with the Infantry. After a halt of two hours, which was utilised by the enemy to cut the bank of large water reservoir and thus improve his position by inundating parts of the Front, at 2 P.M. General Lake ordered a bayonet attack by the 76th (2nd West Riding) Regiment supported by two Native battalions and the British Cavalry, and by 4 P.M. had beaten his foes.

The gunners died at their guns, 74 of which were taken; 2,000 trained Infantry surrendered; the cavalry and remaining Infantry drew off after suffering great losses. The British loss was 840 killed and wounded. The General's horse was shot under him, and his son was severely wounded as he offered him his own, but Lake scarcely paused to look at him, and in the words of the Governor-General's dispatch, "appeared with matchless courage in every principal charge."

Great Britain owes the chief expansion of its empire over India to the victories of Assaye and Laswari, which broke down the power of the Maráthas; doubled our then existing possessions, and paved the way for future conquests.

PART X

THE PENINSULAR WAR

CHAPTER I

CAUSES AND ORIGIN

Napoleon's Plans for Invasion of England—Zenith of Napoleon—Decree of Berlin—England Seizes Danish Fleet—Position of Spain—The Continental Blockade—Troubles in Spain—Abdication of Charles I.—The French Invade Portugal—Military Situation in the Peninsula—King of Spain Deposed—Sir Arthur Wellesley Lands in Portugal—Marshal Junot.

WHEN the destruction of the allied French and Spanish fleets off Cape Trafalgar left Napoleon no hopes of immediately carrying out the invasion of England, he determined that in due course he would get the use of all the European navies and concentrate them for the transport of an irresistible force across the Channel.

**Napoleon's
Plans for
Invasion,
1803**

By June, 1807, Napoleon was at the zenith of his power. At home, he had established a despotic government; abroad, he was master of Western Europe, and at the Treaty of Tilsit he and Alexander settled their differences and respective shares in the future spoliation, and partition of their neighbouring States.

**Treaty of
Tilsit, 1807**

Already, by the Decree of Berlin (November 21st, 1806) the British Isles had been declared to be in a state of blockade, to which the English Cabinet had retaliated by somewhat similar Orders in Council (January 7th and November 1st, 1807); and when the march of the French troops towards Holstein indicated that Denmark would, willingly or unwillingly, have to place her fleet at the disposal of Napoleon and Alexander, it was seized by the English fleet, supported by 30,000 troops, and brought to England in October, 1807.

**Decree of
Berlin, 1806**

Before the Battle of Jena, 1806, the Spaniards had mobilised their troops, and offered assistance to Prussia. Godoy, the Spanish Prime Minister, issued a fantastic

**Napoleon's
Spanish
Plans, 1807**

proclamation, calling on his countrymen to rise against the Oppressor (without naming him, however); but three days later, on learning of the Prussian defeat, Godoy declared that the preparations for war were directed against Gibraltar. Napoleon apparently accepted the explanation, but that moment he decided to annex Spain at the first opportunity. Two months after the battle of Friedland, June 14th, 1807, he compelled Spain to join with him in coercing Portugal into declaring war upon England, and as a result of the subsequent events there, the engagements took place which marked the beginning of the Peninsular War.

**Continental
Blockade**

The Battle of Trafalgar, October 21st, 1805, having rendered Napoleon's project for the invasion of England impracticable, he organised a Continental blockade against his most persistent foe. While the Emperor in August, 1807, was insisting on Portugal's acceptance of the Continental system, he arranged with Spain a secret Treaty, signed at Fontainebleau, October, 1807, to partition Portugal's Colonies between the Allies.

**Invasion of
Portugal**

The Regent of Portugal, under much pressure from Napoleon, agreed to declare war against England, her ally for many years. He remonstrated, however, against the order to imprison English merchants, and to confiscate their property, as Napoleon had demanded. This gave the Emperor the excuse he desired, and he sent Marshal Junot to invade Portugal, the French troops crossing the Spanish frontier of the Bidassoa six days before the Fontainebleau Treaty was signed, the Spanish Government and people then welcoming and assisting the French troops.

The Portuguese Regent, now much alarmed, offered to do anything which Napoleon might order, but the Emperor took no notice of this submission, and ordered Junot to seize Lisbon as soon as possible.

Marshal Junot, urged on by the Emperor's imperious command, marched his unfortunate soldiers over desolate districts and trackless mountains between Almeida and Abrantes to Lisbon, where he arrived with less than 2,000 starving and disorganised infantry, and one battery. This was sufficient, however, to frighten the Regent, and he sailed for Rio de Janeiro, Portugal being garrisoned by

Britain's Intervention in Spain 255

French and Spanish troops, while England still hesitated as to the expediency of helping her old ally. No decision had been taken when Napoleon published his Decree in the *Moniteur*, "The House of Braganza has ceased to reign."

Junot took possession of Lisbon, and mulcted the citizens heavily, both officially and for his personal advantage, while Spain occupied Elvas and Oporto.

The King of Spain, Charles IV., and his son Ferdinand were quarrelling, and Charles implored Napoleon's aid against his son (November 30th). The French had occupied all the country north of the Ebro, and being in possession, on February 27th, 1808, they formally demanded its cession. Charles abdicated, and was succeeded on March 19th by Ferdinand VII.

Murat occupied Madrid with the Imperial Guard and Moncey's Corps, March 23rd, but did not recognise Ferdinand as King, who was cajoled by Napoleon into visiting him at Bayonne, April 20th, and after dining with the Emperor was followed out by Savary, who informed him that he was now deposed from his Throne! Ten days later Napoleon induced Ferdinand's father, Charles IV., his Queen, and her lover, Godoy, the Prime Minister, to come to Bayonne, and by May 10th all had given in to Napoleon's imperious demands, and his brother Joseph, King of Naples, was translated, and proclaimed "King of Spain and the Indies."

Insurrections at once broke out all over Spain, and deputations from the Juntas, or local governing bodies of provinces, arrived in London asking for aid. Money and arms were given freely. Sir John Moore was recalled from Sweden with 12,000 men, for service in Portugal; General Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Cork, and on July 30th landed in Mondego Bay, 100 miles north of Lisbon, with 9,000 men, where he was joined by General Spencer, who brought 3,000 men from Cadiz.

Arthur Wellesley, after nine years' successful service in India, had returned to England in 1805, sat in Parliament for Rye, 1806, and was Irish Secretary, 1807, when he was appointed to command the troops in Portugal. He was superseded before he achieved the results of his victory at Vimiera.

When the British Government at last decided to inter-

Junot in
Portugal,
1807

Napoleon
and the
Spanish
Kings,
1808

Britain's
Interven-
tion in
Spain, 1807

**Military
Situation,
1807**

vene in favour of Portugal and Spain, the military situation on the Iberian Peninsula was as follows: Spain had about 70,000 troops at home, but they were badly organised, officered, and equipped. Portugal had practically no Regular army, but her local Militia and Levies, when later trained and led by British officers, did excellent service. France had 600,000 men under arms, of which 80,000 were sent to Spain. They occupied the fortresses of Vittoria, Burgos, and Madrid. One Corps was marching from Madrid towards Cadiz, where there was a French squadron in the harbour, blockaded by a British fleet. The French soldiers were formidable, from the confidence inspired by continuous victories, and were generally well commanded. Saragossa and Valencia were still resisting all attacks, but Napoleon, satisfied with their progress, had left for Paris.

**Marshal
Junot,
1771-1813**

Junot, b. 1771, d. 1813, first came to the notice of Napoleon when acting as secretary to the future Emperor at Toulon. A shell burst close to them, covering the paper on which Junot was writing, who calmly observed "Nous n'avons pas besoin de sable pour secher l'encre, en voici." He did very good service at Millesimo (April 13th-14th, 1796), was wounded in the head at Lonato, August 3rd, 1796. At Austerlitz he showed again conspicuous courage.

Junot, besides the Spanish troops under his command, had 25,000 Frenchmen in Portugal. He held the fortresses of Lisbon, Almeida, Peniche, and Elvas, but the continuous insurrections, although suppressed with severity, had kept his troops continually on the alert.

CHAPTER II

THE CAMPAIGN IN PORTUGAL, 1808

Position at Rolica—Combat of Rolica—Retreat of Laborde—Junot Marches to Torres Vedras—Wellesley's Plans—Arrival of Sir Harry Burrard—Battle of Vimiera—Burrard Refuses to Allow Wellesley to Advance—Losses of Both Sides—The Convention of Cintra.

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY left Mondego Bay with **Rolica, 1808** 12,000 British and 2,000 Portuguese infantry, and some artillery, and on August 17th found General de Laborde, with 5,000 men and six guns, occupying isolated ground of moderate elevation near the village of Rolica, which closes in the valley three miles south of Obidos. Laborde wished to hold on to the mountains on his Right, in the hope of Loison joining him with 6,000 men. The British, on the other hand, wished to keep them separate, and to drive Laborde back before Loison could come up. Sir Arthur, therefore, made a Central attack, assisted by turning movements on both flanks, which his superior numbers made possible; but difficult ground and inaccurate leading caused the advantage of numbers to be lost, while the French retained the advantage of a very strong position.

Laborde, strongly attacked in front and flanks, retreated steadily by alternate fractions. At the village of Columbierra, where the ridge of hills widened out, and was protected by ravines on the flanks, he made another stand, but was finally forced into the mountains, ultimately reaching Torres Vedras. The British bivouacked at and round Zambugeiro. Laborde was wounded and lost 600 men and three guns; the British loss was 500.

The road towards Lisbon was now clear, and it was the intention of Wellesley to march for Torres Vedras, and so cut off Loison and Laborde from the capital; but in the night he heard of the arrival of a fleet off the coast with reinforcements, so, relinquishing the high road, he moved by one nearer the coast, so that he might cover their disembarkation. On August 19th he arrived at Vimiera, a

Vimiera,
1805

small village on the Maceira, nine miles from Torres Vedras, and three miles from Porto Novo at its mouth, where the troops disembarked on the 19th and 20th. The men were in high spirits, for pigtails having been discontinued, they were relieved from hair-tying, which was a grievous operation.

Junot, with Loison, marched from Lisbon to join Laborde at Torres Vedras, where he assembled a force of 14,000 men, including 1,800 cavalry under Margaron. Hearing that reinforcements for the British were off the coast, he desired to attack before they arrived. The British force now amounted to 17,000 men, and while Junot designed to march on the night of the 20th, in order to attack the British at daylight on the 21st, Wellesley intended to march at 5 A.M. on the 21st, round his flank, avoiding Torres Vedras and moving on Mafra, 13 miles nearer to Lisbon than is Torres Vedras. He would thus cut the French off from the capital. But at this juncture Sir Harry Burrard arrived off the port. Sir Arthur Wellesley waited on him, and explained his intentions, but they were disapproved. Sir Harry forbade any forward movement, intending to await the arrival of Sir John Moore, who was expected with reinforcements. Burrard decided to sleep in comfort on board one night more.

Near the village of Vimiera the little river Maceira breaks through a chain of hills, the southern portion of which runs from east to the sea above Porto Novo; the northern part runs almost parallel with the coast. In front of Vimiera is a low and isolated hill, which covers the opening in the chain of hills and the plain through which the Maceira runs. The bulk of the army was placed on the southern hill, which formed the right of the position, with advanced posts on the Mafra road. The lower hill in front was occupied by two brigades—Fane's on the Left and Anstruther's on the Right—with six guns. It was partly open and partly covered by vineyards and copses. The northern hill, forming the Left, was protected by a nearly impassable ravine in its front, and being without water, besides being out of the direct line of an enemy's attack, was occupied only by Trant's Portuguese and detachments of the 95th Rifles. The Commissariat stores were behind the hill, and here the 4 cavalry squadrons were posted.


The advance of Junot's army was reported during the night by a cavalry post three miles south of Vimiera. Fane's and Anstruther's infantry pickets were a mile in front of the village. Junot, who had marched all night to attack at daylight, but had been delayed by rough tracks, halted four miles off for the troops to breakfast, and it was nearly 10 A.M. when the French cavalry, under General Margaron, crowned the hill eastwards of the English position.

Junot intended that Laborde and Brennier should attack simultaneously, the former the British Centre, and Brennier against the Left. The ground to the north of Vimiera, however, had not been reconnoitred, and Brennier came on a ravine which was reported to be impassable. He therefore moved northwards, going nearly to Praganza, then turned westwards, and came into action only at the end of the battle.

When Wellington perceived that the heads of a portion of the French columns were moving northwards past the isolated hill which stands immediately to the south of Vimiera, he occupied the hill to the north of it. General Hill's two brigades then stood alone on the hill south of the village.

Colonel Anstruther put the 50th (1st Royal West Kent Regiment), and the 95th in line in a dip of ground which hid them from the view of their assailants until they came to within one hundred yards. Colonel Fane had most of the 95th (Rifle Brigade) at the foot of the hill in a thick line of skirmishers, and the remainder were on top, stand-

Vimiera,
1808



PLAN OF THE COMBAT OF ROLICA, AUG. 17th, 1808

Vimiera,
1808

ing with the 50th. In the valley behind Vimiera were two squadrons of the 20th Light Dragoons, 240 strong, and 260 Portuguese cavalry.

When Junot perceived the movement of the English troops to the north he became apprehensive for the safety of General Brennier's brigade, 4,500 strong. It was two miles away to the northward and eastward, and breaking up his other division, Junot sent General Solignac with 4,000 men to support Brennier. Thus at the opening of the action Generals Laborde and Loison had each but one brigade.

The French attack was made in battalion columns following closely on a thick line of skirmishers, eight guns moving up with the column, and in close support. On arriving on the summit of the hill it was received by the missiles of six guns and the fire of two battalions in line. The 97th (2nd Royal West Kent) charged the Front, and the 52nd (2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry), changing Front to the Left, caught the columns in flank with a volley fired at ten paces' distance. Almost immediately afterwards the 1st Royal West Kent and Rifle Brigade of Fane's brigade charged Thomière's men, who had then gained the crest of the hill. Smitten by a terrible fire at close range, both French brigades broke and fled down the hill, leaving seven guns behind them, nor could they be rallied while within musket range.

Junot then sent forward St. Clair's brigade of Grenadiers. Before it got fairly up to the top of the hill it was smitten by the fire of a battery and four battalions, and, giving way, carried back the supporting troops, who had not recovered from their first defeat.

Junot now sent in his last infantry Reserve, consisting of four battalions of Grenadiers, 3,000 strong. The Grenadiers moved up the Torres Vedras-Vimiera road which, east of the village, runs in a hollow. The 43rd occupied a cemetery and chapel which commanded the road, and from the walls of which they fired with deadly effect on the left flank of the Grenadiers. General Acland, who was to the north-east of Vimiera, moving southwards to the hill overlooking the road, attacked the Grenadiers' right flank with skirmishers and two guns, at the same time that the 43rd was firing into their left flank.

The Battle of Vimiera


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Kellermann's Grenadiers could not advance under these circumstances; but they held their ground for some time, until the 43rd closed in on them at the east end of the village. Volleys were exchanged so close as to burn the men's clothes, and there was furious hand to hand fighting with the bayonet by detached parties on both sides, until the Grenadiers gave way.

As Kellermann's men fell back, covered by a regiment of Dragoons, Sir Arthur Wellesley ordered out the four squadrons of English and Portuguese dragoons. They rode forward, the 20th Light Dragoons in the Centre, and the Portuguese on the flanks. On coming under fire the Portuguese halted, and retreated to their original position. The 20th galloped over the French Dragoons, and sabred many of Kellermann's infantry. They took several prisoners, and eventually reached the hill on which Junot was standing. Here their gallant career was arrested by a high stone wall, and they were there charged by two Dragoon regiments, losing their Colonel and 55 men. They then returned much elated to Vimiera.

We now turn to the movements of Brennier's and Solignac's brigades. When Brennier was a mile and a half north-east of Vimiera, considering the ground impassable, he turned eastwards, and marched by the hamlet

Vimiera,
1808



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF VIMIERA, AUG. 21st, 1808

Vimiera,
1808

of Carraquiera—which is three miles north-east of Vimiera—to Praganza, passing out of sight of the British troops.

When Solignac came to the ravine which had stopped Brennier's advance, instead of following him to the eastward, he moved northwards, and having turned the head of the ravine about half a mile south of Ventosa farm, sent forward his regiments in column, covered by clouds of skirmishers, up the sloping ground in a north-westerly direction. As the French skirmishers, with their columns close behind them, breasted the hill, four British battalions, with three battalions in support behind, closed up and poured in a volley at one hundred yards' distance, crushing the French skirmishers and shaking their supporting columns. Then the British line, having reloaded, advanced in silence—some 3,000 fixed bayonets, two deep, and overlapping Solignac's brigade. The Frenchmen were shouting, individuals were firing, while all the officers in front were trying to deploy the battalions. The best troops in the world in these circumstances would have lost formation, and in a few minutes Solignac's whole brigade fled along the crest of the hill in a north-easterly direction, carrying off, however, their General, who was severely wounded, but leaving behind many prisoners and three guns which they had dragged up the hill.

Shortly after Solignac's defeat General Brennier's brigade appeared on a height to the northward at a moment when the 36th (2nd Worcestershire) and 40th (1st South Lancashire) Regiments were pursuing Solignac's fugitives. The 71st (1st Highland Light Infantry) and 82nd (2nd South Lancashire) were re-forming in a hollow near the abandoned guns. Brennier sent two squadrons of Dragoons and four battalions down the hill, and scattered the 71st and 82nd, retaking the guns; but the 29th (1st Worcestershire) came up in support, and the 71st and 82nd rallying immediately, the three battalions attacked Brennier's four battalions and drove them up the hill from which they had descended, recapturing the three guns of Solignac's brigade, and three more which had accompanied Brennier, who, severely wounded, was now taken prisoner.


Thus in less than three hours Junot's troops had been beaten; though three brigades had not been engaged. At this time Fergusson, with the 36th and 40th, had got 1,800

of Solignac's broken brigade in a hollow, whence they must have been shot down or captured but for an order to halt which was received from General Sir Harry Burrard. Vimiera, 1808

When Sir Harry came on the field Junot had lost all his guns, and the remnants of his force had been driven off the Vimiera-Torres Vedras road in a northerly direction, retreating in great confusion in a mountainous country. Sir Arthur Wellesley pointed out that he had four brigades which had not been engaged, that every soldier carried a day's rations, that he had in his camp twelve days' supply, and reserve ammunition, and urged that by a march down the Torres Vedras road he must forestall Junot's fugitive troops. Nothing, however, would induce Sir Harry Burrard to allow of any movement to the front, and Sir Arthur, turning away, said sadly to his Staff, "There is nothing left for us to do, gentlemen, but to shoot red-legged partridges!"

The British losses were 720, all ranks. Junot lost 1,800 men, the last of his straggling fugitives joining him at Torres Vedras next day. Generals Charlot, Solignac, and Brennier were all severely wounded. Shrapnel shell which had been recently introduced into the British service was used with great effect in this action.

The day after Sir Harry Burrard stopped Sir Arthur Wellesley at the moment of victory, Burrard himself was superseded by the arrival of Sir Hew Dalrymple, who concurred with his cautious junior that no risks should be run. A convention, known as the Convention of Cintra, was made a few days later, under which Junot's defeated army was conveyed back to France by the British fleet.



CHAPTER III

TOPOGRAPHY OF THE PENINSULA

The Cintra Ridge—The Centre of Spain—Madrid—The Rivers and Mountains
—The French Strategical Position—The Spaniards Harass the French—
England's Militia Establishment—Wellesley Superseded—Wellesley's
Methods.

THERE is no difficulty in understanding the three weeks' campaign of August, 1808, which ended with Sir Arthur Wellesley's victory over Junot at Vimiera, for the British troops were scarcely out of sight of the Atlantic, the engagements at Rolica and Vimiera being fought on under-features of the Cintra ridge, which is a prolongation of the Sierra Estrella mountains. This last-named ridge runs from Almeida on the north in a south-westerly direction, and its prolongation under the term, the Cintra range, meets the sea to the west of Lisbon. The Cintra Ridge

It is, however, impossible to understand the movements of the British troops, or the narratives of battles, unless the reader has some idea of the mountain, and the river systems of the Peninsula. The Centre of Spain

The centre of Spain may be described as a mountainous promontory interspersed by fertile plains near the Atlantic, and Mediterranean seas. In the interior stands Madrid, the capital, 2,000 feet above the sea, and nearly equidistant from the Bay of Biscay, the Mediterranean, and the Atlantic. The city is built on a plain, studded with sandy hills. It stands amidst lofty ridges with intervening arid deserts. This rugged tableland is crowned by sierras, i.e. serrated chains of mountains, with huge fallen masses of rocks, which half fill up yawning fissures, making deep and narrow defiles, where 300 men might arrest the advance of an army. There are isolated, walled towns, few roads, and large rivers, which are seldom bridged, and can be crossed only by dangerous fords.

Most of the great rivers run outward from the centre of the country, and, speaking in general terms, flowing to the

**The
Rivers and
Mountains**

east, south-east, and west, are fed by affluents which cut their way down deep and steep ravines. Except on the few main lines of communication, the so-called roads are merely tracks. The long ridges of mountains isolate the provinces, the populations of which have never amalgamated, as has been the case in all other European countries.

The principal mountains are as follows: The Maritime Pyrenees, which run from Cape Finisterre on the Atlantic, approximately 370 miles, in a nearly straight line eastward to Roncesvalles, South of Bayonne. At Roncesvalles the mountain chain, there called the Continental, Eastern, or French Pyrenees, trends in a south-easterly direction 270 miles to Figueras on the Mediterranean. From Figueras a chain runs 270 miles in a south-westerly direction to about half-way between Tortosa, and Valencia.

From the Maritime Pyrenees, near Reynosa, the source of the Ebro river, a mountain chain runs nearly parallel with the river 450 miles in a south-easterly direction towards the Mediterranean, until the chain midway between Tortosa and Valencia joins the above-mentioned system of mountains which extends in a south-westerly direction from Figueras.

From the Reynosa-Tortosa chain, and about midway in its system, another ridge of mountains runs in a south-westerly direction, passing to the north of Madrid, from which city a road traverses the mountain chain, and leads towards Burgos. The portion of the chain to the east of the road is known as the Somosierra, and that to the west of it, as the Sierra Guadarama. Over this latter chain of mountains the Madrid-El Escorial road is carried through a pass to Valladolid.

Still farther to the west, the mountains under different names extend to near Coimbra, in Portugal, and then spreading out in several ridges run in a south-westerly direction, being called the Sierra Estrella, and Cintra range, to the Atlantic west of Lisbon.

From the western part of the Maritime Pyrenees, that is from Galicia and the Asturias, spurs run from north-east to south-west, towards the Douro river, near Oporto.

The Douro rises 100 miles north-east of Madrid, passing on the northern side of the Somosierra, and then runs west-

wards to the Atlantic at Oporto; and the Tagus rising about the same distance to the east of the capital runs in a generally western course till it reaches the Atlantic at Lisbon.

**The French
Strategical
Position**

There were practically only two roads available for the French lines of communication, that by Bayonne on the northern extremity of the French Pyrenees, and the other by Perpignan near the Mediterranean, with the former of which only we are concerned. It is well to bear in mind that the mean breadth of the Pyrenees is about 70 miles.

The French Commander-in-Chief had the great advantage of his central elevated position on the plateau of Spain, which has been compared with a soup plate upside down, but as his columns descended the river basins towards the coast they were necessarily separated by intervening roadless mountain chains.

When the Spaniards fully realised the treacherous iniquity of Napoleon they rose in insurrection, and though they were generally defeated in battle, they greatly impeded the enemy in all operations by waylaying aides-de-camp and couriers and so keeping the French generals in ignorance of the British and Spanish movements. As the line of communication to Bayonne passed over several mountain ranges, "it required many men to guard it against the hostile Spanish population."

The British Government, having been relieved from all anxiety of invasion by Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar, October, 1805, were enabled to use the troops which had been stationed for three or four years along the southern and eastern coasts in readiness to repel invaders.

The embodied Militia of 120,000 was allowed to give 50,000 volunteers annually to the Army, and this carried England through a war lasting six years, 42,000 having joined in the first year of the operation of the Act. The Militia establishment, moreover, was then sustained by enforced ballot. Lord Castlereagh had in all collected about 40,000 men in regiments for an overseas expedition, but England had no organised army. The first 18,000 infantry landed in Portugal were accompanied by only 400 cavalry, the artillery, and a small Train were without horses. There were no Engineers and none of the necessary Auxiliary departments now known as Supply, Ordnance, and Transport Corps.

**England's
Militia
Establishment**

**Sir Arthur
Wellesley
Superseded**

Sir Arthur Wellesley in public and military opinion stood next to Sir John Moore, but the Commander-in-Chief in London and those about him preferred generals without war experience, and after Wellesley had gained his brilliant victory of Vimiera he was superseded by two senior officers, who evinced great want of enterprise.

Although the Commander-in-Chief and Ministry sent out no Departmental Staff, horses for cavalry, or wagons with animals to draw them, they sent abundant generals, six being appointed to command 15 battalions!

England having command of the sea, was able to choose the place of disembarkation, but the numbers available, 9,000 from Cork, 5,000 from Cadiz, and 12,000 from Sweden, were insufficient, if landed in the Bay of Biscay, to meet the French with a fair chance of success.

Wellesley was the first general to conceal troops in folds of ground, or on the reverse slope of hills, until the last moment and then to meet the enemy's columns by the fire of deployed lines. The determined resolution of the British troops enabled them to crush all the serried masses they encountered; it was the front companies only of the French which could use their muskets, and they were smitten to the ground by the line opposing them face to face, generally within 60 yards, while the unscathed flanks of the line wheeling inwards poured a leaden hail on the flanks and rear of the dense columns, which were soon decimated: hampered by the dead and dying they withered away in consternation and confusion, and seldom awaited the charge of bayonets they saw impending, after the last destructive volleys had been poured in, when the combatants were near enough to see the whites of their opponents' eyes.

CHAPTER IV

THE CORUNNA CAMPAIGN

Anger in England at Convention of Cintra—Sir John Moore—Transport Difficulties—General Sir David Baird is Delayed—Moore Advances to Salamanca—The Retreat to Corunna—Napoleon in Pursuit—Lord Paget's Demonstration against Soult—Indiscipline of Moore's Troops—A Terrible March—Oman's Criticism of Moore—A Defence of Moore—The Battle of Corunna—The Death of Moore.

WHEN the terms of the Convention of Cintra became known in England there was a violent outcry against the British Generals who had signed it. Effigies of Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley were hung in the streets of towns.

Anger in
England at
Convention
of Cintra

Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard were recalled to London to appear before a Court of Inquiry, and Sir John Moore, who had landed soon after Wellesley's victory, was left in command of the troops in Portugal.

Sir John Moore (1761-1809), the only British General who had ever won lasting fame by conducting a retreat, was the most cultivated soldier of his epoch. He joined the 51st (Yorkshire Light Infantry) in 1777; was Member of Parliament for a pocket borough at 23 years of age, and became a Lieutenant-Colonel in 1790, when he resigned his seat in Parliament. He distinguished himself in Corsica, in the West Indies, and in Egypt, where he was severely wounded, but he is best known in the Army for the system which he adopted in training infantry when in command of the camp at Shorncliffe, where he laid the foundation of our series of successes during the six years of the Peninsular War. He had great difficulty in overcoming the prejudices of the senior officers of the Army, who clung at that time, and for at least three generations afterwards, to the spirit and drill formations of Frederick the Great.

Sir John
Moore,
1761-1809

Moore's influence on our Army can scarcely be overstated, and it is remarkable that without exception the men who rose to eminence under Wellington's command all acknowledged Moore as their instructor, and example.

Moore's
Command
in Portugal,
1808

When he assumed command of the troops in Portugal there were two brigades on the frontier, at Almeida and Elvas, the rest of the regiments being cantoned around Lisbon. Sir Hew Dalrymple had reported to Lord Castlereagh, September 27th, 1808, "The army is in high order, and fit to move when required." The General seems to have been singularly inapt, for there was no army, neither was there any Divisional, Brigade or Regimental transport. The troops had hired country wagons in order to move their baggage from Mondego Bay to Lisbon. There were a few Royal Wagon Train men, but only sufficient to take care of the equipment, comprised under our present expression Ordnance Stores, and the wagons which they brought to Portugal, being too heavy for the country tracks, were at once necessarily replaced by Portuguese carts.

The Cabinet sent ample food supplies from England, but no Transport, instructing Sir John Moore that he was to render his troops mobile by the purchase of horses and mules from all parts of Spain. No money was, however, sent, and this naturally greatly impeded Moore's efforts to mobilise the regiments. Carts, oxen, and mules were now hired, but with great difficulty. The few Treasury clerks acting as Commissariat officers who were available did not speak Portuguese, or Spanish, and had no subordinate Staff.

The married families had accompanied their regiments to Portugal, and although Sir John Moore offered them passages to England, he did not insist on their embarkation, nor did he prevent their marching with their regiments into Spain, a cruel kindness fraught with indescribable misery and loss of life three months later during the retreat from Benavente to Corunna.

According to the instructions received October 6th, the General was to be furnished with 5,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry, with which he was to co-operate with the Spanish army for the expulsion of the French from the Peninsula.

The Spanish armies were on the Ebro river, and thus formed a screen 200 miles in front of Valladolid, which lessened the risk of concentrating the Lisbon and Corunna wings of the British army. The point of assembly was 250 miles from their bases.

General Sir David Baird arrived at Corunna, October 13th, with 10,000 troops, but the Galicia Junta objected

to their being landed, suggesting that they should disembark at Gijon, or St. Ander in the Asturias. The Junta gave no thought of the danger from the proximity to the French forces in the Asturias, their sole object being to avoid having to furnish supplies and transport.

Baird at
Corunna,
1808

Sir David Baird could not force a landing in face of the objection of our Allies, and ten days were lost while the question was being referred to the Supreme Junta at Seville. When permission was received for the disembarkation, the General borrowed £25,000 from the Local Government, but there were not sufficient mules and draught oxen in Galicia to meet the demand, even at extravagant prices. Eventually when supplied with funds Baird was obliged to march his troops by detachments, and with light baggage only, in most cases by carts hired for stages from town to town, hoping to complete his troops with transport in the Plains of Leon.

In consequence of this delay Baird did not reach Astorga till November 22nd, and then with three brigades only, and some batteries, the Cavalry Brigade, consisting of the 7th, 10th and 15th Hussars, and the remainder of the infantry being at that date upon the road between Astorga and Lugo.

Baird at
Astorga

Baird now heard of the defeat ten days earlier of the Spanish armies under General Blake at Espinosa, north of Burgos, and at Gamon: east of that fortress; he heard also that Marshal Soult was at Reynosa, and Lefebvre at Carrion. Even if properly equipped with Transport, and he had none of his own, it would have been impossible for him to march to Salamanca across Lefebvre's front without Mounted troops. He therefore reported to Sir John Moore, who had, however, simultaneously heard of the defeats of the Spanish armies, and was preparing to retreat to Corunna if the French army should move westward.

Defeat of
Spaniards at
Espinosa

Napoleon had, however, no information about the British Army, and ordered Soult southward to Carrion and Sahagun, and Lefebvre to Madrid. The Emperor's ignorance of the position of the British troops was as fortunate for Moore's force as it was for Sir David Baird's detached Corps. Their concentration if the French armies had advanced would have been impossible, and they must have retreated as they had advanced, that is to Corunna and Lisbon.

The British
Position

Moore's difficulties were increased by the stupidity of

The
Advance to
Salamanca,
1808

the Supreme Junta in refusing to put their generals into direct communication with him. Mr. Frere, the new Minister, continually urged Moore to advance at all risks, not indeed on Madrid, but towards the remnants of Blake's army, accompanying his demands with statements concerning the condition of the Spanish armies which were obviously grossly inaccurate.

The General's plan to advance to Salamanca had been made on inaccurate statements: (a) That his concentration of the Corunna and Lisbon columns would be covered by large Spanish armies; (b) That he would be received by an enthusiastic population and their rulers, who would provide supplies and transport.

In the result:

(a) When the wings of Moore's force were at Astorga, 120 miles north-north-west of Salamanca, and at El Escorial, 90 miles south-south-east of his Head-quarters, he had no Spanish armies in front of him, but merely fugitives flying after the disastrous routs at Espinosa and Gamonal, inflicted by Soult and Victor ten days earlier.

(b) The General could get neither supplies nor transport, and the Spanish people were at that moment profoundly apathetic.

Moore, nevertheless, in spite of the adverse circumstances of his position, determined to try by an advance to take Napoleon's pressure off the Spaniards, and on November 28th issued orders for a march forward on the following day. He learnt, however, December 9th, that the garrison had capitulated the day after its chiefs had urged Moore to make a diversion in its favour. The General then sent his sick and his heavy baggage back to Lisbon, and moved to Sahagun, December 22nd.

Sir John Moore was personally at Alaejos, December 13th, where he received an intercepted dispatch from Marshal Berthier, Napoleon's Chief of the Staff, addressed to Marshal Soult, which had been taken from the body of a French Staff officer, who was murdered by Spanish peasants near Segovia. The dispatch showed clearly the Emperor's intentions, and it stated that the last news of the English rear-guard showed it to be at Salamanca and El Escorial, retreating to Lisbon. The "Grand Army," headed by Lefebvre's corps, was moving from Talavera to

Paget's Rear-guard at Sahagun 273

Badajoz. Bessières was chasing Castaños to the southward on the Valencia road, and Mortier's and Junot's corps had reached Spain.

The
Retreat
to Corunna,
1808-9

Moore at once determined to fall on Marshal Soult, who had no supports nearer to him than the Corps of Junot, who was marching from the frontier to Burgos. The heads of the British columns which had been marching eastwards were turned northwards, crossing the Douro, with the cavalry acting as a screen to the eastward, at Tordesillas, the infantry at Toro and Zamora.

The Salamanca and Corunna columns concentrated at Mayorga, December 20th. Soult had not received any duplicate of the intercepted dispatch and was still at Saldana and Carrion, his front being covered by Debelle's Light Cavalry brigade, with its head-quarters at Sahagun.

General Lord Paget, with the 10th and 15th Hussars, surprised one of Debelle's pickets on the high road near Sahagun at daylight on December 21st, only one man escaping to give the alarm. Paget sent the 10th Hussars into the town and with the 15th galloped round it. He surprised the 8th Dragoons and 1st Chasseurs forming up in a vineyard outside the Eastern suburb. Paget rode headlong into the French as they were "changing front." He upset both regiments, killing 20 men, wounding a great number, and capturing 11 officers and 150 of other ranks.

Sahagun

The leading battalions of British Infantry reached Sahagun that evening. Moore halted December 22nd to allow the rear to close up. Marshal Soult, realising from the way Debelle's brigade had been crushed that Moore must be near at hand, brought his Right column of infantry from Saldana to Carrion, and sent orders to Burgos and Palencia for all supports to hasten to his assistance. His direct line with Madrid by Valladolid being now cut he could communicate only with the Emperor by the circuitous route of Burgos.

Sir John Moore had issued orders for the troops to advance in order to attack Soult, who had 8,000 men and a battery, 18 miles north-west of Sahagun, December 22nd. The report of his position was received at 8 P.M., but after they had marched Romana reported that he had been advised by a friend living near Madrid that all the French armies except a small garrison had left the capital, and were moving in a north-westerly direction.

The
Retreat to
Corunna,
1808-9

When Sir John Moore heard this news his leading brigade had already marched off in an easterly direction to attack Soult at Carrion, tramping over frozen snow, but it was now recalled to its previous bivouac. The troops were bitterly disappointed, and Moore has been criticised for not fighting Marshal Soult, and then afterwards falling back; but so far as we have read no soldiers of repute have endorsed this criticism, and the best known military writers of recent days have scouted the suggestion.

The Emperor had heard, December 19th, that English troops were moving eastwards in Old Castile, but he received only 48 hours later full information of Moore's advance.

That General wrote in his diary, Sahagun, December 24th: "To draw off the enemy's attention from the Spanish armies in the south I have risked infinitely too much." His success is shown clearly by Napoleon's orders issued on December 21st, wherein the subjugation of Spain was abandoned for a time. The Emperor marched his troops to crush Moore with such relentless vigour that some of his soldiers, unable to keep in the ranks, committed suicide to avoid falling into the hands of the Spanish peasantry. As Napoleon said later of the immediate result of Moore's advance, "it was the only move which could have checked the victorious southward progress of the French Army." Ultimately "it was the spirit and example of Moore which made possible the victories of Wellington."

Sir John Moore's difficulties of transport were very great, for many of the drivers of the hired vehicles deserted the moment that the columns turned towards the coast, preferring the certain loss of their property to the risk of being killed. The strategical and tactical skill of the British General may be to some extent realised when we reflect that with 30,000 troops he upset all Napoleon's plans for the strategical employment of 300,000.

Moore commenced his retreat on Christmas Day, moving off his troops by successive brigades, so as to utilise the few houses on the road for shelter for his men in the inclement weather, and arrived at Benavente on December 26th, leaving that town on December 29th. He transferred all the stores for which he had transport to Astorga, moving those at Astorga by local carts to Villafranca.

Napoleon in Pursuit of Moore 275

When the Emperor left Madrid on December 22nd the weather was fine, but just as he overtook the Imperial Guard at the foot of the Guadarama Mountains, the whole column had been stopped by a terrible blizzard from the north which had made deep snowdrifts in large heaps. Batteries and train were stuck in the pass, and further progress seemed to be impossible. The Emperor, dismounting his cavalry, ordered them to lead their horses. He set to work every available pioneer to cut tracks in the snow, and then put on the Guard to trample it down. He carried his point, but only with the loss of several men who died from exposure and over-exertion.

The gale blowing in the faces of the troops obliged the Emperor to dismount, but he struggled forward on foot, until half-way up the mountain he could go no farther unassisted, when he linked either arm in those of Marshals Duroc and Lannes. The three leaders being overcome by fatigue from marching through the snow in jack-boots, then rode astride of the guns, and in that manner reached the top of the pass. When the army got into the plain of Leon the Emperor pressed on his troops without pity, insisting on their trying to accomplish on a short winter's day 30 miles in deep snow, but nevertheless, on reaching Benavente Napoleon learnt that the British troops were already across the Eslla.

When Sir John Moore ordered his infantry to retreat towards Corunna he sent Lord Paget with five cavalry regiments to demonstrate against Marshal Soult, who was thus kept inactive, anticipating an attack until December 26th. The French Marshal then sent Lorge's Dragoons towards Mayorga, marching himself with the infantry and Franceschi's Cavalry Division by Mansilla on Astorga.

Napoleon's columns were now approaching, and on December 27th Marshal Ney's advanced brigade, and Lahoussaye's Dragoons, numbering 2,400 sabres, strove to push back Lord Paget's five cavalry regiments who were covering the retreat on a frontage of 30 miles. How well these five regiments were handled, and with what determination they fought, is shown by the Emperor's estimate of their numbers, which he calculated to be between four and five thousand sabres. The 18th Light Dragoons (now Hussars) charged six times, December 26th, each time riding over opposing squadrons, and thereby securing further un-

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Paget's
Rear-guard

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molested retirement. One troop of 38 sabres, near Valencia de Don Juan, charging a squadron of 105 men, killed 12, and captured and carried off 20 Dragoons. As Sir John Moore noted, December 28th, "they obtained an ascendancy over the French."

Mayorga

The 10th Hussars, after holding back General Lorge's Dragoons, December 27th, near Mayorga, were retiring when they found one of Ney's Light Cavalry regiments drawn up behind them on rising ground. Without hesitation the 10th charged up the hill, and though the soil was deep in the slush of half-melted snow, they rode over the French cavalry regiment, and retired to a safe position, carrying off with them 100 prisoners. All the five cavalry regiments had plenty of hand to hand fighting December 26th and 27th. In twelve days' operations from Salamanca out they captured 500 prisoners, suffering themselves comparatively but little loss.

Benavente

The divisions of General Hope and Fraser moving by the main road, and that of Baird marching by cross-roads, reached Astorga on December 29th unmolested, while the Rear-guard Division under General Lord Edward Paget, and cavalry under Lord Paget, held back the enemy until the infantry had left Benavente, when the cavalry crossed to the western bank of the river.

General Lefebvre-Desnouettes spent some time in searching for a ford, for Lord Paget had blown up the bridge. The General having found one near the ruined structure and seeing apparently only pickets, for the supports were in Benavente, he forded the river with four squadrons of the Cavalry of the Guard, numbering from five to six hundred sabres. The pickets found by the 18th Light Dragoons (Hussars) galloped in from the north and south flanks, and when about 130 sabres had assembled, Colonel Otway charged with them but was beaten back. They rallied on a troop, 3rd King's German Legion under Major Burgwedel, and then charging once more rode through the French leading squadron, and again retired. Brigadier-General C. Stewart withdrew the squadron towards the 10th Hussars, which Lord Paget had formed up behind the eastern suburb of Benavente.

When Lefebvre's leading squadrons were close up to the town the 10th Hussars and those squadrons of the 18th, which had already been engaged under Otway, charged, and

routing the Frenchmen after a hard fight, pursued them for two miles down to the ford, where Private Grisdale made Marshal Lefebvre a prisoner. The 10th captured 70 wounded prisoners, killing or wounding 55 Frenchmen who were left on the ground, the British casualties being 50. Captain Downman's Horse Battery now galloped up from Benavente, and dispersed the rest of the Cavalry of the Guard, who were about to cross the ford.

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The Emperor, who was on the east bank of the Esla during these brilliant encounters between Lefebvre's and Paget's horsemen, wrote to King Joseph, his brother: "Lefebvre's affair was disgusting." Napoleon had previously from Benavente instructed his brother: "Put in your newspapers that 36,000 English are surrounded. Soult is in their front, I am in their rear, and you may expect to hear of great events." The Emperor also ordered Joseph to publish accounts in the newspapers of outrages committed by the British troops at Leon, but no British soldier had ever been within thirty miles of that town.

Marshal Soult having overwhelmed Romana's Spanish troops at Mansilla, had occupied Leon, December 31st. Napoleon reached La Baneza the same day, his infantry occupying Astorga on January 1st, 1809, 36 hours after Moore's main body had evacuated it. Napoleon had pledged himself publicly to overthrow and crush Moore; to make his appearance in France without having fulfilled that pledge would be, as he clearly saw, an admission of defeat. Now, political consideration forbade the Emperor to lay himself open to such a charge. By leaving the direction of the pursuit in other hands, he hoped to be able to create the impression that it was the fact of his recall which had saved the British from disaster.

Hence a dramatic scene enacted on January 1st. At Astorga a courier, riding at speed, overtook the pursuing army, and, before the eyes of the troops, handed dispatches to the Emperor.

These dispatches Napoleon read. Then he gave orders for the return of the Guards, and caused the rumour to be spread abroad that intrigues in Paris, and the threat of an Austrian war necessitated his immediate presence in France. The Emperor handed over the pursuit of the English to Marshal Soult and returned to Paris.

**The
Retreat to
Corunna,
1808-9:
Indiscipline
Amongst
the Troops**

At Betanzos, Lugo, and even at Villafranca there were large depots of supplies but no means of transporting them to meet the retreating columns, and thus at Astorga there was but little food for the soldiers, but unfortunately there were vast quantities of rum; there were also stores of muskets, ammunition, and entrenching tools, boots, wagons, and carts, the draught animals of which had died, and in the town was stored the heavy baggage of Baird's division. There must inevitably have been much confusion under the circumstances even with effective Commissariat and Ordnance establishments, which in those days did not exist. Thus much valuable property was necessarily abandoned, and also 400 invalids, who, being too ill to be carried on in open carts, fell with all the stores into the hands of the enemy.

Both at Astorga and especially at Bembibre and down to near Corunna there were many scenes of indiscipline amongst the infantry, both officers and men in that branch being irritated by continual retreats, and, except those in the rear Division, without the satisfaction of fighting. The division commanded by Moore's friend, Lord Edward Paget, alongside whom he generally rode throughout the Retreat, was called the reserve. Its officers and men were probably encouraged by the presence of two determined generals riding with them, but it is remarkable that, although they had had all the fighting that was done on the Retreat, their casualties were but a fraction of those battalions which never fired a shot.

In the other divisions men often robbed the inhabitants, and pillaged stores which they knew must be abandoned. Many soldiers who broke into the stores of rum, stupefied with drink, were left behind, some being indeed saved by the cavalry Rear-guard, who hustled them on to their feet. Many of these drunkards were overtaken by Lahoussaye's Dragoons, and cut down while still incapable of raising a hand in self-defence. The enemy's cavalry never, however, ventured to close on Lord Edward Paget's division.

At Villafranca there were similar scenes of indiscipline and consequent suffering and loss of life. The number of men who quitted the ranks was in direct proportion to the discipline of the regiments. The 43rd (1st Oxfordshire and Bucks) and 95th (Rifle Brigade) throughout the Retreat lost

less than 100 men each, whilst other battalions in the same brigade lost nearly four times that number of stragglers. Perhaps the most remarkable instance of the effect of discipline in saving life is given by the Record of two battalions of Guards. Some 350 were away on detachment, but the battalions went into action at Corunna after marching from Mayorga 1,600 strong, and the total loss from England out and home from all causes was rather less than 6 per centum.

Lord Edward Paget's, the Rear, division between Villafraanca and Nogales, 18 miles, passed through a continuous trail of abandoned equipment and dead horses, the cavalry shooting every horse which could not carry its rider. Sir John Moore, January 5th, marched the troops for 36 hours, and with fatal results. Now it was not only the faint-hearted who fell out of the ranks but good soldiers who, short of food and sleep and numbed with cold, succumbed. An eyewitness, standing on Monte Cebrero, describes the painful scene, as, looking down from the highest point of the hills, he saw the army winding along the road. The oxen pulling the wagons loaded with sick and wounded in many cases died in their yokes, and the soldiers in the wagons necessarily perished. The track was dotted for miles with dead and dying men and women, who had struggled on till they fell unable to rise again. In some cases on the women's breasts their babies, still alive, were seen trying to draw sustenance from the corpse.

The conduct of some of the French soldiers was deplorable; according to one of their own writers, several young English women fell a prey to the French cavalry advanced corps, and were put up to auction.

Professor Oman, the learned historian of the best account of the Peninsular War which has been published, alleges that Moore missed an opportunity of crushing Soult on December 23rd, stating that if he had marched on Carrion in the afternoon of the 22nd he would have caught Soult at a disadvantage at dawn of the 23rd. This criticism appears to me to be unfounded, but to appreciate fully the difficulties of the movement of troops with impressed or hired transport, it is necessary to have had some personal experience with such means of conveying the supplies and baggage of an army.

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The
Retreat to
Corunna,
1808-9

Moore reached Sahagun late on December 21st, after a march of 18 miles from Mayorga; the distance from Sahagun to Carrion is about 30 miles. The ground was covered with snow, and even on fair roads in dry weather oxen cannot be expected to make more than two miles an hour during the time they are actually travelling. As Soult had been warned by the overthrow of his cavalry of an impending attack, he would naturally have fallen back on his supports, which would have given time for the advance of Napoleon.

Defence of
Moore's
Strategy

The distance and local river systems, moreover, would have been an insuperable objection to an attempt to fight Soult at Carrion, December 23rd. Six miles north of the town the Carrion river divides into four branches. The town stands on the left or eastern bank of the eastern branch, four miles away from the main river, which is the most westerly of the four. To reach Carrion from Sahagun Moore's wagons must have crossed the Valderaduez river, just east of Sahagun, then have marched north-north-east to within five miles of Saldanha, and after crossing the Carrion river have moved down the left bank, covering at least 30 miles. The sun rose about 8 A.M. and set at 4 P.M.

This defence of Sir John Moore's strategy is irrespective of the question of the impending danger, by Napoleon's advance from Madrid, the news of which determined Moore's retreat on Corunna. Had the British army gone forward, and had it even beaten Soult, within a week it must have accepted annihilation, or capture.

On subjects of strategy most soldiers will accept a written opinion of Napoleon when he had no object in being untruthful, and, as Ovid wrote, "*Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*" The Emperor in a letter addressed to Soult, Tordesillas, December 26th, when hurrying forward to overtake Moore, wrote: "If the English pass the day in their position they are lost; if they attack you in force, retire a day's march: the farther they go the better for us."

Another criticism, that of Moore having inflicted unnecessary suffering on the troops by causing them to make forced marches, without adequate reasons, and especially for two nights in succession, merits more careful consideration. In one case the soldiers marched from midnight to

Last Stage of the Great Retreat 281

dawn, and after obtaining what rest was possible on the snow-covered ground during the day, continued their tramp throughout the following night. There can be no doubt but that successive all-night and day marches try severely the moral and physical strength of troops.

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Sir John Moore's probable reasons for having called on the soldiers for such an effort was the desire to get them past the open country, in which the overwhelming numerical superiority of the French cavalry would have put his force at a disadvantage.

By nightfall on January 6th, Sir John Moore, who had lost only 1,500 men since he left Salamanca, assembled 19,000 at Lugo; and on the following morning issued a general order in which he sternly rebuked officers and men for their recent indiscipline, and intimated his intention of offering battle to the enemy.

The effect of this order was immediate. Men who only a short while before had been riotous, insubordinate, and drunken, in a moment became orderly and eager for the fray. The thought of battle was the very stimulus they needed.

Towards midday, Marshal Soult approached, but decided to await the arrival of reinforcements. The following morning Soult still deferred his attack.

This delay proved fatal to Moore's hopes. He dared not attack, for in rear Soult had 20,000 more troops closing up, and the British army had sufficient ammunition for one battle only; and owing to the scarcity of food in the stores at Lugo, Moore could not afford to wait longer for the enemy's attack.

Silently and in good order, the army moved off at 10 P.M. A terrific storm broke over them—wind and rain, mixed with sleet—in consequence of which the guides lost the direction, and the troops again became demoralised. One division gained the main road, but the other two, bewildered by the storm and darkness, strayed from their course, and, when day broke, were still near Lugo. Fatigued, drenched by rain, and shoeless, the troops lost all sense of discipline, and stragglers became more numerous than during any other period of the Retreat.

The Last
Stage

The officer commanding the leading division allowed his men, during a halt in the night, to take refuge in some

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houses near the road. This well-meant act had a disastrous result, for when the time came for the march to be resumed the troops refused to return to their ranks; and the infection soon spread through the other divisions.

The British General, seeing that the enemy were unable to advance, spent the next day rallying his troops; but when they arrived at Corunna, January 11th-12th, they learnt that contrary winds had detained the fleet at Vigo.

While Sir John Moore awaited the arrival of the ships on which the army was to re-embark, the battalions were re-armed from the depots of stores which had been accumulated in the fort. The new muskets and cartridges gave his troops a great advantage over the French, whose weapons and ammunition had deteriorated seriously during the inclement weather.

The General re-embarked 3,000 sick soldiers, 50 guns and his dismounted Cavalry and Artillerymen. Those two Arms had lost respectively only 200 and 250 men during the retreat. Some few horses and draught oxen were retained for use in the battle, and 2,000 were destroyed.

Sir John Moore drew up 15,000 infantry and 9 six-pounder guns facing southwards on the inner of three ridges, which commanded the approaches to the Peninsula, jutting out into the Atlantic, on which the fortress, and town of Corunna stand. The Left front was protected on the east by the harbour and estuary into which the river Mero falls; and the Right flank, much drawn back, was placed on the highest ground to the West, overlooking Orzan Bay. The guns were placed along the frontage of two miles. The intervening ground between the opposing forces was rough, and much cut up, by walled enclosures connecting the villages.

Soult had 4,500 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, and 40 guns. It took the French the whole night of January 15th-16th to drag the pieces by hand into position, the greater number being placed in one battery opposite the village of Elvina.

Marshal Soult hesitated for many hours to attack, but at 2 P.M., January 16th, moved forward, the great battery opening a heavy fire on General Baird's division just as Moore had ordered the Rear division to embark. Baird was immediately wounded, and Moore rode to the hill above Elvina where Soult's greatest effort was being made.

The Death of Sir John Moore 283

Some battalions of French infantry, veterans of campaigns in Austria and in Italy, cleared our "advanced troops" out of the village which was taken and retaken several times by the 1st Black Watch, and 1st Royal West Kent Regiments, who were holding the ridge above the village.

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Corunna,
1809**

Sir John Moore was directing an attack made by a Guards' battalion on a large house, held by the French, when he was mortally wounded, and his command devolved on General John Hope.

By nightfall, when the firing ceased, the French cavalry, which had failed in its attempt to pass over the intricate ground in front of the British Right, had been driven back, and Lord Edward Paget's division had followed it to the Left flank of Soult's large battery opposite to Elvina. The cavalry having been driven off and the infantry escort to the guns broken, the battery might have been captured without much loss, but the object of the British Commander, which was to re-embark his force, had now been attained, and General Hope's decision to stand fast was undoubtedly sound, for Soult had 15 battalions which had not been engaged.

The troops re-embarked without further loss, their commander dying after dictating his dispatch, his last words being: "I hope my countrymen will do me justice." He indeed was, in the words of Sir Charles Napier, "A very King of men."



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF CORUNNA,
JANUARY 16th, 1809

CHAPTER V

THE OPORTO CAMPAIGN, 1809

Wellesley's Arrival in the Peninsula—Ney Falls to Subjugate the Galicians—
The Assault of Oporto—Thomas Graham—Campaign of 1809—Wellesley
—Military Situation, Spring, 1809—Wellesley Crosses the Tagus—The
Retreat of Marshal Soult—Amarante—Ponte Nova—The Advance on
Madrid—Victor's Retirement towards Madrid—Cuesta Joins Wellesley.

Wellesley
in the
Peninsula,
1809

WHEN Sir Arthur Wellesley landed in Lisbon on April 22nd, 1809, the military situation in the Peninsula was as follows: The Emperor Napoleon had returned to Paris, sending back some of his best regiments. His brother, King Joseph, enjoyed nominal command of the French armies, and at Madrid, besides its garrison and after deducting the garrisons necessary to hold various posts, had about 100,000 men available for field operations.

French
Activity

Marshals Ney, Soult, and Victor were jealous of each other, and unwilling to co-operate even for the Public service. They all three had but little respect for the King's military abilities, and rendered him and General Jourdan, his Chief Staff Officer, grudging obedience.

Marshal Ney (1769-1815) was still endeavouring to subjugate the Galicians, for as soon as he had forced one district to submit to the French another rose in insurrection.

Marshal Soult (1769-1851) had been ordered by the Emperor to invade Portugal from Galicia, and capture Lisbon. He was appointed to command the Army of England assembled at Boulogne, August, 1803, and two years later by his vigorous assault of the heights of Pratzen assisted materially in gaining the victory of Austerlitz, December 2nd, 1805. He was defeated by Sir John Moore at Corunna, January 16th, 1809.

Soult reached Oporto without being seriously opposed by any body of troops, but his march was productive of terrible loss of life to the peasantry, who, exhorted and encouraged by the personal example of self-sacrifice of their priests, showed undaunted courage. These leaders of

the flocks stood amongst the resisting peasants crucifix in hand, and died without offering to turn their backs. The Portuguese, without good leaders, and incapable of combined resistance, died heroically in fruitless efforts to defend their villages and houses. Old and young of both sexes fired from windows while the doors of their homes were being battered down, and continued to resist until they were pierced by bayonets. These brave but cruel peasants massacred several of the leading Portuguese whom they suspected of favouring the French, and killed, after inflicting terrible tortures, every straggler of Soult's army who fell into their hands.

The Assault
of Oporto,
1809

The city, then on the north bank, built on a steep slope falling to the Tagus, consists of narrow streets, most of which converge on the bridge of boats over the river, which is 300 yards wide, rapid, and deep. There were thirty wine-laden merchant ships, mostly English, moored to the quays, which, being wind-bound, could not cross the bar at the mouth of the river four miles lower down.

Marshal Soult, who had been able to estimate accurately the fighting value of his enemies, gave the bishop every chance to save his city, but he was obstinate, and on March 28th, having blessed the three generals in command and their troops, he crossed the Tagus to the Serra Convent on the south bank.

The assault was more like a slaughter than a fight. When the Portuguese senior general saw the central redoubt carried he determined to retire, and ordered the guns to be spiked, but was immediately shot by his men, who then fled without offering any resistance; hundreds of them were driven into the sea west of the city. General Parreiras, who commanded in the Centre, fled early to the southern bank, followed by a mob of fugitives.

Although Soult's losses were but trifling, the city suffered all the horrors of a captured place given over to incensed soldiers. Such scenes, however painful, were dwarfed in a fearful catastrophe. After hundreds of fugitives had safely crossed the bridge of boats to the southern bank, an unknown officer caused some sections of the boats to be removed, thus creating a chasm between the ends of it. When the fugitives approached this gap of forty feet, they

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of 1809**

endeavoured to stop, but for at least half an hour the surging crowd behind pushed those who were in front into the river, the surface of which was covered with men and horses. Those in rear continued to press on, and could not be stopped until the French, taking pity on them, forcibly diverted the stream of fugitives on the banks up and down the river, rescuing, moreover, all they could who were already in the water. Marshal Soult took 200 cannon, large stores of English ammunition, and seized the merchant vessels, the Portuguese casualties being over 7,000 of killed and drowned.

**Sir Arthur
Wellesley**

Sir Arthur Wellesley, when he landed, was under forty years of age, of middle height, slightly built but very wiry, with a prominent nose, the privates giving him the nickname of "Old Hooky-nose."

He was never sick during his six years' campaigning, though he was necessarily not only Commander-in-Chief, but the Organiser and Head of all Departments of his army, acting also as Treasurer-General. His capacity for doing continuous hard work was great. He had remarkable powers of organisation, for as we have said, he not only created his Staff, Military and Departmental, but did his own work, and that of Chief of the Staff. Wellesley was simple in his personal tastes, very careless of his own dress, and that of those under his command. He disliked all show, and discontinued the escort, which had always attended his predecessors, contenting himself with one or two mounted orderlies. He had the great failing of believing that though other officers made mistakes, he could never be in the wrong.

Amongst Sir Arthur's few personal friends in the army was Thomas Graham (Lyndoch), who was twenty years his senior, but whose sporting tastes, and the same gift of indomitable courage, drew the men together by a bond of sympathy. Sir Arthur never attempted to interfere with Graham in his command at Cadiz, but to all others he was autocratic. He was essentially an infantry officer, disbelieving in cavalry. It must be admitted, even by a cavalry enthusiast, as I am, that the Duke's personal experience of the use of that arm had been unfortunate, except at Salamanca, July 22nd, 1812, and the following day at Garcia Hernandez : and amongst our senior Generals

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in the Peninsula only Sir John Moore saw the brilliant operations in which Lord Paget, in the retreat to Corunna, with half the numbers had continually defeated Napoleon's renowned cavalry leaders. It is right to add that Artillery officers of his epoch alleged that he had but little knowledge of, or sympathy with their Arm.

Wellesley, without any desire to engage in hand to hand combat, was often in danger from sabres and bayonets; always anxious to see personally the enemy's position, he was nearly taken prisoner when reconnoitring at Talavera (1809), on the French army unexpectedly moving forward to attack.

Professor Oman states, and with reason, that by his soldiers "he was respected, feared, and followed, but never loved." This was the less surprising, seeing that, although in his farewell Peninsular General Order he declared that he would never cease to take the warmest interest in the welfare of his men, he did not even support the application for a medal to the Rank and File, which was decreed June 1st, 1847, and only then by the repeated efforts of civilian members of the House of Commons.

When Sir Arthur Wellesley concentrated his troops at Coimbra, the French armies were thus employed: Ney was still in Galicia, and Soult, although comfortably established in Oporto, had been obliged to detach a column, for the peasantry, having risen in insurrection behind him, had taken Vigo, capturing his military chest; and another column under General Loison had been sent to hold the bridge at Amarante on the line of communications with France. The peasantry had also seized Soult's Supply depot, and military hospital at Chaves, on the Lamego river.

The Marshal had received no news of General Lapisse, who had been ordered by Napoleon to advance from Salamanca into Portugal, and to capture Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. Soult was equally cut off from Madrid, the peasantry intercepting all postal communications. He felt that he was not strong enough to advance on Lisbon, although he had encamped Franceschi's division on the road to that city.

General Lapisse had been completely imposed on by the audacity of Colonel Sir Robert Wilson, an Irregular officer in command of small bodies of militia. The French General

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imagining that he was opposed by a large force, which might overwhelm him, had at the end of April, after repeated requests to the King, obtained leave to join Victor, who was at Merida in Estremadura.

Wellesley had assembled at Leiria, on the Lisbon-Coimbra-Oporto road, 25,000 British and King's German Legion. General Beresford had 16,000 Portuguese, instructed and commanded by British officers, at Thomar, midway between Leiria and Abrantes, on the Tagus.

Portuguese Militia were threatening Amarante; Spanish troops were assembling under General Cuesta to the south of Merida, and at Carolina, in Andalusia, under General Venegas.

Professor Oman, quoting from documents written by Wellesley on April 24th, two days after he landed, shows clearly how correctly he judged the military situation, and the wisdom of his decision to expel Soult from Oporto before making any offensive movement against Victor in Estremadura. When Wellesley concentrated at Coimbra, May 2nd, he recalled the Portuguese brigade from the Tagus, which rejoined Beresford, who with one British brigade and Portuguese, in all about 6,000 men, was ordered to cross the Douro at Lamego in order to threaten Soult's line of retreat, when Wellesley should drive him from Oporto.

The Tagus

Wellesley sent eight squadrons, four battalions and one battery to Abrantes to "contain" Victor, and moving forward with 16,000 British, a King's German Legion, and 11,000 Portuguese, endeavoured to surprise General Franceschi at daylight, May 10th. The night march failed, partly owing to want of practice in this important duty, and from the difficulties of moving artillery on an unknown road. Wellesley, however, manœuvred the French out of their position by flank movements, after a wild headlong charge by two squadrons (16th Lancers) and 20th Light Dragoons (Hussars) down a road, in which they rode over three battalions, killing and wounding 100 and taking 100 prisoners. Soult withdrew Franceschi's troops across the Tagus. Then, having cleared the southern bank of all boats and removed the centre of the bridge of boats, he thought he was secure for a time.

The Marshal disposed all his other troops to watch the river, from the city downwards to the sea, for Wellesley

had used some fishing boats in his operations, May 9th-11th, to move Hill's brigade northwards when out-flanking Franceschi's position; and the Marshal anticipated that after some days Wellesley might collect enough boats to attempt a crossing. The most favourable spot being apparently just above the bar at the mouth of the river, he gave all his attention to this stretch of water, which extended from the city downwards, for he knew that Wellesley's advance-guard was immediately opposite to it.

The
Campaign
of 1809

Crossing
of the
Tagus

Nearly all the pickets were watching from the city down to the sea. There was but one battalion to the east, or up-stream, and this was placed too far back, from whence no view of the water was obtainable. No one in Soult's force ever anticipated that as soon as the British troops arrived on the banks of the river, 300 yards wide, and running rapidly with a breadth greater than that of the Thames at London Bridge, their Commander would attempt its passage, for which, as far as the French knew, he had no means.

Reconnoitring officers had, however, been sent forward by Wellesley, and when early in the forenoon, accompanied by several Portuguese notables who had fled from the city before the arrival of the French, he ascended the Serra Convent hill, he could see from it all the French positions, and at once thought of the possibility of attacking them.

Down-stream of the city pickets were on the alert extending to the mouth of the river, but opposite to where Wellesley stood there were no signs of life. The houses were apparently empty, and there was no one moving in the streets. Some of the reconnoitring officers now returning, reported that the ferry-boat at Avintas, four miles up the river, had been scuttled, but was being repaired by the ferrymen, and Colonel Waters, who continually did very good work during the war as a reconnoitring officer, found an inhabitant of the city who, during the preceding night, had crossed the river in a skiff which was hidden in a clump of trees.

Immediately opposite to the Serra Convent hill there was a large clerical college, and underneath it were moored, and lying half aground, unguarded, four large wine barges. Colonel Waters, with the help of a priest.

**Campaign
of 1859****Crossing
of the
Tagus**

induced four peasants and the skiff owner above mentioned to accompany him to the north bank. A French patrol had just passed when the little party launched the boat, but they crossed without attracting attention, got the barges afloat and drew them across to the south bank. Colonel Waters reported to Wellesley that the college immediately under which the barges had been lying, a large isolated building, was apparently empty.

Wellesley sent General Murray with two battalions of his brigade, King's German Legion, two guns, and two squadrons 14th Light Dragoons, to march as fast as possible up the left bank of the Tagus, and crossing by the repaired ferry-boat, to hold a position on the north bank.

Three field batteries were brought by hand into action in the convent gardens, and laid on the approaches of the college opposite, and fifteen minutes later the leading barge had landed 30 men of the Buffs, who occupied the college, and with those who followed prepared its walls for defence.

By 11.30 A.M. a third trip had been made, an hour after the first crossing, when the French advanced to attack the north and west walls of the college, bringing a battery down to the edge of the river below the building to shell the barges as they crossed the water.

The 18 guns in the Serra Convent garden opened on the French battery as it unlimbered. The first shot, fired at 300 yards range, overturned a gun and knocked down the entire detachment—every man and every horse of the team. Then the 17 other guns following with a hail of shrapnel, drove the Frenchmen back, who, for half an hour, bravely persevered, but the battery was wiped out. The infantry running up towards the bank that they might see the barges, had to cross an open space, and those who tried to do so were shot down. General Laborde now attacked with three battalions, but he could not get up to the college walls; the open space in front of it was strewn with dead and wounded Frenchmen. During the three hours' fighting the British battalions, sheltered under the walls, had less than 100 casualties.

The inhabitants of the city, seeing the French troops who had been holding the quays withdrawing to attack the college, pulled over all the boats which Soult had

collected on the north bank, and the Guards Brigade crossing in them attacked the French column who were assailing the college, capturing a battery by coming up behind it. The French ran away in a confused mass, and were pursued by the college garrison under Hill, who had succeeded to the command, General Edward Paget having been severely wounded. The Portuguese mob running out of the houses began to massacre the French wounded, and it was necessary to place British sentries near the college to protect them.

General Charles Stuart, sent by Wellesley to see what Murray's force was doing, came up to it as the French were endeavouring to form a Rear-guard, at which Stuart immediately galloped with Captain Hervey's squadron, 14th (Hussars) Light Dragoons. The Dragoons rode home, a private unhorsing General Laborde, who would have been taken prisoner, but the Dragoon being killed, the General escaped, and General Foy, who was with him, got off after being wounded. Soult lost 300 men around the college, and left 1,500 sick in hospital; six field-guns, and 52 Portuguese guns were taken. Wellesley's losses were under 150.

Soult was marching for Amarante, but during the night, May 12th-13th, he heard that General Loison having been badly beaten by General Beresford, had given up the bridge at Amarante, and was retiring in a north-westerly direction. The Marshal now destroyed his cannon, and everything except what could be carried on artillery horses and mules, and leaving the road at Penafiel, climbed the Serra Catalina mountains, one of the great spurs running in a south-westerly direction from the Maritime Pyrenees. The track was merely a rough mule path: rain fell continuously for 72 hours, and his men were so utterly exhausted that when it became necessary to abandon a military chest, and the troops were invited to help themselves, as they passed it, few men availed themselves of the offer, not wishing to be burdened with even an ounce more weight than they carried with the ammunition on them, and biscuit ration.

Except for the differences of feeling in pursuers and pursued, Wellesley's and Beresford's troops following the French suffered nearly as much from exhaustion, in the incessant rain and scarcity of food, as did the enemy.

Campaign
of 1809

Soult's
Retreat

Campaign
of 1809

Marshal Soult had left Merle's division to act as Rear-guard, and at 5 P.M. May 16th, its rear sections were driven in by the advance of the British infantry, headed by the Brigade of Guards, who pursued close up to the re-floored bridge at Ponte Nova. The parapets had not been replaced, and when a battery opened on a struggling mass of fugitives following in the rear of the French army, in their maddened efforts to escape the fire of the guns at close range, they thrust each other from the bridge into the torrent below, which was choked with over 300 bodies of men, horses, and mules. Soult's disorganised troops reached Montalegre during the night, May 17th-18th, and Orense May 19th, with about 20,000 men, having lost in his retreat 5,700.

Wellesley halted his infantry at Ruivaca, sending on a mounted detachment as far as Montalegre. He had accomplished much more than he had hoped to effect, for he had driven Marshal Soult off his line of communication into the mountains of Galicia, the Marshal having lost one-sixth of his effectives, and all his Artillery and Equipment.

Sir Arthur Wellesley, without loss of time, sent his British brigades to the southward. When the troops reached Abrantes a prolonged halt became necessary, for though the leading battalions arrived on June 11th, it was six days later before the rear got up. The men had marched for five weeks incessantly and in 72 hours' rain-storm; they were barefooted, and the mules carrying the ammunition were exhausted.

Advance
towards
Madrid

In the south General Cuesta had at the end of July 35,000 men under arms, and Sir Arthur Wellesley now arranged with the Spanish General a combined advance against Victor and the French near Madrid, supposed to number about 50,000, on whom General Venegas, with 25,000 men, was to advance simultaneously from the country south-east of the capital.

Wellesley, in agreeing to go forward without being supplied with army Transport, relied on the promises of the Central Junta, who undertook in repeated assurances to furnish all the bread and meat required, and Transport to bring it to the troops. The British General leant on a broken reed, and brought his army within measurable distance of starvation, but he never again in the five succeeding years took the field without being adequately

equipped with transport, and having previously formed depots of supplies. By a strange neglect, due to England having no War Staff, an error which has been repeated many times in the last hundred years, the Government at home kept Wellesley very short of money, for he had not sufficient to pay the muleteers, or even the soldiers, of whom at this time 10 per centum were in hospital, many from causes induced by want of food and equipment. He had no news of Soult, whom he believed to be still in Galicia. That Marshal's troops had been refitted with personal equipment, as far as was possible, from the stores of Marshal Ney's corps, and had moved down into Castile.

Campaign
of 1809

Wellesley united with General Cuesta at Oropesa, July 20th, and advanced on Victor, who fell back behind the Alberche river, which joins the Tagus at Talavera.

Oropesa

Marshal Victor had for weeks been asking King Joseph for permission to retire on Madrid, for, independent of the feeling that he was overmatched by the number whom he might have to meet in battle, his men were suffering from want of food. It was very seldom that he could issue meat, and frequently only half a ration of bread or flour. As a natural consequence his hospitals were filled with sick, and men weakened from want of proper nutriment. The King had hitherto replied to all such requests by urging the Marshal to threaten an invasion of Portugal by attacking Alcantara, in order to relieve the pressure of the British troops on Soult.

The guerrillas, as above mentioned, while they often failed to transmit information which would have been of great value to their friends, generally delayed its transmission to their enemies. It was just three weeks after Soult's defeat by Wellesley at Oporto that the news of the victory of the hitherto despised British general reached Madrid. It had the immediate effect of orders being dispatched to Victor to retire.

CHAPTER VI

THE TALAVERA CAMPAIGN

Oropesa—Cuesta Unprepared—The Fighting at Salinas—The Flight of the Spanish—The Battle of Talavera—General Craufurd's March—Wellesley Fears Starvation for his Troops.

Cuesta
Unprepared

THE Allies moved forward from Oropesa towards Talavera, 19 miles distant, July 22nd, the Spaniards marching on the high road and the British troops to the north of it. The French cavalry division of six regiments under Latour-Maubourg deployed in front of Cuesta's advance, and held back the Spanish cavalry, outnumbering the French by two to one, and still stopped the Duke of Albuquerque's cavalry even when it was reinforced by Zaya's infantry division. No ground was gained until the British cavalry threatened the French Right or northern flank, and Latour-Maubourg then fell back, skirting the north wall of the town, from which two battalions came out following the cavalry division. Albuquerque sent a regiment at them, but although they advanced three times he could not induce them to ride home, for the squadrons halted as soon as they came under fire.

Wellesley got into position, in conformity with his arrangements with Cuesta, at 3 A.M., July 23rd, to attack Marshal Victor's army; after some hours' delay Cuesta declined to attack till next day, and before he was ready to advance Marshal Victor had retreated!

Wellesley, having no food for his troops, declined to march, and Cuesta, much irritated, pursued the French alone.

Finding themselves opposed only by Spaniards, the French took the offensive. But Cuesta, when he discovered the strength of the enemy, beat a hurried retreat, and reached the Alberche unmolested. Near the river he found two divisions of Sherbrooke and Mackenzie, which Wellesley had sent forward to cover the Spaniards' retreat. The British General now rode over to meet Cuesta, and begged

the Spaniard to hasten his retirement. This Cuesta declined to do. 's troops, he declared, were too exhausted; he would encamp on the eastern side of the river. And no arguments of Wellesley could convince him of his folly. Salinas, 1809

Fortunately, the enemy did not arrive during the night, and the Spaniards were spared the disaster which otherwise must have overtaken them; in the morning their leader consented to occupy the position which Wellesley had selected in front of Talavera.

At 1 P.M. Victor, from the Heights of Salinas, on the east side of the Alberche, saw the Allies then taking up their position, a division being still near to the ruined Casa de Salinas, a mile to the west of the Alberche.

The ground here is thickly wooded, and, owing to the insufficient precautions taken by the pickets, the enemy, advancing briskly, took the British by surprise. Wellesley, who at the time was standing on the roof of the Casa making observations of the surrounding country, was fortunate in escaping capture, for he barely had time to mount his charger before the enemy was upon him. Three battalions were broken and driven to the rear, losing 80 prisoners. Wellesley in person restored an orderly retirement.

The country between the Alberche and Talavera is a plain covered with cork and olive trees; bounded on the north by a round, steep hill, the Cerro de Medellin, which runs parallel with the Tagus at a distance of two miles. This hill is separated by a deep valley, about half a mile in width, from the range of mountains which divide the Alberche and the Tietar. The Field of Talavera

Wellesley's front extended from Talavera to the Cerro de Medellin. The Spaniards were posted in and in front of the town in a strong position, concealed by woods, and covered by walls, ditches, and enclosures, which rendered it almost unassailable. Their Left rested on a mound where a large field redoubt had been constructed.

Wellesley entrusted to Hill the defence of the Cerro de Medellin, the key of the position. For some unexplained reason, Hill neglected to occupy the summit on the evening of the 27th, but halted his men in the rear. The French cannonade being continued after the surprised troops had rejoined the main body of the army, an immediate attack seemed to be probable.

Talavera,
1809

The Spanish line between the British Right, and Talavera, on seeing in the distance some French Light Horse, opened fire, although the enemy were out of range. Then suddenly four battalions of infantry broke and ran off to the rear in disorder. They were neither attacked nor threatened with an attack; and Wellesley, who witnessed the scene, could explain their conduct only on the ground that they were "frightened by the noise of their own gun-fire." The Spanish cavalry managed to round up the fugitives; and on the morning after the battle (July 29th) Cuesta determined to decimate the battalions which had fled. Wellesley dissuaded him from taking such drastic measures; none the less, the obstinate Spaniard executed some thirty men, chosen by lot.

While panic thus prevailed in the Spanish lines, Victor—although neither King Joseph nor General Sebastiani had yet come up—was preparing to deliver a night attack on the Cerro de Medellin.

Three regiments, some 5,300 men, moved down to the attack at about 9 P.M., and midway between the foot and the crest of the cerro, surprised Low's brigade, King's German Legion, and broke it completely, having fired into the men before they could stand to their arms. The French columns then marched straight up the hill, and the leading battalions succeeded in reaching the summit without encountering any further opposition.

General Hill, who had been forming up his division on the rear (western) slope of the hill, directed Stewart's brigade to support Low, should occasion arise. As Hill was giving his orders he noticed some men on the top of the hill firing in his direction. Thinking "it was only some blunder," the General galloped, with Captain Fordyce, his brigade-major, towards the summit, shouting to the men to cease fire; and, before he realised his error, had ridden right in among the enemy.

A Frenchman grabbing him by the arm called on him to surrender, but Hill, spurring his horse, managed to break free and galloped back to his division, followed by a volley. His horse was badly wounded, but the General escaped. Fordyce was killed.

Without waiting for another horse, Hill led forward Stewart's brigade on foot, and fell with such determination

The Battle of Talavera

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on the enemy that the French columns, which, owing to the darkness, were in some disorder, soon broke, and were driven in confusion down the hill. Ruffin lost some 300 men. The British casualties were heavier, mainly from the disaster to Low's battalions. Dawn showed 40,000 troops ready to advance against Wellesley's thin line. Hardly a French soldier was posted opposite the Spaniards. Ruffin's division was drawn up on the French Right or northern flank, and considerably in advance of the main line, with Villatte's division and Beaumont's two cavalry regiments in its rear.

Talavera,
1809

At 5 A.M. Victor's artillery opened a heavy cannonade, from 54 guns, and under cover of this fire Ruffin's brigades advanced.

Hill's division made a counter-attack and in forty minutes drove Ruffin's men across the Portiña.

The fight, which had lasted only forty minutes, cost Ruffin's three regiments 1,300 men killed and wounded. The British casualties were about 750, among the number being their gallant leader, who received a wound in the head, which compelled him to hand over the command of his division to Colonel Tilson.

An informal armistice followed this engagement. The heat of the morning was intense, and thirst drove men from both sides to seek water from the black, stagnant Portiña. Here friend and foe mingled peaceably; and later, when some officers came down to the stream, it was agreed that either party might carry off its wounded without molestation.

At 10 A.M. the armistice came to an end; and Joseph—again in compliance with the counsels of Victor—delivered a general assault along the British front.

The fight recommenced at 2 P.M., when the French artillery, 80 guns in all, opened with telling effect on the British line, for in some places the French batteries were barely six hundred paces distant. When the enemy had advanced to musketry range both sides opened fire, but the attacking force suffered the more heavily, especially its Centre, into which the guns from the redoubt were now pouring canister. A counter attack headed by the Royal Fusiliers (7th) repulsed the French, who lost a battery of 6 guns.

About 4 P.M. a second attack was repulsed; and as the

Talavera,
1809

French fell back two regiments of Spanish cavalry charged them with much vigour in flank, and, cutting down many men, captured four pieces of artillery. This charge, writes Professor Oman, "was by far the best piece of work done by the Spanish cavalry during the whole of the first years of the war, and did much to atone for the panic of the infantry on the previous evening."

When the French batteries ceased fire two divisions moved down to the Portiña under cover of a cloud of skirmishers, and, driving the British outposts before them, advanced quickly on Sherbrooke's division.

In obedience to orders, the troops, although suffering heavily from the French musketry, withheld their fire until the enemy were within fifty paces of them. Then having delivered a volley, before which the advancing battalions went down in swathes, they charged, driving the broken columns in confusion over the Portiña.


The Guards and King's German Legion, carried away by their success, followed too far; and when out of hand found themselves facing solid masses of the enemy's reserves, having, moreover, on one flank the French guns on the hill to the east of the Portiña, and on the other flank Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. Though they fought with rare determination, they were driven back over the stream in a disordered mass, carrying with them in their rout Cameron's brigade, which had not advanced so far.

The Centre of the British line was broken; and the French surged forward with shouts of triumph, mercilessly slaughtering the routed troops, who fell by scores.

Wellesley quickly brought forward Mackenzie's division and a brigade of Cotton's cavalry. Round this division the undaunted Guards rallied, "giving a loud hurrah as they turned and faced the French."

Wellesley had no reserves to bring forward. So, taking the 48th (1st Northamptonshire) Regiment under Colonel Donnellan, he sent it at "the double" down the southern slope of the Cerro towards the position formerly occupied by the King's German Legion.

The battalion arrived just as the retreating masses were being driven back, and it seemed impossible that they could avoid being rolled back also; but, "wheeling back by companies that regiment let the crowds pass through, and then



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF TALAVERA AT THE PERIOD OF
THE FINAL ATTACK, JULY 28th, 1809

Talavera,
1809

re-forming line fell on the flank of the victorious French columns, and closing upon them with such a firm step that their offensive movement was checked." Thus arrested, the French attack lost its vigour; and, while the men stood clumped together, hesitating to advance, the batteries on the Cerro opened on them. This decided the issue. The enemy wavered. Lapisse made one brave effort to urge them forward, but was struck down immediately by a cannon-shot. Then his troops, losing heart, fell back, and were soon in full retreat towards the Portiña brook.

Up to this time, but for the incessant roar of artillery, there had been comparative quiet on the Cerro de Medellin, for Joseph had resolved not to deliver another frontal attack till the centre of Wellesley's line had begun to fall back.

Wellesley asked General Cuesta for help to meet a third attack of Ruffin's, now threatening North of the Cerro hill, who sent all Albuquerque's cavalry, some guns and 5,000 Infantry.

The French had moved some distance up the valley when Wellesley ordered Anson's cavalry (23rd Light Dragoons and 1st Light Dragoons, K.G.L.) to charge the heads of the advancing columns.

The horsemen started off at a canter, increasing their speed as they went, until they were riding headlong as they drew near to the enemy, who had formed into squares to meet the charge.

About 150 yards in front of Ruffin's infantry a deep watercourse intervened, concealed by the long grass in the valley. Colonel Elley, riding two lengths in front of his Dragoons, was the first to see the obstacle. His own horse cleared it at a bound, but, knowing that it could not fail to bring down the rank and file, the Colonel pulled up on the farther side, and signalled to his men to stop.

But it was too late. The leading squadrons had already reached the brink; and in a moment all was confusion. hundreds of men and horses lying huddled helplessly together, many with broken necks, scores with broken legs. The German cavalry farther up the valley suffered a similar fate. Both leaders, instead of falling back and re-forming their men, led those who had managed to scramble over the ravine against the hostile infantry.

The French squares easily repulsed the disordered horse-

men. The Legion's Dragoons and the left squadrons of the 23rd then turned northwards, moving up the valley. But Colonel Elley and the right squadrons, having no infantry immediately in front of them, rode on until presently they found themselves in the midst of Merlin's cavalry. Hopelessly outnumbered, these gallant horsemen were killed almost to a man, Colonel Elley and a few of the well-mounted officers alone being able to cut their way back across the ravine.

This failure benefited Ruffin but little. He had still Fane's brigades and Albuquerque's cavalry in his front; and his infantry squares were suffering terribly from the guns on the Cerro. When Ruffin heard that the attack on Wellesley's Centre had failed, he fell back, recrossing the Portiña; and the battle came to a standstill.


Joseph dared not risk another attack. Daylight was failing. The moral of his

troops had been shaken, and there were 25,000 Spaniards who as yet had taken no part in the battle. Joseph did not know that Wellesley deemed them incapable of manœuvring. Under cover of a heavy artillery fire, therefore, he retired; and when day broke on July 29th the plain and rolling hills in front of Talavera were deserted.

At six o'clock that morning, just too late to take part in the battle, arrived from Lisbon the reinforcements which Wellesley had been anxiously awaiting—Robert Craufurd's brigade: the 43rd (1st Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry), 52nd (2nd Oxford and Bucks Light Infantry), and 95th (Rifle Brigade) Regiments.

Craufurd's march is historic. Hearing at Naval Moral that a battle was imminent, he hastened forward with almost incredible speed. The sun was intensely hot. His men carried between fifty and sixty pounds' weight on their shoulders; and during the march they heard from fugitives the

Talavera,
1809



PLAN OF CRAUFURD'S MARCH

**The French
Retreat
from
Talavera,
1809**

most alarming reports. Yet, with unflagging energy, Craufurd and his brigade pushed on towards the sound of the guns. In twenty-two hours they covered forty-three miles, and arrived on the field having left only seventeen stragglers.

The state of his army rendered it impossible for Wellesley to follow up his victory. His men had fought all day under a blazing sun, on half-rations, and were incapable of further action.

The French retreated with a loss of 7,000 men. The British troops lost 5,500; the casualties in the Spanish army were but trifling, as its position in the outskirts of Talavera town was not seriously attacked.

Lack of water and supplies, moreover, occasioned a good deal of suffering to the wounded.

"It is positively a fact," wrote Wellesley on July 31st, "that during the last seven days the British army have not received one-third of their provisions, and that at this moment there are nearly 4,000 wounded soldiers dying in hospital from want of common assistance and necessaries, which any other country in the world would have given even to its enemies."

**Soult's
Manœuvres**

We must now turn to Marshal Soult. The Emperor Napoleon had placed under his command the Corps of Marshals Ney and Mortier, and though in the interior of Austria, far distant from Spain, he foresaw the probability of Wellesley trying to reach Madrid by the valley of the Tagus, and commanded Soult in such a case to cross the mountains separating the valley of the Tagus from that of the Douro, and fall on the flank of the British army.

Marshal Soult did not receive until the first week in July the guns of his field batteries sent to replace those which he had destroyed in his retreat from Oporto, when pursued by Wellesley; and, moreover, Marshal Ney came slowly away from Galicia, the people of which he had not succeeded in reducing to a state of submission.

The Allied Generals learned, July 30th, that Soult, with a force estimated at 50,000 men, had brushed away the few troops which General Cuesta had sent to hold the Banos Pass over the mountains, and might be expected in a few days at Plasencia.

Cuesta and Wellesley had a long and violent discussion. but Wellesley at Cuesta's request undertook to march to-

wards Plasencia and attack Soult. He begged the Spanish General to requisition carts to enable him to remove his sick and wounded. Very few carts were procurable, for off the high road to Madrid there were few tracks on which their use was possible, and they consequently were not in the country. When it was clear that not more than 20 carts were available, all the British soldiers who could stand on their feet crawled after the troops; 500 died on the roadside; about 2,000 eventually reached the hospitals at Truxillo, and 1,500 who were left in Talavera fell into the hands of the French, by whom they were well treated.

Wellesley's
Plans

Sir Arthur Wellesley early in the morning, August 3rd, received from General Cuesta a dispatch which had been taken from a spy, and which showed clearly Marshal Soult's strength as being more than double the Allies had anticipated, and so Sir Arthur instead of moving on towards Plasencia turned the head of his troops southwards, and crossed the Tagus by the narrow fragile bridge of Arzobispo. By a curious coincidence Soult received the same morning a letter written by General Wellesley to General Erskine, which had been taken from an orderly of the Spanish cavalry. Wellesley's letter gave Soult the first news of Victor's defeat, July 28th, and indicated clearly Sir Arthur's ignorance of the fact that Ney and Mortier's Corps were with Soult's original command. Ney's Corps was still two marches behind: and the British troops had got to the south of the Tagus four days, and General Cuesta's army three clear days, before the French discovered a ford, for they could not cross the bridge at Arzobispo as it had been placed in a state of defence. When the French crossed they punished the rearmost division of the Spanish army, but Soult was now ordered to send Ney back to Salamanca to cope with insurrectionary bands. Sir Arthur Wellesley had occupied with Craufurd's brigade the bridge over the Tagus at Almaraz, and was therefore now beyond attack.

Sir Arthur was continuously pressed to advance again on Madrid, but he steadily declined to risk his army once more until he had magazines filled and transport available. None of these amateur advisers of Wellesley realised a general's responsibilities in feeding an army.

CHAPTER VII

COMMENCEMENT OF THE LINES OF TORRES VEDRAS

Result of the 1809 Campaign—Sir Arthur Wellesley Created a Viscount—The Douro and Tagus—Wellington Organises the Portuguese Army—The Lines of Torres Vedras—Field-Marshal André Masséna—General Craufurd—Almeida—Ciudad Rodrigo—Busaco—Thomas Graham's Force—La Peña—Battle of Barrosa—Graham Joins Wellington.

Result
of 1809
Campaign

THE result of the campaign of 1809 was briefly as follows. France lost her hold on the northern provinces of Galicia and the Asturias. Marshal Soult failed to entrap Wellesley's army, which the Supreme Junta had left in ignorance of the concentration of the three French Army Corps in Old Castile. Sir Robert Wilson with a small force called the Lusitanian Legion, and some Spanish battalions had got to within 12 miles of Madrid, and paralysed the movements of French troops three or four times their number. Eventually, when the Allies retired from Talavera to the west and south, Wilson's force, though apparently surrounded on three occasions by portions of three Army Corps, by evading action or fighting when it was essential, got back to Portugal with a loss of only 400 men.

Sir Arthur Wellesley now realised that the force available under his command was unequal to defending Spain with such Allies as he had at hand, and determined that France should be resisted in Portugal. He wrote in September, and again in October, to Captain Fletcher, his Royal Engineer officer, who then began the works which under the name of the Lines of Torres Vedras were the following year to make Wellesley famous as the foremost General of Defence. He was created a Viscount for his victory at Talavera.

Flight of
Central
Junta, 1810

When the armies of Marshal Soult approached Seville at the end of January 30th, 1810, the Central Junta fled to Cadiz, which city from its situation—although Sir Francis Drake had sailed into the harbour and captured it twice—was nearly impregnable against a land attack, especially if

The French Armies in Spain 305

the command of the sea was held, as was the case in 1810, by an Allied Power.

Watershed
of Douro
and Tagus

When describing the topography of the Peninsula we mentioned a chain of mountains which branch from the Maritime Pyrenees abutting on the Bay of Biscay, and run in a west-north-west, south-south-east direction towards the Mediterranean. In this chain the Douro and Tagus rivers rise, and about midway between the Bay of Biscay, and the Mediterranean, there is another chain, which passes generally in a westerly line towards the frontier of Portugal. This latter chain separates the basins of the Douro and Tagus. It extends in a westerly direction up to the frontier of Portugal, then turns south-westwards, and runs down in many spurs to the Atlantic through the little town of Torres Vedras, 25 miles to the north of Lisbon, and thence, in what is known as the Cintra range, meets the sea to the west of Lisbon.

The chain of mountains which runs east and west across the centre of Spain for 400 miles divides the basins of the two rivers by a barrier so immense as to separate the provinces on either side, except in four or five places where roads have been cut through the mass of rocks, as effectually as if they were different countries. It thus came about that armies operating in the basins of the Douro and Tagus were practically separated. In a lesser degree the same conditions applied to the Masséna-Wellington Campaign of 1810 in Portugal.

During the winter, 1809-10, the French armies in Spain were continuously augmented until they amounted in the summer to 360,000. Professor Oman shows that 138,000 crossed the French-Spanish frontier from December, 1809, to September, 1810. They occupied nearly all the Spanish provinces. Marshal Soult commanded 70,000 in Andalusia, and held the title of Chief Staff Officer to King Joseph, of whom, however, he was practically independent. The King had 24,000 in and around Madrid under his own hand, and early in the spring, 1810, 65,000 had been assembled about Salamanca, and on the eastern frontier of Portugal.

French
Armies in
Spain,
1809-10

Lord Wellington began to organise a Portuguese army immediately on his return after the campaign of 1809, placing them in distinct categories: (a) There were 30,000 Regulars, trained, paid, and commanded by British officers.

The
Portuguese
Army.
1808-10

Unfortunately the British Government gave the Portuguese Government money to ration this first line, and Supply frequently failed—because, firstly, the Portuguese Government in order to save money in the purchase of Transport relied generally on hired wagons; and secondly, because instead of buying wheat in the open market it preferred to obtain it by requisitions from the farmers, who supplied as little as possible. As the troops commanded by British officers were frequently short of rations, those under direct Portuguese control were naturally still worse supplied. (b) 30,000 Militia, under the command of General Beresford, and under a combined system of British and Portuguese officers, were stationed in the Alemtejo and to the east of Lisbon. (c) 30,000 Militia were called out and were stationed north of the Douro river. (d) The law calling out the Ordenanzan, decreeing a time of National emergency, was put in force. This law was of old standing, and in its effect it put on duty every male adult, and what was a greater advantage, enabled the general in command to enforce at his will when he considered it necessary, the devastation of any district.

Lines of
Torres
Vedras

A line of defensive posts 30 miles in extent was made from the Atlantic up the left, that is south, bank of the Zizandre river to near Torres Vedras and thence to the village of Alhandra, the redoubt of which was flanked by gunboats on the estuary of the Tagus. This for 20 miles above Lisbon formed a large sheet of water varying in breadth from 4 to 15 miles. The ground from Torres Vedras to the Tagus, by nature strong for defence, had been made more so throughout the position by scarping hills, damming streams, and forming inundations, by improving roads of interior communication, and destroying those likely to be used by the enemy. Eight miles behind the front line of defence was a second and stronger line, and still farther inland the city of Lisbon was encircled by an entrenched camp. In all there were 150 redoubts, mounting 600 guns, which, begun when Sir Arthur Wellesley wrote to Colonel Fletcher, September, 1809, had been constructed by the manual labour of 10,000 peasants, relieved weekly, and which gradually, under the supervision of Colonel J. Jones and Colonel Fletcher, had rendered Lisbon nearly impregnable before Masséna advanced.

The amount of spade work, apparently unpaid, still visible, was quite stupendous, but perhaps the National spirit of the Portuguese was still more remarkable in that until the French came in sight of the entrenched positions after the Battle of Busaco, September, 1810, they had no idea of the work which had then been going on for over six months.

Lines of
Torres
Vedras

During the winter 1809-10, while Wellington was raising and training Portuguese troops the French were increasing their armies in Spain, which numbered in the spring of 1810 366,000 men.

Marshal Soult early in 1810 occupied Seville and sent Marshal Victor to besiege Cadiz.

The corps of Junot, Ney, and Reynier, which was later to be commanded by Masséna under the title of the "Army of Portugal," made up to 80,000 men, was ordered to concentrate at Salamanca.

André Masséna (1758-1817), the third Field-Marshal to suffer defeat at the hands of Wellington and the British troops, was born at Nice, the son of a small shopkeeper. He went to sea as a cabin-boy, but disliking the life, entered the army, leaving again in 1789, when he married. During the excitement of the Revolution he re-enlisted 1792, and in the following year got command of a battalion. From that epoch his rise was rapid, and in 1796, when commanding the advanced guard of an army, he captured 90 guns. His services were at this period so brilliant that Napoleon termed him "The spoiled child of victory."

Field-
Marshal
André
Masséna

In private life he was shamelessly immoral, avaricious, notoriously dishonest, exacting a percentage on all sums he could touch. On this account he got into trouble with the Directory, and Bonaparte treated his peculations with a drastic hand. When the Emperor instituted his Continental System to conquer England by suppressing her seaborne commerce, many French officials made large fortunes by selling licences for merchants to trade with the English, or in other words to smuggle goods. General Bonaparte found Masséna out, and mulcted from him his ill-gotten gains from the above source alone £140,000. Masséna was ill-educated and morose, but on the field of battle he became a man of genius, indefatigable, indomitable, and resourceful. Mr. Oman, who for research cannot be surpassed as a mili-

André
Masséna

tary historian, records that Masséna was "hard, suspicious, and revengeful." It must be admitted that this severe criticism was generally accurate, but in the last year of his life he showed a singular absence of revengeful feeling. In consequence of his failure before Torres Vedras, he was recalled and stationed at Marseilles in disgrace by Napoleon, and he attributed his downfall in a great degree to the reports Ney made against him. After a conference of Field-Marschals in 1810 Masséna desired Ney to lead an aide-de-camp's sister who was the mistress of the Commander-in-Chief to the luncheon table. Ney who was a clean-living plebeian was so grossly rude that the woman fainted, and was carried away senseless.

Five years later Masséna who had taken no part in the "Hundred Days' War," was still in command at Marseilles, and was summoned by the Bourbon Government to attend as a member at the Court Martial of Marshal Ney, but he absolutely refused to sit, and was in consequence roundly abused by the Royalist Faction. Wellington estimated him as the "most astute, able commander of all the French generals whom he encountered."

French Line
of Attack

The French armies having evacuated Galicia, on the north of Portugal, the only roads available to them for the purpose of invading the country were from the south and on the eastern frontier. The city of Lisbon stands on the north shore of the Tagus estuary, and was covered on its southern side by an expanse of water, and as gunboats could go twenty miles up the estuary, which varies in breadth from four to fifteen miles, the city was wellnigh impregnable on the south so long as England ruled the seas, as she did in the case under consideration.

It might at first sight appear that the whole of the frontier of the eastern part of Portugal was open to attack, but practically there was only one line of advance available, and that was by the roads and tracks on the northern side of the Sierra Estella. Junot, indeed, marched on the south side of that range in 1807, but when he got to Lisbon he had with him only half a dozen very light guns and 1,800 bootless, footsore, worn-out men. His track lay over a series of barren uninhabited mountains, often without water for a stretch of ten miles in extent.

During the first six months of 1810 Lord Wellington's

cantonments were protected while his new Portuguese army was being formed, by Brigadier-General Robert Craufurd and the three battalions which had made the historical march, arriving too late to take part in the battle of Talavera. Craufurd had entered the army in 1779, and while Wellesley became Lieutenant-Colonel in six years, Craufurd served 26 before he gained the same grade. Wellington trusted him beyond every other subordinate except Graham. When he joined, the force numbered 4,000. From March to July, 1810, it covered Wellington's front. Craufurd, a fine horseman, speaking German fluently, worked himself with the officers commanding the squadrons of the 1st Hussars, King's German Legion, spread over a front of some 40 miles. The infantry were placed some way back behind the cavalry, which watched the Agueda river. Sir William Napier gives a graphic description of the system by which signal codes were arranged for day and night service, and in conformity with which Craufurd's force could assemble ready to move within seven minutes of an alarm.

General
Robert
Craufurd

Ciudad Rodrigo stands on a plain commanded by hills a hundred feet above it. General Andres Herrasti, who was 70 years of age, with a garrison of 5,500 men made a stubborn defence, when Marshal Ney besieged the place with 30,000 men, having 17,000 more within two days' march. Wellington had moved his troops up to Pinhel, Guarda and Celorico, having in all 33,000 men, about half of whom were Portuguese recruits of less than five months' training.

Ciudad
Rodrigo,
1810

The Spanish nation was vexed because Wellington would not advance and fight a battle to save the fortress. If he had done so, and gained a victory, he must have retired immediately afterwards, because, looking to the composition of his army, 33,000 men could not hope to fight successfully 80,000 Frenchmen who were within reach. That number would have been concentrated, and might have overwhelmed Wellington before he had time to retreat inside defensive works. If, on the other hand, he had been defeated, the Spanish cause would have probably been lost, for the British Government, harassed by an active Opposition, must have in all probability given up what seemed to be to many in England the impossible task of resisting Napoleon.

Ciudad Rodrigo capitulated July 9th. Besides the loss of life, Ney's troops had consumed all the local wheat avail-

Ciudad
Rodrigo,
1810

able, and moreover 15,000 draught oxen, which could not be replaced at once, had died during the siege. This delayed Ney's advance to drive General Craufurd back on Almeida, which was only 22 miles distant, until July 21st, when Craufurd, retiring, stood again only three miles from the French line of pickets.

Marshal Ney at dawn, July 24th, with 24,000 men, attacked Craufurd's little force, which was extended over 2,000 yards. It faced to the south-east, with its left on the fortress of Almeida and its right on a loop of the Coa river, there 70 yards wide, with the only bridge immediately behind the right flank. Even then, had Craufurd fallen back at once, he might have got away with comparatively little loss, but he still delayed, and eventually was only able to reach the west bank with much difficulty.

The 43rd (1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry) had maintained its position in spite of the danger of being overwhelmed, in order to allow the guns, and the 52nd (2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry) to retire in safety, and was in consequence much pressed by the advancing enemy.

Almeida,
1810

Marshal Ney then made the great mistake of trying to carry the bridge by heavy columns of attack. The French traditions were full of similar feats, as at Arcola, where Napoleon, "Le petit Caporal," himself planted a flag on the bridge under a hail of bullets, and again at Lodi, and now Ney himself without fear sacrificed two battalions in succession, and was then beaten back. He first sent the 66th Regiment of the line, and although it was gallantly led, yet its losses were so appalling that the men could not be induced to cross. The Marshal then ordered his aide-de-camp to carry the bridge at all costs with a battalion of picked shots of the 6th Corps. It numbered only 300, of whom 237 fell on or close to the bridge in ten minutes!

The officers of the 43rd and 95th (Rifle Brigade) behaved grandly, losing respectively 17 officers and 150 other ranks, and 10 officers and 140 men. Finally the survivors barricaded the bridge with piles of dead bodies, from behind which they held back Ney's troops. Marshal Ney sent in a truthful report of the morning's work, out of which Masséna concocted a dispatch so mendacious as to be incredible.

Wellington now drew back his troops, except one divi-

The Battle of Busaco

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sion, which he kept at Guarda to watch the Almeida road, and to keep up connection with General Hill in the south, retiring with his army on the left bank of the Mondego.

Wellington's
Retreat to
Busaco,
1810

Masséna having taken Almeida August 28th, advanced, reaching, with the infantry, Vizeu, September 21st, but the artillery only came up and with great difficulty 48 hours afterwards, the gunners having to precede the batteries on foot and mend the roads as they marched.

Lord Wellington retired on a parallel line to that followed by Masséna ordering General Hill, and also General Leith, who commanded the 5th Division, composed of one British and two Portuguese brigades, to join him.

The Vizeu-Martagoa-Coimbra road passes over the Sierra Busaco 15 miles north-west of Coimbra, the ridge of the mountains rising 250 feet above the general height of the surrounding features.

At Martagoa, which is rather more than half-way from Vizeu to Coimbra, four tracks pass over the wood-clad heights of Sierra Busaco in a general line north-east—south-west. One track passed north-west through the Boyalva pass, emerging at Sardao on the Coimbra-Oporto road. The other four roads could not be used by the French until the formidable ridge extending along the sierra had been occupied.

Wellington had sound reasons for fighting if he could obtain sufficiently good conditions. (a) He wanted to gain time for the clearing of large Supply depots which he had formed in Coimbra; (b) He wished to inure his young Portuguese troops to fire, and thus give them the confidence arising from a victory; (c) It was important for Wellington to win a victory in order to encourage the British Ministry to continue the war by showing them the possibility of defeating Napoleon in the Peninsula.

For these reasons Wellington had therefore selected a position 30 miles to the eastward of Busaco, anticipating that Masséna would advance in a straight line by the Celorico-Murcella road (but the Marshal had no trustworthy guides and very faulty old maps, and had turned away due west for Vizeu!).

The ridge selected by the British General for the battle fought September 27th stretched over nine miles, from the hill standing above Penacova on the east to that overlooking

Busaco,
1810

Paradas on the west, but from its commanding position, three hundred feet above the very rugged country over which Masséna's troops must advance to attack, it was easy for the defenders to move either way to support any threatened point, and in the result the fighting was carried on within a frontage of three miles of the convent. The convent stands slightly above the ridge, which after running westwards 6 miles from Penacova, near the convent turns West-North-West and ends above Paradas.

Marshal Ney and General Reynier reconnoitred the Busaco position at daylight, September 26th, and sent to Marshal Masséna an urgent recommendation for an immediate attack. The Marshal was, however, still in bed late in the forenoon, ten miles in rear, and arrived at the Front late in the afternoon.

Half an hour after daybreak, September 27th, the head of Reynier's Corps, 12 battalions moving in column, reached the summit of the hill on which patches of mist and fog still hung. They had mounted the steep slope with but trifling loss, reaching the crest between the Divisions of Generals Leith and Picton: the French troops were re-forming on an open expanse of boulder-strewn heather, the men still breathless from the steep climb, when the fog lifted, and then the Columns were smitten by musketry and artillery fire. Just then, at the critical moment, Colonel Wallace, commanding the Connaught Rangers, called on the Sherwood Foresters Regiment for co-operation, and charging with fixed bayonets drove the whole of Reynier's columns hurtling down the hill.

General Foy, who commanded the second Division, led up a brigade of seven battalions on a flank, and smiting two Portuguese battalions heavily drove them back. This impending attack had been foreseen by General Leith, who sent the Norfolk Regiment, assisted later by the Staffordshire, with fixed bayonets at the columns. They were pushed down the hill with the result that the batteries of Reynier's Corps were silenced, and 2,000 infantry rendered incapable of further effective action.

Marshal Ney now sent forward Generals Marchand and Loison from the north of Sula, Marchand directing his troops to march on the convent at the top of the hill. Pack's Portuguese brigade was extended in the intervening woods, and drove Marchand's men back with heavy loss. General

The Battle of Busaco

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Loison experienced great difficulty in advancing after he had passed the enclosures around the village of Sula, as his movements were checked by the fire of 1,300 riflemen of the Rifle Brigade, and 4th Cacadores. When the columns got clear of the hamlet they came under the fire of the British batteries, and the loss was great for the leading regiment, the 26th, moved all three battalions in column in mass, on the front of one company.

Busaco,
1810

General Craufurd had placed the Oxfordshire and Bucks Light Infantry in hollow ground out of sight, he standing somewhat higher up and farther to the eastward; he waited patiently until General Loison's two brigades straggling up the hill in two confused masses had got to within 20 paces when he gave the order as arranged, by waving his hat, adding the words "52nd, revenge Sir John Moore." The front of each column fell and then the two battalions of the Oxfordshire wheeling inwards, by their fire crushed the Centre and Rear, pursuing the disorganised mass to the foot of the hill.

Masséna who had brought 35,000 gunners and infantry into action, now fell back with 4,500 casualties, Wellington having lost 1,300 men.

The average effective range of the old musket, "Brown Bess," was less than 100 yards, but a French writer who was present in the action attributes the heavy losses of Masséna's army to the accurate shooting of the British soldiers, which was very superior to that of his own countrymen.

Wellington had 26,000 English and 26,000 Portuguese present on the battle-field, but three divisions were not engaged. The French officers led their men with marked gallantry and suffered severely in consequence, line tactics again prevailing easily against those of serried columns.

Wellington's
Retreat to
Torres
Vedras

Wellington fell back slowly on the Torres Vedras position, and Masséna came, October 10th, in sight of those vast works, of which he had never heard, although he had a score of renegade Portuguese officers and grandees on his Staff, one of whom was the principal landowner of the country around Coimbra. The French Marshal for a whole month looked, but looked in vain, for an opening by which he might penetrate the girdle of forts. In the meantime the Portuguese Militia and Ordenanza captured his Supply convoys, and his men must have starved even early in the winter

**Masséna's
Failure,
1810**

had he not dispersed them widely. He sent General Foy to see the Emperor at Paris, and beg him to send reinforcements, and after a fruitless attempt to cross the Tagus, cantoned his troops at Thomar, Santarem and Punhete, where the Zerere flows into the Tagus.

Masséna's failure, irrespective of his personal deficiencies in inducing officers and men to work willingly for him, was due to three main causes: (a) To the creation by Wellington of the Torres Vedras lines; (b) to the systematic, even though not thorough, devastation of the country outside the line of forts.

While Masséna's troops were eating their last Supplies outside Torres Vedras, Marshal Victor, who was investing Cadiz with 20,000 men, attacked General Graham (Lord Lyndoch) at Barrosa hill, as he was marching from Tarifa towards the French lines of investment.

Claude Victor (1764-1841) served in the ranks from 1781 for 10 years. He rejoined in 1791, commanded a battalion 1793 and, showing brilliant courage, was made a Field-Marshal after the battle of Friedland.

**Thomas
Graham**

Thomas Graham, of Balgowan, born in 1748, was employed in the defence of Toulon. Returning to London in 1794, Graham raised at his own expense, with the temporary rank of colonel, the 90th Regiment Perthshire Volunteers (2nd Scottish Rifles), of 1,000 rank and file.

His Majesty the King, on the recommendation of Sir John Moore, promoted Graham to be Major-General. He received his first independent command in February, 1810, at Cadiz, with the local rank of Lieutenant-General.

Victor was engaged in the investment of Cadiz in February, 1811, with 20,000 men.

Graham landed at Tarifa February 25th, 1811, with 4,300 men and 10 guns. On 27th the Spanish Captain-General La Peña landed with 7,000 Spanish troops; and Graham, to preserve unanimity and flatter Spanish pride, ceded to him the chief command. This was unfortunate, for La Peña was not only an incapable commander, but was also timid, and untruthful.

On the morning of March 5th, after a long and weary night march, the troops being under arms for sixteen hours, the Allied forces reached the Barrosa height.

Graham recognised the value of the height, and

The Battle of Barrosa


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before advancing on Cadiz asked that it should be held in strength. La Peña gave Graham a peremptory order to occupy the long narrow ridge of the Bermeja, two and a half miles further westward, marching through the pine wood on the slope in front of that position. Graham obeyed, but left on the Barrosa height the flank companies of the 9th (Norfolk Regiment) and 82nd (South Lancashire Regiment), under Major Brown, to guard his baggage.

Barrosa—or, as the Spaniards call it, the Cerro de Puerco—is a ridge 160 feet above the sea, trending inland until its farthest and loftiest extremity is about a mile and a half from the coast. It overlooks a broken plain of small extent, carpeted by flowering shrub, bounded on the south by the cliffs of the seashore, on the east by the forest of Chiclana, and directly in front by the pine-wood on the eastern slope of the Bermeja ridge. Victor had concealed his troops in the forest of Chiclana; Graham, as he entered the Bermeja pine-wood, saw no adversary, and the Spanish cavalry had reported it as “All Clear.”

Victor, leading Ruffin's troops, climbed the eastern side of the Barrosa ridge, drove the Spanish Rear-guard off the height in the direction of the sea, and took three guns. Major Brown retired into the intervening plain slowly and in good order, and sent across it to

Barrosa,
1811



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF BARROSA, MARCH 22, 1811

Barrosa,
1811

Graham for orders. The General, then in the pine-wood, sending the laconic command, "Fight!" faced about, and as he emerged from the wood, in front he beheld Ruffin's division, on Barrosa; down the slope towards the seaward the Spanish Rear-guard in rout, the French cavalry in pursuit; Laval on his own Left; La Peña had disappeared.

Major Brown lost no time in acting on Graham's order. He fell headlong upon Ruffin's column, posted on the Barrosa height; and although nearly half of his command went down under the enemy's volleys, he stubbornly maintained the fight until Dilkes's brigade of Guards, which had hurried across the plain, scrambled through a deep ravine and, never stopping even for a moment to re-form the battalions, came up. Without halting, and with but little order, but full of fighting ardour, the Guards charged up towards the summit, where Ruffin's column waited the assault. On the crest the gallant opponents met, and a fierce, and for some time doubtful, combat raged. The contest was sanguinary. Ten guns Royal Artillery under Major Duncan, engaged at close ranges, exercised a decisive effect. Finally the dauntless perseverance of the Guards, and the brave hardihood of Brown's, Norcott's and Acheson's detachments, overcame all resistance. At last, Ruffin himself and the Colonel commanding the two battalions of reserve Grenadiers fell mortally wounded; then the English pushed strongly forward, and their destructive fire drove the French off the height with the loss of three guns and many men.

During those fierce infantry combats on and about the Barrosa height La Peña looked on from a distance.

The fighting in the Battle of Barrosa lasted only an hour and a half. During that time 4,000 British soldiers defeated a French army of at least 9,000 men. The casualties were exceptionally severe in proportion to the strengths engaged. Fifty officers, 60 sergeants, and 1,100 rank and file were killed or wounded on the British side. The French loss exceeded 2,000 officers and men, and 400 prisoners. The trophies of the victory were six guns and an eagle.

Graham exposed the misconduct of La Peña; he refused with contempt the title of Grandee of the First Class voted to him by the Cortes; relinquished his command to General Cooke, and joined Lord Wellington's army.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1811

The French Retreat — Ney Disgraced — Almeida and Badajoz — Battle of Fuentes de Onoro — Marshals Marmont and Victor — Sir William Beresford Crosses the Guadiana — Battle of Albuera — Wellington at Badajoz — Retirement to Elvas — French Attempt to Raise the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo — French Surprised at Arroyo dos Molinos — Wellington as an Administrator.

THE French retreat from Portugal began March 5th, all but the daily essentials of existence having been previously sent back towards Spain. Lord Wellington had just dispatched part of his army to the southward, and not expecting Masséna to give way quite so soon, was unprepared to advance, so did not move forward till four days after the French retired. When he followed them he soon outmarched his Supplies, and had to wait near Foz d'Arouce until he could get rations brought up from the mouth of the Mondego.

The French
Retreat
from
Portugal,
1811

It may seem strange that Wellington had not purchased transport of his own, and was still relying on hired country carts, but he could not buy with paper money, and the Ministry had great difficulty in finding sufficient specie for his wants, even to pay the soldiers and camp followers. There had been no silver coined at the Mint for nearly thirty years, and the guinea was worth in England 25s. Throughout the winter he was urging the Ministry to send him more money in specie.

The French suffered terribly in this retreat, their troops having been weakened from the effects of receiving short rations during the winter. Marshal Ney commanded the Rear-guard, showing daily his superb qualities for that trying duty. Lord Wellington might have driven his troops in on several occasions, in spite of his masterly dispositions, but the English general's main object was to drive the French out of Portugal with the smallest loss of life to his own troops. He was always looking ahead, and wrote at

Campaign
of 1811 :
The French
Retreat

this time to the Government, "Almeida and Badajoz must be retaken."

As Masséna and Ney, on two different roads, retired, they were obliged again and again to sacrifice baggage, and even their Battery and Ammunition wagons, in order to use the horses for the gun teams. Masséna during the night, March 14th-15th, ordered the destruction of all his wheeled transport except a few ammunition wagons, Marshal Ney setting the example in his own Corps, by burning the carts which conveyed his personal baggage.

The 2nd and 8th Corps left Miranda de Corvo at night-fall March 14th, Ney with the 6th Corps following at 1 A.M. March 15th. Masséna had ordered Ney to cross the Ceira at Foz d'Arouce, and destroy the bridge of 100 feet in length over the river which was then in flood. The Marshal, instead of doing so, kept three brigades and a cavalry regiment on the west side of the river.

Wellington in Pursuit

The morning was foggy: Wellington would not march until it lifted, and it was therefore late in the afternoon before the 1st and 3rd Divisions, which were in front, came in sight of Ney's Rear-guard, and by order of their commanders, who did not imagine that any operation would be undertaken so late in the day, were encamping, when shortly before dusk Wellington, riding up, sent them forward and surprised Ney's Rear-guard, some of whom were panic-stricken.

Some companies of the 95th (Rifle Brigade), passing down a ravine, got into position close to the bridge, and drove off the 39th French Regiment, which plunged into the river, losing several men by drowning, and an Eagle, which was found later when the waters subsided. Marshal Ney retrieved the situation at the bridge by personally leading a charge which drove out the companies of the 95th, and enabled all on the west bank to recross, but with a loss of 250 men.

Ney
Deposed

When Marshal Masséna arrived at Guarda he cancelled his orders for the retreat on Almeida, and directed his army to prepare to cross the mountains through a roadless, uninhabited country into the valley of the Tagus. He deposed Marshal Ney, who had protested vehemently against the orders, from his command, ordering him to proceed to Valladolid and there await the Emperor's decision, and put

The Position at Fuentes de Onoro 319

General Loison, the senior General, in command of the 6th Corps.

Campaign
of 1811:

General Reynier a few days later also wrote protesting against Masséna's plans, and their remonstrances were followed up by protests from Marshal Junot and General Drouet. Then Masséna gave way, and recrossed the frontier into Spain, having lost in Portugal 30,000 men and nearly all his Cavalry and Artillery horses.

Investment
of
Almeida
and
Badajoz

Wellington, having driven the French out of Portugal, invested Almeida April 9th, and having arranged for the handling of his troops for all probable contingencies he could foresee in the event of their being attacked, rode rapidly to the southward to confer with General Beresford, meeting him just as he was about to undertake the investment of the fortress of Badajoz. The two Generals reconnoitred the fortress and discussed the plans for besieging it, and then Wellington, hearing that Masséna was collecting a provision convoy for Almeida, rode rapidly back to Fuentes de Onoro, where he had left troops in a selected position some twelve miles to the south of that fortress, whom he rejoined April 28th-29th.

Marshal Masséna, advancing May 3rd from Ciudad Rodrigo with 48,000 men, drove back the Light Division, which, with two regiments, was posted in advance of Fuentes de Onoro on the Agueda river. Masséna halted his convoy at Gallegos, 12 miles to the east of Wellington's position. When Wellington fought May 3rd and 5th, he had 8,000 less infantry, and in cavalry less than half of the French horsemen.

Fuentes de
Onoro

The British position, facing generally south-south-east, extended from the village of Fuentes de Onoro five miles to the northward to a ruin called Fort Concepcion. In front was the river Dos Casas, and two miles in the rear a smaller stream, the De Turon, the Coa river running nearly parallel but five miles farther back.

The village of Fuentes de Onoro, with the exception of a farm and a few houses, stood on the west side, or behind the Dos Casas, which is there broad and shallow, but the water-bed deepens as it goes northward and, becoming more rugged, is a ravine over a hundred feet deep near Fort Concepcion. Two miles south of the village there is a smaller hamlet, called Pozo Bello.

Campaign
of 1811:
Fuentes de
Onoro

Masséna reconnoitred May 3rd, but could not be certain how Wellington's position was occupied, for he, as usual, had concealed his troops as much as possible in folds of ground, so it was difficult for the Marshal to locate them, but in the afternoon he attacked the village with two brigades, and held for a time the farm and lower houses on the stream, but was then beaten back with 600 casualties. No further attack was made next day, as General Montbrun was trying to find out the best line of attack on Wellington's Right flank.

Masséna, at dawn, May 5th, had 14,000 troops ready to assault Fuentes de Onoro, then held by the 71st (1st Highland Light Infantry) Regiment, 79th (Cameron Highlanders) Regiment with 24th (South Wales Borderers) Regiment in support. There were 20,000 French assembled to the east of Pozo Bello ready to turn the British Right flank. A force of guerrillas, under Sanchez, posted on the hill at Nave de Aver, was surprised at dawn, but retreating rapidly to the southward, escaped without loss. Two squadrons 14th (Hussars) Light Dragoons had moved up in support to the guerrillas' bivouac during the night, 4th-5th, and made a brilliant resistance to General Montbrun's advance, never giving ground until their flanks were threatened. They were joined by two other squadrons near Pozo Bello, and resisted strenuously for an hour, when two French infantry divisions stormed Pozo Bello and the wood standing to the south of it, then held by two battalions of the 7th Division. As the infantry were leaving the wood and village they were ridden over by a Light cavalry regiment, losing 150 men, and would have been destroyed but for a gallant and opportune charge made by two squadrons King's German Legion, which, with the 14th Light Dragoons, then covered the broken infantry until they rejoined their division under General Houston. Its position was perilous, for with only two British battalions, the 51st (King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) Regiment and 85th (King's Shropshire Light Infantry) Regiment, and other newly raised Continental battalions, it was being outflanked by Montbrun's masses of cavalry.

General Robert Craufurd had only resumed command of the Light Division the previous evening, when he returned from leave of absence in England. Though he was much

disliked by officers, the men welcomed him warmly. Wellington now sent him from where the division was lying behind Fuentes de Onoro in reserve, to cover the retirement of the 7th Division. The confidence Craufurd felt in his men was fully reciprocated, and while he delayed the advance of the French masses of infantry, Wellington, pivoting on Fuentes de Onoro, in military language, "changed front, Right back," that is, he retired his Right flank until it stood at almost a right angle to the troops holding Fuentes de Onoro. Craufurd's resistance was so steadfast that Wellington had ample time to occupy his new front while the Light and 7th Divisions were retiring, for the French advanced but slowly.

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of 1811:
Fuentes de
Onoro

It is extraordinary to a cavalry student of war that Wellington should not have appreciated more highly than he did the work of his Cavalry, and Major Bull's troop of Horse Artillery, at least, on May 5th. There is some dispute as to the exact numbers of sabres present, for our military authorities have for 200 years acted illogically as regards their Mounted forces. We spend about three times the amount of money and time in training a horse soldier more than is required to train infantry, and then, instead of utilising them all on the field of battle, we employ large numbers as messengers and attendants on general officers. At Fuentes de Onoro there should have been 1,500 cavalry soldiers in the saddle, but both Sir William Napier and Major Tomkinson in their books give the number present as 1,000 sabres; on the other hand, there is no question but that Montbrun had 2,700 cavalry present.

French authorities have exhausted terms of eulogy in writing of this brilliant cavalry leader, calling him "le brave, l'intrépide, l'héroïque Montbrun," of whom Napoleon, writing November 3rd, 1806, says, "A Cavalry leader of the first class."

General Montbrun tried again and again to ride over the British squadrons, which, assisted by Major Bull's troop, protected the 7th Division, which was retreating in squares over as sound galloping ground as Newmarket Heath, according to General Sir Thomas Graham, who knew both places. The four cavalry regiments knew that they must be finally beaten, but that it was imperative for them to ride "home," especially in the earlier parts of

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the retreat, when it was necessary to gain time for a battalion, which had been broken up, to re-form its companies. The cavalry retired by alternate squadrons, and each squadron as it became in turn that nearest to the enemy, charged, and in every case drove back its opponents and pursued until its progress was arrested by the on-coming French Reserves. The squadrons never got out of hand, and though they lost 157 of all ranks, only five men were taken prisoners. The tactical skill of the officers was as exemplary as was the courage of the troopers.

Masséna had, however, got 15 guns up to the front, but on the only occasion on which they unlimbered close to the retreating Light Division, Captain Kripe led his squadron, 14th Light Dragoons, directly up to the muzzles of the guns, and although he was killed in the charge and his squadron suffered heavily, the delay that the attack caused enabled the threatened squares to get away to the rear. Major Bull's troop of Horse Artillery co-operated closely with the British squadrons, continuously checking the advance of Montbrun's masses, remaining in action again and again until the attacking squadrons were close up to the guns, the detachments relying, and with good reason, on their cavalry comrades.

After a brilliant defence of the lower part of the village by the 24th, 71st and 79th Regiments, General Drouet sent in three picked battalions, composed of the Grenadier companies of all battalions of the 9th Corps. The fighting was obstinate, and the losses were heavy on both sides, but eventually the Grenadiers got up close to the top of the hill, where, however, our three battalions stood firm.

At noon Drouet sent forward two fresh battalions, and although they were much impeded by the corpses strewn in the narrow streets of the village, and by the stern resistance of the remaining Highlanders in the houses, the French gradually pushed on, and carried the position at the church and the houses on the top slope of the hill, but there the advance was arrested.

Lord Wellington was close at hand waiting for the crisis, and now sent forward Brigadier-General McKinnon. He, leaving the 45th (1st Sherwood Foresters) in support, charged with the 74th (2nd Highland Light Infantry) and 88th (1st Connaught Rangers). The 88th, leading in column


The French Fall Back

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of sections, met the front of the 9th Léger at the church, and a severe struggle with the bayonet took place. While the 9th Léger, which was at the head of Conroux's division, was gradually pushed back, the 74th, charging down another lane, was followed by a cheering crowd of the remnants of the 71st, 79th, and part of the Light companies which had been supporting them. As soon as the first backward impulse was given to the French they were driven tumultuously out of the village, some of the British troops pursuing them being killed on the far side of the Dos Casas stream. The French retreated to their original position. In their attacks on the village they had lost 1,300 men, while the British had 200 casualties, mainly amongst the 71st and 79th Regiments, who were engaged throughout the struggle.

It was now 2 P.M., and the battle beginning at break of dawn, had been fought during an oppressively hot day, and each time the French had assaulted they had suffered severely. While Wellington's men, with the exception of the 7th Division, being in a good position, had been more

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PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF FUENTES DE ONORO, MAY 8th, 1811

(From Oman's "History of the Peninsular War," by permission of the Oxford University Press.)

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Onore

fortunate. Marshal Masséna now dismounted, and looked for a spot where he might break through the defence, but found none.

General Reynier, to the north of the village, was faced by the ravine, and on its west bank stood 10,000 British troops, whom Wellington had not brought into action. The fire gradually petered out during the afternoon; the Allies had 1,800 men down, and the French 2,800. Wellington's position was strong in itself, but there can be no doubt the force of Montbrun's turning movement had been broken by Craufurd's superb handling of the Light Division and the steadfast courage of the men who, profiting by the instruction imparted by Sir John Moore, had gained in mobility without losing their steadiness under fire.

Almeida

When day broke, May 6th, the French were still in position, and the British troops had entrenched their front, putting the guns in pits. Marshal Masséna remained on the ground he had occupied on May 4th until midnight May 7th-8th, and Professor Oman gives an interesting account of his proceedings. He had realised that he could not re-provision Almeida, and was distributing the stores amongst his army, the convoy being still halted at Galleggos. He offered £240 to any soldier who would carry into Almeida instructions for the Governor. Three men came forward; two disguised themselves as Spanish peasants, and, being caught, were hanged as spies, but the third, wearing uniform, crawled down the Dos Casas ravine to the north of the ruined Fort Concepcion, and then, still on his hands and knees, he passed through standing crops into the fort, and delivered the letter to General Brennier.

The Governor was informed that he must evacuate the fort, but was directed to destroy all the guns and ammunition, and to blow up the works, firing salvos at 10 P.M. as a sign that he understood his orders. This was done, and at midnight Masséna marched his troops back to Ciudad Rodrigo. Next day Lord Wellington sent his advanced troops to resume their position on the Agueda river, directing the 6th Division to watch Almeida, and warning the general officer in command that the French might probably try to escape. The General somewhat carelessly cantoned his division in villages three and four miles distant, and at midnight, May 10th-11th, Brennier.

French Escape from Almeida 325

marching out with 1,300 men, broke through the cordon of 6,000 and escaped over the Barba del Puerco bridge. He had done well, for he had destroyed his cannon and blown up the fortifications.

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of 1811:
Almeida

Lord Wellington censured all concerned, describing the failure to capture the garrison, which was inevitable if his orders had been obeyed, as "a most disgraceful affair." It seems, so far as records go, that the regimental and junior officers received censure which was more justly attributable to the two generals, and a sensitive lieutenant-colonel, when he learnt that his statements as to the non-receipt of orders was disbelieved, committed suicide.

General Foy, riding rapidly on his return journey from Paris, reached Ciudad Rodrigo May 10th, where Marshal Marmont had arrived two days earlier, reporting himself to Masséna as designated by the Emperor to replace Marshal Masséna in command of the 6th Corps.

When Marshal Masséna read the instructions brought by General Foy deposing him and ordering him back to Paris, he lost control of his temper, abused General Foy, and pointing to the envelope covering Napoleon's letter, which was slightly torn, insinuated that Foy had opened it to read its contents. This suspicion was wholly unjust, and could not have been imagined of General Foy by anyone but Masséna.

Marshal Marmont (1774-1852) had first attracted Napoleon's attention when serving with him in the artillery, and he accompanied the General to Egypt, for which expedition he had organised the artillery.

The opposing commanders in the Battle of Albuera were Marshal Soult and Sir William Beresford.

Albuera

Soult was one of the first Marshals created. The Duke of Wellington had a great respect for his talents as a commander.

Beresford, the illegitimate son of the Marquis of Waterford, was born in 1768. Money and interest pushed him on, and after 10 years' peace service he commanded a battalion. In 1809 he was appointed to the command of the Portuguese Army, and in March, 1811, was advancing on Badajoz with 22,000 men and 18 guns, following up Latour-Maubourg, who had evacuated his position at Campo Mayor.

**Campaign
of 1811:
Albuera**

Five troops 13th Light Dragoons after a spirited charge upset a larger force of French cavalry, and believing that they would be supported by the heavy cavalry, attacked the French artillery, cutting many of them down, and then galloped in pursuit of the fugitives up to the Bridge of Badajoz. On their return they encountered the French artillery in retreat. Sabring many drivers, they captured guns and baggage. When the 13th met the unbroken French infantry and the remnants of the beaten French cavalry, being without support, the Light Dragoons abandoned all, save one, of the captured guns. Their loss in this brilliant attack was 30 per cent. of their total strength. The French lost 300 of all ranks killed, wounded, or prisoners.

Beresford, ordered by Lord Wellington to cross the Guadiana at Jernmenha, encountered great difficulty from the want of materials for a bridge. A bridge was, however, completed on April 3rd, and the troops were to cross on the 4th. During the night there was a freshet which swept away the trestles. Major Squire, with boats constructed a flying bridge for the cavalry and artillery, and with the few pontoons in his possession and some casks found in the neighbouring villages, made a light bridge for the infantry, and by the evening of the 6th all the troops were across the river. Latour-Maubourg retired when he found his adversary occupying a strong position on the eastern side of it.

Soult, on May 10th, started from Seville to relieve Badajoz, and Beresford suspending siege operations occupied a line of undulating, bare, low hills varying from 50 feet to 150 feet above the Albuera stream, facing east, and from one and a half to two miles west of it, covering from north to south about three and a half miles. In front of the Right of the position was a wooded hill, standing in a fork formed by the junction of two streams with the Albuera river. These streams were fordable above the village, and there was a bridge near Albuera in front of the left centre of the Allies, where the road to Valverde crossed the river.

The numbers on both sides were approximately as follows: The Allies—Spaniards, 14,700; Portuguese, 10,000; British and Germans, 10,400; guns, 30; total, 35,100. French, 24,000 (21,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 40 guns).

Soult hoped, by fighting on May 16th, to separate the

English and Spanish armies; being unaware that Blake's army had joined Beresford at midnight, May 15th 16th. About 9 A.M. Godinot's division attacked the bridge of Albuera, but it was evidently a feigned attack, and Beresford therefore sent an order to Blake to form his second and part of his first line on the broad elevated plateau facing to the south at right angles to the general direction of the Allies' position.

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of 1811 :
Albuera

Rain now fell and screened the advance of the French infantry through the woods. Beresford rode to Blake, who, vain and punctilious, had refused to obey the first order, believing, moreover, that the real attack was at the village and bridge. He had similarly disregarded a second message, but at last proceeded to change front. Unfortunately, the movement was too late, and, before the Spaniards were drawn up in order on the summit of the beforementioned plateau, the French were upon it.

Professor Oman has, by his unrivalled capacity for taking pains, by his perusal of papers published by all four nations whose troops were engaged in the battle, and by his study of the battle-field, now made the story clear to all those who will take the trouble to follow his narrative with the excellently drawn maps in his volume.

Soult directed General Girard to take his and Gazan's division, followed by Werlé's brigade, which was 6,000 strong, to move on to the south-west end of the elevated ground west of the Albuera stream.

The Marshal left the actual formation to be adopted to Girard, who went forward in *une colonne serrée de bataillons*. This, translated into our drill book, means, "each division in a mass of brigades of battalions of double companies at quarter-column distance." Each battalion had four companies, who stood in three ranks. The front of each battalion was formed by two companies, and standing behind them were two more at quarter-column distance, i.e. the intervening space from front to rear of companies was equal to one-fourth of their frontage. The other battalions of the brigade were similarly formed, and standing behind the front battalion. Outside these two brigade columns a battalion marched in line on each flank, and outside these battalions in line marched either a regiment of three battalions, formed in columns like the centre columns, or a

Campaign
of 1811:
Albuera


column of one battalion. The object of these outside flanking columns was to protect the deployed battalion from an attack of cavalry on their flanks. They varied in strength according to the units they had detached to serve in the garrison of Badajoz.

It was intended that Gazan's division should move forward as a separate support, but when Girard's division began to suffer loss, Gazan's regiments instinctively closed up.

The huge mass, some 8,400 men, ascended to the high ground on a frontage of about half a mile, accompanied by three batteries, two batteries being attached to Werlé's brigade, which advanced later in support. As the French masses came within 60 yards of General Zaya's brigade, their skirmishers cleared the front, and the leading ranks of the column fired, and then advanced slowly after each volley.

Many French and Spaniards had fallen when General Stewart, commanding the 2nd Division, brought up his leading brigade. The Buffs (East Kent Regiment), the leading battalion of the brigade, passed to the right of the Spaniards, the 48th (1st Northamptonshire) and 66th (2nd Berkshire) moving through its right battalion, and all three came into action against the left flank of the French column. Cleave's battery of the King's German Legion pouring into the mass of Frenchmen case-shot at short range; while the infantry, with repeated volleys from their line, created terrible havoc in the mass. The two left columns of Girard's men facing to the left opened fire with their front rank men kneeling. The officers beat their men who, fearing the terrible slaughter, tried to run off to the rear, as the Buffs, 48th, and 66th, cheering, advanced closer to the mass. While the three battalions were thus occupied, the 31st (1st East Surrey) was still a little way behind, coming up to the highest part of the ridge in column.

The early morning had been fine, but later heavy clouds had been lowering, with mist and rain, and just as Colborne's brigade was delivering its attack, there was a violent downpour of hail. The three battalions were intent on crushing Girard's mass, and were themselves enveloped from time to time in the smoke of their own musketry. On the hill, 2,000 yards to the south-west, sat General Latour-Maubourg, who, seeing the breaking up of Girard's unwieldy masses



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA. MAY 16th, 1811

under the attack of Colborne's brigade, sent down against their unprotected flank the 1st Vistula Lancers, followed by the 2nd Hussars.

Colborne's three battalions were absolutely surprised, for the few officers and men who feeling the thud of the horses' feet had momentarily looked round, mistook the Lancers for Spaniards. The crash came, and in five minutes 58 out of 80 officers, and three-fourths of the brigade of other ranks, were speared, or ridden over. The havoc amongst the infantry was such as is seldom seen in brave troops.

Campaign
of 1811:
Albuera

The Poles left 130 out of 580 men on the ground, and the Hussars 70 out of 300. They drove off 480 men as prisoners from our battalions, carrying away five out of six Colours and a howitzer, being unable to remove three others they had captured for want of horses.

Now General Houghton's brigade coming into action, established itself on the hill, and the 31st fought by its side. Beresford thought that the battle was lost. Fortunately his staff officer, Colonel Hardinge (afterwards Lord Hardinge) was at his elbow, and, gathering what his intentions were, he said, "I think, sir, I ought to tell you that you have a peerage on the one hand, and a court-martial on the other," and Beresford, after a moment's reflection, said, "I will go for the peerage." Hardinge directed General Cole to attack with the 4th Division, and then "went to Abercromby," commanding Stewart's 3rd brigade, "and authorised him to deploy, and move past Houghton's left." While Houghton's brigade held the hill, Myers's Fusilier brigade and Abercromby passed the flanks on the right and left, and made a simultaneous attack on the enemy, who began to waver, and then went off to the rear.

The Fusilier Brigade was on the left of Cole's division, and Hervey's Portuguese brigade on the right. Colonel Hawkshawe, with a battalion of the Lusitanian Legion, flanked the advance in column. Cole brought his division up somewhat obliquely. When the 4th Division advanced, 5,000 bayonets in line, with a battalion in column on each flank, Soult sent into the fight Werlé's 6,000 men to protect Gazan's left flank, and ordered Latour-Maubourg to charge Hervey's Portuguese, but they were perfectly steady and drove off the squadrons. They behaved very well, but the brunt of the fighting was borne by the Fusilier Brigade. It had deployed before it reached the crest of the hill, and 2,000 Britons and 600 Portuguese fought 5,600 Frenchmen under Werlé, who used Girard's formation. He had three columns on a front of two companies each and nine in depth, so he had in each case only about 120 men, firing against 500, while Myers's battalions had each a separate column for targets. The brigade advanced steadily in line under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and gained the summit of the hill, and then ensued a furious duel. The French guns vomited forth grape in a continuous stream,

while under cover of their fire the heavy French columns strove to deploy, but the musketry of the Fusilier brigade swept away the heads of their foes' formations, though not without suffering fearful loss themselves. Myers, the Brigadier, fell stricken to death. General Cole and Colonels Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshawe were all disabled, and many other officers, together with hundreds of men, were killed or wounded.

Campaign
of 1811:
Albuera

Although the brigade, indeed, seemed on the point of being annihilated; yet firing and advancing, it pressed steadily but slowly onward, leaving behind it a constantly expanding field of dead and wounded men. In vain did Soult encourage his splendid troops; in vain did the latter fight with the historical gallantry of their race; in vain did the reserve, pushing to the front, strive to stem the ebbing tide. Our Fusiliers were not to be denied, the French reserve was swept away by the dissolving fragments of the leading combatants, and the "mighty mass gave way, and like a loosened cliff went headlong down the steep. The river flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and fifteen hundred unwounded men, the remnant of six thousand unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal field."

Sir William Beresford, in his dispatch, wrote that the dead, particularly those of the 57th (1st Middlesex Regiment), ever since known as the Die Hards, were to be seen "lying as they had fought in the ranks, and every wound in front."

General Stewart was twice hit but would not quit the field. General Houghton, who had received several wounds without shrinking, at last fell dead, pierced by three bullets, whilst cheering on his brigade.

The total casualties of the British and Alten's King's German Legion were 206 officers, and 3,953 out of 10,449 men engaged. Colborne's, Houghton's, and Myers's brigades lost five-sixths of the total casualties. The loss of the French was about 9,000, including five generals. The Spaniards' casualties were 1,368 out of 14,700; the Portuguese lost 390 out of 10,000.

At sunset both armies remained on the field, but during the night of the 18th Soult retired to Solano, and thence to Seville.

**Campaign
of 1811**

The only tactical ability shown in the battle was the well-timed and perfectly executed Cavalry charge initiated by General Latour-Maubourg on General Colborne's brigade.

The battle was won by the indomitable courage of the British Infantry, who conquered after losing half their numbers.

The savage Poles fought gallantly, but gave no quarter. After the collision many galloped on in the rear of the position. One Pole single-handed attacked a brigade staff, riding over men and horses, reaching eventually the Headquarters Staff before "he literally bit the dust." A comrade attempted to spear General Beresford, his lance passing under the powerfully built Irishman's arm, who, catching him by the throat, pulled him off his horse.

**Masséna
Evacuates
Portugal**

The day Masséna commenced his retirement from Santarem in order to evacuate Portugal, his colleague, Marshal Victor, was soundly beaten at Barrosa, five miles to the east of Cadiz, which he had blockaded with 15,000 men since January, when Marshal Soult had moved northwards to endeavour to capture Badajoz.

Badajoz

Lord Wellington, after his victory over Masséna, May 3rd-5th, 1811, at Fuentes de Onoro, rejoined Beresford at Badajoz, resuming the siege which had been raised to fight Soult at Albuera.

Lord Wellington made two assaults on the fortress, but, having no siege-train, failed, and when Marshal Marmont, having crossed the mountains south of the Douro, advanced into the Tagus valley, in conjunction with Soult, Wellington retired towards Elvas. Shortly afterwards scarcity of supplies obliged the French Marshals to separate, and spread their armies in order to feed them. Soult remained for some time at Seville, where he held a miniature Court, and Marmont returned to Salamanca.

**Ciudad
Rodrigo**

Lord Wellington marched back to the banks of the Agueda and tried to starve out the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo. He entrenched his head-quarters at Fuente Guinaldo, 17 miles south-west of the fortress, and stationed General Hill with 14,000 troops near Castel Branco and Elvas. Wellington's total force of 40,000 men was widely separated, as he was watching the Penamacor road against

The Fighting Around Ciudad Rodrigo 333

an advance by Marmont, and the Perales Pass over the mountains into the Tagus valley.

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of 1811:
Ciudad
Rodrigo

It thus happened that when Marmont received reinforcements through the Baños Pass, and concentrated north-east of the fortress with the troops of General Dorsenne, who had come to Salamanca from the north, Wellington was unable to prevent the French putting supplies into the fort, for Marmont now had 60,000 troops, and 100 guns.

Lord Wellington thought that when the fortress had been re victualled Marmont would retire, but he was mistaken, and incurred great risk when he stood alone with the 4th Division at Fuente Guinaldo, where some entrenchments had been thrown up. General Picton with the 3rd Division was at El Bodon, five miles south of Ciudad Rodrigo. Graham with the 1st and 6th Divisions was 15 miles away on the Azava river, guarding Ordnance stores which had been collected at Villa de Ponte, and Craufurd with the Light Division was at Martagon, 11 miles eastwards of the 4th Division.

The ground about Fuente Guinaldo and El Bodon being higher than Ciudad Rodrigo, Marmont was unable to detect how Wellington's troops were located. The Marshal had a division south of the fortress, and believing that Wellington would never stand where he was unless he was ready to fight, sent General Montbrun to push through one part of the British extended position, and to report on strength and the distribution of their troops.

Montbrun, September 25th, at 8 A.M., marched up the Ciudad Rodrigo-Fuente Guinaldo road, and General Wathier, with a brigade of Light cavalry, rode westwards to reconnoitre the Azava river somewhat earlier in the day. He drove in the cavalry screen, the troops of which formed up on either side of a wood, which was lined by Riflemen from General Graham's command. Wathier's Hussars were checked by a brisk fire from the wood, and being vigorously charged by squadrons of the 14th and 16th Light Dragoons (Hussars and Lancers), were broken up and pursued for two miles, Wathier reporting that the Azava was held strongly by a force of all arms.

When Montbrun moved up the road with four brigades, 2,500 sabres, the cavalry screen fell back, showing two British battalions and two Portuguese batteries, on the

Campaign
of 1811:
Ciudad
Rodrigo

Combat at
El Bodon

flanks of which the screen, consisting of 500 sabres, the 11th Hussars and King's German Legion, re-formed. The ground suitable for horsemen was there limited, and thus Montbrun's front necessarily remained contracted, and was charged in succession by the British cavalry half a dozen times, being driven back on each occasion. During these brilliant hand to hand encounters a French Dragoon brigade on the east side of the road charged a Portuguese battery, and though heavily smitten by case-shot, rode into it, and captured four pieces, the gunners standing up to their guns till the last moment. They suffered but trifling loss, for just as the Dragoons reached the guns, Major Ridge, commanding the 5th (Northumberland) Fusiliers, who was on higher ground behind the battery, advanced his battalion in line, close up to the triumphant horsemen, who were busy amongst the guns, and with three volleys at close range sent them galloping down the hill in disorder, followed by the shells of the batteries, which the Portuguese gunners again brought into action. Ridge was the officer who led up the ladders raised against the castle wall at Badajoz six months later, and of whom Napier in his History wrote: "Ridge fell, and no one died that night with more glory."

The ground over which the Rear-guard was now moving becoming more open, General Montbrun spread out his squadrons, and General Picton covered the retreat, with the 5th (Northumberland) Fusiliers, 77th (2nd Middlesex) Regiment, and two squadrons of the King's German Legion. After an hour's respite from attack, when the Rear-guard had nearly overtaken the remainder of its brigade (Colville's), Montbrun, driving in the Hussars, charged the squares of the 5th and 77th on the south-east and west sides simultaneously. The infantry reserved their fire until the horsemen were within thirty yards, and then drove the cavalry off in disorder, when they were charged by the King's German Legion Hussars.

Half an hour later Montbrun's squadrons again advanced, and marching alongside of the column for six miles across a level plain, harassed it again and again with their Horse artillery. General Picton rode on the danger flank of the Rear-guard, declining to form squares, even when Montbrun's cavalry, riding up to within pistol-shot, inclined towards the road as if about to charge. The Rear-guard was

Wellington Retires from Ciudad Rodrigo 335

now approaching the position of the 4th Division, and the 3rd and 4th Dragoon Guards coming out from the camp, Montbrun retired his columns.

Campaign
of 1811:
Ciudad
Rodrigo

When Marmont realised how few infantry were in front of him he sent back to Ciudad Rodrigo orders for the infantry division he had left on the south side of the fortress to come up. It had, however, moved westwards to support Wathier, and the other three divisions, being on the north side of the fortress, did not arrive until sunset, when 20,000 men were assembled.

Marmont hesitated to attack all September 26th, crediting Wellington with his reputation of never fighting unless he was in a good position, and with troops enough to hold it. The Marshal through his telescope saw imaginary closed redoubts, armed with heavy guns, resting on precipitous hills, and retired eastwards that night.

Lord Wellington had quite realised his critical position, and he moved also, but in a south-westerly direction, and when Marmont found out that Wellington was retiring he was too late to be able to harass his retreat. Lord Wellington in his dispatch, September 29th, eulogised the conduct of the troops, praising the cavalry for the vigour of their repeated charges, and declaring that the 5th and 77th Regiments had given "a memorable example of steadiness and discipline."

Before the year closed, General Hill, one of Wellington's trusted subordinates, with Howard's brigade, executed some long marches, which resulted in the capture of three guns and 1,300 Frenchmen at Arroyo dos Molinos, and the dissolution practically of a whole brigade, cutting out a portion of General Girard's troops, who were collecting supplies in Estremadura.

Arroyo dos
Molinos


Hill assembled his troops at Portalegre, and marched, October 23rd, over goat-paths across a high mountain chain to the Spanish fortress of Albuquerque. The next day he marched 20 miles to Casa del Santillana, and when night fell he marched on to Malartida, but on arriving there found that Girard had left Caceres, Hill's objective, for Torremocha, 20 miles south-west of the place where Hill had hoped to surprise him.

Hill turned the head of his brigade, which was leading a combined force of about 10,000 men, mainly of Spanish



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**Campaign
of 1811:
Arroyo dos
Molinos**

troops, and marching parallel to Girard, on arriving at a pass over the Montaches range, learnt from peasantry that Girard had left Torremocha, making for Arroyo dos Molinos. Hill appealed to the men, and marching throughout the night they covered 28 miles, crossing two mountain ranges, while Girard, who although he had been warned by friendly Spaniards, did not believe that he was in any danger, had marched only 12 miles.

The weather had been deplorable for 24 hours, and when at 3 A.M. General Hill, who had got down to the south of Arroyo dos Molinos, advanced towards the town he did not meet a single picket or sentry until he was close in, when Howard's brigade, 71st (Highland Light Infantry) and 92nd (2nd Gordon Highlanders) came on a French picket huddled together under trees, with their backs turned to a blinding rain. Hill had cut in between the main body and a cavalry regiment and infantry brigade, for these units were marching on Merida in advance of Girard's force which was then preparing to follow, the cavalry saddling up, the infantry assembling from their billets, and the General being at breakfast in the house of the Mayor.

General Hill had blocked all three roads leading out of the town. He captured General Bron, 30 officers, 1,300 men and three guns, but General Girard and some of his Staff escaped on foot up the sides of the steep mountain, under a shoulder of which the town stands. Those troops who were not captured then threw away their arms and dispersed.

**Wellington's
Conduct of
the
Campaign**

Some writers hold that the campaigns of 1811 were Wellington's most brilliant successes. They show clearly the great military advantages of the British Supply system, irrespective of questions of Right and Wrong. Wellington paid for all local supplies in cash, and feeding his regiments from depots, could keep them massed in one position as long as he desired; the French, on the other hand, subsisting on the country, could never remain concentrated for more than a few weeks.

Wellington used to say laughingly of himself, "I may not be a great General, but I am the best Commissariat officer in the Army." In fact, no British Army leader in the field, with the exception of Marlborough, has ever been

The Army and Politics

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his equal, considered as an administrator, strategist, and tactician.

It may be hoped that the Army will in time become neutral as regards politics—as the Navy is now—and all questions affecting it be considered as outside party strife. During the Peninsular War the Opposition in Parliament did not hesitate, in order to gain party advantages, to declare to their own dishonour that the crossing of the Douro was merely a trifling affair, and opposed the votes of thanks to Wellington and the Army for the victories at Talavera and other places.

CHAPTER IX

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1812

Wellington's Supply System—The San Francisco Redoubt—The Assault on Ciudad Rodrigo—Badajoz—A Premature Attack—The Light Division at Badajoz—San Vicente Ramparts—Triumph of the 5th Division—A Terrible Slaughter—Wellington's Grief—Strategical Position—The Crossing of the Guarena—Salamanca—The Occupation of Madrid—Southern Spain Evacuated by the French—Wellington's Homogeneous Army—Wellington's Captures—Siege of Cadiz Raised—Siege of Burgos—Winter Quarters.

Wellington's Supply System

IN December, 1811, Napoleon had withdrawn from Spain the Imperial (Young) Guard and other troops, but there were still 250,000 French soldiers in different provinces, and as all the districts became more and more depleted in supplies it became necessary to separate the troops more widely, till at last, being spread out on a frontage of 500 miles, they required some weeks to concentrate.

Lord Wellington had 40,000 men on the Coa river, where he was collecting Siege materials, so far as that could be done by the troops locally. He ordered General Hill to demonstrate in Estremadura against Marshal Soult, which had the desired effect of drawing him towards Badajoz.

The advantages of Wellington's Supply system were great, but so long as the French held Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz he could not invade Spain without incurring great risk, and that this was appreciated by Napoleon is clear, for he wrote to Marmont, who felt uneasy about Badajoz, "You must suppose the English to be mad if you imagine that they will march on Badajoz while you are at Salamanca, and could get to Lisbon before their return."

Wellington had failed in 1811 to capture Badajoz from want of a Siege-train. This, however, had now been provided from England and was stored in Lisbon. Wellington had it openly re-embarked, as if to be returned to Portsmouth, but it was transferred at sea into small vessels, and carried up the Douro to Lamego, and thence re-transported to near Almeida, which is only 20 miles from Ciudad

Investment of Ciudad Rodrigo 339

Rodrigo, being pulled across the plains on specially constructed drays.

Campaign
of 1812:
Ciudad
Rodrigo

Wellington invested Ciudad Rodrigo January 8th, 1812, and it was in danger before Marmont could arrive to relieve it, he having heard of the investment only January 15th.

The fortress stood on rising ground in a nearly open plain with a rocky surface. About 100 feet above it, but to the northward there were two hills respectively some 180 and 600 yards distant from the ramparts. The first of these, called the Lesser Tesson, was about on a level with the walls; the second, or Greater Tesson, rose a few feet above them.

Upon the Greater Tesson an enclosed and palisaded redoubt had been constructed, called San Francisco, and this prevented any Siege operations on this side while it was in the enemy's hands. The town itself was defended by a double line of fortifications—one, the inner, an ancient wall of masonry; the second, outside it, constructed to cover the inner wall. The latter is known in old-fashioned fortifications as a "fausse braie." It gave but little defence, being set far down the slope of the hill. Besides the foregoing work, the suburbs of the town were defended by an earthen entrenchment hastily thrown up by the Spaniards two years previously. Since the French had held Ciudad Rodrigo they had utilised three convents, large and substantial buildings, in the general defence, fortifying them and placing guns in battery upon their flat roofs.

Four divisions were employed in the siege. As the weather was bitterly cold and the army had no tents, and there was no cover on the north side, the regiments occupied cantonments on the south bank among the villages, one division crossing daily in turn carrying cooked food, and entrenching tools. The men waded through water sometimes up to the waist. No fires could be lighted in the trenches, and the soldiers' wet clothes often froze on the men during the night.

Wellington having decided to attack from the north side, assaulted the redoubt of San Francisco. It was carried on January 8th in most gallant style by a portion of the Light Division, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Colborne, one of the most brilliant of the soldiers in the Peninsular War, later Field-Marshal Lord Seaton.

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of 1812:
Ciudad
Rodrigo

They moved forward about 9 P.M., and sprang over the palisades without waiting to break them down. Then, mounting the parapets, forced the gorge of the redoubt. Such undaunted courage was irresistible. The garrison of the redoubt were all killed or made prisoners, and with only trifling loss on our side.

The capture of the redoubt was the signal for "breaking ground," as it is called, the digging of the first trench or parallel—the first of the series of zigzags or approaches—under cover of which the assailants creep up to a fortress which is being besieged. A brigade covered this operation, and 700 men with pick and shovel laboured to such purpose that a trench 3 feet deep and 4 feet wide was dug before daylight. The work was continued the next night, 1,200 men being regularly employed.

The bombardment was continued without intermission until January 18th. Then Wellington summoned the place to surrender. The commandant refused, declaring "my brave garrison prefers to be buried with me under its ruins." Wellington issued his orders, prefacing them with the memorable words, "Ciudad Rodrigo must be taken to-night."

The 3rd and Light Divisions were on duty. To the first was entrusted the assault upon the main breach, to the latter that on the lesser, or breach near the tower.

The assault was initiated by Pack's Portuguese troops at 7 P.M. A regiment under Colonel O'Toole crossed the river and attacked the work in front of the castle. The 5th (Northumberland Fusiliers) and 94th (2nd Connaught Rangers) Regiments, supported by the 77th (2nd Middlesex Regiment), covered the attack of the main breach by Mackinnon's brigade. While Wellington in person on the left was instructing Napier how to move with the Light Division stormers, the 3rd Division rushed on to the breach. First came a party of sappers with haybags to fill up the ditch; then the stormers, 500 strong, under Major Manners, preceded by a Forlorn hope; then the brigade. The whole space between the advanced parallel and the ramparts was alive with troops advancing reckless of the iron tempest that thinned their ranks. The column from Santa Cruz made good its entrance and secured the opening between the two walls of defence, driving the French

before them. This cleared the ground for Mackinnon's men, who pressed gallantly on; but from behind a retrenchment the defenders resisted stubbornly.

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of 1812:
Ciudad
Rodrigo

While the assailants were seeking to cross the ditch, a mine was sprung with an explosion which proved fatal to many, including the brave Mackinnon. The survivors held their ground; and now Mackie, who led the Forlorn hope, clambered over the rampart wall and dropped inside, finding there an opening on one side of the main breach by which an entrance was possible. Climbing back, he led his men by this road into the interior of the place. About this time they encountered and joined O'Toole's Portuguese Regiment, and, these columns having made good their footing, established themselves strongly among the ruined fortifications, awaiting the result of their comrades' attack.

General Robert Craufurd, while personally directing the advance of the stormers of the Light Division, was mortally wounded, but his troops raced for the breach, distant 300 yards, under heavy fire, and without waiting for the ladders, dropped down 11 feet into the ditch. The main body was checked at the breach because the opening was so narrow. This crushed the attacking column into a compact mass, upon which the enemy's fire told with terrible effect. Just then George Napier, its leader, was struck down. The men halted, irresolute, and, forgetting they were unloaded, began to snap their muskets. Then their wounded chief, from where he lay disabled, shouted, "Push on with the bayonet!" and the stormers answered the inspiring command with a loud "Hurrah!" and pressed forward. The breach was carried; the supporting regiments—Vandeleur's brigade—1st and 2nd Oxfordshire and Bucks Light Infantry, "coming up in sections abreast, gained the rampart, the 52nd wheeled to the left, the 43rd to the right, and the place was won." The British casualties were 1,300 killed and wounded. The French lost 300 killed, 1,500 out of 1,800 being taken prisoners.

Wellington, now bent on capturing Badajoz, sent on his infantry to the southward, and remained behind with cavalry to watch the frontier, until the day on which his troops crossed the Tagus, and then rode down to rejoin them.

On March 16th, 1812, a British force 22,000 strong, with a battering train of 52 guns, reached Badajoz, Wellington

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of 1812:
Badajoz

having sent General Hill with 30,000 to contain Marshal Soult.

General of Brigade Philippon commanded in Badajoz with a force of 4,742 men.

Badajoz 300 feet above a plain presented a formidable task to a besieging army, being protected on one side by the river Guadiana, 500 yards wide in places, and having several outworks, notably one called the Picurina, on a hill to the south-east. Philippon had, moreover, taken every means possible to strengthen the fortress.

On the night of the 17th, 2,000 men broke ground, 160 yards from the Picurina, the sentinels on the ramparts hearing nothing in the howling wind; at daylight 3,000 yards of communication, and a parallel 600 yards long, had been thrown up, on which the garrison opened fire.

The Siege train was of different natures, some pieces dated from the days of the Spanish Armada; others were cast in the reigns of the Stuarts.

Wellington had, moreover, great difficulties to contend with in many directions.

The Guadiana rose and tore away the pontoon bridge which connected the troops with the stores at Elvas; it was replaced, however, but we got nearer to the walls, the fire from the Picurina being galling. It was captured after hard fighting during the night March 24th-25th.

The firing from the town ceased at midnight, but at dawn the garrison turned their guns on to the captured fort, driving out the garrison and crumbling it to pieces.

Three breaching-batteries were constructed, one against the Trinidad bastion, another to shatter the Santa Maria, and the third—which consisted of howitzers—was to throw shrapnel into the ditch and so prevent the garrison from working there. In eleven days, in spite of obstacles, considerable progress was made.

The breaches became larger as masses of stone and rubbish fell into the fosse below, and, on April 6th, a gap showed in the masonry of the curtain between two bastions.

Then came a crisis. Generals Soult, Drouet, and Darican were approaching; a battle was imminent which would need all the British forces.

The original order for the Assault, 7.30 P.M., was altered later to 10 o'clock, and during that interval the French placed a revolving beam of sharpened sword-blades in the gap between the bastion; piles of shot and shell were laid along the ramparts, with beams of wood, old carriage-wheels, and every conceivable missile that their ingenuity could devise.

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Badajoz

About nine o'clock, April 6th, four companies of the 95th Rifles crept forward and lay down, under the crest of the glacis, within a few yards of the French sentinels, whose heads could be seen against the sky. One of them peered over the parapet: something had caught his ear, for he cried "*Qui vive?*" Not satisfied, he again challenged, and, receiving no reply, fired his musket into the darkness; and instantly the drums of Badajoz beat to arms. For ten minutes more the riflemen lay motionless, until the Forlorn hope came up, and then, each man sighting carefully at the heads which showed above the rampart, poured in a volley, and the attack began.

This was unfortunate, for Wellington intended all our assaults to take place simultaneously; moreover the garrison threw a "carcass" from the walls, and by its powerful blaze they saw the 3rd Division drawn up under arms; so the order was given, "Stormers to the front!"

The 3rd Division had only twelve ladders but they reared them against the masonry, and fought with each other who should be first to ascend. Stones, earth, live shells, beams, heavy shot, and a rain of musket-balls poured down; those men who reached the top were stabbed and flung on to the others behind them—here a cheer as a man grasped the coping—there a howl of rage as the ladder was hurled broken from the wall and all its occupants flung in a heap below.

A corporal of the 45th fell wounded on hands and knees, a ladder was placed on his back in the confusion, his comrades mounting above him, and he was found next day crushed to death, the blood forced from his ears and nose. Several of the ladders were broken, and those that remained were flung off repeatedly by the garrison on the ramparts, until the French cried "Victory," and the 3rd Division retired to re-form.

Meanwhile, the 4th and Light Divisions marched quickly

Campaign
of 1812:
Badajoz

on to their assigned breaches, and the trench-guard rushed at San Roque and—bayoneting its defenders—carried the lunette.

As the firing commenced at the castle the heads of the columns reached the glacis, finding the place wrapped in gloomy silence. The ditch yawned beneath them, and the stormers threw their hay-bags into it, and lowered the five ladders which had been supplied for both divisions!

The ditch was crowded with the stormers, and men were waiting their turn to follow down the ladders, when a tongue of flame lit up the darkness, a terrific explosion seemed to rend the earth itself, and five hundred survivors of 4 hours' carnage at Albuera a year earlier were blown into eternity under the eyes of their comrades on the glacis above them. For a moment the Light Division stood aghast, the next they were leaping, sliding, climbing, never heeding the depth, into the gory grave that lay between them and the breaches.

Down went the 4th Division and mingled with them: the ditch was full of shouting red-coats, all struggling, regardless of rank, to get at the French, who, yelling defiance in their turn, showered grape, round-shot, canister, hand-grenades, stones, shells, and buck-shot upon them; rolling huge cannon-balls from the parapet, sending barks of timber thudding into the living mass of Britons pent up in the death-trap below.

Bursts of dazzling light were succeeded by moments of intense darkness; for an instant the huge bastions showed, bristling with armed men, to be lost again, till re-illuminated the next minute by the flashing guns—by wavering port-fires, and trailing rockets. The French had dug in the main ditch a long cut, 17 feet deep, which was nearly full of water. In it a hundred "Albuera Fusiliers" were drowned unseen; the air was heavy with gunpowder smoke; individuals and regiments surged and scrambled seeking a passage; until at last, getting on to an unfinished ravelin, mistaken in the confusion for a breach, both divisions came together, and great disorder ensued.

At length there was a rush for the great breach. Officers and men, having extricated themselves from the carnage below, ran on, to find an impenetrable barrier of sword-blades fixed in wooden revolving beams, and set firmly

Failure of the Attack

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
across the opening, while the rubbish in front was strewn with planks covered with spikes: if a soldier trod on one of them it slid down, either throwing him on the spikes or on to the bayonets of his comrades.

Campaign
of 1812:
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It was not until the slaughter had gone on for *two hours* that the diminished Divisions withdrew, and stood furious and exhausted, still under a fire that was thinning their broken ranks, while the enemy cried mockingly to them, "Why don't you come into Badajoz?"

About midnight Wellington ordered the troops back to reform for another attack, but in the meantime Picton's (3rd) division had rushed forward again, led by Colonel Ridge, who placed a ladder against the castle wall, where an embrasure offered a chance of foothold. Canch, a Grenadier officer, reared a second one alongside it, and the two mounted together, followed by their men, securing the ramparts after a desperate hand to hand conflict, and were successful in their endeavour to drive the enemy out of the castle into the town.

The garrison sent reinforcements, and there was a sharp passage of arms at the gate, our men firing from one side



PLAN OF THE SIEGE OF BADAJOZ, 1812

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Badajoz

almost muzzle to muzzle with the blue-clad, square-shakoed French on the other; but we kept the castle, though the gallant Ridge was slain.

It was about half-past eleven when the 3rd Division succeeded in their escalade. About the same time the 5th Division, under Lieutenant-General Leith, reached the breastwork before San Vicente at the west end of the town. All was silent around them; the murmur of the river rose on their left, the fortifications showed clearly before them as the moon came out. They cleared the paling and jumped into the ditch, crossing the cunette with difficulty and finding the ladders too short for the top of the escarp; the engineer was killed, and a small mine exploded in the ditch, but fortunately the ramparts at San Vicente had been thinned of their defenders, who had gone to fight Picton's men in the castle, and three ladders were placed under an embrasure where there was a gabion instead of a gun and where the scarp was only 20 feet high.

Hand over hand, the troops clambered up under a fire that struck down dozens, and the topmost stormers had to be pushed up by those behind in order to reach the embrasure; but as the leading men got a foothold, they pulled the others up, until the red-coated mass grew larger and larger, and then half the King's Own attacked the houses while the rest of the Division charged along the ramparts, pushing the stubborn garrison out of three bastions in succession. Shouts mingled with the crash of grape-shot and the hum of shells; yells and curses were heard amid the boom of cannon and the incessant crack-crack of muskets fired at close quarters.

General Philippon and Colonel Vielland, the second in command, though both wounded, hurried, sword in hand, from rampart to rampart, encouraging their men, while the solemn chime of the cathedral rang out unnoticed hour after hour of that night of horrors.

The King's Own had entered the town at the first onslaught of Leith's division, and in strange contrast to the uproar of the bastions, with bayonets fixed and bugles blowing, they filed through the streets, silent and deserted as a tomb; every door shut, lamps alight in many of the windows, but not a soul abroad except some French soldiers leading ammunition mules, who were taken prisoners.

The Trinidad and Santa Maria were still wellnigh impregnable, in spite of their shattered condition; but the capture of San Vicente had let the British in *behind* them; so Philippon with some soldiers crossed the bridge into San Christoval across the Guadiana, where he surrendered next day with all his surviving men.

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The ditch, the slope, from the edge of the glacis to the top of the bastions, resembled a huge slaughter-house, nearly 2,500 Britons having fallen between the Santa Maria and La Trinidad alone, within a space of a hundred square yards. The 43rd and 52nd (1st and 2nd Oxfordshire and Bucks Light Infantry) lost 670 men between them.

The place presented a shocking appearance as the result of the explosions which had taken place.

Five British generals were wounded, 5,000 officers and men had fallen during the siege, and when Wellington stood in the breach and looked around him at the scene of carnage, he burst into tears.

The fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz reversed the previous strategical position of the British and French armies. For whereas since Junot in 1808 first occupied Lisbon, the French had either been in possession of Portugal, or of the frontier fortresses, and thus stood in the way of invasion of Spain, now Wellington had the power of advancing on Madrid either by the Douro valley on the north, or by the Tagus on the south, whenever he should have men enough to justify his attempting the invasion. He eventually determined to enter Spain according to the plan adopted by Sir John Moore in 1808, which he had himself suggested for that campaign.

Strategical
Position,
1812

Wellington crossed the Tormes river June 17th, and captured some small forts at Salamanca June 27th, and Marmont retiring north of the Douro, which was then in flood, guarded the river from the bridge at Toro on the west, that of Tordesillas in the centre, and Simancas to the east on a frontage of 30 miles. The British troops faced the French position on the south or left bank of the river, on a frontage of 22 miles from the Guarena river, opposite to Toro on the west, to Rueda on the east.

Salamanca

Wellington hoped that Marmont, owing to want of food, would be obliged to retire after a few days, but he

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Salamanca

held on. It was impossible to cross the river without severe fighting, and, while he was waiting, Marmont moved, July 15th-16th, to Toro, where, having crossed, he advanced a short distance to the southward, and then counter-marching his troops throughout the night up the river bank, they crossed unopposed at Tordesillas, having covered from forty to fifty miles without a halt.

Lord Wellington heard of the French being across the river on the night of the 17th at Toro, where he had gone on learning of the French advance in that part of the position. He drew in his Right from Rueda, concentrating on the west bank of the Guarena, which river, like the Trabancos, runs due south to the Douro river. Wellington's Right in falling back from the Trabancos was followed up closely by the French July 18th, but when they attempted to cross the Guarena in the evening they were repulsed.

Both armies were about Canizal July 19th. That evening Marmont marched his troops southwards up the right bank of Guarena, and Wellington conformed, moving up the opposite bank. Both Commanders wished to cross the Tormes river, which flows from the mountains northwards as far as Huerta, and there bending sharply westwards, reaches Salamanca in ten miles, whence it flows in a north-west direction to the Douro.

Wellington's object was to cover Salamanca and the high road leading to Ciudad Rodrigo 50 miles south-west of it, to threaten which it was necessary for Marmont to cross the river.

The fords, naming them from upstream, were at Alba de Tormes, then 10 miles lower down Huerta, where there was a good ford, and between that last-named place there were fords at Aldea Lengua and Santa Marta, the last only four miles from Salamanca. Wellington had placed a garrison in Alba de Tormes, so imagined that ford would not be attempted by Marmont, but the Spanish officer in command abandoned the fort on the approach of the French, and without reporting his departure to Wellington.

For some hours, July 20th, the opposing armies, horse, artillery, and foot, marched within musketry range of each other, over parallel ridges, the artillery firing, it is true, an occasional shot, but the officers of the rival armies saluting each other from time to time. Either General

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would have attacked if he had seen a favourable opening. The French outmarched the British troops, and reached the Huerta ford, held it, and that of Alba de Tormes, in the fort commanding which, abandoned by the Spanish, they placed a garrison.

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Salamanca

Next day, July 21st, both armies crossed at the fords they were holding, the French using Alba de Tormes and Huerta, and the British Aldea Lengua and Santa Marta. Wellington, leaving General Pakenham entrenched on the Right or north bank between Huerta and Santa Marta, extended the remainder of his troops on a ridge of low hills, from near Santa Marta, on the river, to the straggling village of Arapiles, occupying a frontage of nearly three and a half miles, and facing generally north-east. Immediately to the right front of the British line were two nearly isolated circular hills, standing 100 feet above the plain and to the east of the village, called Arapiles, which is built on low ground. The hills were 500 yards apart, and later got the name of the English and French Arapiles, from the nationalities occupying them, after what was practically a race, and from the fact that the two Commanders, Wellington on the western and Marmont on the eastern hill, stood on the summits to overlook the battle-ground.

At daybreak on July 22nd the positions of the two opposing armies were as follows:

Wellington had the 3rd Division still on the right bank, as he did not feel certain by which side Marmont would advance. The left flank of the army rested about Santa Marta in the low ground; the right extended eastwards towards the village of Arapiles and the hills of that name.

Marmont's army had crossed the river by the fords at Huerta and Alba de Tormes, and had occupied the heights opposite the English from Calvariza Aniba to Nuestra Señora de la Pena. Marmont, seeing columns of dust rising from the Ciudad Rodrigo road, concluded that the enemy was already in retreat.

He directed General Thomières, supported by the Light cavalry, to march on Miranda, 6 miles due South of Salamanca, which movement would take him across the British new Front and intercept the English in their supposed retreat; while he would fall upon them at the Arapiles vil-

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Salamanca

lage. Thomières's movement was a tactical error. The French Left was separated from the Centre and the Right; both were far back still in the woods to the rear, or crossing the river.

Wellington rode to the English Arapiles hill, and from that high ground realised Marmont's plan.

The English line had until then faced north-east from the river at Santa Marta to the Arapiles hill; hereafter it faced south from Aldea Tejada on the Right to the Arapiles village, and hill, which became the Left. This Left was held by the 4th Division; the 6th and 7th Divisions were massed in a hollow behind, and below the Arapiles hill; the 3rd Division was brought across the river, and being posted at Aldea Tejada, became the Right of the line.

Wellington formed his troops in three lines; the first consisted of the 4th and 5th Divisions, with some Portuguese on their right, and beyond them the Heavy cavalry. In the second line were the 6th and 7th Divisions, with the Light cavalry on their right; and in Reserve the third line, made up of the 1st and 8th Divisions, the rest of the Portuguese, and more cavalry. As soon as the above-mentioned changes of position were completed, Pakenham was ordered to come up from the Right of the second line in four columns with 12 guns on his Left or Inner flank to be in readiness to pierce the enemy's line of march. As soon as Pakenham attacked, the first line was also to advance and second his endeavour. Then, on the English Left, an assault was to be made on the French Hermanito hill.

The rapid movements of the English showed Marmont his error and that the mistake was patent to his enemy. He saw their troops moving in combined strength, while his own army was scattered and in the midst of a difficult and half-completed manœuvre. But as yet he had not seen Pakenham's division, and hoping he might reunite his army before the moment of collision, dispatched messengers in all directions, one way to hurry up the Centre and Rear columns, the other to check Thomières in his advance. At the same time, with some of the troops in hand, he attacked the Arapiles village, and English hill of that name.

Then Marmont caught sight of Pakenham's division. He was hastening to the Front when he was severely wounded by a bursting shell, and was carried off the

Victory at Salamanca

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field. General Bonnet, who succeeded him, was also disabled before he could take any steps to restore the fight, and the command then devolved upon General Clausel, an excellent soldier.

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General Thomières, who led the first of Maucune's two divisions, was now attacked by Pakenham. The French guns at first essayed to answer, but were driven off the field; then the French formed a line of battle upon two fronts, one to face Pakenham, the other opposed to the 5th Division and the Portuguese. General Clausel's own division, part of the Centre, had come up through the wood, and had regained touch with Maucune's Rear division.

Now their complete overthrow was accomplished by Wellington, who at the critical moment sent forward Le Marchant's Heavy, and Anson's and Arentschildt's Light



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SALAMANCA, JULY 22nd, 1812

**Campaign
of 1812:
Salamanca**

cavalry brigades. Napier tells the story how the horsemen rode down the French infantry "with a terrible clamour and disturbance. Bewildered and blinded, they cast away their arms, and crowded through the intervals of the squadrons, stooping and crying out for quarter, while the Dragoons, big men on big horses, rode onwards, smiting with their long, glittering swords in uncontrollable power." Le Marchant was killed, but others led his cavalry on. Pakenham, with the 3rd Division, followed close, and after a struggle in which many were laid low, the French were completely defeated. Guns and standards were captured and 2,000 prisoners; and in 40 minutes "the divisions under Maucune no longer existed as a military body."

Clausel, who, although wounded, had not left the field, employed some unbroken troops, flanked by cavalry, to show a front while he drew off his shattered forces. General Foy bravely and skilfully checked the last charges of the cavalry. Night had now fallen when the beaten French retreated across the Tormes by the ford at Alba de Tormes.

**Results of
the Victory**

Wellington thought the fort of Alba was held by the Spaniards. But, as we showed above, the Spanish General, Carlos d'España, had not only withdrawn the garrison, but he had not reported it, and Marmont had reoccupied it the previous day. Wellington, thinking retreat by Alba barred to his enemy, had turned his attention to the only remaining ford, that of Huerta, where he counted upon finding the entire French army in confusion. But, while he strengthened his Left wing to intercept their retreat by Huerta, the French drew off unmolested by Alba, and when the fact was discovered it was too dark to continue the pursuit. But for this disappointment the whole French army would have been compelled to lay down its arms. As it was Wellington captured 11 guns, 2 Eagles, and 7,000 prisoners.

Other results, direct and indirect, followed from this great victory. One of the first was the occupation of the capital of Madrid, which King Joseph immediately left to join and strengthen the defeated and retreating troops under Clausel. Of the indirect results the greatest was the evacuation by the French of southern Spain, for Soult was now obliged to abandon Andalusia, and, moving round by a circuitous route through the south-east districts, to regain touch with the road to France.

Occupation of Madrid

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Wellington was stronger in Cavalry but weaker in Artillery than was Marmont. He commanded a homogeneous army—Wellington's was made up of British, German, Portuguese and Spaniards. He thought that it was his best battle in a tactical point of view. A French General wrote, "Wellington had beaten 40,000 Frenchmen in 40 minutes."

Campaign
of 1812:

Wellington, now Marquis of Torres Vedras, entered Madrid August 12th, taking two Eagles, 180 guns, 20,000 muskets, and a quantity of ordnance stores.

Occupation
of Madrid

Soult having raised the Siege of Cadiz August 26th, moved all his troops eastwards. General Hill, marching up the valley of the Tagus, covered Madrid on the south against the Field-Marshal.

Cadiz

Wellington, September 12th, advanced northwards against General Clauzel, and entering Burgos September 18th, besieged its castle. The garrison, 2,000 in number, successfully resisted five separate assaults, and after persevering for thirty days, Wellington learning that Clauzel on the north, and Soult from the east were closing on him, raised the siege. As Wellington explained in a letter to the Government, dated November 23rd, 1812, he had plenty of siege-guns at Madrid, and could have got more from St. Ander, but for the want of Transport, which was not available in the country.

Burgos

General Hill moving through Madrid and Arevalo, joined Wellington near Salamanca, and the army, November 18th, went into winter quarters on the Coa river. The troops relaxed in discipline during the retirement on Portugal. There was much plundering and intoxication which was severely reprobated by the Marquis of Wellington, and some officers thought, in too general terms, since there were some regiments in which discipline was well maintained.

Retirement
to Winter
Quarters in
Portugal

There was much dissatisfaction in England at the retirement into Portugal. It was no doubt disappointing, but when Wellington read of it in the English newspapers he pointed out, in studiously moderate terms, that besides his victories he had taken possession of seven arsenals, and had sent 20,000 Frenchmen as prisoners to England. He spent the winter in reorganising the Departments of the Army, which at the conclusion of the War had reached a state of efficiency hitherto unknown in the British Forces.

CHAPTER X

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1813

The French Outwitted by Wellington—Crossing of the Douro and Ebro—The Navy Assists the Army—Vittoria—Recapitulation of the War—The Close of the Peninsular War—The Capture of San Sebastian—The Crossing of the Bidassoa—The Battle of Toulouse—Napoleon's Disasters.

A Campaign of Strategy

THE campaign in this year was mainly one of strategy, unlike those in which Vimiera, Busaco, and Salamanca gave such striking examples of Wellington's quickness of eye and ready decision. Now in the sixth year of war, the opposing forces which eventually fought under Wellington and King Joseph were nearly equal in numbers, but the latter had many more field batteries. The plan of the French generals was to hold the Douro river, for the defence of which against the expected advance of Wellington from Salamanca 35,000 men and 160 guns were available.

Crossing of the Douro

It did not occur to the French leaders that it was possible for Wellington to cross the Douro at Lamego and thus turn their formidable works, which closed the possibility of a direct advance on Valladolid without great loss of life.

Wellington gave Sir Thomas Graham command of 40,000 men, and he, crossing near Lamego, got behind King Joseph's troops when they retired from what they imagined at first to be the whole of the Allied army. Graham's troops had to cross very difficult country, the infantry, in order to ford rivers, being frequently obliged to hold on to the stirrups of the horsemen; but on June 3rd, including Spanish levies which came down from Galicia, some 90,000 men were collected at Toro, and the French, blowing up the castle of Burgos, took up a position behind the Ebro. That river in itself formed a strong line of defence, and the Pancorbo Pass on the south, or right bank is so narrow that a few determined men might hold it against many troops.

Wellington moved away to the north, and, passing over mountains previously deemed inaccessible for troops, crossed


Britain's Sea Power

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the Ebro thirty-five miles from its source in the Maritime Pyrenees, and then, marching down its left bank, encamped, June 20th, on the Bayas river, King Joseph drawing up his troops almost opposite, behind the Zadorra, which in its course from north-north-east to south-south-west covers the north and west of Vittoria, and then runs down the Puebla Pass to the Ebro.

Campaign
of 1813:
Vittoria

Just as Nelson's great victory, October 21st, 1805, off Cape Trafalgar had enabled England to transport her troops at will to Corunna, Mondego Bay, the Tagus, and Cadiz, so the Sea Power now enabled Wellington to give up his ever lengthening Line of Communications from Lisbon, and use the ports in the Bay of Biscay behind him, which the



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF VITTORIA, JUNE 21st, 1813

Campaign
of 1813:
Vittoria

French had evacuated. This advantage will be readily appreciated, when putting the day's march for wagons drawn by oxen at 15 miles we see there is a saving of 33 days between Bilbao and Vittoria over the distance, from Lisbon to Vittoria.

King Joseph put between 60,000 and 70,000 troops, stretched over $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, in position on the left bank of the Zadorra, which varies greatly in its size and character. In some places it is fordable and in others deep, being in the left centre of the French position 150 feet wide. There were seven bridges crossing the river, none of which had been destroyed. The position itself was in many respects favourable, but it had one all-important defect, that is, that the French line of retreat to Bayonne was in prolongation of the right flank.

Wellington extended his troops, numbering from 70,000 to 75,000, of which 45,000 were British, over a frontage of more than six miles, depending for the timing of the different attacks on the judgment of the leaders of his flanking columns, which were commanded by Hill and Graham, in whom he reposed great confidence.

General Gazan held the Left of the French position. D'Erlon commanded in the Centre, and Reille was on the Right, in front of Vittoria.

Hill was to attack Gazan, Graham to force Reille's position, while Wellington commanded the two centre columns and co-ordinated the whole of the movements. The precision shown in conducting the attacks was a remarkable indication of Wellington's power, and the high standard the army's leaders, under his instruction, had attained in the combined handling of troops. Hill and Graham carried out their duties perfectly, and at nightfall Wellington had no longer in his front a French army but merely the wreck of one, which was escaping to the mountains in the direction of Pampeluna. The French, according to General Gazan's report, "lost all their guns, treasure, train, and battalion accounts, so that no soldier could say what was due to him, and all Ranks from general to private who escaped had nothing but what they carried on them, many being bare-footed." The Allies lost 5,000 men, the French 6,000, in killed and wounded, 143 guns, and a million in specie. After the battle 7,500 men deserted.

This battle virtually finished the Peninsular War, though the French still held some fortresses, and there were yet some battles to be fought; nevertheless, Spain was now free of an invader, and the war was carried into France. It may be convenient to recapitulate here briefly what Wellington accomplished from his victory at Vimiera, 1808, after which Junot capitulated, to the battle of Vittoria in 1813.

1809.—Soult was driven out of Oporto and Portugal, and King Joseph, with Victor, was defeated at Talavera.


1810.—Masséna was defeated at Busaco, and repulsed at Torres Vedras.

1811.—Masséna was driven out of Portugal, having lost in that country 30,000 men and nearly all his horses.

1812.—Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz were captured, Marmont was defeated at Salamanca, and Wellington entered Madrid.

1813.—King Joseph was outmanœuvred on the Douro and defeated at Vittoria; the French were driven out of Spain, and the invasion of France followed.

Although Wellington had practically driven the French out of Spain, Soult's army, in spite of successive defeats, continued to fight bravely under adverse circumstances.



PLAN OF THE ASSAULT OF SAN SEBASTIAN,
AUG. 31st. 1813

Campaign
of 1813:
San
Sebastian

Before Wellington could safely follow Soult's troops into France it was necessary to capture San Sebastian, and in a lesser degree important it was desirable to obtain possession of Pampeluna in order to prevent their garrisons interrupting Wellington's Line of Communications.

The fortress of San Sebastian stands on a promontory which juts out into the Bay of Biscay, and is surrounded by water on three sides. The tidal river, Urumea, unfordable except for two hours before and after high water, bounded the fortress on the east side.

General Graham (later Lord Lyndoch) with 10,000 men and 40 siege guns attacked the position on July 10th, and delivered an assault on the 24th, which failed; this failure was chiefly due to the fact that although the breach was wide enough, the adjoining works which flanked it were still intact, and the garrison from them poured on the breach when the stormers arrived at it, a heavy fire. There was also the difficulty inseparable from all night attacks in maintaining the direction, and cohesion of the Forlorn Hope, and Supports.

A second assault was not immediately possible because there was no more ammunition available for the guns. This failure occurred several times during the War. Although the Ministers were now anxious to thoroughly support Wellington, there was no one in London to co-ordinate the dispatch of guns and ammunition, and indeed a month later, when two extra Siege trains were dispatched sufficient ammunition for one day's firing only was sent.

As Marshal Soult was now approaching, Wellington ordered Graham to content himself with blockading the fortress. Soult having advanced to the vicinity, and carefully concealing his intended movements, at first obtained some advantage, but Wellington showing the rapid decision which had characterised his action the previous year at Salamanca, having concentrated his troops, which had been somewhat widely dispersed, after ten engagements, fought between July 25th and August 2nd, drove the French back; they losing 13,000 and Wellington 7,000 men. San Sebastian was captured on September 9th, with a loss to the British of 4,000 men, the French losing half that number.

The tactics employed in the assault and capture of the fortress indicate high discipline. When the troops reached

Capture of San Sebastian

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the summit of the breach, there was a heavy drop in front of them, the ground being covered by sword blades, behind which there was an interior rampart from which a heavy fire was poured on the breach. The troops were ordered to lie down at its foot, while 40 siege guns played immediately over their heads on the enemy's retrenchments, and in twenty minutes' time exploded magazines, which throwing 300 Frenchmen into the air, who had just been shouting defiance, triumphantly demoralised the defence, and enabled our men to capture the fortress.

Campaign
of 1813:
San
Sebastian

This was perhaps Wellington's greatest tactical success. The river is tidal, and rises 16 feet with a treacherous shifty bottom, and the skill that Wellington showed tactically is as remarkable as was his strategy in this campaign up to the battle of Vittoria.

The
Crossing
of the
Bidassoa

On the east bank of the river there are high hills overlooking the water, and for a month the position had been artificially strengthened for defence in two lines. The French Right, that is north flank, rested on the sea, and their Left on the Great Rhune mountain, almost inaccessible, 3,900 feet high. The whole Front of about 12 miles appeared to be unassailable. Wellington, however, threatened the French Left; he demonstrated all along the Front, taking 7 columns across the river, and thus rendering uncertain which was the point of real attack. The Marshal was at the extreme Left, when Wellington drove in his Right, and pushed his troops back to the Nivelle.

This success on October 7th, when all the columns reached the East bank of the river, was remarkable, moreover, for the gallant conduct of the Spanish and Portuguese troops, who after two days' hard fighting captured the extreme Left of the French position on the Great Rhune mountains.

After these operations there were several minor engagements on the Nivelle and Nive rivers, and outside Bayonne. The battle of Toulouse was fought after Peace had been proclaimed in Paris, and indeed, owing to the time it took couriers to pass over the distance to the south of France, 10,000 men fell after Napoleon had been driven from the throne.

Toulouse

Commanding troops in action was one of the least of Wel-

**Campaign
of 1813:**

Wellington's difficulties. The Spanish troops were always short of food, and naturally took to plundering, their conduct being so bad as to induce Wellington to proffer his resignation of their command, and to send 25,000 of them back to Spain. This decided action on Wellington's part brought about a reform. The crazy democrats representing at Cadiz the Spanish Government were put on one side, and the Portuguese Government was compelled to issue pay to their Army, which was then two years in arrears.

While the Emperor's five Lieutenants were being successively driven from the Atlantic, through Spain, and over the Pyrenees into France, a series of disasters had fallen on Napoleon.

He had left the bones of one generation of soldiers in Russia, and those of another generation on the battle-fields of Germany.

**Napoleon's
Abdication**

Europe combined against him, and, in spite of his brilliant generalship, in 1814 his abdication was enforced.

His return to France and final downfall are described in the Waterloo Campaign.

PART XI

THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER I

NAPOLÉON'S NEW ARMY

Napoleon at Elba—Congress of Vienna, 1814—Diplomatic Strife in Europe
—Napoleon's Escape from Elba—The Allied Powers—Napoleon's New
Army—The Emperor's Plans—Wellington Advances on Quatre Bras.

AFTER the crushing reverses sustained by the French **Napoleon**
armies in 1814 the Emperor Napoleon abdicated, and **at Elba**
retired to Elba, the small island which his victorious
enemies had given him to govern; whilst the House of
Bourbon, represented by Louis XVIII., the aged brother
of the hapless monarch who had perished at the time of
the Revolution, was placed on the Throne of France.

Ostensibly, peace prevailed throughout the Continent
of Europe. Prussia was preparing to reduce her army;
and in England politicians, following tradition, were
clamouring for a reduction of naval and military forces.
Everywhere fêtes and fireworks were manifesting the end
of long and sanguinary wars.

Still, much remained to be accomplished in the resettlement of the Continent. In September, 1814, delegates of the Allied Powers assembled at Vienna, empowered to re-arrange the map of Europe, with which Napoleon had ruthlessly played havoc. But despite this Congress, as far-seeing statesmen realised, the days of crises had not yet passed. **Congress of Vienna, 1814**

It was no easy task to re-arrange the map of Europe, for the peoples of the various countries concerned held very different views as to how that re-arranging should be done. Russia, for example, claimed the whole of Poland; Prussia insisted on being given Saxony; Austria wanted Lombardy and Milan, and proceeded to show quite clearly that, unless her wishes were conceded, she was prepared to enforce

**Congress of
Vienna,
1814**

them at the point of the sword; whilst Britain, in support of her contention that Belgium and Holland should be incorporated as an independent Kingdom, sent troops to the former country. The longer these matters were discussed the more bitter became the arguments; and in the early part of 1815 it seemed inevitable that the Congress of Vienna would break up, and that the Allies, no longer united by a common fear of Napoleon, would fly at each others' throats to wrest from former Allies the advantages they had gained in common. What might have happened it is impossible to say, for what did happen completely silenced those voices of disruption.

**Napoleon's
Escape**

Napoleon escaped from Elba. On March 1st he landed with 800 men in the south of France. Before the end of the month, having won over the Army to his side, he had re-established himself as controller of his country's destinies; and Louis XVIII. was compelled to quit France, and once more resume his travels.

The delegates of the Allied Powers, assembled at Vienna, greeted the news of Napoleon's return with, it is said, an outburst of hysterical laughter. As soon, however, as they realised the full significance of the tidings, they immediately forgot their differences. The common enemy had reappeared; Europe once more was menaced by Napoleon; and this fact completely overshadowed all minor points of dispute.

Forthwith, Austria, Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain, and Sweden united, determined to overthrow the man whom they denounced as "the general enemy and disturber of the world." Then, having mutually promised assistance to one another, the Allied leaders returned to their respective countries to make preparations for the coming struggle; and the Waterloo Campaign began.

* * * * *

**Napoleon's
Plans**

Napoleon knew that from Russia he need fear nothing for several months. Austria, too, though geographically much nearer, was unprepared to take the field. Britain and Prussia alone were immediately dangerous. Napoleon decided, therefore, to assume the offensive without delay, and, by crushing his enemies one by one, to frustrate their general plan, which was to advance in concert upon Paris.


"The 100 Days War"

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The Emperor, having dispatched troops to guard his other frontiers and to deal with Royalist risings in various parts of France, assembled an army on his north-eastern frontier, which was already threatened by British and Prussian troops.

The
Military
Situation,
May, 1815

The position towards the end of May was as follows: A Prussian army, numbering 113,000 infantry, with 12,000 cavalry and 312 guns, under the command of Marshal Blücher, was cantoned near to the Franco-Belgian frontier



SKETCH-MAP OF THE FRENCH AND BELGIAN FRONTIER IN 1815

(From "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign." Sampson Low, Marston & Co.

**The
Military
Situation,
May, 1815**

in the neighbourhood of Charleroi, Namur, and Liège; whilst an Anglo-Belgian army of 200 guns and 106,000 men (of which 27,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 5,500 gunners manning 120 guns, being British or German Legion), were under the Duke of Wellington, whom the Allies elected Commander-in-Chief of all their armies. He—in order to simplify the question of Supplies—spread out the British troops over a large area in the vicinity of Brussels.

**Napoleon's
Offensive**

To oppose these forces Napoleon had 124,000 men and 350 guns in cantonments covering a front of nearly 250 miles along the Belgian frontier, from Lille to Metz.

Collectively, the forces of Wellington and Marshal Blücher greatly outnumbered the army of Napoleon, but the Emperor was stronger than either of his two enemies taken separately. He decided, therefore, to strike immediately at the centre of their position, drive them back along their respective Lines of Communication—Wellington in the direction of Antwerp or Ostend; Blücher towards Cologne.

Accordingly, he gave orders for his army to concentrate immediately along the line Maubeuge-Beaumont-Philippeville, which was within twenty miles of Charleroi, where lay 30,000 men of Blücher's army under the command of Ziethen. By June 14th this concentration had been effected: so quickly and secretly that the Allies in their cantonments remained without a suspicion of the Emperor's intentions.

Early on the morning of the 15th the French army advanced, crossing the River Sambre in three columns, at Charleroi, Marchiennes, and Chatelet. General Ziethen, unable to offer effective resistance, was forced back, but in good order, upon Fleurus.

**The Allies'
Plans**

Wellington and Blücher had arranged, in the event of their centre being attacked, to unite their forces on the road leading from Nivelles to Namur, somewhere between Quatre Bras, and Sombreffe. Immediately, therefore, on receiving the news from Ziethen, Blücher moved his whole army in this direction. Wellington, however, still hesitated: he was not convinced as to Napoleon's immediate objective for, as a glance at the map will show, there were several roads leading from the French frontier to Brussels, any of which Napoleon might take.

It seemed, then, possible that the advance through Char-

British Advance to Quatre Bras 365

leroi might merely be a feint to mask a general movement towards Brussels along the Mons road. Now an attack from this direction would have been a serious menace to Wellington's Right flank, for, should this happen, he might be pushed off his Line of Communications, which ran parallel to his Front.

Wellington's
Plan of
Campaign

He decided, therefore, to wait until Napoleon's plan had developed. "If all is as General Ziethen supposes," he told Baron Muffling, the Prussian General, who was attached to his Staff during the campaign, "I will concentrate on my Left wing, and so be in readiness to fight in conjunction with the Prussian army. Should, however, a portion of the enemy's force come by Mons, I must concentrate more towards my Centre. I must therefore wait for positive news from Mons before I fix the concentration."

About midnight this information arrived; there were no French troops advancing from the direction of Mons. Accordingly, Wellington gave orders for his army to advance upon Quatre Bras. Then, in order to avoid creating alarm in Brussels, he and many of his officers attended the famous ball given that night by the Duchess of Richmond.

At 3 A.M. Wellington left the ball-room. At 5 A.M. he rode out to join his army, to measure his strength for the only time against Napoleon.

CHAPTER II

THE BATTLES OF LIGNY AND QUATRE BRAS

The Anglo-Belgian Army at Quatre Bras—Ney's Attack Delayed—The Battle of Ligny—Napoleon Misunderstands the Allies' Movements—Quatre Bras—Death of the Duke of Brunswick—Kellermann's Cavalry—The Cost of Victory.

The Allies' Armies

ON the morning of the 16th Ziethen, with 30,000 men, was established at Ligny. Here, before eight o'clock, he was joined by two more Corps of the Prussian army, under the command of Blücher himself, whose 4th Corps, Bülow's, was hastening by forced marches in the same direction.

The Anglo-Belgian army, meanwhile, was concentrating on Quatre Bras; but as many of the troops had twenty and some thirty miles to cover, this concentration could not be effected quickly. In consequence, during the morning, there were not more than 10,000 men there—Dutch-Belgians under Perponcher—to oppose any advance the French might make.

Ney's Attack on Quatre Bras Delayed

Napoleon intended that, as early as possible on the 16th, Marshal Ney should move on Quatre Bras, seize this strategical position, leave part of his force there to hold it, and then attack the Right flank of the Prussians. Simultaneously with this latter movement the Emperor himself undertook to assault the Prussian Front; proposing later, with Ney's assistance, to drive Blücher back along his Line of Communications, and so to cut him off from Wellington.

Various delays wrecked this plan. If Ney could have attacked early in the morning he would, as Napoleon had foreseen, have met with very little opposition. But it was two o'clock in the afternoon when Ney began his attack, and by that time Wellington had assembled an army not only strong enough to offer serious resistance, but to make it impossible for the French General to detach troops against the Prussian Right.

The Battle of Ligny

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Ney has been much criticised for his slowness on this occasion; but, as Sir Edward Creasy has written, "censors should remember that soldiers are but men; and that there must necessarily be some interval of time before troops that have been worn and weakened by twenty hours of incessant fatigue and strife can be fed, rested, reorganised, and brought again into action with any hope of success."

Ney's
Attack on
Quatre Bras
Delayed

It must also be remembered that Ney was summoned by Napoleon at the eleventh hour, and arrived from Paris only in time to take over the command of the left wing of the French army late in the afternoon of the 15th, and that the Chief of Napoleon's Staff, Marshal Soult, unaccustomed to the work, gave Ney but little of the necessary information about his command.

Napoleon had sent for Ney on June 11th. On receiving Napoleon's summons, Ney posted to the Front, dining with the Emperor at Avesnes. On the 13th he purchased horses from a brother Marshal (Mortier) who had been taken ill on the frontier, and on the 15th he assumed command of the Left wing of Napoleon's army. This was composed of the 1st Army Corps (D'Erlon), and—with the exception of Girard's division—the 2nd Army Corps (Reille). The Emperor also placed at Ney's disposal Kellermann's cavalry, and the Light cavalry of the Imperial Guard, but gave instructions that the latter were not to be used unless it became absolutely necessary.

When Ney took command of this force on the 15th he had no Staff, and he did not even know the names of the General Officers commanding divisions. He cannot, therefore, justly be accused of dilatoriness in that he did not engage the enemy early on the following morning, especially seeing that he had no reliable information as to the strength of Wellington's army or the disposition of the Allied forces. Moreover, it was 11 A.M. before he received from Napoleon definite orders to advance.

Napoleon, at half-past three, finding that Ney was more strongly opposed than had been anticipated, and that some time, at any rate, must elapse before the attack on Blücher's right could be delivered, gave the signal to his army to assault the Prussian position at Ligny.

A desperate battle ensued, and for the next five and a half hours was contested stubbornly; but, finally, as dark-

Ligny, 1815 ness fell, the Prussians slowly and reluctantly fell back from their position. So fierce was the fighting that, soon after the battle began, the Emperor sent in haste orders to Ney to dispatch to his assistance D'Erlon's Corps, 20,000 strong, which Ney had been holding in reserve. By curious mischance this message was not delivered to Ney, but to D'Erlon himself, and he, thinking that Ney was aware of the command, set out in the direction of Bry. But Ney knew nothing of Napoleon's orders. When, therefore, he learned that D'Erlon's Corps was on the move, he forthwith commanded it to return, for at this time he himself stood greatly in need of assistance.

Thus it came about that D'Erlon, with 20,000 men, spent the whole afternoon marching to and fro between the two armies, and never got into action at all—an unfortunate blunder for Napoleon, seeing that those 20,000 men would have been sufficient to enable Ney to defeat Wellington at Quatre Bras, or would have enabled Napoleon to crush the Prussians at Ligny, instead of merely driving them from the field. In consequence of D'Erlon's absence Ney was forced to retire to Frasnes, whilst the Prussians were able to retreat in fairly good order—*upon Wavre*.

The Emperor, ignorant of the understanding existing between Blücher and Wellington that they would support one another whatever might happen, assumed that the Prussians had fallen back towards their own base, in the direction of Liège, and on the following day, without reconnoitring, in order to verify this assumption, he sent General Grouchy, with 33,000 men and 96 guns, towards Gembloux in pursuit, as he thought, of the retreating Prussians. Hence, forty-eight hours later, when at Mont St. Jean the supreme struggle began, Grouchy, instead of being able to prevent the Prussians from joining Wellington, found himself cut off by them from Napoleon's main army.

Blücher personally escaped from the battle-field of Ligny only by the devotion of his aide-de-camp. While he was endeavouring to rally his troops, his charger, a present from the Prince of Wales, was shot, and began to falter in its stride.

"Now I am done for!" exclaimed the Prussian leader, feeling that his horse had been shot, to an officer of his

The Battle of Quatre Bras

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Staff; and a moment later the animal fell, rolling on its rider, who was ridden over not only by his own cavalry but by an advancing squadron of French Cuirassiers. As the struggling masses surged backwards and forwards, the Field-Marshal was trampled on several times, and for nearly a quarter of an hour lay half-stunned. The aide-de-camp retained his presence of mind, and, dismounting, threw a cloak over the Chief; then, with the aid of four Dragoons, pulled away the horse's carcass, and eventually, putting Blücher up on another horse, in the darkness of the evening led him away from the field of battle.

The French losses in the action against Ziethen on the 15th, and in the Battle of Ligny, amounted to 11,000 men; whilst the Prussians lost 25 guns and 18,000 men, and in addition 10,000 more, enlisted from what had recently been French provinces, retired to Liège without orders.

Bülow, whose Corps had not come up in time to take part in the battle, arrived at Gembloux during the night (16th-17th) with 36,000 men, and behind these troops the remnants of the commands of Ziethen, Pirch, and Thielman rallied.

During the battle at Ligny, Wellington's army was hotly engaged by Marshal Ney at Quatre Bras.

The position taken up by Wellington was not tactically strong, but strategically important, being the junction of the main road from Charleroi to Brussels, with the road running from Nivelles to Namur, by which latter Wellington and Blücher had hoped to concentrate their armies.

Between Frasnes and Quatre Bras there are no hedges or ditches worthy of mention except in the valley which divided the French and British positions. In this valley stand the manor house and farm buildings of Gemioncourt.

On the west side of the Charleroi-Brussels road was the Bois de Bossu, now cut down. Here rises a small stream which, flowing from west to east, passes north of Gemioncourt and forms a pond half a mile to the east of the road. Just south of this pond stands the hamlet of Piermont; whilst at the southern edge of the Bossu wood is the farm of Pierrepont.

On either side of the stream—which was (and still is) bordered by thick edges impassable for mounted troops, and through which infantry could move only in single file

Ligny, 1815

Quatre Bras

Quatre
Bras, 1815

—the ground rises sharply, thence undulating in the direction of Frasnes to the south, and to Quatre Bras on the north side.

The scene of the battle, measuring from the southern edge of the Gemioncourt enclosure to the farm buildings at Quatre Bras, covered three-quarters of a mile, and on this small space, and in the wood of Bossu, the fight raged for five hours with alternating success.

The Bois de Bossu, though in some parts close and intricate, was found to be generally passable by cavalry in "extended order"; whilst the standing crops of wheat and rye-grass in the neighbouring fields provided sufficient cover to conceal the movements even of Mounted troops.

General de Perponcher, who commanded the 2nd Dutch-Belgian Division, arrived at Quatre Bras at 3 A.M. on June 16th, and by 6 A.M. had occupied the southern end of the Bossu wood and the farm of Pierrepont. The Prince of Orange, who was in command of the 1st Corps of Wellington's army, arrived between 6 and 7 A.M., and, having endorsed Perponcher's aggressive attitude, sent forward two batteries of Artillery up to the ridge south of the Gemioncourt stream.

At 10 A.M. the Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras; but, seeing no sign of movement by the enemy, rode over to the Prussian position, seven miles to the eastward. Near Bry he met Blücher, who strongly urged the Duke to move, so soon as he had concentrated his forces, and support the right rear of the Prussian army. Wellington did not, however, approve this plan, because such a movement would leave open the Charleroi-Brussels road. Finally, however, the Duke reluctantly yielded to his colleague's importunity, remarking, as he rode away, "At any rate, I will come if I am not attacked myself."

But he was attacked. Indeed, the attack began before Wellington got back to Quatre Bras, and at 2.30 P.M., when he arrived there, he found that Perponcher's advanced troops were falling back before the French, and that the Artillery had already retired with the loss of two guns. Before three o'clock, Ney had gained possession of the south edge of the Bois de Bossu, Piermont, and all the ground up to Gemioncourt. The situation of the Allied army, therefore, at Quatre Bras was for a short time

critical. Reinforcements were, however, hastening to the battle-field from the northward, and by 3.30 P.M. Picton's division had arrived, and taken up a position on the Nivelles-Namur road in time to check further French advances.

Quatre
Bras, 1815

Wellington had now 18,000 infantry and 2,000 Continental cavalry in hand. The positions taken up by his troops were as follows: Perponcher's men held the Bossu wood to within 100 yards of the stream; the Duke of Brunswick, who had arrived, with 3,000 infantry and 1,000 horse, soon after Picton, was in the open on the west of the road about 600 yards south of Quatre Bras cross roads where stood the 92nd (2nd Gordon Highlanders) Regiment (of Pack's brigade). Between the Namur road and the Charleroi-Brussels road was Picton's division—brigades of Pack and Kempt, the former being on the Right, the latter on the Left; and in support stood Best's Hanoverian Militia Brigade. The wood lying between Quatre Bras and Sart à Avelines was held by the 95th Regiment (Rifle Brigade) of Kempt's brigade.

Ney's extreme Left (Foy's division) held the Bossu wood up to the stream, his Centre (Bachelu's division) was firmly established at Gemioncourt, and his Right (Prince Jerome's division) at Piermont. The French guns were massed on the ridge to the South of Gemioncourt, whence they were able to play with great effect on the Allied artillery, and with still more deadly effect on the infantry as it came into position, the Duke of Brunswick's men being within 700 yards' and Picton's troops within 1,200 yards' range.

The Brunswickers were severely tried by the casualties which they suffered in quick succession, but they were steady, being extremely well commanded by the Duke, who himself displayed notable courage.

Ney presently sent forward two heavy columns, under Bachelu, into the valley east of Gemioncourt. Whereupon Wellington, fearing for the safety of the Brunswick troops, ordered Picton, at 4 P.M., to leave the 92nd (2nd Gordon Highlanders) at Quatre Bras, and to advance against the enemy. This counter-stroke proved brilliantly successful, the French columns, surprised by Kempt's brigade, which moved through high crops, being routed by a bayonet charge, and driven through the hedgerows into the valley.

Quatre
Bras, 1815

Just after the British troops had resumed their position, and were beginning to re-form, Foy's division, supported by Piré's cavalry (Hubert's brigade of Chasseurs and Wathier's brigade of Lancers), advanced from the stream, one column on the Brussels road, the other between it and the Bossu wood.

The Duke of Brunswick, finding that he had not room for two cavalry regiments between the high road and the wood, sent the Hussars back to Quatre Bras, while he himself at the head of the Lancers charged the enemy's advancing infantry. The French troops, rapidly forming from line into square, easily repulsed the Lancers, who galloped back to Quatre Bras. The leading French squadrons followed boldly, and the Brunswick infantry then broke and fled. The Duke bravely but vainly strove to rally them, he himself being mortally wounded in his endeavours.

Meanwhile, the Brunswick Lancers, pursued by the Chasseurs, galloped in a crowd on to the 92nd, then lining the ditch of the Namur road close to Quatre Bras. The Highlanders wheeled back one company, let the Lancers through, and then fired with great effect into the French horsemen, forcing them to retire.

The Brunswick Hussar Regiment was now ordered forward from Quatre Bras to attack the Chasseurs; but, unable to face the fire of the French Infantry which had advanced on the eastern skirts of the wood, the Hussars hesitated, then turned—so closely pursued by the Chasseurs that the two bodies of Horsemen were mistaken by our infantry for Allied cavalry retiring. The Chasseurs following the Hussars got through the 2nd Gordon Highlanders, behind whom Wellington had taken refuge. The Duke escaped only by jumping the fence of a garden which was lined by a company of the battalion.

The Chasseurs advanced up to Quatre Bras; then, seeing that they were isolated, tried to retire by breaking through the 92nd from the rear. Few of these brave Frenchmen eventually escaped. An officer, coming from the rear, personally attacked the Duke of Wellington, but he was shot through both legs by some soldiers who faced about, his horse falling just as he reached the Duke.

Wathier's Lancer brigade did not follow up the Chasseurs, but, wheeling round, attacked in the rear the two

foremost regiments of Pack's brigade, the 42nd (2nd Black Watch) and the 44th (1st Essex) Regiment.

Quatre
Bras, 1815

The 42nd was in the act of forming square at the time of the charge, and succeeded with comparative ease in repulsing the Frenchmen. But the 44th, taken by surprise, had no time to alter its formation, the thud of galloping horses' hoofs being the first indication it received of the coming storm.

Colonel Hamerton quickly faced both ranks about, reserving his fire until the Lancers had approached to within short range, when a murderous volley destroyed many of the foremost horsemen. With undaunted courage, however, individual men pressed on, and one grey-haired old Lancer, riding straight at the Colour party, severely wounded Ensign Christie, who carried one of the Colours, driving the lance through his left eye to the lower jaw. The Lancer then endeavoured to seize the Colour, but Christie, with marvellous endurance and determination, dashed the flag to the ground, and threw himself upon it. The Frenchman succeeded in tearing off a portion with his lance, but a moment later he was bayoneted, and the Colour was saved.

Presently the Lancers were forced to retire, and, withdrawing under a heavy fire from the 44th, re-formed, with the rest of Piré's shattered cavalry division, on the south side of the Gemioncourt stream.

Thus, shortly before 5 P.M., ended the first main attack on the Allied position. Ney had driven the Dutch-Belgians and the Brunswick troops to the north of Quatre Bras. His Artillery had severely punished Picton's division, Pack's brigade having suffered so heavily that the 42nd and 44th Regiments were now re-formed in one square. Towards the conclusion of the struggle moreover, Ney's infantry had got possession of the Bossu wood almost up to its northern end, and he had advanced two batteries inside the wood, close to its eastern boundary.

* * * * *

Soon after 5 P.M. the 3rd Division of Wellington's army (Alten's) arrived at Quatre Bras, the men having marched 22 miles under a hot sun, and without any dinner. These troops were immediately called into action, Kielmansegge's brigade moving down the Namur road to

Quatre
Bras, 1815

reinforce Wellington's Left; whilst Halkett's brigade took up its position at the north-eastern edge of the Bossu wood, on the ground from which the Brunswick troops had been driven back.

Half an hour later the 1st Division (Cooke's) consisting of Maitland's and Byng's Brigades of Guards, arrived at Quatre Bras, and began, with a determination which nothing could resist, to gain ground in the northern end of the wood. This was the turning-point of the battle. Wellington's forces now out-numbered those of Ney, who at this time was vainly endeavouring to bring back D'Erlon's Corps to his assistance, and the French troops were being slowly but surely driven back.

Marshal Ney, however, declining to admit defeat, decided to launch Kellermann's cavalry, supported by the remnants of Piré's division and Foy's infantry, against the Allied battalions, who now were without cavalry support, for the demoralised Brunswick horsemen had quitted the field, and no British mounted troops arrived at Quatre Bras till eight o'clock in the evening, having been watching the Mons road.

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General Kellermann, the finest cavalry leader in Napoleon's army, then advanced, riding at the head of the 8th Cuirassiers.

As General Halkett, of Alten's division, took up a position, with the four battalions composing his brigade, he received a pressing demand for support from Pack, whose men had run short of ammunition. Accordingly, he sent the 69th (2nd Welsh) Regiment to the east side of the road, and formed up the three remaining battalions between the road and the Bossu wood.

Halkett himself then rode forward to the Gemioncourt stream to observe the French dispositions. From here he saw Kellermann preparing to advance. So he sent his aide-de-camp forthwith to the 69th, and ordered it to "form square" since a cavalry attack might be expected; whilst he himself galloped back to the remainder of his brigade and gave similar orders.


A few minutes later the Prince of Orange, who commanded the 1st Army Corps, rode up to the 69th and asked

The Squares at Quatre Bras 375

what the battalion was doing. The Commanding-Officer explained that he had been ordered to form square. The Prince ordered him to get into line again, saying that he did not believe an attack to be imminent. Yet as he spoke 800 sabres had already crossed the stream, and Kellermann's Cuirassiers, hidden among the tall-standing crops, were within 400 yards of the battalion.

In a few minutes, the Horsemen were upon the defenceless Infantry; and in less than two minutes 150 of the 580 men of the 60th were lying on the ground, dead or dying. Mr. Clark, a volunteer in the battalion, fought magnificently, and, although wounded in twenty-two places by sabre cuts, preserved the Colour he was carrying. The other Colour was taken, and sent back to be paraded before Foy's infantry, then preparing to advance.

Kellermann next charged Halkett's Right battalion and drove it into the wood. Up to this moment his attacks had achieved considerable success. He had ridden over two battalions, and his regiments had kept the remainder of the British infantry in squares — a formation which offered an easy target for the French artillery.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.
JUNE 16th, 1815

Quatre
Bras, 1815

But now the Cuirassiers suffered severely, not only from the fire of the battalions which stood grouped around them but also from the British artillery; whilst Piré's cavalry, despite all efforts, could do nothing to shake the British infantry standing to the east of the road. The French attack, therefore, temporarily slackened; and at this critical moment it so happened that Kellermann's horse was shot, falling dead upon its rider.

Kellermann was not seriously hurt, but, for some inexplicable reason, the sight of their leader lying on the ground completely demoralised the Cuirassiers, and, deaf to the commands and entreaties of their officers, they turned and fled in confusion, galloping over everything in their path, and carrying Piré's division away with them in a tumultuous mob. Foy's infantry columns, which had moved forward in support, were only prevented by the personal exertions of Ney himself from following the fugitive cavalry.

The victory was now won. Wellington's army advanced along its whole line; and by nightfall the French were driven back to the position they had held in the morning.

The Battle of Quatre Bras cost the Allied army some 3,500 troops, excluding Dutch-Belgians, whose losses are unknown; the French lost about 5,000 men.

CHAPTER III

THE EVE OF WATERLOO

Wellington Rides to Genappe—The Retreat from Quatre Bras—Napoleon's Gigantic Task—Skirmish at Genappe—Wellington Takes Up Position at Waterloo—The Battlefield of Waterloo—The Opposing Armies—Marshal Soult Chief of Napoleon's Staff—Napoleon Disposes his Forces—Grouchy's Movements.

SUCH was the moral effect produced by the charges of the French cavalry at Quatre Bras that many of the British battalions slept in square during the night, being apprehensive of a renewed advance by the Horsemen. The rain which fell during the night added greatly to the sufferings of the numberless wounded men lying scattered over the ground between the Gemioncourt stream and Quatre Bras.

Wellington's
Retreat
from Quatre
Bras

After the battle Wellington rode to Genappe, and there took up his quarters for the night, still ignorant of the result of the fighting which had taken place at Ligny. Early next morning, however, he heard of the disaster that had befallen Blücher; also the better news that the Prussians were retiring upon Wavre.

The defeat of the Prussians had altered materially the position of the Anglo-Belgian army, whose left flank was now unguarded. Wellington, therefore, issued orders for the troops to fall back. He intimated his intention to Blücher, saying that if he could rely on assistance from two divisions of the Prussian army he would halt near Waterloo, and there give battle to Napoleon.

Blücher's reply was characteristic. Not only would he come with two divisions, said the fiery old Marshal, undaunted by the reverse which his army had suffered on the previous day, regardless of the wounds which he had received; "he would come with his whole army."

Wellington's retreat from Quatre Bras was well carried out. After all the baggage and trains had gone to the rear, the main body of the army moved off between 10 and

Napoleon's
Great
Task in
1815

11 o'clock on the 17th, followed between 1 and 2 P.M. by the cavalry.

The French army halted during the morning of the 17th. Napoleon had intended to march and follow up Wellington early in the day, but he was dissuaded from doing so by his generals, who urged that the British troops were fresh, and their men tired. On the other hand, the French soldiers grumbled at being kept inactive.

In previous campaigns the Emperor had not asked opinions of his generals. It may be, therefore, that there was some truth in the remark of the blunt Vandamme: "Ah, this is not the Napoleon of former days!" But it must be borne in mind that from 3.30 A.M. on June 12th, when he left Paris for the frontier, until 11 P.M. on the 16th, when he rode from the battle-field of Ligny, the Emperor had been constantly travelling or fighting; and for three months prior to this not only had he been working fifteen hours daily in reorganising the defences of France, but, in addition, had been obliged to discuss many weighty political questions with Constitution-makers.

A task such as confronted the Emperor on his return from Elba would have overwhelmed any smaller man; and even on Napoleon it had told its inevitable tale. The mental strain proved more than the body could endure, and this alone may account for his apathy on the morning of June 17th. At midday, however, the Emperor hearing that Wellington was still at Quatre Bras, sent orders to Ney to occupy that position, adding that he himself would support him from Marbais.

Skirmish at
Genappe

Before the French reached the cross-roads Wellington had already fallen back. The British cavalry, however, were followed up closely, and a skirmish occurred at Genappe in which the Life Guards distinguished themselves, repulsing, with heavy loss, Piré's pursuing Lancers. The morning had been oppressively hot, without a breath of air, the sky being covered by dense, low-lying clouds, and later in the day a terrific thunderstorm, accompanied by rain of tropical violence, burst over the British army's line of march. In a few minutes all movement faster than a walk became impossible, except on the road, for the horses sank deeply in the soft fields on the high ground up to their knees, and on the lower slopes up to the girths. This, of

course, while interfering seriously with the movements of Wellington's men, made vigorous pursuit on the part of the enemy a difficult undertaking.

The British
Position at
Waterloo

Towards nightfall Wellington's army took up the position south of Waterloo upon which the British General had previously decided; and the head of Napoleon's army bivouacked directly opposite to it, less than a mile separating the two armies.*

Between 6 and 7 P.M. Napoleon deployed a division of Heavy cavalry near the inn "La Belle Alliance," and opened fire from four batteries. The Allies replied with 60 cannon, and the French moved back to their bivouacs.

When the opposing lines of outposts had got into position, the Artillery on both sides ceased fire, and another thunderstorm broke over the battle-field, the rain falling in torrents, greatly to the discomfort of both armies. The French suffered more than did the Allies, for the latter had the advantage of having got into position in time to collect fuel, and large fires were soon blazing all along their lines. For the French, on the other hand, very little fuel was available, and moreover, for some unknown reason, orders had been issued that no fires were to be lighted.

The French troops were greatly in need of food; whilst the Allies, although their horses lacked fodder, were adequately rationed. The French provision wagons were far behind, and even when they arrived at 8 A.M. next day, were found to contain nothing but spirit rations, which were issued, without solid food, to troops who had been forced to bivouac in fields of standing corn, soaked by the rain.

Donzelot's infantry did not pass through Genappe until 11 P.M., and then they found the road so choked by artillery and baggage wagons that they were obliged to proceed across standing crops of wheat and hemp, which wetted their clothes up to the waist. The night, moreover, was so dark that the men had to march on connecting files of cavalry placed 200 yards apart, and who kept on shouting: "This way, this way!"

* While passing through Belgium in the summer of 1814 Wellington had noticed the strength of the position at Waterloo, Mont St. Jean, and had remarked at the time to those who were accompanying him that should the day ever come when he would have to fight a battle for the protection of Brussels, he would, if it were possible for him to do so, fight it in that position.

**The
Waterloo
Position**

Erckmann-Chatrian describe vividly how, long past midnight, companies of exhausted and ravenous soldiers, to satisfy the cravings of hunger, "broke their ranks" in order to dig up radishes and other vegetables in the gardens of the farms they passed.

A traveller from Genappe to Brussels arriving at the height on which stands "La Belle Alliance" inn, sees the ground falling away in front of him; whilst about 2,000 yards to the north is a ridge, Mont St. Jean, somewhat less than two miles long, and divided into two almost equal parts by the Genappe-Brussels high road. The crest of this ridge extends on the west of the road to a point some 300 yards north of Hougomont; and on the east to within 500 yards of the north of Papelotte, where it merges into the plain.

It was on a narrow plateau along this ridge that Wellington took up his position, his main line of resistance being the hollow road which leads from Braine l'Allend, by Ohain, to Wavre. This road cuts the Genappe-Brussels road at right angles just north of La Haye Sainte; and then, a quarter of a mile or so farther to the east, trends northwards 500 yards north of Papelotte. Thus, to one standing near "La Belle Alliance," Wellington's position would have appeared straight in its centre portion, with the left flank somewhat drawn back, and the right flank advanced.

A hollow road, which runs generally east and west, follows the crest, which marked the main line of resistance.

It was bordered on either side by hedges of box and beech; these formed the only fences on the battle-field, and gave the name to the adjoining farm, La Haye Sainte. In 1815* the roadway ran, in some places, 8 feet or 10 feet below the surface, as was the case immediately to the north of La Haye Sainte, where it constituted a formidable obstacle. On the west of the Genappe-Brussels road the average depth of this crossway was 6 feet.

To the east of the Genappe-Brussels road the southern slope of the ridge was sufficiently steep to check the French cavalry when charging; whilst, on the day of the battle the sodden condition of the ground rendered movements over it extremely difficult. Moreover, on the west side of the high

* Since then it has been altered in appearance by the removal of earth to form the mound on which now stands the Belgic Lion.

road the ascent to the crest of the hill was very steep, except just midway between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont. Elsewhere the ground rises so sharply that during the battle the helmets of French horsemen, halted 150 yards to the south of the crest-line, were only just visible to our infantry standing on it; and our guns, when a little drawn back, were unable to *lay on* troops who were attacking the farm buildings of La Haye Sainte. These stand in a hollow on the west side of the road, 250 yards in front of the main position.

The
Waterloo
Position

On the right of the Allied line was Hougomont, an old manor house, surrounded by orchards and high walls which afforded great facilities for defence, the more so on account of the wood which extends a quarter of a mile to the south of the building, and which sheltered the walls from Artillery fire.

From the crest of the British position every movement made by the French could be clearly foreseen, since their army was ranged on a hill, with higher ground farther to the southward. Hence it was impossible for Napoleon to conceal his troops when moving to make either a flank or front attack; and to add to his difficulties, the heavy rain of the past twenty hours had rendered the ground so soft that guns, when moved off the ridge, sank up to the axles.

Napoleon, on the 18th, spent from 11 A.M. till 3 P.M. on the so-called "Heights of Rossomme," an undulating plateau over which passes the Genappe-Brussels road. Here, on a hillock just to the west of the road, sat the Emperor at a table, with a map spread out before him. To the northward, below his position, the ground falls rapidly away; but to the east of the road the slopes are less steep. The front French line was ranged along the descending slope, opposite and nearly parallel to the Allied army, which was some 1,500 yards away.

Wellington's forces, prior to the arrival of the Prussians in the evening, numbered in all 68,000 men (of whom 7,000 were British cavalry) and 156 guns.*

The
Opposing
Armies

Napoleon's army, excluding the Corps of Grouchy (33,000

* These figures do not include the force of Prince Frederick of Orange (17,000 strong), which Wellington, still fearing an attack on his right flank, had sent after the Battle of Quatre Bras to Hal, and which took no part in the battle on the 18th.

**Disposition
of Wellington's
Forces**

strong), which had been detached from Ligny to follow the Prussians after their defeat, numbered 66,000 men, with 242 guns; the Emperor had about 11,100 cavalry actually present on the battle-field.

Wellington drew up his army in two lines—the first consisting of infantry, with cavalry on its flanks; the second almost entirely of cavalry.

Wellington's second line: To the east of the Genappe-Brussels road stood Ponsonby's "Union" Brigade*; to the west of this road stood Lord Somerset's Heavy Brigade.

Wellington distributed his artillery along the main ridge of his position—26 guns to the east of the Genappe-Brussels road, 30 guns to the west. The remainder he held in reserve at first, but most of the guns came into action during the course of the battle.

The Reserves were posted thus: Lambert's infantry brigade, and Collaert's Dutch-Belgian cavalry near the farm of Mont St. Jean; and the Brunswick corps, cavalry and infantry, near Merbe Braine.

Despite the mixture of nationalities which it contained, in Wellington's army there was some good fighting material. In the Nassauers, the Dutch, and the Belgians, the Duke could place but little reliance, for their attachment to the Allied cause was more than doubtful. The King's German Legionaries, however, were good soldiers; so, too, were the Hanoverians and the Brunswickers, although many of the latter were very young.

Wellington was dissatisfied with his Head-quarters Staff. Its members, he said, were untrained and inefficient; and he resented very strongly the way in which the appointments had been made, his own nominees having been ignored. Still, his army on the whole was well officered, most of the higher commands having been given to men who had confidence in their Chief, and who understood his methods.

The French army included a larger number of veteran soldiers than did that of the Allies; and these were men who still retained faith in what they believed to be the all-conquering genius of Napoleon; men eager to avenge the disasters of 1814, and animated by the spirit of the stirring "Order of the Day" which the Emperor issued to his troops on June 14th.

* So called because it was composed of English, Scottish, and Irish regiments

"To conquer or die in the attempt" was their determination, as was also that of the junior officers; but it cannot be said that the same feeling was shared by the generals. The Bourbon restoration, despite its short duration, had in fact materially altered their position; and now not only were they suspicious of one another, but were not loyal to their Chief.

Napoleon's
Army and
Staff

Several of them, moreover, though young in years, were prematurely aged, and had lost that determined audacity which had gained many battles both for the Republic, and the Empire. Ney, Lobau, and some others were loyal; for they believed that their safety depended on their ability to keep Napoleon on his Throne. Exelmans and Vandamme, however, were full of zeal and confidence, but they unfortunately were not on speaking terms with Soult, whom Napoleon had appointed Chief of the Staff.

The appointment of Marshal Soult to act as Chief of the Staff has often been criticised as an unfortunate selection, but Napoleon had but very little choice. He greatly missed Berthier, who, for nineteen years, had served him faithfully in this capacity. Berthier, though neither a great general nor a great organiser, was an admirable Staff officer—indefatigable, diligent, quick to decipher the Emperor's illegible writing and comprehend his most complicated orders, and very clever at elaborating them with the necessary precision and exactitude.

Soult was an object of suspicion to all sections of the army—the generals had no confidence in him; the soldiers mistrusted him. He was a competent general but not a good Staff officer. "If the General may be regarded as representing the head of a human body," writes von Hardegg, "the Staff may be justly compared to the nerves which convey the volition from the head to the different members."

On June 18th personal animosities were forgotten so far as was humanly possible. Both the French generals and their troops fought with splendid valour and determination. None the less, the fact remains—Napoleon's army was not what it had been; it was no longer a great fighting unit bound by devoted loyalty to its Chief.

The Emperor disposed his troops for the battle in two lines. The Centre and Right, or east of his position—i.e. the ridge which extends from "La Belle Alliance" inwards towards Papelotte—was held by D'Erlon's Corps, which in-

Disposition
of
Napoleon's
Troops

**Napoleon's
Position**

cluded the divisions of Allix, Donzelot, Marcognet, and Durette, Jaquinot's cavalry, and six batteries.

To the west of the Genappe-Brussels road was Reille's Corps, which included the divisions of Prince Jerome and of Generals Bachelu and Foy, in addition to Piré's cavalry and six batteries.

Lobau's Corps, with the cavalry of Domont and Subervie, was placed in second line, just south of "La Belle Alliance"; Milhaud's cavalry were in rear of Allix's division, and Kellermann's cavalry in rear of Foy's division.

Napoleon sat with the Imperial Guard near Rossonne on either side of the Genappe-Brussels road, with Guyot's cavalry in advance to the west, and the Light cavalry (Lefebvre-Desnottes) slightly more in advance to the east of the road.


**Blücher and
Grouchy**

On the morning of the 18th Blücher's main army was in the vicinity of Wavre, preparing to advance, via St. Lambert, on Waterloo; whilst Grouchy, who was at Gembloux, set out between 6 and 7 A.M. towards the place from which Blücher was departing.

Grouchy had no idea that the Allies would fight at Waterloo; he thought they would retire to somewhere north of Brussels, and that Blücher would try to join them there, marching via Louvain. This being so, Grouchy hoped that if he hastened to Wavre and moved thence in a westerly direction, it might still be possible for him to interpose his troops between Wellington and the Prussians. He conducted his movements in accordance with Napoleon's orders.

After the Battle of Ligny no serious effort was made by the French to ascertain the Prussian line of retreat. At daybreak on the 17th, Pajol reconnoitred towards Namur, but no cavalry pushed northwards to see if the Prussians had retired in that direction. Hence, when a report came in from Pajol that 20,000 Prussians had been seen at Gembloux, Napoleon regarded this as confirming his own surmise that Blücher was falling back towards his Base.

Accordingly, he decided to dispatch Grouchy with 33,000 men to follow up the Prussians in this direction, and complete their defeat. But at 12 o'clock, when Grouchy received this order, his soldiers, who had breakfasted at daybreak, and had been "standing to arms" since early morning,



THE HONORABLE JAMES C. HARRIS

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1951

1952

1953



THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON
From a Portrait by Sir Thomas Lawrence, P.R.A.



were cleaning their muskets, whilst a part of the cavalry had "saddled" to ease their horses. Thus more valuable time was wasted before finally the Army Corps went forward. And then the march was so seriously delayed by the heavy rain, which fell from 2 o'clock, that the head of the columns did not arrive at Gembloux till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and it was dark before the last detachments reached that village. So Grouchy halted there, having covered only six miles.

Grouchy's
Movements

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO

The Six Phases of Waterloo—The Onslaught on Hougomont—The Fighting at the Farm-house of Papelotte—La Haye Sainte—The Heavy Cavalry Brigade—The Movements of Blücher—The Attack by the French Cavalry—The British Infantry Stand Firm—Ney's Great Attack—The Blunders of the Prince of Orange—Napoleon's Ignorance of His Troops' Advantage at La Haye Sainte—Advance of the French Imperial Guard—A Striking French Tribute—The Advance of the Allies—Napoleon's Flight from Waterloo—The Meeting of Wellington and Blücher—Abdication of Napoleon—The Allied Armies Before Paris—Napoleon Sent to St. Helena.

The
Position on
June 18th

BOTH the French and Allied soldiers had uncomfortable bivouacs during the night (17th-18th), for rain fell continuously, sometimes in torrents, and the ground on which the men slept, or tried to sleep, had been churned up into thick mud by the columns of troops which had passed over it during the evening. Water stood deep in every hollow place.

When day broke on the 18th there was no sign of life in the Allied position except in the outposts; but behind the centre of the French position Reille's Corps was on the move, coming up from Genappe, beyond which place it had been unable to advance overnight.

Soon after 9 o'clock the weather began to clear, and at 11.50, according to Lord Hill, who had timed with his stop-watch the first shot fired, the Battle of Waterloo began.

In it there were six phases, which may be better understood if dealt with separately. These phases may be summarised as follows:

1. The assault upon Hougomont.
2. The attack by D'Erlon's Corps upon the Allied Left and Centre. This began at about 2 o'clock, and continued for rather more than an hour, when the French were driven back to their original positions.
3. The attacks of the French cavalry upon the Right centre of Wellington's position. These were made at in-

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tervals between 4 and 6 P.M., but were repulsed by the Allies.

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4. Ney's attack upon the Allied centre, which began about 6 o'clock and lasted until nearly 7.30.

5. The advance of the Imperial Guards. They, too, failed to penetrate Wellington's position; and their failure was followed by—

6. A general advance of the Allied army and the total rout of the French, who were pursued relentlessly by the Prussians, whose advance-guard of cavalry had joined the British Left soon after 5.30 P.M.

The chief object of the onslaught on Hougoumont was to distract Wellington's attention from his Centre and Left, against which Napoleon was preparing to direct his main attack, his intention being to capture La Haye Sainte, press forward, seize Mont St. Jean, and so cut Wellington off from his line of retreat on Brussels, and Blücher.

The First
Phase:
Hougou-
mont

Under cover of a heavy cannonade, Prince Jerome's division of Reille's Corps, supported by Foy and Bachelu, descended from the west side of Napoleon's position and assailed Hougoumont vigorously, soon gaining possession of the wood and advancing to the walls around the house. But, although the enemy more than once set fire to the outbuildings, Hougoumont remained in the hands of the Allies, who held it all day despite the hardihood of the French attacks.

Byng's Brigade of Guards, which Wellington sent to assist the defenders, fought with a courage and grim determination worthy even of the Guards. The number of casualties alone shows how desperate was the nature of the struggle. During the first hour of the attack a thousand men fell at Hougoumont, and many thousands later in the battle.

During the fighting at Hougoumont, the cannonade became general along both lines; then D'Erlon, in accordance with his instructions, having brought 74 guns into action on a ridge in front of the French position, drew up his Corps and waited for the signal to attack.

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Phase

This signal was delayed, for at one o'clock the Emperor noticed troops moving in the far distance, in the direction of St. Lambert. At first, he hoped they might be Grouchy's Corps, but he soon learned that they were Blücher's. Where-

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Phase

upon he dispatched the cavalry of Subervie and Domont (and later Lobau's division) to contain them.

Then the Emperor gave the signal for D'Erlon's attack to begin, and at 1.30 the Corps, which was divided into four divisions, numbering in all 16,000 men, moved forward in direct echelon from the Left, under cover of the guns which had already been advanced to within 600 yards of the Allied position.

D'Erlon's front extended from Papelotte on the east to La Haye Sainte on the west, and was supported by Bachelu's division of Reille's Corps and a cavalry division of Kellermann's command. The flank brigades were the first to come into collision with the Allies, who had outposts stationed both at Papelotte and in front of the farm of La Haye Sainte.

The farm-house of Papelotte, held by a single company, was captured immediately, but was soon retaken, and thenceforth remained in the possession of the Allies.

Papelotte

The fighting at La Haye Sainte was heavy, and continued for some time. This farm, and the orchard to the southward of the buildings, was held by Baring's battalion of the German Legion, whilst on the open ground to the west of the farm's enclosures some companies of the same battalion were extended.

As these latter were driven back by the French skirmishers who were leading the Left echelon of D'Erlon's attack, the Duke of Wellington, who was on the crest immediately above the threatened point, sent down the Luneburg battalion from Kielmansegge's brigade. Baring, seeing the reinforcements coming down, went forward to recover the orchard which the French had seized, and was already driving back the enemy, when he saw a Cuirassier regiment approaching.

As it advanced the German Legion skirmishers retired, ran towards the orchard, and collided with the Luneburg battalion, which they threw into disorder. The Cuirassiers, coming boldly on, rode down and sabred the infantry outside the enclosures; then re-formed under the crest of the British position, immediately below where Kielmansegge's and Ompteda's brigades stood in square.

La Haye
Sainte

Meanwhile, to east and west of La Haye Sainte, D'Erlon's four columns had moved through the great

battery which had covered their advance, and the French guns again had opened fire—with good effect on Picton's division, and with still more effect on Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian brigade, which stood on the southern slope of the ridge.

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La Haye
Sainte

The tall standing crops in the valley and the saturated condition of the soil rendered it difficult for the closely packed columns of Frenchmen to maintain regular formation as they advanced. The Rear brigade of the Left Division (Allix's, temporarily commanded by Quiot, Allix being absent on special duty) attacked La Haye Sainte, but the leading brigade (Bourgeois's) inclined away from the farm, and so came up with Donzelot's division to the Right Front of Kempt's brigade, as yet unseen, but from the fire of which brigade both divisions now suffered severely.

Nevertheless, the columns still moved forward—the drums beating, the troops shouting "Vive l'Empereur!"—and got close to the road running across the British front from east to west. Here Bourgeois attempted to deploy close to Picton's division, Kempt and Pack having previously moved forward.

Picton, however, had only the remnants of two brigades under his command, 3,000 men in all, for he had borne the weight of the French attacks at Quatre Bras; and now some 10,000 of the enemy were marching towards a gap in his position, made by the retreat of Bylandt's brigade, which had retired in confusion before the advancing French, and could not be rallied till its battalions had reached the extreme rear of Wellington's position. Nevertheless, as the French ascended the hill and approached the hedge which bordered the road, they suffered heavily, for immediately to the north were British batteries which continued to fire case up to the very moment of the enemy's arrival at the batteries.

The French guns had now ceased to fire, and there were renewed shouts of "Vive l'Empereur!" as the troops nerved themselves for a great effort to carry the British position. Then Picton ordered the charge to be sounded. Immediately his men moved forward to meet the enemy, their leader himself being among the first to fall—shot through the head. For a moment, it seemed that the thin red British line, disordered by passing through the sunken

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La Haye
Sainte

road, would be overwhelmed, not by the column in its front but by the massed battalions then surging up the ridge farther to the eastward. And overwhelmed it must have been had not Lord Uxbridge at this critical moment ordered the cavalry to charge. In a few minutes Ponsonby's Union Brigade passed through the British infantry, and swept down upon the French in one of the most memorable charges in the annals of warfare.

The Royal Dragoons struck with their centre squadron the leading column of Donzelot's division which, although under fire from the left of Kempt's brigade, had no troops confronting it, and was advancing with shouts of triumph across the ridge. When the column caught sight of the British cavalry its front rank opened fire, and some twenty Dragoons dropped from their saddles, but, without drawing rein, the "Royals" pressed on, charging into the French infantry, sabring all within reach, and rolled the leading column back upon the rear battalions, which were still advancing, until the whole became so crowded together as to be helpless.

The "Royals" having cut down many men, demoralised more, and taken an Eagle, dashed on to the supporting columns; and presently, when the Inniskilling Dragoons had broken through Donzelot's rear demi-brigades, the entire French division turned, and ran before the pursuing cavalry, leaving some 3,000 men to be taken as prisoners by Picton's men, who captured another Eagle.

Meanwhile, to the west of the Genappe-Brussels road, Alten's division had been resisting valiantly the onslaughts of Kellermann's Cuirassiers. Against these, almost simultaneous with the movement of Ponsonby's brigade, Lord Somerset launched his Heavy Cavalry Brigade.

The British troopers and the French Cuirassiers collided, said an eyewitness, "like two walls." But the result was never for a moment doubtful. Our men were better trained than the Frenchmen; they were also better mounted on bigger horses, and, in addition, had all the advantage of the descending slope. The Cuirassiers, therefore, unable to resist them, turned, followed closely by the Heavy cavalry, who soon became mingled with the Union Brigade.

The two brigades, galloping forward, then dashed at

Alten's
Division

the batteries with which D'Erlon had covered the advance of his infantry, and not only killed gunners and horses, but spiked many of the guns. Now, however, the two brigades, carried away by excitement, got out of hand and scattered, with the result that they suffered heavily at the hands of Milhaud's Cuirassiers and Jaquinot's Lancers, who came up in time to save D'Erlon's Corps from overwhelming disaster.

Lord Uxbridge had intended that Vandeleur's cavalry should move in support of the Union Brigade, but, owing to a misunderstanding of orders, Vandeleur advanced his brigade too late to prevent the heavy losses which were inflicted on Ponsonby's and Somerset's disorganised squadrons.

Sir William Ponsonby himself was among the slain. After he had crossed the valley the hack he was riding became exhausted and could move no faster than at a walk. Seeing, therefore, a squadron of Jaquinot's Lancers approaching, Ponsonby took a locket from his neck and gave it to his aide-de-camp, who was better mounted, begging him to see that it should be faithfully delivered to Lady Ponsonby. This mission the aide-de-camp never fulfilled, for he, too, was speared.

Jaquinot's men gave quarter to no one. Milhaud's Cuirassiers, on the other hand, acted differently. One of them galloped at a trumpeter with the intention of running him through; but, seeing how young the boy was, he dropped the point of his sword and passed on. Unfortunately, he was killed a moment later by a (2nd) Life Guardsman, who failed to notice that he had spared the lad.

It is pleasant to record another case of generous conduct, which, happily, met with a reward. Major Poten, of the King's German Legion, having lost an arm in the Peninsula, was usually accompanied at Waterloo by two non-commissioned officers, deputed to ride one on either side of him. During the confusion of a charge the Major became separated from his escort, and presently found himself confronted by, and at the mercy of, a Cuirassier.

Already the man had raised his sword, and was about to strike when he happened to notice that the Major had no right arm. Immediately he lowered the point of his sword to "the salute" and rode away.

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After the Allied armies had occupied Paris Major Potemkin met in a street, and recognised, the assailant who had spared him. He inquired about the man, and reported his generous action to the colonel of his regiment.

That Cuirassier received the Cross of the Legion of Honour.

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The return of the British cavalry to the main position ended the second phase of the battle. Napoleon's great effort to penetrate Wellington's Left centre had failed completely, and, due mainly to the headlong charge of the British cavalry, D'Erlon's Corps had been routed.

The determined resistance offered against his attacks by the British infantry had come as a surprise to Napoleon. Hitherto, in his self-confident mind, he had regarded the reputation which our infantry had won merely as exaggerated nonsense; and he had laughed at Marshal Soult when the latter, from the memory of his own experience in the Peninsular Campaign, ventured to give warning and advice. "You were beaten by Wellington," sneered the Emperor, "and so you think he is a great General; but I tell you Wellington is a bad General, and the English are bad troops, they will be merely a breakfast for us." "I earnestly hope so," was Soult's reply. So far, events had justified the Marshal's fears, for Napoleon's attack on the Allied position had left the British troops unshaken, and now the Prussians were already menacing the French Right flank. For once in his life the Emperor found himself irresolute, unable to decide in his mind what was the best course of action now to be pursued. And, while Napoleon was hesitating, the Prussians were drawing nearer.

During the night of the 17th-18th Wellington and Blücher had been in communication, and it was decided then that the latter General should resume his march from Wavre at daybreak—the 1st Corps (Ziethen) moving via Ohain to support Wellington's left; the three remaining Corps moving via St. Lambert to fall upon Napoleon's right flank.

When making these arrangements Blücher fully expected that he would arrive on the field of Waterloo by noon. But

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in this he was disappointed. In the first place, the exhaustion of his troops and the rain which had fallen during the night made it impossible for the march to begin till seven o'clock; and the state of the roads was such as to allow only of the slowest progress.

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Blücher's
Advance

Indeed, no army, save one thirsting for vengeance on the enemy as was the Prussian, could have moved along such roads at all. Once even Blücher's men demurred. The guns had sunk axle-deep in the mire, and it was more than men and horses together could do to pull them out again.

"We cannot go on," exclaimed the weary troops. "We cannot go on!" "But you *must* go on," said the indomitable Blücher. "I have pledged my word to Wellington; you will not have me break it." And on the army went—slowly, but on; Ziethen towards Ohain; the 4th Corps (Bülow) and the 2nd Corps (Pirch) in the direction of St. Lambert.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Corps (Thielman) was fighting Grouchy at Wavre. So soon as Grouchy attacked him, Thielman—for he had only 16,000 men with whom to oppose more than 30,000 of the enemy—sent word to Blücher, begging for reinforcements.

But Blücher refused to send a man. "It is not at Wavre," he replied, "but at Waterloo that the campaign will be decided." And the Prussian General, in order to decide that campaign, deliberately left Thielman unaided to grapple with Grouchy's corps as best he could, while he himself, with the main army, advanced on Waterloo.

By that act, Marshal Vorwärts ("Forwards"), as his soldiers named him, more than justified the faith which Wellington had reposed in him. Not only had Blücher—and he was a man seventy-two years old, it must be remembered, who had been severely shaken by the mishap which had befallen him on the 16th—to contend with the badness of the roads and the exhaustion of his army, but also with the opposition of his officers.

General Gneisenau, the Chief of the Staff, strongly disapproved of the advance on Waterloo. Gneisenau had but little confidence in Wellington, and he was greatly perturbed as to what would happen to Blücher's army should the British retreat from Waterloo before the

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Advance

Prussians could arrive. "If the English," he argued, "only make a demonstration with a Rear-guard, and then fall back on Brussels, we shall be caught in making a flank march in a difficult country, and have the whole weight of the French army on us." It was not until he heard the sound of the heavy cannonade which opened about 12 o'clock, that the Prussian Chief of the Staff felt convinced that the British meant to fight on their ground.

To anticipate, at 4.30 P.M. Bülow's Corps debouched from Bois de Paris, two and a half miles due east of La Haye Sainte, and before 6 o'clock some 30,000 Prussians were marching from Frischermont towards Planchenoit, directly upon the rear of the French Right flank.

Napoleon, at about half-past three, resolved to make yet another attempt to cut his way through Wellington's position, and so achieve victory before the Prussians could arrive in force. His infantry had failed to move the British; but his cavalry, as he thought, would prove irresistible. Accordingly, he gave orders to Marshal Ney to charge with a mass of horsemen the Right Centre of the Allied position.

At the same time, in accordance with his practice of colouring reports as he thought would best suit the object he had immediately in view, the Emperor sent his aide-de-camp, Labedoyère, to pass down from right to left of the attacking columns, and assure the generals that the sound of the firing heard on the extreme right and right-rear of the French position came from Grouchy's Corps.

That firing in fact was the outcome of the desperate struggle then beginning between the 6th Corps (Lobau's) and the advancing Prussians. The French soldiers, therefore, had grounds for their distrust of the Staff, and for declining to believe anything which was not confirmed by their own eyesight. Such false statements as that quoted above were bitterly resented by Marshal Ney, who later stigmatised them in the plainest terms.

The French army at Waterloo suffered more, perhaps, from the want of able cavalry leaders than from anything else. There were many brave men under Napoleon at Waterloo; and all his generals were in the prime of life. The Emperor himself was only forty-six years of age, as also were Ney, Soult, Lobau, and Kellermann, whilst all

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Phase

the other generals of note were younger; but, except Kellermann, there was no Cavalry leader.

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Murat would have been an invaluable addition of strength, and Napoleon bitterly regretted later that he had decided not to employ him. Murat, as the Emperor wrote at St. Helena, "would perhaps have achieved the victory for us." Ney, who led the cavalry as well as the infantry charges on the 18th, however brave, however much experienced in war, was so far as cavalry was concerned a poor substitute for Murat, who had the great characteristic of inspiring his followers with the utmost devotion and his enemies with terror. To make matters worse, moreover, Ney refused to listen to the advice of Kellermann, who was greatly superior to him as a Leader of Horse, and, either because he did not believe the men and horses to be sufficiently trained for employment in line formation, or because he personally preferred to use masses similar to those in which he sent forward the infantry, advanced his cavalry, throughout the battle, in successive lines of columns. Thus every horse and rider struck down in the crowded ranks entailed the fall of many others, and impeded the advance.

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The French cavalry attacks were prefaced by a terrific cannonade, all Napoleon's available batteries being brought into action. Then, about 4 o'clock, Marshal Ney led 4,500 men, Milhaud's corps of Cuirassiers (21 squadrons) and the Light cavalry of the Guard (19 squadrons), across the open space between La Haye Sainte and Hougomont.

Every French trooper fully believed that he was going forward to complete a victory which had already been practically won. Of the British infantry nothing could be seen, and although the Allied artillerymen, both British and German, stood up to their guns until the cavalry had actually reached them—when "by order," they ran back and lay down under the bayonets of the squares formed in their rear—the Frenchmen thought that Wellington's infantry were in full retreat.

So the immense mass moved forward full of confidence, squadron after squadron, with waving plumes and shimmering breast-plates, not a single man of the two Corps

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being left in Reserve. At first they moved at a slow trot: and while their own artillery necessarily ceased fire, the British batteries, though firing as rapidly as possible, could scarcely miss the enormous target. Despite the gaps soon made in their ranks, the undaunted Frenchmen came on. Steadily, though slowly, they advanced until the guns of the Allies, now double-loaded with case and canister shot, were fired with the muzzles, in many cases, actually touching men and horses ere the gunners ran back to the infantry squares. Not even then did the Frenchmen waver!

As the first line mounted the crest of the Allied position, trumpeters sounded the charge, and the leading squadrons disappeared momentarily from the sight of those following them. A triumphant cheer broke from the ranks of the rear French squadrons. The victory had been won, it seemed; the Allies were in full retreat. And the troopers pressed forward, eager for the pursuit.

But the victory had not been won; and as they mounted the crest the French squadrons saw, instead of a retreating infantry, some 6,000 men—Alten's division—ranged in two lines of nine squares, standing there as if rooted in the ground. On the left of this division stood a brigade of Brunswick troops, and on the right, Maitland's Brigade of Guards. Behind the infantry were the remnants of the Heavy cavalry, and Dörnberg's Light Cavalry Brigade.

As the Cuirassiers rode against the squares not a musket was fired until the Frenchmen were within thirty paces, and then the havoc wrought was ghastly. But though the enemy did not flinch, yet, on the other hand, but few actually collided with the squares of bristling bayonets. Every attack was made in column. Individuals rode up to our men, and strove to knock aside the bayonets. But the only result was that their bodies and those of their horses soon formed ramparts round the squares.

Writing to Lord Beresford on July 2nd, the Duke of Wellington observed: "We had the French cavalry walking about us for some time as if they had been our own." And this is what actually did happen; the enemy *walked* about but did not *charge* our squares.

The French officers showed the most devoted gallantry. One who, with desperate valour, had penetrated a square,

lay sorely wounded on the ground, and begged our soldiers to kill him. This they refused to do; and, intensely mortified by his men's failure to follow him, the Frenchman took his own life. The enemy's private soldiers were courageous enough, but not sufficiently trained to follow their leaders closely, and thus they proved incapable of making vigorous concerted attacks.

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As the successive regiments came up they got mixed, not only in squadrons but by regiments and corps. Then they were charged by the British cavalry, and driven off the plateau. Though now our horsemen, profiting by the errors of their comrades, generally advanced no farther than the southern slopes, one regiment, forgetful of orders, charged down into the valley, and, being surrounded by hostile horsemen, suffered considerably; and, when galloping back, the Dragoons lost in addition many men from the fire of the British infantry, who mistook them for the enemy.

The French cavalry after its first repulse, re-forming under the British position, repeated their attack, this time holding back a portion of their third line to meet the British squadrons; but after a time they were again repulsed and driven back to the low ground. During one of these attacks Lord Uxbridge led a squadron of Household Cavalry against a huge column of the enemy's horsemen and, although he failed to drive it back, arrested its progress.

Although the French squadrons were unable to remain halted within sight of our guns, they merely withdrew below the crest, and individuals menaced the guns whenever an attempt was made to reload them. Major Lloyd, with one gunner of his battery, succeeded in firing six rounds into a serried mass, the head-dress of which he could just see; but he was interrupted again and again when about to fire by an officer of the Imperial Guard, who, though alone, rode straight at the Major several times when he was reloading. A Brunswick rifleman shot the Frenchman, and eventually Major Lloyd himself was mortally wounded by one of the enemy's indomitable, devoted officers.

Undaunted by these costly reverses, Ney returned yet again to the crest of Wellington's position—now with 77 squadrons, for he supported the survivors of the former

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charges with Kellermann's division (24 squadrons), and Guyot's division of Heavy cavalry of the Guard, consisting of six squadrons of Horse Grenadiers and seven of Dragoons; in all, a reinforcement of 37 squadrons.

Kellermann implored Ney to keep in reserve a part of this immense force, but Ney remained obdurate. And so the French horsemen advanced, some 12,000 strong, over a space too small for their proper employment, even in columns, and ground, moreover, encumbered by corpses.

But this great advance in mass—the greatest, it is said, that ever has been made by cavalry against infantry—proved no more successful than the previous efforts. "For upwards of an hour," declared Lord Hill, "our little squares were surrounded by the élite of the French cavalry: they gallantly stood within forty paces of us, unable to leap over the bristling line of bayonets, unwilling to retire, and determined never to surrender. Hundreds of them were dropping in all directions from our murderous fire, yet as fast as they dropped others came up to supply their places."

Twelve times, between four and six o'clock, Ney led or sent forward the French cavalry against the British squares, and, according to the accounts of the French officers, the squadrons were handled better in the later than in the early advances; but the final result was identical with that of the previous attacks.

Nor is this failure altogether surprising when one remembers that the later advance was carried out generally at a walk. The Cuirassiers were men of magnificent stature—the regiments had been made up from Mounted Police (Gendarmes), and drafts of 30 picked men from each Dragoon regiment in the Service—but they had not worked together even in squadrons, and half the horses had only recently been purchased.

Towards six o'clock the Horsemen slowly withdrew, and those that were left in the ranks re-formed between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, whence they had started. Two-thirds of their number were strewn on the slopes and plateau of the Allied position; nearly all their field officers had been killed or wounded, and some of the few who escaped, unscathed by sword or bullet, had been hurt seriously by the pressure in the mass of horses.

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Under cover of these cavalry attacks the remnants of D'Erlon's Corps came forward and made a furious assault on La Haye Sainte. For a while Baring's men valiantly stood their ground, but, as they had been fighting almost without ceasing since the battle began, their power of resistance was now rapidly ebbing, and their ammunition had almost given out. Further resistance, therefore, was impossible, and at about six o'clock Baring abandoned La Haye Sainte.

Wellington's position was now critical. The French were established within sixty yards of his main position; and their infantry, by lining the southern crest of the ridge held by the Allies, were able to pour a hot fire into Alten's and Kempt's divisions. From this our men suffered terribly, for the 27th (Royal Inniskilling) Fusiliers, standing immediately north of the cross-roads, in a very short time lost half their numbers, but without flinching or moving from the spot!

The enduring courage of the 27th was remarkable, even amongst the many heroic deeds performed that day. The battalion had been quartered at Ghent, and had marched thence, over forty miles, without halting for more than a few minutes, to Mont St. Jean, the village south of Waterloo, where the men slept soundly from 9 A.M. to 3 P.M. on the 18th. Then they took post in Wellington's position to close the open gap which had been caused by the retirement of Bylandt's troops. Later, when the French occupied the knoll above the sand-pit near La Haye Sainte, the enemy fired into the Inniskillings with such effect that eventually two-thirds of the battalion fell, yet no man flinched.

The survivors of a battalion of Kielmansegge's brigade also stood firm under equally trying circumstances. The French succeeded in bringing two guns into action to the west of La Haye Sainte, within 300 yards of the Allied line, and before they could be driven back, fired two or three rounds at the square, completely blowing away one face of it.

The Prince of Orange thereupon ordered Brigadier-General Ompteda to deploy and move against the enemy's infantry, then advancing. Ompteda pointed out that the French cavalry were immediately under the crest; but the

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Prince, disregarding this warning, ordered him to be silent and obey. At once, therefore, Ompteda deployed the 5th Battalion, and charged. The French infantry drew back, but a regiment of Cuirassiers catching Ompteda's men in flank, rolled them up from Right to Left, killing the Brigadier and destroying the battalion. Only 30 effectives answered the muster-roll after this unfortunate attack. The Prince of Orange, though a very incompetent soldier, was a brave man, and shortly after Ompteda's death, led forward another battalion, and was himself wounded. This wound was fortunate for his reputation, as it tended to make people forget that he had been the direct cause of the loss of the 69th (2nd Welsh) Regiment at Quatre Bras, and of Ompteda's two battalions.

Happily for Wellington, Napoleon failed to observe the advantage which his troops had gained at La Haye Sainte, for at this time the Emperor's attention was distracted by the approach of the Prussians. Bülow was already attacking Planchenoit; Ziethen was almost in touch with Wellington; and this serious menace to his Right monopolised all Napoleon's energies.

The blow at the Centre of the Allied position, therefore, was not forced home. Soon after 5.30 P.M. the Prussian cavalry came up on the Left of the British position. Lord Uxbridge was then able to move the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to support the infantry near La Haye Sainte.

When Sir Hussey Vivian arrived at the Centre of the position, the scene of ruin in the vicinity of the cross-roads showed no indication of the coming victory. Hundreds of men, dead and dying, lay on the ridge; while numberless loose and mutilated horses wandered in circles, bewildered by the smoke and deafening noise of the guns.

Near the cross-roads Vivian met Lord Edward Somerset with two weak squadrons of Household cavalry, and asked: "Where is your brigade?" Lord Somerset pointed significantly to the few men then in the saddles. None the less, the immediate danger at La Haye Sainte had passed before, at 7.30, Napoleon made his final bid for victory by an attack by all three Arms along the whole of the Allied position.

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Under cover of a cloud of skirmishers and a deafening cannonade, the advance began. D'Erlon directed the attack against the Left Centre of the Allies, where stood the brigades of Lambert, Best, and Kempt; whilst Marshal Ney, with 10 battalions of the Imperial Guard, and many batteries, advanced from "La Belle Alliance," between Hougomont and La Haye Sainte, directly against the Right Centre of Wellington's position.

"Napoleon rode forward to a spot by which his veterans were to pass; and, as they approached, he raised his arm, and pointed to the position of the Allies, as if to tell them that their path lay there. They answered with loud cries of 'Vive l'Empereur!' and descended the hill from their own side, into that 'valley of the shadow of death,' while the batteries thundered with redoubled vigour over their heads upon the British line."

In stately array, moving forward in two bodies, one slightly in front of the other, the Imperial Guard advanced. As they neared the crest of the ridge, behind which were crouching Maitland's Brigade of Guards and Adams' brigade, the French guns ceased fire. The guns of the Allies continued in action on the advancing Frenchmen who, nevertheless, still moved majestically forward, Marshal Ney riding at their head, till his horse was shot under him; when that dauntless soldier, sword in hand, continued to lead his men, on foot, up the lower slopes of the hill and on to the crest.

There, naturally, the French troops expected to find Wellington's battalions awaiting them, but, to their amazement, no soldiers could be seen—only dense clouds of smoke, and a small group of officers, among whom sat the Duke of Wellington. For a moment the French veterans hesitated. Then a command rang out: "Up Guards!" and up started a line of the British Guards in perfect order.

The French officers made a brave effort to deploy their columns, but it was too late. The British Guards were already upon them; and, a few minutes later, Napoleon's hitherto unbeaten veterans turned and went down the hill a disorganised rabble.

The second column of the Imperial Guard advanced a little while after the first. This gave Maitland time to re-form his brigade, and furthermore enabled Colonel

Waterloo,
1815:
The Fifth
Phase

Colborne, of the 52nd, in Adams' brigade, to take up a position with his men on the left flank of the on-coming French. Caught thus between two fires, even picked soldiers like Napoleon's veterans were powerless, and the second column of the Imperial Guard turned and retreated, closely pursued by Adams' victorious brigade, in the direction of La Haye Sainte.

Here they became mingled with the infantry of Donzelot's division; and the news that the Guard had been routed soon spread through the whole of D'Erlon's corps—with disastrous results. Battalion after battalion began to waver, and officers could not rally them.

One of Napoleon's Generals, Foy, a very brave soldier, has left on record a striking tribute to the splendid obstinacy of the British infantry as it stood unmoved by the assaults of courageous Frenchmen.

"Wounded, vehicles, reserve ammunition train, auxiliary troops, were hurrying in confusion towards Brussels. The Angel of Death was ever before their eyes, and busy in their ranks. Disgrace lay behind them. In these terrible circumstances, neither the bullets of the Imperial Guard nor the hitherto victorious French cavalry could break the immovable British infantry. One would have been inclined to believe that they had taken root to the ground if the battalions had not, some few moments after the sun set, moved forward in grand array. This they did when the arrival of the Prussian army showed Wellington that, thanks to his numbers, thanks to his masterly inactivity, and to his knowing how to place his brave men in a defensive position, he had won the most decisive victory of our age."

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Napoleon, near "La Belle Alliance," still had in reserve two battalions of the Imperial Guard, and around these he and Ney proceeded to marshal the remnants of the defeated veterans in the hope that it might yet be possible to deliver another attack upon the Allied position.

Wellington now assumed the offensive. He ordered Vivian and Vandeleur to charge the troops which Napoleon was endeavouring to re-form. Then he gave the order for a general advance of his army.

Waterloo,
1815:
The Sixth
Phase

It was now 8 o'clock in the evening, and as the British and German regiments eagerly moved forward against the foe whose attacks they had been resisting for nine hours, the setting sun showed behind the clouds, and shone, for the first time that day, on the bayonets of the Allies, now surging down the slope.

Wellington himself rode among the foremost of the pursuers, recklessly exposing himself to danger, at the head of Adams' brigade, where the bullets still flew thick and fast. Once a member of his Staff ventured to remonstrate with him, but the Duke laughed lightly. "Never mind," he said; "let them fire away; the battle's won, and my life is of no consequence now."

Meanwhile, as Vivian's brigade descended the slope, covered with dead and wounded men, the smoke hung so thick over the ground that the Brigadier could see nothing; but the fire and shouting to the eastward showed that the French were falling back. When the brigade got to the low ground Vivian saw in front of him crowds of scattered fugitives, and two or three well-formed squares of infantry, flanked on either side by cavalry and artillery.

The cavalry were the remnants of the squadrons which had been recklessly squandered between 4 and 6 P.M.; the infantry, four battalions of the Middle Guard. The latter were charged in flank by several British squadrons, and put in disorder. The fugitives ran back, and, according to Napoleon himself, "others, seeing troops of the Guard flying, thought it was the Old Guard, and the panic spread immediately over the whole battle-field."

While Vivian was advancing to attack, he received an order not to charge infantry unless he felt sure of breaking the squares. He urged, however, that the enemy's cavalry, if unmolested, might charge our infantry. Accordingly, he led the 10th Hussars against a regiment of Lancers which formed the Left of the French horsemen.

A squadron of Cuirassiers attempted to arrest the advance, but was beaten back. A regiment of French Carabiniers, charging our cavalry, came under infantry fire at fifty paces and were destroyed, and the three squadrons of the 10th, each riding into distinct bodies of the enemy, put to flight all the Mounted men to the westward of the infantry squares.

Waterloo,
1815:
The Sixth
Phase

Having ordered the 10th to re-form, Vivian galloped back to the 18th Hussars. On his way he was attacked by a Cuirassier, but, although he had only one hand—he had lost the other during the Peninsular Campaign—he managed to wound his antagonist, who was killed by an orderly following the General. Riding up to the 18th, Vivian shouted:

“Eighteenth, will you follow me?”

“Yes, General,” answered Sergeant-Major Jeffs, “to hell, if you will lead us.” And the Hussars galloped forward with great determination, riding over and destroying a battery of artillery which crossed their front. Then, having first upset some squadrons in their immediate front, they inclined to the right and charged a body of horsemen who were covering the retirement of one of the squares. The French squadrons were driven away, and a battery behind them was abandoned by its detachments—all the troops flying in disorder. Two squares of the Old Guard, however, still stood intact.

Vandeleur's brigade, under the command of Colonel Sleigh—for Vandeleur had taken the place of Lord Uxbridge, who had been wounded—passed on farther to the westward, and attacked a large square of infantry between Mon Plaisir and Rossomme, breaking it up and taking many prisoners.

The 16th (now Lancers) Dragoons then came upon a large body of French infantry endeavouring to form square, and, charging it, took or destroyed the entire column; whilst almost at the same moment the 11th (now Hussars) Light Dragoons, farther to the Westward, took a battery—the last of the French guns in position.

Our cavalry were now careering everywhere amid crowds of helpless fugitives, and, with the British and Hanoverian infantry advancing from the North, and the Prussians rapidly closing in upon them from the East, the demoralised troops of France fled before the storm in wild confusion—with one exception; three battalions of the Old Guard still stood firm, declining to surrender. They were covering a square in which Napoleon and his Staff had taken shelter, and no efforts, until darkness fell, could drive them away faster than at a foot's pace.

At first, it was Napoleon's intention to stop with the

The Flight of Napoleon


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square, but Soult, recognising the futility of further resistance, seized the bridle of the Emperor's horse and dragged him away. "Your Majesty," he said, "are they not already successful enough?" And the Emperor rode off in the direction of Charleroi.

On the "Heights of Rossomme" Wellington ordered his troops to halt, and left the pursuit of the enemy to the Prussians. Later that evening he met Marshal Blücher, and the two Generals, having shaken hands, warmly congratulated each other.

Although the main body of the British and German Legion had abandoned the pursuit, Vivian and Vandeleur and the relentless Prussians continued for a long while to pursue the flying Frenchmen. The British Light cavalry halted at about 10 p.m., but the Prussians, under General Gneisenau, went on throughout the night. And when the

Waterloo
1815:
The Sixth
Phase



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO, JUNE 18th, 1815

Waterloo,
1815:
The Sixth
Phase

infantry wearied, General Gneisenau continued on his way alone with the cavalry.

From nine distinct and separate bivouacs the demoralised French soldiers were driven, and, when the light of the moon was insufficient to enable the pursuers to kill the enemy, the sound of a Prussian drum, carried on a troop horse, sufficed to goad the fugitives into renewed efforts to escape.

Napoleon endeavoured near Charleroi, at about 5 A.M. on the 19th, to stay the flight and panic of his troops, but even his efforts proved unavailing. On and on rushed the routed Frenchmen, now divided into two bodies, the larger following the road that leads to Avesnes, the smaller running towards Philippeville.

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The horrors of that night baffle description. Beaten, demoralised, with all bonds of discipline dissolved, the French army retreated in helpless and wild confusion towards the frontier. "The road," General von Gneisenau wrote to his wife next day, "resembled a seashore strewn with cannons, limbers, muskets, ammunition, and baggage wagons, wreckage of all descriptions."

The deplorable condition into which the French troops soon sank is shown only too clearly by the vivid description which Captain Delafosse, General Foy's aide-de-camp, has left on record of his own experiences. "We drew near Beaumont, when suddenly a regiment of horse was seen debouching from a wood on our Left. The column that we followed shouted out, 'The Prussians! The Prussians!' and galloped off in utter disorder. But," added Delafosse, "the troops that thus alarmed them were not a tenth part of their numbers, and were, in reality, our own 8th Hussars, who wore green uniforms. The panic had been brought even thus far from the battle-field, and the disorganised cavalry galloped into Beaumont, which was already crowded by our infantry. We were obliged to follow the *débâcle*."

No returns were made of the French losses in the battle, but certainly not more than 40,000 men recrossed the Sambre. The losses of the Allies, killed and wounded, amounted to 22,000 men, of whom 7,000 were Prussians.

After leaving Charleroi, Napoleon succeeded, but with difficulty, in escaping to Philippeville. From there he sent word to all those of his generals whom he had left in France, to converge on Paris with their troops. Then, having ordered Soult to collect the fugitives of his own army and march with them on Laon, he himself set out for Paris, reaching the capital in advance of the news of his defeat. But the latter was not long delayed; and, on the following day, the Chamber of Deputies met and issued the stern ultimatum that unless the Emperor should abdicate within one hour, his deposition forthwith would be declared.

Napoleon bowed his head to the inevitable, and on June 22nd, for the second and final time, abandoned the Throne of France.

Meanwhile, the Allies were moving steadily on Paris—not merely the armies of Wellington and Blücher; Russian, Austrian, and Spanish troops, too, now were crossing over the frontiers; and by the middle of July there were something like 800,000 invaders quartered upon the inhabitants of France. Such opposition as Soult could offer was useless. And Grouchy, who by skilful manœuvring had managed to escape with his corps from Wavre, likewise fell back before the advancing hordes.

On June 29th the Allied armies arrived before Paris. Blücher, indomitable as ever, wished, it is said, to proceed immediately to storm the city, but the wiser counsels of Wellington prevailed, and on July 3rd, a suspension of arms having been agreed upon, negotiations were begun. Between the 4th and the 6th the French army filed through the streets of Paris and made its way towards the Loire, leaving the Allies, under the Duke of Wellington, in possession. And on the 8th of the month, Louis XVIII. was restored to the Throne of France.

Some days earlier Napoleon had left the capital. On July 2nd he set out for Rochefort, hoping to be able to escape thence to America. But on July 14th, when about to be arrested by the Bourbon Government, he surrendered himself to Captain Maitland, commanding H.M.S. *Bellerophon*. On October 16th the ex-Emperor landed at St. Helena, where, in accordance with the decision of the Allied Powers, he was detained until his death.

Waterloo,
1815;
Abdication
of
Napoleon

Allies in
Paris

St. Helena

PART XII

THE ARMY IN INDIA, 1842-49

CHAPTER I

THE CONQUEST OF SCINDE

The Napiers—General Sir Charles Napier Lands at Karachi—Major Outram
—The Amirs Sign the Treaty—The Battle of Miani—The Conquest of
Scinde Completed.

The
Napier
Family

THE conqueror of Scinde, Charles Napier, was the eldest of three brothers, all of whom served under Sir John Moore. All three took part in Moore's retreat to Corunna in the winter of 1808-9, and fought in the battle which was the brilliant ending to that disastrous retreat. William wrote "The History of the Peninsular War," during which he, Charles, and George were repeatedly wounded. Charles, severely wounded at Corunna, and reported as dead some months later, recovered his will which had been admitted to Probate. His life was saved by a French drummer, and both Soult and his successor, Marshal Ney, behaving generously, sent him to England pending an exchange of prisoners.

When General Sir Charles Napier, vacating command of the Puna division, landed at Karachi, September, 1842, the population of Scinde, a million, consisted of four distinct peoples—Scindians proper, Hindus, Baluchis of the plain, and Baluchis of the mountains. The two former were the helots of the territory. The chieftainship was divided between the Amir of Kyrpoor, or Upper Scinde, and the Amir of Hyderabad, or Lower Scinde. During the march in 1838-9, through Upper Scinde of the British army proceeding to Afghanistan, the Amirs had been forced into compliance with our demands, which included cession of territory, annual subsidies and rights of passage, but no sooner had the British army moved forward than Lower Scinde broke out in opposition. The British stores at

The Scinde Treaty

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Hyderabad were plundered, and the British Agent was driven from the Residency. The Amirs had, however, in March, 1839, signed the treaty which formulated the relations existing between the British Government and Scinde when Sir Charles Napier came on the scene. Its main stipulations were: That a British force of a strength specified by the Governor-General be quartered in Scinde; that three named Amirs should pay £10,000 annually towards the maintenance of the force; that the territory should be under British protection; that they should be absolute in regard to their own subjects, but quarrels among themselves should be referred to British mediation; that their foreign policy should be approved by the British Government, and that they should furnish a defensive force at call; and that tolls on trading boats on the Indus should be abolished.

Conquest of
Scinde,
1842

Major Outram, "the Bayard of India," was Resident at Hyderabad in 1842. Lord Ellenborough, the new Governor-General, communicated to him his intention to punish the first chief who should prove faithless, by the confiscation of his dominions. Outram temporised because, knowing the Amirs' disposition as a body, he feared that Lord Ellenborough's menacing tone might drive them to extremities. This was the position when Sir Charles Napier, on September 25th, had his first interview with the Amirs of Lower Scinde, and took over the entire authority of all Political and Civil officers within the limit of the Military command.

The Scinde
Treaty,
1842

A garrison was left in Sukkur, and the Indus was crossed in the middle of December. After issuing in vain a proclamation calling on the Amirs to assemble at Khyrpoor to complete the treaty, Napier marched slowly southwards. Outram went to Hyderabad. The time for signing the treaty was extended again and again, for the chiefs were intriguing amongst themselves and against Outram, whose chivalrous feelings led him to a deep sympathy with the Amirs in their approaching downfall, which he strove to avert. He informed Napier that not an armed man was in Hyderabad, and that a peaceful arrangement could be concluded if the General would leave his army, and come in person into Hyderabad. Napier's spies, however, reported that 25,000 men were assembled within a few miles of the city. On February 12th, the Amirs signed the

Hyderabad

Conquest of
Sinde,
1842:
Hyderabad

treaty in Outram's presence. But two days later a deputation informed him that the chieftains and tribesmen were determined to fight, and that the Amirs could not restrain them. Outram had already been threatened, and insulted by the turbulent populace of Hyderabad; on the 15th the Residency was attacked; Outram and Conway, with their escort of 100 men, withstood the attacks of Baluchis for four hours, and then effected a retreat to steamers on the river, and rejoined the Army.

Miani

Napier waited at Nowshera until February 6th, at Outram's instance, who still pleaded strenuously in favour of the Amirs. The Baluchis numbered 22,000 fighting men entrenched in the dry bed of the Fullaillee river, near Miani, 6 miles from Hyderabad. Napier had 2,200 under arms, of whom less than 500 were Europeans.

When Napier, tired of waiting, advanced his little force for a direct attack, in passing a high boundary wall on his Right, he observed a gap in it through which his Right Rear could be taken in reverse. Captain Tew's company of the 22nd (Cheshire) Regiment was ordered to hold it. Tew was slain, but possession of the gap was maintained, and 6,000 Baluchis were paralysed by the resistance of a single company.

When the line reached the wide bed of the dry river, a dense mass of warriors met their assailants. For a moment the Red wall seemed to stagger, when the animated figure of the veteran chief was seen out in front of his soldiers, as with vigorous gesture he urged them forward into the crowd. The young soldiers of the 22nd—Cheshire Regiment—responded gallantly to the old leader's call. The Sipahi regiments prolonged the line of fire to the left, coming into action successively with ardour and resolution. The antagonists fought hand to hand, often, indeed, intermingled, and several times the British regiment was forced violently backwards, but Napier was always there to rally and cheer on his people.


For more than three hours this struggle continued, until every British regimental officer was either wounded or killed. Napier now sent orders to Colonel Pattle to charge the enemy's Right with the Bengal and Scinde Horse. The troopers dashed through the Baluchi guns, crossed the deep bed, gained the plain beyond, charged with irresistible fury.

The Battle of Dubba

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and spread confusion along the rear of the masses opposed to the British infantry. Then the 22nd leaped forward with the shout of victory, and pushed their antagonists back into the deep ravine. The Amirs had lost the battle, and their dogged tribesmen slowly and reluctantly retired. Miani was one of the fiercest actions of modern times. The loss of the Baluchis was about 7,000 men. The British lost 270.

On March 24th, 1843, Napier, with 4,000 Infantry, 1,000 horsemen, and 19 guns, attacked Shir Mahomed, "the Lion of Mirpur," at Dubba, and soon put 26,000 men to flight, killing 5,000. The conquest of Scinde was then complete.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MIANI, FEBRUARY 17th, 1843

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST SIKH WAR

The Fighting at Mudki—General Gough—The Action of Firozshah—The Battle of Aliwal—The Battle of Sohraon—A Critical Moment—The Bravery of the Sikhs—The End of the First Sikh War.

Mudki,
1845

RANJIT SINGH, a great Eastern potentate, ruler of the Sikh nation, a firm British ally, died in June, 1839. One of his widows was sacrificed at his funeral, in the attendant ceremonies of which, his son and successor, Nihal Singh, was accidentally killed.

The British Government maintained friendly relations with the successive rulers of the Sikhs, whose advent to power was accompanied by the murder of the previous ruler, and the slaughter not only of his family, but of his friends and their relations. Eventually, when the cantoning of the Sikh troops became threatening, the Governor-General of India sent some regiments up to our frontier—the left bank of the Satlaj, the largest tributary to the Indus.

Fifty thousand Sikhs, trained by French officers, with 108 guns, crossed the Satlaj, December 11th, 1845, and encamped between Firozshah and Mudki.

European troops were hurried down from the Himalayas and concentrated at Ambala, where they were formed into brigades, and a division from Mirath (Meerut) concentrated with the Ambala troops, which marched, December 15th, twenty-six miles; 16th, thirty miles; 17th, ten miles; 18th, twenty-one miles—many of the marches being over sandy desert tracks with little water. When the troops were cooking at Mudki, they were called to arms at 3 p.m. on the 18th and fought till nightfall. They lost 900 killed and wounded, but drove off the Sikhs, taking 17 of their 22 guns.

Firozshah

Next day the British troops were reinforced by one battalion of Europeans and two of Natives, and, December 21st, marched on the main Sikh position, being joined when four miles from it by General Littler from Firozshah, who brought 7,000 men, 1,000 of whom were Europeans.

Battle of Firozshah

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General Gough, the Commander-in-Chief, accepted the offer of the Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, a Peninsular veteran, to serve under him as second in command, and he took charge of a wing of the army. They attacked at sunset; were at first repulsed, and then succeeded in penetrating into the middle of the Sikh position, where they halted.

First Sikh
War.
1845-46:
Firozshah

Next morning, when their troops were cheering a supposed victory, Tej Singh, a rival leader to Lall Singh, who had been defeated overnight, came up with 10,000 men, and opened fire. The British guns were unable to reply, as they had no ammunition left. Tej Singh retired after a short time, having attained his object, which was to see his rival countryman crushed by the British troops.

The strenuously-contested action of Firozshah, when the British army under Sir Hugh Gough, after two days' fighting, beat the Sikhs on December 22nd, 1845, exhausted the resources of the conquerors, and for a month reduced them to inaction. Ammunition and heavy guns had to be sent up from Delhi, 200 miles distant. The Sikhs were still in the possession of a numerous artillery and of large reserves of disciplined troops.

After their repulse at Firozshah, the main Khalsa army withdrew to the west of Satlaj. Early in January, 1846, Sikh troops crossed the Satlaj again, and advanced to Ludhiana, which had only a weak garrison. Simultaneously Ránjur Singh, with 8,000 troops and 70 guns, crossed the river at another point.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ALIWAL, JANUARY 28th, 1846

First Sikh
War,
1845-46:
Aliwal

By the night of January 23rd, General Smith had effected the relief of Ludhiana, and being reinforced by Wheeler's brigade and the 53rd (1st Shropshire Light Infantry) Regiment, had 10,000 men and 32 guns.

Sir Harry started from Ludhiana to attack Ránjur Singh, who had taken up an entrenched position at Aliwal, six miles distant, with the Satlaj river at his rear. The Khalsa troops insisted on meeting the English on the open plain, instead of fighting from behind their earthworks. Their force had now swelled to 20,000 men, with 52 guns.

On January 28th, the British infantry deployed into line, the Battle of Aliwal began with a smart cannonade from the Sikh guns. The village of Aliwal was the key to the enemy's position. Against this our attack was concentrated, and it was stormed and captured, the 53rd (1st Shropshire Light Infantry) leading the way. Major Lawrenson unlimbered his battery of Horse artillery within a short distance of the Sikh guns, and forced the Khalsa artillerymen to abandon their pieces.

Sir Harry Smith now fell on the Left and Centre of the Sikh line, whilst the cavalry delivered several effective charges. The 16th Lancers on this day made history for their corps: "Gallantly led by their death-despising officers, our troopers broke through the Sikh squares." As the impetus of their charge carried them past the successive formations, the Sikhs flung themselves on the ground, and directly the squadrons had passed sent a volley of bullets after them. Three times the 16th repeated this attack, losing a hundred of their number in the effort, or nearly one-fifth of the total casualties on the British side during the action.

The infantry took the Sikh batteries one after another, notwithstanding the resolution with which they were defended. Step by step the Khalsa troops fell back, halting every few paces to discharge a volley into the faces of their foes. Finally, they were forced to leave the last of their 52 guns, and, being driven to the banks of the Satlaj, crossed under a heavy artillery fire, abandoning everything to their conquerors.

The remnants of Ránjur Singh's force rallied at Fobraon, where, on the Satlaj river just below its junction with the Beas, they formed a vast entrenchment, semicircular in

The Battle of Sobraon

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form, bristling with triple rows of guns, its flanks resting on the river, and protected by batteries on the northern bank of the river enfilading the approaches. These formidable works, defended by 120 pieces of artillery and 30,000 troops, constituted an almost impregnable fortification.

First Sikh
War,
1845-46:
Sobraon

On February 7th the first portion of the Siege-train arrived, and orders were issued on February 9th for an assault to be delivered on the following morning. It was proposed to cannonade and then storm the enemy's Right or western flank. To accomplish this we had 15,000 men in the field, of whom one-third were Europeans, and about 100 guns.

It was a misty morning, such as is often experienced during the cold weather in the Panjab plains.

At seven o'clock Grant's battery of Horse artillery opened fire from Chota Sobraon. The Sikh fire was not effective, the majority of their shells bursting too high. But our guns made no impression upon the enemy's earthworks, and after two hours ammunition began to run short, and it became evident that, if Sobraon was to be taken, it must be at the point of the bayonet.

Therefore, at nine o'clock Sir Robert Dick sent forward Stacey's brigade, led by the 10th (1st Lincolnshire Regiment) and 53rd (1st Shropshire Light Infantry) and supported on either flank by Horse artillery. They advanced quickly, but in perfect line, whilst the batteries took up successive positions at the gallop until they came within 800 yards of the Sikh heavy batteries, where, under a hot fire, the brigade halted. Sir Robert Dick then led his Reserve forward, whereupon, with a cheer, the leading line rushed on. The 10th, on the extreme Left, effected an entrance into the earthworks, and news of their success rolling down the line, their comrades broke their formation and, storming the entrenchments with irresistible dash, drove the Sikhs before them in confusion.


The centre Division was drawn up a mile to the right of Sir Robert Dick's, fronting the Centre of the Sikh defences, their attack on which had been intended as a feint. But, with a temporary check of the Left, the plan of action was changed; and first Gilbert, then Sir Harry Smith, were ordered forward to storm the lines and batteries directly in their fronts.

First Sikh
War,
1845-46:
Sobraon

Gilbert's leading brigade missed the objective and arrived, unsupported, in front of the apex and strongest point of the enemy's defences. Her Majesty's 29th (1st Worcestershire) Regiment and H.E.I.C.'s 1st European Light Infantry were leading, and, under fire of grape and canister, crossed a dry ravine and charged right up to the earthworks, which were too high for them to clamber over.

The walls stood well above the reach of the men. Thrice did the 29th and the European Light Infantry attempt to scale them, and thrice were they repulsed and driven back across the ravine, followed each time to its edge by the Sikhs, who cut to pieces the wounded. At this critical moment Sir Henry Hardinge shouted out, "Rally those men!" His aide-de-camp, Colonel Wood, instantly galloped to the Centre of the wavering line, snatched the colours from the hand of an ensign, and, waving them aloft, carried them to the front. The line renewed the assault. The men helped each other to scramble over, and just as Dick's division had made good its footing on the Left, Gilbert's men burst into the Centre of the Sikh camp.

During the process of the assault the pioneers had made some openings in the Sikh earthworks, and through one of these Sir Joseph Thackwell led his squadrons in single file.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF SOBRAON, FEBRUARY 10th, 1846

The Carnage at Sobraon

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Filing through the earthworks, furrowed with trenches, they re-formed inside the hostile camp, and then, charging, cut down the Sikhs.

First Sikh
War,
1845-46 :
Sobraon

The Khalsa army defended itself with resolution, displaying a cohesion which had never before been apparent in its ranks. Shoulder to shoulder the Sikhs stood, and resisted stubbornly as one man.

Although their Commander-in-Chief, Tej Singh had fled, Shám Singh Atáriwala remained, an old and brave soldier who had fought under Ranjit Singh. He, gathering his officers and chiefs around him, reminded them how great was the stake at issue; and that there might be no retreat, commanded the two centre boats of the bridge over the Satlaj to be cut adrift. Clothing himself in white, in token that he had devoted himself to death, he stood in the front of the Khalsa army, a rallying point for his countrymen, until, covered with wounds and glory, he fell where the slaughtered bodies of his followers lay thickest.

Directly the British infantry had gained a footing in the works a hand-to-hand struggle ensued, but the Khalsa soldiery were borne back upon the river. But there was no panic; they retreated in admirable order. At last their fire slackened, for they had become huddled into one dense mass as our three Divisions closed in on the bridge. Then it was recognised that the possibility of further resistance was over, and in a few seconds the narrow pontoon was crowded with guns, horses, and soldiery of all arms, swaying it to and fro as those who had reached the gap strove to keep back the pressure at their rear. Suddenly, with a mighty crash, the overladen bridge parted from its moorings, and the boats that composed it broke up and foundered. The surface of the water was packed with dead or dying Sikhs, whose writhing bodies formed a bridge across the blood-dyed river. "In the whole annals of warfare no parallel can be found to the carnage of Sobraon."

In two hours we lost 2,383 killed and wounded. Many thousands of Sikhs with the heroic fortitude of their race perished.

CHAPTER III

SECOND SIKH WAR

The Treaty of Lahor—The Siege of Multan—Lord Dalhousie Advances His Troops—Colin Campbell Commands the Advance Force—The Action at Ramnagar—The Battle of Chillianwala—The Disaster to General Pennycuik's Brigade—General Sir Charles Napier Supersedes Lord Gough—The Battle of Gujrat—The Surrender of the Sikhs.

The Treaty of Lahor

THE issue of the First Sikh War (1845-46) placed the vast territory of the Panjab at the mercy of the British Government. Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General, decided against annexation, and the Treaty of Lahor accorded a nominally independent sovereignty to the boy Prince Dhulip Singh. Henry Lawrence was placed at Lahor as the British Representative in the Panjab, and a reduced and limited Sikh army was reorganised. A Council of Regency composed of eight Sikh chiefs was appointed to act under the guidance of the British Resident for eight years, until the Young Maharajah should attain his majority. The treaty conferred on the Resident unprecedented powers, and Major Henry Lawrence, an officer of the East India Company's Artillery, became in effect the successor of Ranjit Singh.

Mulraj's Revolt

When in January, 1848, Henry Lawrence sailed on sick furlough from Calcutta to England in company with the retiring Governor-General, he left the Panjab, to all appearance, in a state of unruffled peace, Henry Lawrence's successor being Sir Frederick Currie. When Sir Frederick Currie reached Lahor he appointed a Governor for Multan vice Mulraj, who had resigned. Mulraj accompanied two British political officers to their camp, and having on the road witnessed their assassination, he, on the following day, raised a Revolt. The Commander-in-Chief, Lord Gough, with the concurrence of Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General, intimated his resolve to postpone military operations until the cold weather set in, when he would take the field in person.

The Siege of Multan

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Siege of
Multan

Meanwhile a subaltern, for whom forced marches and hard fighting in hot weather had no terrors, struck in on his own responsibility. Collecting in the wild Trans-Indus district of Bannu 1,500 men with a couple of guns, Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes marched towards Multan. Colonel Cortlandt, with 2,000 Pathans and six guns, hastened to join him; and on May 20th the united force defeated Mulraj's army, 6,000 strong. The loyal Nawab of Bhawalpur sent a strong force across the Satlaj to join hands with Edwardes and Cortlandt; and the concentration had just been accomplished, twenty miles from Multan, when the Allies were attacked by Mulraj with a force of equal strength. After half a day's hard fighting the enemy fled in confusion. Mulraj was again defeated, July 1st, outside Multan, and took refuge inside the fort.

By the end of August 7,000 men under General Whish reached Multan, but the Siege-guns were not in position until a fortnight later. Mulraj held out resolutely; and costly approaches were carried on for a week, when Sher Singh and his contingent, sent by the Lahor Government, passed over to the enemy. After this defection, Whish considered it to be impracticable to continue the siege, and he retired to a position in the vicinity pending the arrival of reinforcements from the Bombay side. The siege was re-opened late in December; the city was stormed and captured after a hard fight; and, finally, on January 22nd, 1849, Mulraj surrendered at discretion.

By the end of September, 1848, the flame of rebellion had spread over the Land of the Five Rivers; and by the end of October only a few brave English officers were still holding together the last shreds of British influence in the Panjab outside of Lahor.

Lord Dalhousie realising from the collapse of the siege of Multan that he had before him a serious campaign, ordered the concentration of a large force at Firuzpur, and the advance from Bombay of a smaller column against Multan. Before the end of October, the leading brigades of the army had marched past Lahor across the Ravee towards Shahdara. Cureton's cavalry brigade and Godby's infantry brigade were already there, and on November 12th Colin Campbell (later Lord Clyde) joined Cureton with two Native infantry regiments, taking command of the advanced

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force with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. Lord Gough took the field, crossing the Ravee on the 19th with four British and eleven Native infantry regiments, three European cavalry, five Native Regular cavalry, and five corps of Irregular horse. The artillery consisted of 60 Horse and Field-guns, eight howitzers, and 10 eighteen-pounders.

The Commander-in-Chief, reconnoitring personally towards the Chinab River, came at daylight, at Ramnagar, a village ten miles from his camp, on some detachments of Sher Singh's army which was retreating to the right bank.

The Bengal Horse Artillery, under Captains Lane and Warner, not content with the good target they had for their guns, followed up the retreating enemy through deep sand until they were fired on, and overpowered by Sikh batteries in position on the far bank. As the Horse batteries fell back through very deep ground, one gun stuck fast, and masses of Sikh cavalry came across the river to secure it, and two ammunition wagons which were embedded close to the gun. Several fine charges of our Horsemen against vastly preponderating numbers were delivered, but the piece was not recovered, and some senior officers fell in the charges, one being Colonel Cureton, the Adjutant-General of the Army, who riding forward to prevent another effort being made by Colonel Havelock, both these officers were killed.

Lord Gough then withdrew his troops out of range, and they remained inactive till December 2nd, when General Sir Joseph Thackwell was ordered to cross to the right bank 24 miles upstream.

Insufficient reconnaissance had been made. The river at the point designated for its passage was wider and deeper than it was near Ramnagar. Its passage was effected with much difficulty, and success was mainly due to Sher Singh's want of enterprise, and the valuable initiative of John Nicholson acting as a Political officer. It was he who fell gloriously ten years later when leading a column in the capture of Delhi, after having achieved a world-wide reputation. Nicholson with a Pathan escort rode forward in advance of Thackwell's troops, and secured 17 large boats, by which the crossing was effected.

The Battle of Chilianwala

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Sher Singh surprised Sir Joseph Thackwell's force at 11 A.M., December 3rd, but after a cannonade of five hours, retired. The British Mounted troops were unskilled in reconnaissance, and reported that the Sikh army had crossed the Jhelam (Hydaspes) river, whereas it was only 10 miles distant.

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Chilianwala

In a strategical point of view, Lord Gough should have halted until he obtained the troops which would have been set free by the impending fall of Multan, but the Governor-General, hearing of the surrender of Atak to the Sikhs, sent an order, January 10th, for Lord Gough to attack, if he thought success was possible.

Lord Gough marched early, January 13th, 1849, with 15,500 men in a westerly direction against the Sikh Army, 23,500 strong, which was reported to be in position at Chilianwala, on a jungle-covered plain, the surface being studded with mimosa-thorn and caper bushes.

General Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded the 2nd Infantry Division, suggested that a reconnaissance should be undertaken before the army advanced, but this was not approved, and the Commander-in-Chief formed his plans for the attack before he had ascertained the enemy's strength or position!

It was determined to advance in Direct Echelon from the Right, which was to be directed on the low hills overlooking the Jhelam. The village of Rasul stands on the hills above the river which there flows north-east and south-west. Lord Gough's intention was that when the village was gained the leading Echelon should "change position to the Left" and attack the left flank of the Sikh army, whilst Sir Colin Campbell's Division, and the Artillery attacked directly to their front.

When General Gilbert's division was marching towards Rasul, deserters reported that the Sikhs were leaving the hills, and forming in the plain immediately to the west of Chilianwala, so Gilbert's division was ordered to incline to its left. A Sikh outpost was driven from a mound which stands due east of the village, whence a view of the enemy, though obstructed by the jungle, was obtained. The Sikh right was opposite Chilianwala; there was an interval of 1,500 yards between the left of the Sikh right, and the right of its centre. The left rested on the Rasul hills.

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Lord Gough ordered Sir Colin Campbell to move his Division up into alignment with that of Sir Walter Gilbert. When it had done so, Campbell's left brigade, under Brigadier-General Hoggan, came immediately opposite the gap in the Sikhs' position.

General Gough had intended to defer his attack till the following day, and at 2 P.M. had given orders for the troops to halt, but Sher Singh, in order to bring on an action, advanced his artillery, and opened fire. It was generally innocuous, but Lord Gough allowed his Field batteries to reply, although it was impossible for them to see their adversary's guns, and for direction and range they were obliged to trust to smoke and sound, judging from time of flight of the enemy's projectiles. After a brief cannonade Lord Gough, becoming impatient, ordered the infantry to take the guns, a mile distant, with thick jungle intervening.

The right of Sir Walter Gilbert's division was covered by a brigade of Cavalry, and three Horse batteries, Bengal Artillery. Between the Right and Left Divisions were 8 Howitzers and 10 eighteen-pounders under Major Horsford. The left of Sir Colin Campbell's Division was covered by Sir Joseph Thackwell's command, consisting of a Cavalry brigade, and three Horse batteries. The Field artillery batteries moved with the infantry. General Penny with three Native battalions formed the Reserve. As the jungle was too thick to allow the Divisional generals to control their commands, Sir Colin Campbell accompanied his Left brigade, which was under General Hoggan.

General Pennycuik's brigade, consisting of the 1st South Wales Borderers, the 25th, and 45th Bengal Native Infantry, suffered comparatively little loss from the 18 guns immediately to the front of the brigade, until it emerged from the jungle opposite to the gap in the Sikh line, but on reaching open ground had to pass through a storm of grape and case-shot. The battalions "charged," while still 300 yards distant from the Sikh guns, and the men, breathless ere they reached them, halted to fire instead of continuing "the charge." There were numerous pools of water in front of the guns which made the men diverge, and they fell into disorder. Then after some minutes a few scattered groups rallied, and charging forward, bayoneted the gunners, capturing the batteries.

A Serious Situation


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When the smoke cleared away, the Sikhs recognising that a handful of men had captured their guns, brought forward reinforcements and drove the brigade back with heavy loss, nearly as far as the ground whence it had advanced. The 24th South Wales Borderers fought desperately. Thirteen officers were killed, nine were wounded, and 460 of other ranks fell at the guns. As the remainder fell back they were charged successively and successfully by the Sikh cavalry. General Pennycuik fell, and his son, a mere lad, stood over his body to protect it, until he also was slain.

While this disaster happened to General Campbell's Right brigade, General Hoggan penetrated almost unopposed into the gap of the enemy's position, and now attacked the flank of the centre of the Sikh army.

The Right of the Sikh Army under Atar Singh leaving some battalions to contain Sir Joseph Thackwell's Horsemen, advanced on Hoggan's left flank and rear, but what happened in this part of the field we will relate lower down. It may be well to turn our attention, before telling more of Hoggan's movements, to the Right division. The disaster to Pennycuik's brigade exposed Sir Walter Gilbert's Left brigade.

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Sikh War,
1848-49:
Chillianwala



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF CHILLIANWALA,
JANUARY 13th, 1849

Second
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1848-49:
Chillianwala

under General Mountain; and his own frontal attack, although it had reached the batteries in front, they being well supported by infantry, had inflicted on the brigade considerable losses. The Left battalion, which was the 56th Bengal Native Infantry, after showing great courage in pushing home amongst the guns, had been repulsed with a loss of eight officers and 322 other ranks. The Sikhs advanced into the gap so that the brigade, like that of Hoggan, was threatened on both flanks, and its immediate peril was averted only by the remarkable courage and effective fire action displayed by Dawes' battery of the Bengal Horse Artillery.

At the same time the incapacity of the Cavalry Brigadier, and the gross misconduct of his regiments on Sir Walter Gilbert's Right flank accentuated the peril of the Division.

The Cavalry brigade, without ground scouts, or anyone in front of it, was halted immediately in front of Major Christie's battery of Bengal Horse Artillery, which was thus obliged to cease fire.

Some Sikh cavalry, insignificant in numbers in comparison with our Cavalry brigade, galloped out of the jungle, and one of the leaders cut the Brigadier's head open with a sword. The brigade, in which there was one regiment which had a grand record for dashing feats of courage in the Peninsula, and has since lived up to that reputation, turned and fled. The three regiments galloped over Christie's and Huish's batteries, and carried disorder and dismay to the line of doctors who were attending wounded in the Rear. One squadron of the 9th Lancers which was attached to the brigade, breaking loose from this disgraceful flight, rallied behind the guns, which had been captured, and in some degree averted further disaster.

The Army Staff work was faulty, and the confusion being great, General Penny's Reserve brigade of three Native battalions, ordered up to support General Hoggan on the Left, came into action on the flank of General Gilbert's Division on the Right!

A crushing defeat was now averted by the enduring courage of the European Infantry, who were well supported by some of the Native battalions.

The 2nd Europeans (now the 1st Royal Dublin Fusiliers), of Godby's brigade were practically unconquerable, and

gradually arrested the advance of the Sikhs. When the European battalions were attacked in front, in flank, and in rear they repelled their assailants by facing about the Rear rank: the 31st and 70th Bengal Native Infantry formed squares when surrounded by the Sikhs, but the 1st Worcestershire (20th) Regiment repelled the attack by facing about their Rear rank. At the time that this sanguinary struggle was taking place on the Right of the battle-line, Sir Colin Campbell, mainly by the discipline, courage and fine training of the 2nd Gloucestershire Regiment, obliged the Sikh infantry in his immediate front to give ground.

When our narrative of the fight on the Left flank broke off, General Hoggan's brigade was threatened in flank and rear by Atar Singh's encircling bodies of troops. Their outflanking movements were arrested mainly by the devoted courage of Captain Unett's squadron, 3rd Light Dragoons, and three squadrons of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who rode through the centre of the Sikh masses.

General Hoggan's brigade thus protected on the Left rear, marched on, soon coming under fire of four guns, on their Right front, while faced by a large hostile body of cavalry, and a mass of infantry standing in front of Hoggan's Native battalions. Both battalions fell back, but the 2nd Gloucestershire (61st) Regiment continued to advance, and when two Sikh guns opened fire on the battalion with case-shot, within 25 paces of the Right flank, Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, by order of Sir Colin Campbell, "changed position to the Right," and led by him, charged, and captured the guns.

While the Regiment was forming a new line to the Right on the victorious companies, a Sikh force of infantry advanced headed by two guns. Sir Colin Campbell again putting himself in front of the battalion, ordered it to charge. It captured the two guns as its prize, making 13 that day, and driving away the Sikh infantry moved on northwards until it met Sir Walter Gilbert's Left brigade. This success was opportune, for General Thackwell's command of Cavalry and Horse artillery was necessarily detached to the Right, to redeem the disgraceful disaster on that flank.


Now arose simultaneously British cheers from Right

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MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



Second
Sikh War,
1848-49;
Chilianwala

to Left of the battle-line indicating the repulse of the Sikhs. If the Commander-in-Chief had been a general, instead of merely an impulsive, very courageous soldier, he might at this moment, by leading forward the discredited Cavalry brigade who were conscious of their shameful misconduct, have achieved a great victory; but he joined the leading infantry, and at 5 P.M. decided to retire to Chilianwala, the Sikhs falling back after dark to Rasul. They carried away the guns of Christie's battery, and all but a dozen of their 40 pieces which had been captured from them by our infantry.

The British casualties numbered 113 officers and 2,900 of other Ranks. The Sikh losses were about 6,000.

On receipt of the news in London, General Sir Charles Napier, whose statue stands in Trafalgar Square, was ordered out to India to supersede Lord Gough.

Fall of
Multan

After the indecisive battle of Chilianwala, the combatants maintained their positions, the British at the village, and the Sikhs at Rasul, three miles distant, each Army awaiting reinforcements. Chattar Singh joined his son, Sher Singh, on the 16th, and 1,500 Afghan Horsemen, under the command of a son of the Amir of Kabul, came in on February 18th. When Multan fell, January 21st, General Whish marched with 9,000 men, one third being British, to join Lord Gough.

Gujrat

The Sikhs soon ran short of provisions, and they made several demonstrations on the British flank, and rear, trying to bring on a battle before they were obliged to fall back and also before General Whish could join the Commander-in-Chief. To facilitate this junction, Lord Gough moved to within 20 miles of the reinforcements, and on February 20th, Whish and General Dundas with the Bombay Column having joined, the united forces advanced to Shadawala, "in order of battle," halting within three miles of the enemy's camp.

The Sikh army, numbering about 50,000 men, had placed their infantry and artillery with the Left or East flank on the Katela, an affluent of the Chinab, which it joins three miles above Wasirabad. Their Right or Western flank, somewhat drawn back, rested on the Dwarah, a broad, waterless, sandy river bed. The Afghan Horse and the greater part of the Sikh cavalry stood on either flank.

The Battle of Gujrat

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those on the western side of the battle on a tree-studded plain. The city of Gujrat was immediately in rear of the Sikh position.

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Sikh War,
1848-49:
Gujrat

The British Commander-in-Chief and his Staff reconnoitred the enemy's position carefully, and Lord Gough decided to attack the Sikh Left and Centre.

The British troops advanced at 7.30 A.M., 23,000 strong, February 21st. Lord Gough moved his 90 guns, 18 of which were heavy calibre, in the centre. Sir Walter Gilbert's Division, and General Whish's troops covering the right of the guns; Hearsey's and Lockwood's Cavalry brigades being still farther to the eastward.

Sir Colin Campbell's Division moved forward on the west of the Dwarah ravine, the Cavalry and Horse artillery in direct echelon on the outer flank.

The Sikh artillery opened an innocuous fire at 1,000 yards range, the British guns gradually moving forward, and the Infantry advancing in columns at deploying intervals. The Bengal Horse artillery moving in advance of the general line of the great battery in the centre, fired with great effect on the enemy's infantry, but suffered considerable losses, and were necessarily withdrawn twice in order to obtain fresh detachments, horses, and ammunition. The Cavalry brigades watching the Sikh and Afghan Horsemen, outmanœuvred, and checked several attempts which they made to break in on the flanks of the British infantry.


When Sir Colin Campbell's infantry came under effective fire, he deployed his columns into line and covered its front by thick groups of skirmishers. He handled the two Arms with great skill, insisting on the men lying down the moment they halted, and used his Artillery with such effect in sweeping the bed of the Dwarah ravine, that with the exception of his skirmishers, his infantry while in line had scarcely to fire their muskets.

The successful advance of Sir Walter Gilbert and Sir Colin Campbell on the flanks of the Sikh infantry position, caused a gap in the centre of the British formation, into which Sher Singh advanced his heavily smitten but still undaunted infantry. Lord Gough ordered two Horse batteries to come into action in the gap, but they were without ammunition, and although at the moment the Scinde Horse,

**Second
Sikh War,
1848-49
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and 9th Lancers, had just ridden over the Afghan cavalry, yet the danger was great.

In front of General Penny's brigade was the village of Kalrah, and Lord Gough ordered the infantry to occupy what seemed to be an empty post. It was flanked in rear by Sikh batteries, there was a deep pool to the south of the village between it and Penny's brigade; two Sikh regiments were in the village, the houses of which had been loopholed. The Dublin Fusiliers, the 31st and 70th Bengal Native Infantry, moved forward against the village as steadily as if they were on parade. Many fell, but in a few minutes the village was cleared of all living defenders, who fell by scores, or were shot down as they ran. No quarter was asked or given, for the Sikhs had massacred all our wounded who fell into their hands on the field of Chilianwala.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF GUJRAT, FEB. 21st, 1849

Surrender of the Sikhs

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The repulse of the Sikhs was accelerated by Sir Colin Campbell, who had turned the fire of his Field batteries on to the flank of the Sikh infantry as it moved forward towards the dangerous gap in the British line. It became impossible for the Sikhs to continue their advance under such heavy flank fire, and they fell back, at first steadily, covered by their cavalry.

By 1 P.M. Sher Singh's whole army was retreating. It was heavily punished by the Mounted troops under Sir Joseph Thackwell, who pursued for 14 miles. Many Sikhs were slain; more, absolutely disheartened, quitted the Ranks, throwing away their weapons. Lord Gough recalled Thackwell at sunset, sending him forward again next day, supported by Sir Colin Campbell, thus adding 28 miles to his march when in pursuit of a routed and demoralised enemy! The British casualties were less than 1,000 killed and wounded, while the Sikhs' losses were enormous.

On March 14th the remnants of our brave adversaries surrendered, and ever since the Sikhs have been loyal, high-spirited as any men who in India have marched and fought under the command of the British Sovereigns.

Second
Sikh War,
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Gujrat

PART XIII

THE CRIMEA

CHAPTER I

THE CAUSE OF THE WAR

England's Unpreparedness for War—Russia Covets Constantinople—The Franco-British Fleets in the Black Sea—Lord Raglan Assumes Command—The Conditions at Varna—The Cholera Scourge.

British
Army,
1815-51

AFTER the Peace of 1815 the British Army and Navy fought no important battles in Europe for nearly forty years. The bombardment of Algiers, 1816, and Acre, 1840, were carried out by overwhelming forces; and the destruction of the Egyptian and Turkish fleets by the combined English, French, and Russian fleets at Navarino, 1827, was aptly described by the Duke of Wellington, then the Head of our Government, as "an untoward event."

The Army had fought in Asia, always gallantly, but not with invariable success.

Our greatest General, Wellington, born in 1769, had died on September 14th, 1852. After holding political offices for many years, he had resumed the Command of the Army in 1842, which Command he nominally exercised until his death. He rode daily to the Horse Guards, Whitehall, with such unvarying regularity, to transact business, that many enthusiastic admirers set their watches as he passed along the Mall, after his luncheon. But the Duke latterly, on reaching his office, slept in his arm-chair, where no one ventured to disturb him until he awoke in the evening to ride back to Apsley House.

The troops in the United Kingdom, as regards arms, clothing, efficiency and equipment, reflected the now fading mind of the great Commander who had created the Army nearly half a century earlier.

The artillery, the musket, the stiff asphyxiating leathern

stock, and drill movements were such as were in use during the Peninsular War. Unfortunately, the Staff, Medical, Commissariat, and Transport establishments, organised by Lord Wellington in Portugal, had disappeared, which was the cause two years later of indescribable sufferings and of terrible losses.

The British
Army, 1851

This want of preparation for war was indicative of the feeling of the Nation amongst all classes. In May, 1851, the First International Exhibition, in Hyde Park, which brought the results of the industry of the World to London, was generally regarded as a pledge of perpetual peace. The attention of the middle classes was fixed on commerce, and franchise questions. On the Continent, indeed, bloody Revolutions had broken out, but Pretenders to thrones and deposed Monarchs readily found asylum in our island, the peoples of which for two generations had known nothing of war, and were generally under the impression that England would never again take part in a European contest. Even sober-minded, thinking politicians really believed that war, being not only foolish, but immoral, would, now that nations competed in friendly commercial rivalry, become impossible.

These pleasant delusions were soon shattered. From the time of Peter the Great, Russian Emperors and their ministers had coveted Constantinople. The Czar Nicholas, who was warmly disposed towards England, and was a great admirer of the Duke of Wellington, had, ever since Waterloo, exercised a preponderating influence on the Continent. He, on every possible occasion, attempted to exert a Protectorate over the Christian peoples in the Turkish Empire.

Russia and
Constanti-
nople

The Czar had made up his mind, as far back as 1841, that the dissolution of the Turkish Empire was imminent. After a very friendly reception in England, he put on paper that year a memorandum suggesting that arrangements should be made at once between England and Russia as to the steps to be taken on the break-up of the Turkish Empire in Europe. This memorandum was filed in our Foreign Office, but it was not until 1853, when the Czar repeated his proposals, that our Government informed St. Petersburg that it was unable to discuss any such arrangement of the territories of a friendly Power.

**Rival
Claims in
the Near
East**

For many years France, as the protector of the Latin Church, and Russia, acting for the Greek Church, had disputed over rival claims for the custody of certain Holy places in Palestine. The rival claims in dispute in 1852 were easily adjusted, but early in January, 1853, Prince Menschikoff, sent to Constantinople by the Czar, advanced further claims, and, on Turkey's refusal to consider them, the Czar sent troops to take possession of the Danubian Principalities.

**Declaration
of War,
1854**

Diplomatists endeavoured to maintain peace, but in October a Turkish fortress fired on a Russian flotilla, and on November 30th, 1853, the Russian fleet destroyed a Turkish squadron at Sinope. Although war was not formally declared for some weeks later, early in January, 1854, the Allied English and French fleets took possession of the Black Sea, the Russian ships sheltering in Sevastopol.

A Treaty of Alliance between England, France, and Turkey was signed April 10th, 1854, in London. It had been strengthened by the endorsement of Austria and Prussia, a document being added which embodied the terms of their possible eventual participation in the war; and the Scandinavian States having declared their neutrality, Russia was left isolated in Europe.

The overwhelming Naval superiority of the Allies enabled their fleet to attack Russia simultaneously in the Baltic and on the Black Sea. The account of what happened at Bomarsund and Sveaborg, of little effect on the war, is omitted, this short history dealing only with the operations in the Crimea.

**Anglo-
French
Armies in
Dardanelles**

The English and French armies encamped on the shores of the Dardanelles in the spring of 1854, the British being under command of Lord Raglan, a younger son of the Duke of Beaufort. Born in 1788, he was sixty-six years of age. He had served on the personal Staff of Sir Arthur Wellesley throughout the Peninsular War, and remained with him until the Battle of Waterloo, where he was severely wounded, losing his right arm. Subsequently, until 1852, he had been employed either in diplomatic work or at the Horse Guards, and then became Master-General of the Ordnance. He was a high-class gentleman in every sense of the word: handsome, and of a singularly even temperament, which fitted him eminently for the position he

occupied, and which enabled him with a number of British bayonets equal in number to only one-third of those of our allies to virtually control the whole of the invading forces.

A general, however brave and devoted to his Queen and country, who had been engrossed for forty years of Peace at desk work in an office, cannot reasonably be expected to develop into what Wellington became after ten years' War Service—an able adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, commissary-general, principal medical officer, and Commander-in-Chief, combined in one person. With all Lord Raglan's noble courage and high qualities, he had neither the energy nor the ability to make up in England's little army for the neglect of all preparation for war during forty years of Peace.

The gallant regiments—for England did not possess an Army in the proper sense of the term—which left Portsmouth in 1854 were foredoomed by general mismanagement to reach the verge of annihilation. England paid dearly in blood, in treasure, and in reputation, but the victims of her short-sighted parsimony sustained her honour, and her soldiers, with ragged clothes, torn and muddled tents, and empty stomachs, enriched the best traditions of the Service.

Marshal St. Arnaud, the French Commander-in-Chief, left the Army when a sub-lieutenant, after a few years' service, returned to it in 1830, and again soon retired. In 1836 he joined the Foreign Legion, in which he rose in eight years to the rank of colonel, evincing determined courage and endurance, although he was never physically strong, and became the terror of the natives in Algeria.

The Duke of Newcastle, supported by the vehement expression of Public opinion in the Press, wrote privately to Lord Raglan in the early summer that "a successful enterprise against Sevastopol was an essential condition of permanent peace."

No one wielding power in England realised that troops in the field can only exist when provided with Supplies and Transport corps; that a Medical service and hospitals are essential, and that to take a fortress a Siege-train is required.

As late as August, 1854, when cholera had stricken our men in their camps near Varna, there were practically no hospitals, the sick being treated for the most part in bell

Anglo-
French
Armies in
the Near
East,
1854

Sickness
among the
Troops,
1854

tents. There was but a scanty supply of drugs and medical comforts, brandy, wine, arrowroot, sago, and all such requisites for treatment of sick men being deficient. The soldiers themselves had but one blanket, which was insufficient for men when seized by the "cold fit" during an attack of cholera, and warmth is essential.

The Secretary of State for War, when asked in Parliament "why dying men were jolted in springless wagons over unmetalled tracks, so-called roads," answered triumphantly that "he had inquired, and had been assured that there were actually at Gallipoli forty medical panniers for the conveyance of sick." This answer satisfied the House of Commons, the Members of which knew as little as did the responsible Minister that a medical pannier conveys medicines and not human bodies. Even as regards this last explanation, it was unfortunate for the soldiers, that although the panniers were at Gallipoli they were empty.

About 5,000 pack animals had been collected near Varna, but without an adequate number of attendants, and it was estimated that at least 14,000 animals were required to enable the British Army to move; moreover, provision had not been made for their food!

The strength of the enemy to be encountered in the Crimea in July, 1854, before troops could be moved round by Odessa and Perekop, was believed to be about 70,000, including sailors then on board the Russian



SKETCH-MAP OF THE CRIMEA

Sevastopol Blockaded

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fleet in the harbour of Sevastopol, which was blockaded by the Allied navies.

Sevastopol
1854

By dispatches dated London, June 29th, 1854, forbidding any further advance towards the Danube, Lord Raglan was ordered to besiege Sevastopol, "unless he was decidedly of opinion that the siege could not be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success, considering the means available and difficulties to be overcome." The Field-Marshal replied that he would obey instructions in deference to the views of his Government, but that neither he nor Marshal St. Arnaud knew, nor had they means of ascertaining, the strength of the enemy.

In the third week of July cholera not only carried off many men, the French having 10,000 ill at one moment, of whom many died, but the epidemic left all the men of the Allied armies enervated by sickness; the fleet also suffered severely, for in H.M.S. *Britannia* one man in every seven died of the scourge.

CHAPTER II

INVASION OF THE CRIMEA

The Crimea is Invaded—The Army Lacks Medical Attendance—The Opposing Armies on the River Alma—The Battle of the Alma—Lord Raglan's Personal Daring—No Pursuit Attempted.

Disembarkation of the Troops

THE Expeditionary Force began to embark August 24th. The British Fleet acted as escort, for the French and Turkish men-of-war were used as Transports, and were so overcrowded with soldiers that they could not have been fought had the Russians come out of the harbour of Sevastopol and offered battle. The Russian men-of-war, however, 17 in number, which had destroyed the Turkish squadron at Sinope, November 30th, 1853, made no attempt to interfere with the crossing from the west of the Black Sea, and the disembarkation of the Allied armies on its eastern shores was unmolested.

The British officers landed in full dress, carrying sword, revolver, greatcoat, and blanket rolled in horseshoe fashion over the shoulder, a water-bottle, some spirits, three days' boiled salt pork, and three days' biscuit. The rank and file, still weak from intestinal complaints, could not carry their knapsacks, but each man had 50 rounds of ammunition, three days' rations, greatcoat and blanket, together with a pair of boots, socks, and with the pork-pie forage cap tied to the waistbelt. This last article was carried at the earnest request of the men, who later in the campaign got rid of their handsome but irksome head-dress.

During the night of September 14th-15th there was a steady downpour of rain from sunset till daybreak, when water fell in sheets. This added materially to the sickness and cholera which had been brought with us across the Euxine. We buried 150 at sea, and left 300 cholera-stricken patients on board ship. The heavy rain induced an order for tents to be landed, but they were put again on board ship four days later when the army moved, as the only Transport available consisted of 70 mule-carts and 400

country wagons, equal to a load of three-quarters of a ton each, which had been seized from the Tartars.

Landing of
the Troops,
1854

The troops now experienced the want of an army system for Medical attendance. Each military unit had two doctors attached, one of whom at least was unnecessary, to care for some 700 men, when present and fit for duty, and who, moreover, lost sight of the regiment as soon as they became non-effective. There had been an attempt made to provide an Army Ambulance Corps, recruited from pensioners, in many cases worn out, and admittedly so ineffective that the wagons were not taken across the Black Sea, on the absurd plea of insufficiency of naval Transport. The officers' bathorses had been left behind, as were the five or six thousand pack animals, which had been collected at Varna.

The Allied troops, having marched across the Bulgannac stream on the 19th, stood to their arms at 7 A.M. on September 20th. They did not advance till much later, and it was 1 P.M. before they halted on the northern crest of the basin of the River Alma.

The Alma
Position

On the south bank, on which the Russian Commander-in-Chief, Prince Menschikoff, had drawn up his army, the ground rose high above the river, and for a mile and a half, from the sea inland, is steep, precluding the possibility of taking guns up it except at one or two places.

From the sea to the eastern slopes of the Kourgané hill was some five and a half miles; the whole front was covered by the River Alma, a river in places deep, at others fordable. There was a good timber bridge at Bourliouk, in the centre of the position, which carried the post road from Eupatoria to Sevastopol. The western cliffs, nearest the sea, were steep, and supposed to be inaccessible; but the hills fell away as they trended inland, and the approach from the river became practicable, although still offering a stiff climb. The ground about the Centre and Right rose high at two particular points: one was called the Telegraph height, and it dominated the principal road; the other was the Kourgané hill, an elevated saddleback formation in front of which the battle ebbed and flowed.

Menschikoff had not sufficient troops to occupy so long a line. He thought that the west cliff, that part of the position nearest the sea, was inaccessible; it was within

The Alma,
1854

range of the guns of the Allied fleets. These reasons induced him to place his chief force, about 33,000 infantry, between the two hills just mentioned, the Telegraph and the Kourgané, on a front of less than three miles. His cavalry, about 3,600 sabres in all, guarded his Right flank when open downland was favourable to their movement. He did not bring all his troops into action, but had 20,000 men and 86 guns opposite to the British army, and 13,000 with 36 guns opposed to the French.

These dispositions indicate want of tactical skill. If the Prince had reconnoitred the west cliff he would have found that a wagon track ascended the hill from the village of Almatamack, which could be, and indeed was, used for artillery. If the Heights of the Alma had been converted into an entrenched camp, the Allies could not have captured them without great loss.

Menschikoff constructed two works. The first was breast high, without a ditch, some three hundred yards above the Alma on the lower slopes of the Kourgané hill, and was armed with 12 heavy guns. More to the right, on the same hill, was another slight entrenchment facing north-east, and armed with field artillery.

When allies fight side by side there is always the danger of divided counsels, involving the chance of divided action in the field. St. Arnaud wished to attack from the sea to beyond the causeway, leaving Lord Raglan to turn the Russian Right. This the English General declined to do: thinking that a flank movement would be dangerous in the presence of cavalry three times as numerous, and over ground especially suited to it. The discussion ended in an agreement that each army should go up against what was before it, the French attacking the west cliff from the causeway to the sea, the English taking the hills from the causeway to the extreme Russian Right.

In the result the French found no enemy, and the brunt of the battle fell upon Lord Raglan's troops. This arrangement neutralised our advantages of superior numbers. As Menschikoff held the bulk of his forces about his Centre and Right—in other words, just opposite the English attack—it followed that Russians and English fought, as regards numbers, upon equal terms.

At 1.30 P.M. the Allied fleets shelled the Russian position,

and General Bosquet at 2 P.M. led his extreme Right, or seaward French division, up the west cliff. One brigade, Bonat's, followed by the Turks, crossed the River Alma at its mouth, and scaling the heights without difficulty, advanced but met no enemy, and never came into action. Bosquet's other brigade, D'Autemare's, with which he rode in person, having reached the summit, found nobody in front of it. Bonat was far away on his right; Canrobert, his nearest support, was among the rocky, broken country. Next to Canrobert was Prince Napoleon; but the latter hung back without any ostensible reason. When his Division came under distant fire he sent an impassioned appeal to Lord Raglan to advance and take the fire off him.

At this time Menschikoff might have dealt a crushing blow at the Allies, for he was in between his foes, who were separated in two parts by a wide interval. The Prince, however, remained inactive till the golden opportunity was lost, and then he found himself so fiercely assailed by the English that he lost all power of the offensive.

While the French were in this critical condition, the English remained halted, lying down under a dropping artillery fire. When Lord Raglan received urgent requests for aid, he gave the signal for attack; and the 2nd Division, on the right—western—flank, and the Light Division moved on in line two deep without immediate supports, on a frontage of two miles, the British numbering 26,000 infantry and 60 guns.

The 2nd Division stood next the French: the right rested on the village of Bourliouk opposite the causeway bridge; the left joined on to and overlapped the right of—

The Light Division, which faced the Kourgané hill, with its two redoubts heavily armed, and 18 battalions, a formidable position:

Immediately behind the Light came the 1st Division.

The 3rd Division supported the 2nd Division, but at a long distance:

The cavalry, a thousand sabres, were in support to the Left Rear:

The 4th Division of infantry were in Reserve, and did not come up till after the action.

There was no tactical skill shown on either side. The

The Alma,
1854

British advanced beyond the shelter of the river bank slopes until, owing to the heavy loss when attempting to re-form, the order was given, "Come on anyhow," and the brigadier led the 1st brigade Light Division into the greater of the two redoubts.

The Russians were in great strength, standing in heavy columns. The redoubt was armed with 12-pounder guns, yet they did not resist this irregular onslaught, but soon limbered up their guns and went to the rear, from a cause shown farther on.

The 1st Division, however, which had been ordered to support the Light Division, was slow in crossing the river, and the redoubt was lost for a time for want of its support.

The turning-point in the action was an unusual step taken by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan, who with his Staff and a few Dragoons—not twenty horsemen in all—rode into the enemy's position. He had gone down towards the burning village of Bourliouk, and anxious to see what was in progress beyond the river, had crossed and galloped up the opposite slope. He came out at a point under the Telegraph height and above the post road, and thence could survey at ease—for no enemy was near enough to molest him—the battle-field. He looked into the enemy's line of defence, taking it in reverse, and saw the supreme advantage his dangerous position gave him. He called for guns, and Adams's brigade of Evans's 2nd Division and Turner's battery, struggling across the ford, were then brought into action.

Their first shot was a surprise to friends and foes. It indicated to the enemy, a battery of whose guns was in action farther to the north, that it had been taken in reverse. Evans swept forward triumphantly with three battalions, their left covered by Colonel Lacy Yea and the 7th Fusiliers, who just about this time had finally conquered a Russian column with which they had been engaged. Yea's obstinate heroism had not only paved the way for the advance of the 2nd Division but it had rendered possible another attack upon the Kourgané hill.

"When Lord Raglan, crossing the river, rode with his Staff up to the hill west of the post road, he sent the British Horse Artillery forward, but expressly ordered 'the cavalry not to attack.'

The Victory at the Alma

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"When Lord Raglan was witnessing the steady onward movement of the 2nd Light Division, Prince Menschikoff, the Commander-in-Chief, riding back from the extreme Left of the Russian position, came on Prince Gortschakoff, whom he had left in command of the Right Wing of the Army. Mr. Kinglake describes most graphically the meeting: 'I am on foot, because my horse was killed near the river; alone, because all my Staff are dead or wounded,' pointing as he spoke to his uniform, cut by six different bullets. Three out of the four Russian Generals who were fighting on the Kourgané hill fell wounded, and the Russian loss amounted to nearly 6,000.

The Alma,
1854

"The British losses amounted to 2,000 of all ranks. The 15,000 men expended about six cartridges each, and the battalion casualty-rolls indicate clearly on whom the brunt of the half-hour's action fell. The four battalions on the extreme Right and Left of the first line had about twenty men in each corps hit. The Coldstream Guards and three Highland battalions had only 118 casualties between the four battalions. The two battalions, 2nd Division, which crossed down stream of Bourliouk, had only altogether 163 killed and wounded. The Grenadier Guards lost 130; the Scots Fusiliers 180; but the 7th (1st Royal Fusiliers), 19th (1st Princess of Wales Yorkshire), 23rd (1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers), and 95th (2nd Sherwood Foresters) Regiments each had about 200 casualties.

"The greater part of this loss was due to artillery fire—round and case shot—for the Russian musket was a most inferior weapon, while our two divisions engaged had the Minié, a hard-hitting rifle.

"We had 1,000 cavalry; the 3rd and 4th Divisions had not been engaged, and our nine batteries had suffered but 34 casualties, having fired about fifteen rounds per gun. If the enemy had been followed up, great results might have been obtained, for the Russians dissolved during their retreat into a panic-stricken mob, ere, seven miles from the Alma, they reached after nightfall the Katcha river, whence they moved on to Sevastopol."

Prince Menschikoff lost 5,200 men and 2 guns. The French had three officers killed. Their casualties in other ranks were less than a hundred. The total British casualties numbered 2,002.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA, SEPTEMBER 20th, 1854

**The Alma,
1854**

We have shown that although we had battalions there were no Auxiliary departments, without which regiments cannot be worked as an Army, and neither the Commander-in-Chief nor the Staff controlled in any way the general officers, whose courageous troops drove the Russians from the Alma heights. The British Commander-in-Chief deliberately rode into the enemy's position. The only Staff work done by the army Head-quarter's officers was that by the Quartermaster-General, who properly, but peremptorily, ordered forward a battalion which in the attack had been outstripped by the remainder of its brigade.

The Artillery came into action when and as it could. The guns in some cases preceded the detachments. The Russian cavalry and artillery quitting the field early, left the infantry to shift for themselves. Lord Raglan invited St. Arnaud, whose troops had been scarcely engaged, to join the British 4th Division, which had not fired a shot, in a pursuit. Marshal St. Arnaud, however, declined to move forward, pleading that his men had left their knapsacks on the Alma banks before they ascended the cliffs. The Marshal was a dying man—had lost his former vigour, and although his brave spirit revived for a few days after the landing at the prospect of a battle, ten days after it he expired.

CHAPTER III

THE UPLAND AND THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT OF SEVASTOPOL

The Allied Army Marches Round Sevastopol—The English Occupy Balaklava
—Description of the Upland—The Bombardment of Sevastopol.

THE Allied armies halted for forty-eight hours after the battle, employed in burying their dead and carrying the wounded on stretchers down to the beach for re-embarkation to the fleet, for there was no Hospital Transport. There were 750 Russians lying in front of the great battery, which, assaulted by three battalions of General Codrington's brigade, had retired after inflicting considerable losses on their determined assailants.

March
Round
Sevasto-
pol, 1854

The armies moved, September 23rd, to the Katchka, a distance of seven miles only, where the British Heavy Brigade of cavalry landed, and then leaving the 4th Division under Sir George Cathcart still armed with the Brown Bess musket, which our troops had carried at Waterloo, moved on seven miles to the Belbek river. From the southern crest of the valley of that river the Allied Generals looked down on Sevastopol and its magnificent harbour. The cavalry and a battalion of the Rifle Brigade employed as outposts were without food or water for man or horse for forty-eight hours.

During the night September 22nd-23rd, the Russians sunk the greater part of their fleet across the mouth of the harbour, thus forming an obstacle which prevented the possibility of the Allied fleet entering it to co-operate with the army in an attempt to carry the northern forts by escalade.

The British troops, at the head of the Allied army, marched round Sevastopol on September 25th. That evening the head of the British column, led by Lord Raglan, bivouacked at Traktir bridge, on the River Tchernaya, near the ground which later became, and will be for ever, famous for the Light cavalry charge.

**Balaclava
Occupied,
1854**

Next morning the troops occupied Balaclava, a village of one street of straggling houses built on the northern side of an inlet of the Black Sea, with which it communicates by a winding entrance. The miniature harbour looks like a Highland tarn. It is overshadowed on the south and south-west by mountainous-looking hills.

**Kamiesh
Bay**

When the French army arrived next day, and faced northwards, the troops having reversed their front, our Allies were obviously entitled to the use of the harbour, which lay on the Right of the new position. The English, however, were in possession, and General Canrobert, with great courtesy, gave Lord Raglan his choice; he, acting on the urgent advice of Admiral Lyons, elected to remain at Balaclava, the French taking Kamiesh Bay.

**The
Upland
Described**

The decision was unfortunate for us, for not only did the bays at Kamiesh afford more commodious anchorage and egress from the shore, but also covered the Left flank, and running inland to near the centre of the left of the Allies' position, gave the troops on that flank a shorter distance over which they had to haul their Siege material and Supplies. The British troops were seven miles from the Base at Balaclava, and their batteries had to be built on rocky soil. The French had easy ground on which to construct their trenches, and the British line of communication was liable to attack for four miles from the village of Kamara to the Upland. Moreover, after the Battle of Balaclava the British army lost, as the result of that glorious failure, the use of the only metalled road from the harbour up to their siege works.

Mr. Kinglake, the historian, in his descriptive phraseology named the sloping fissured plateau overlooking Sevastopol the Upland. Its eastern crest stands between five and six hundred feet above the Tchernaya valley, and the plateau extends in a straight line from north to south eight miles, reckoning from the head of Sevastopol harbour to the Balaclava inlet of the sea. Between that miniature harbour and the Upland the ground sinks suddenly into what we call the plain of Balaclava, although its formation scarcely justifies that term. The higher ground of the Uplands measures eight miles from east to west, from the height overlooking Traktir bridge on the Tchernaya to Kamiesh Bay. For practical pur-

First Bombardment of Sevastopol 445

poses the extent of ground over which the British army worked and starved may be taken as seven miles by four as the crow flies. On the east side the plateau runs generally from north to south from the head of Sevastopol harbour for six miles, its lower features then passing a mile to the north of Balaklava, and from Kamara southwards, ascending abruptly until they join the cliffs on the seacoast.

The surface of the Upland is channelled by many ravines. Those which had most influence on our Siege operations, and on the tactical episodes of the Battle of Inkerman, begin generally close to its eastern wall-like boundary, and running from south-east to north-west divided the fighting position of the Allies into several different parts.

During the first week of October the English and French troops were busily employed dragging up siege-guns, and as far as the British troops were concerned, carrying on their backs ammunition, which was stored to the extent of 500 rounds a gun. During the night October 9th-10th, the French opened their trenches, and on the two following nights the English began those works which they were to hold for eleven months. Counting from the Right, or east flank of the Allied position, a Lancaster Battery—so-called from the guns in it—was constructed to fire at 2,000 yards, mainly on the enemy's ships still afloat. Gordon's battery, which became the first parallel of the British Right attack, was armed with 21 guns, one face firing on the Malakoff Tower, at a distance of 1,700 yards, the other on the Redan, at 1,400 yards. The Left attack, where the ground was lower, and consequently more overlooked from the enemy's works, was considerably drawn back. When the first bombardment began at 6 A.M. October 17th, the Allies had 126 guns in position, and the Russians 118, besides over 200 pieces trained on the line of approach of any assaulting columns. It had been arranged that the Allied fleet should stand in at daylight close to the harbour to create a diversion, but it was not till after the sailors' dinner hour that the fleets got into position, in which they practically received more damage than they could inflict on their foes.

From 6 A.M. the British batteries fired without intermission. After three hours the Malakoff Tower and its

The
Upland
Described,
1854

Bombard-
ment of
Sevastopol

**Bombard-
ment of
Sevastopol,
1854**

battery were ruined, the guns on its roof were dismounted, and the batteries underneath it silenced. At three o'clock in the afternoon at least one-third of the guns in the Redan were silenced. Soon afterwards a large magazine in it exploded, knocking down a great part of the parapet and killing more than a hundred men. Todleben expected an immediate assault, and ordered down troops to repel it; but the scene of devastation was too terrible for even the long-suffering Russians, who, apparently unmoved, will submit to a loss which unnerves most other armies, and they fell back to the inner harbour. An assault delivered at this moment, i.e. 4 P.M. October 17th, must in all probability have succeeded, but at 10 A.M. an explosion had taken place in the principal magazine for supplying the French batteries, silencing the French fire. The fire from our batteries had gradually silenced that of the Russians, and early in the afternoon there was a yawning breach in the Redan. The defence, as Todleben bears witness, was paralysed on this side; the Russian troops massed behind the Redan to resist attack were demoralised, but we could not go in alone. The bombardment by the Allied fleets had failed; and all the warships had drawn off, bearing more injuries than they had inflicted. A few hours were enough for the indefatigable and indomitable Todleben. During the night the great Engineer built up the ruined fortress anew.

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF BALACLAVA, OCTOBER 25th, 1854

The Russian Advance—The Charge of the Heavy Brigade—The Mistaken Command—The Charge of the Light Brigade—The Result of the Battle.

WHILE the Allies were preparing to renew the bombardment which petered out on October 24th, the Russian Field Army attacked the British line of communications with their Base the little port of Balacclava.

The Russian Advance

The Causeway heights—a low range of hills across the crests of which ran the Woronzoff road into Sevastopol—had been crowned by redoubts of slight profile so insignificant “a donkey might have ridden through them”; their armament consisted of two iron twelve-pounder guns each, and they were garrisoned by Turks—one small battalion in and about the earthworks on Canrobert’s Hill No. 1 Redoubt, and half a battalion in each of the other Redoubts.

The British forces in the valley consisted of one infantry regiment, the 93rd Highlanders, some 200 convalescents, and the Cavalry division, about 1,600 sabres, under Lord Lucan; Generals Scarlett and Lord Cardigan, respectively, led the Heavy and Light Brigades.

Before daylight, October 25th, 25,000 Infantry, 34 squadrons of horse, and 78 guns, commanded by General Liprandi, advanced on the British Line of Communications from Tchorgoun, a village 5 miles to the eastward.

The Russians moved in three columns. The Left through Kamara, was directed on Canrobert’s hill; the second, in the Centre, marched up against the Redoubts on the Causeway heights; the third held the Fedioukine heights. The single battalion of Turks which held Canrobert’s hill was shattered by artillery fire, which disabled its three twelve-pounder guns. Five Russian battalions went up to the assault, with six more in support, and the Russians were masters of the Redoubt by half-past seven A.M. By this time the middle column was close upon the Causeway

Balaclava:
The Heavy
Brigade,
1854

heights, and the Turks ran before the Redoubts were stormed.

The Russian cavalry, numbering 3,000, were converging on the Causeway heights, and nine squadrons approached the 93rd Highlanders, 550 all ranks, standing two deep, with a battalion of Turks on each flank who had fled from the Redoubts; but long before the Russians got near, they turned and ran for the port, crying in English, "Ship! ship!"

While the Russian cavalry were still out of effective range the Highlanders fired a volley, and the Russians halted and then retired.

The main body of the Russian cavalry had neared the Causeway heights, unseen by Scarlett's Heavy Cavalry, which had no "ground scouts" out on its exposed flank.

The brigade was moving towards Kadikoi, when the General became aware of the presence of the Russian cavalry upon his left, just appearing over the heights above him. His regiments were in two parallel columns; on the inner, nearest the enemy, were one squadron of the Inniskillings and two of the Scots Greys; on the outer another squadron of the Inniskillings and two of the 5th Dragoon Guards. Farther in rear were the Royal Dragoons and the 4th Dragoon Guards.


The Russian cavalry—we must not forget there were about 2,000 of them—had now halted, a great, inert mass. General Scarlett wheeled the Left column into line, a short line of barely 300 sabres, and charged: the second column conforming, came on in support. Scarlett himself, being a somewhat old-looking but vigorous man, with snow-white hair and moustache, who rode straight, and sat strongly in the saddle, headed the charge; his aide-de-camp, Alec Elliot, who had seen much fighting in India, galloped by his side; close behind came the General's trumpeter and his orderly: and these four men—General, Lieutenant, and two private troopers—crashed first and alone into the middle of the enemy's heavy column, where they were at once engaged in a hand to hand fight, sword against sword. What the fight was may be judged from the fact that the General received five wounds and Elliot received fourteen. Just as the leading British squadrons drove vigorously in the front Russian mass, three British guns, firing from the high ground above the scene, found

Charge of the Heavy Brigade 449

their target in the Rear squadrons of the unwieldy formation of the Russians, and rendered it unsteady.

One squadron of the Inniskilling Dragoons followed Scarlett; with it came two squadrons of the Scots Greys—two regiments which have ever been close comrades and friends. On each flank behind rode in second line a second squadron of the Inniskillings, and the 5th Dragoon Guards, followed by the 1st or Royal Dragoons, who, "conforming," for the regiment had received no order, rode at speed in support of their comrades. As the squadrons raced forward, eager to overtake their leader, who was already in the thick of the fight, the Russian cavalry advanced a little, but then halted irresolute, apparently intending to deploy, their very numbers helping to encumber and confuse them. The impact of our charging Horsemen carried all before it, "swords rose and fell," then the vast mass of Russian cavalry broke up—two thousand conquered by eight hundred—and, turning, rode fast and in disorder from the field.

Balaclava,
1854:
The Heavy
Brigade



CHARGE OF THE HEAVY BRIGADE AT BALACLAVA, OCTOBER 25th, 1854

**Balaclava,
1854:
The Heavy
Brigade**

This "truly magnificent charge," as it was called by a French general who was present, "the most glorious thing" he ever saw, won universal admiration from all. Sir Colin rode over to his countrymen, and, uncovering, apostrophised them thus: "Greys, gallant Greys, I am sixty-one years of age, but if I were young again I should be proud to serve in your ranks." Lord Raglan dispatched an aide-de-camp with a message to Scarlett, saying, "Well done."

The broken Russian cavalry, retreating, passed through a gap in the Causeway heights within 500 yards of the Light Brigade, 675 men. Major Morris, commanding the 17th Lancers, begged Lord Cardigan to attack them, and on his refusal, asked that the 17th Lancers might do so, but in vain. The Russian cavalry, shattered by Scarlett, could have been utterly routed by Cardigan. He sat still, and the enemy was allowed to escape.

**The Light
Brigade**

It seemed to Lord Raglan, who, sitting on the Western edge of the "Upland," 600 feet above the Tchernaya, could see all that passed below, as though the enemy, by bringing up horse teams, intended to carry off the guns captured in the Redoubts abandoned by the Turks, and he sent Captain Nolan to Lord Lucan with an order in writing, "directing the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, and prevent the enemy from carrying off the guns."

These guns were on the Causeway, higher ground than where Lord Lucan was sitting when he received the order, and he could not see them, or what the Russians were doing, and he did not understand the order. Lord Lucan did not ride up to the higher ground, thinking that Lord Raglan meant the Russian guns in action in the valley, and asked, "Attack! Attack what guns?" Nettled by this, Nolan, not realising that Lucan had not been on the higher ground, with a wave of the hand, replied, "There, my lord, is your enemy; there are your guns."


It is clear that Captain Nolan understood Lord Raglan's intentions, for starting from the left of the regiment in front line of the attack—i.e. 17th Lancers—he rode diagonally across Lord Cardigan's front as the peer in the centre of the brigade led straight down the valley. As he crossed the front of the 13th Light Dragoons, the right-hand regiment, riding towards the Redoubts whence the Russians

Charge of the Light Brigade 451

were trying to remove the guns abandoned by the Turks, and when some short distance to Lord Cardigan's right front, a shell splinter carried away part of his chest, though for some seconds his body remained in the saddle and the sword high in the air.

Lord Lucan, having misconstrued his orders, and not exercising his own judgment in correcting them, rode over to where Lord Cardigan sat at the head of the Light Brigade, and told him to advance down the valley. "Certainly," Lord Cardigan said; "but allow me to point out that there is a battery in front of us and guns and rifle-

Balaclava,
1854;
The Light
Brigade



CHARGE OF THE LIGHT BRIGADE AT BALACLAVA, OCTOBER 25th, 1854

men on either flank." "I know it," replied Lord Lucan; "but Lord Raglan will have it. We have no choice but to obey." Then Lord Cardigan, turning round, gave the order, "The brigade will advance."

"Led by Lord Cardigan," says Sir Edward Hamley, who was an eyewitness of the charge, "the lines continued to advance at a steady trot, and in a minute or two entered the zone of fire, where the air was filled with the rush of shot, the bursting of shells, and the moan of bullets, while amidst the infernal din the work of destruction went on, and men and horses were incessantly dashed to the ground." This fire came from the guns on the flanks; presently, the brigade was near enough to be

Balaclava,
1854:
The Light
Brigade

heavily smitten by the two batteries in front; but, nothing daunted, the survivors increased their pace so much as to lose cohesion, and dashed in among the guns. The Russian gunners were cut down as they served them. Small knots of Englishmen charged straight at great masses of the enemy's cavalry and forced them to retreat. The 8th Hussars, in third line, reversed their front, and charging a Russian cavalry regiment, overthrew it. The struggle went on between the many and the still undaunted few, until the latter had melted away.

Then all that was left of the Light Brigade emerged from the smoke of the battle, and the survivors came dropping back by twos and threes across the plain, covered by the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique on the eastern flank. Two small bodies only of the brigade retained any signs of coherence. About seventy men of the 17th Lancers and 8th Hussars kept together in formation, and cut their way home through three squadrons of Russian Lancers; another party of about the same strength, of 4th and 11th Hussars, were brought out by Lord George Paget, and overcame an intercepting force of Russians. But after the charge no Light cavalry regiment existed as such; all had been shattered. Out of some 673 men, 247 were killed or wounded; and almost all the horses were killed. This happened in twenty minutes, including the advance, the encounter, and the retreat.

Lord Cardigan—who had been the first to reach the guns—did not go farther than eighty yards beyond the Russian batteries, and then rode back alone to Lord Lucan, some of the brigade going on to the Tchernaya river. The French General Bosquet, who saw the charge, said with discriminating criticism, "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

The Russians retained possession of the Causeway heights. On the other hand the determined courage of our cavalry greatly raised our military prestige, and the Russian horsemen never again met our troops in the open field. We lost the use of the Woronzoff road, and were in consequence restricted to tracks which became nearly impassable in the winter. The hardships and privations of the British besieging army were intensely aggravated by the Battle of Balaclava.

CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN, NOVEMBER 5th, 1854

The Strength of the Opposing Armies—The Battle-Ground of Inkerman—
General Pennefather's Weak Force—The Repulse of the Enemy—
Wellington's Peninsular Auxillary Services Wanted at Inkerman.

MANY British battles have been won against great odds; but in none has there been shown more inflexible, unconquerable tenacity than that of the victors of Inkerman.

The
Opposing
Armies

The numbers of Russian troops employed justified their confidence. General Soimonoff led 19,000 with 38 guns; Pauloff, 16,000 and 96 guns; Gortschakoff, who had succeeded Liprandi, 20,000 and 86 guns. The whole Allied strength that day upon the Upland was 65,000, but barely a quarter of these numbers could be—or were—used in the action. The Allies on the ground were 7,464 English and 8,219 French—and of the latter only 3,570 were actually engaged. Moreover, only a small proportion of these were available in the early stages of the fight. For hours the brunt of the battle fell upon the 2nd Division, 3,000 men, and reinforcements came to them in dribblets slowly, the Camp guards being eventually utilised. It was from the extraordinary tenacity shown by our soldiers in their prolonged and indomitable resistance against overwhelming odds that the Inkerman position was held.

The Allied weakness was caused by the insufficiency of their forces for the Siege operations and the need for protecting their communications. On the Right flank of the British front, in the first instance, there were a few weak battalions of the 2nd Division. Next to them was a brigade of the Light Division under General Codrington on the Victoria ridge adjoining, but separated by a rough ravine; behind, and three-quarters of a mile off, was the brigade of Guards, 2nd brigade (Buller's) of the Light Division. The 4th and 3rd Divisions, engaged in the siege works, were from two to three miles distant from Inker-

Inkerman,
1854:
The Forces

man hill reckoning from the extreme British Left flank. A French army corps, under Bosquet, was holding the eastern heights. There were no Reserves available.

The weakness of the 2nd Division in such an isolated position had long been recognised. Lord Raglan would have gladly entrenched the position, but every available man was then engaged in Siege work, and on October 25th the Light Division had not enough men to relieve the outlying pickets.

The Russian General had detected the inherent defects in the British position, for on October 26th a reconnaissance of 6,000 men, intended to entrench and hold Shell hill 30 feet below and 1,200 yards north of the Inkerman crest line, had penetrated the 2nd Division camp, but was then driven back to Sevastopol.

1. Two columns, with a combined strength of 35,000 men, with 134 guns, constituted the main attack. One, commanded by General Soimonoff, was to attack the Left of the English position at Inkerman; the other, under General Pauloff, bivouacked north of the Tchernaya river, was to attack the English Right.

a. Soimonoff's force was to issue from the Carenage ravine, and to come out on the northern slopes of Mount Inkerman, where he was to join hands with—

b. Pauloff, who, marching from the far side of the Tchernaya, was to cross that river and ascend the northern slopes of Mount Inkerman till he connected up with Soimonoff.

2. Prince Gortschakoff, who now commanded the army hitherto known as Liprandi's, near Tchourgoum, a force of 20,000, with 86 guns, was to demonstrate against Bosquet, and so that he should be unable to reinforce the English Right, and later to drive back Bosquet, and join hands with Soimonoff.

3. The Garrison was to sally out in case of success and capture the Siege batteries.

There was not sufficient room, however, upon the Inkerman battle-field for half the Russian forces engaged. Moreover, this ground was cut in two by ravines, which divided the two columns and prevented their combined action. General Gortschakoff's advance depending upon the success of Soimonoff's attack, his 20,000 men were not engaged.

The Battle-Ground of Inkerman 455

A brief description of the battle-ground is necessary, **Inkerman,** and details will be best understood by referring to the **1854** plan.

The battle was mainly fought on a long ridge of ground running mainly in a north-western direction, with many spurs jutting out on each side of it, separated by ravines. The main ridge was termed Mount Inkerman. There is a ridge nearly parallel to it, but separated from it by the Carenage ravine, and known as the Victoria ridge, but the brunt of the fighting took place on the first-named, and at about its central point, where another smaller crest joins it, named by us the Home ridge. This lesser ridge trended forward at its eastern end, forming a right angle, and the salient was called the Fore ridge. The surface of the field of battle was thickly covered with brushwood and low coppice, interspersed with crags and rocky boulders. In some places the brushwood was thick, and in others the ravines were steeply scarped by quarries and difficult of access.

Soimonoff marched at 5 A.M. in darkness and mist, and he reached Mount Inkerman unobserved. He brought his guns into action on the crest of Shell hill, unseen by our outposts, although some of our people had heard the rumbling of wheels. The outpost duty was imperfectly performed, and the enemy was on our pickets before the alarm was raised. They were pressed back fighting, while the Russian guns on Shell hill opened fire. General Pennefather, who was in temporary command of the 2nd Division, led forward all his weak forces to meet the Russian attack. This daring system of counter-attack was greatly aided by the state of the atmosphere; in the fog and mist the small number of their opponents was not realised by the Russians, and the handful of English disregarded the fact that they were unsupported.

Pennefather had barely 3,000 men all told. Soimonoff advanced, without waiting for Pauloff's co-operation. Soon after 7 A.M. he sent three separate columns against the position on the Home ridge. All three were attacked and charged by companies in line with such determination that the Russian columns were driven back behind the guns on Shell hill.

Then Soimonoff came on at the head of nearly 9,000 men, against the centre of our line, where we lost three

Inkerman,
1854

guns. When the first supports—those from the Light Division—arrived, Pennefather at once used them against Soimonoff's masses. The 77th (2nd Middlesex) Regiment encountered Soimonoff's outside column, 1,500 strong. Colonel Egerton had no more than 250, but he never faltered, and his men charged with irresistible dash. There was a struggle with the bayonet; then the Russians turned, Egerton pursuing at the charge to the foot of Shell Hill. These troops did not re-appear on the field. About this time General Soimonoff was killed, his second in command and nearly all the senior officers were shot down, and thus the Russian supports and reserves were not brought forward. Egerton's action had wide-reaching results. Through it the abandoned three guns were recovered, and the 77th, a remnant, held fast for hours the ground it had secured. These combats disposed of about half the forces Soimonoff had put forward in this attack. The remainder advanced courageously against our Centre on both sides of the post road; but they also were beaten back, partly by the fire of our field-guns, partly by the spirited charge of two hundred men of the 49th (1st Berkshire Regiment) under Captain Bellairs.

This portion of the 10th Russian Division never regained cohesion as a military force. It was no mere repulse, but an absolute overthrow, in which regiments melted away and the whole force was demoralised.

Meanwhile a portion of Pauloff's division had taken an unarmed epaulement called the Sandbag battery from a sergeant's party that held it. Three great columns supported this attack, and Pennefather sent General Adams against them with the 41st (1st Welsh) Regiment. He went forward in extended order with a wide front of fire, and the Russians soon fell away; those in the battery evacuated it; the supporting columns broke up and dropped back into the valley; 500 men routed 4,000.

Somewhat later another column of 2,000 Pauloff's men approached a wing of the 30th (1st East Lancashire) Regiment, 200 men, under Colonel Mauleverer. The nipples of the muskets and caps were so wet that they would not go off, but officers leapt down among the Russians; men followed them in the charge; the head of the leading column was struck with such force that it turned in hasty retreat,

causing hopeless confusion in the columns behind, and all fled, a broken throng of fugitives. Inkerman, 1854

This ended, at 7.30 A.M., the first Russian onslaught; 6,000 men were lost to Pauloff. At least 15,000 out of 25,000 were "exterminated," as the Russians state in their official accounts, and this by the dogged valour of 3,500 Englishmen, for Pennefather had by then been reinforced by 500 men. Some of the Light Division, as we have seen, had been already engaged. General Codrington with the rest was in position, holding the Victoria ridge, although with scanty forces. The Guards Brigade, 1,200 men, under the Duke of Cambridge, was approaching; the 4th Division, under Sir George Cathcart, 2,000 strong, was also near at hand. These, with the field batteries, raised the reinforcements to a total of 4,700 men.

General Dannenberg now organised a fresh attack, covered by the fire of 100 guns on Shell hill. He had at his disposal 10,000 fresh troops—Soimonoff's Reserves, and some of Pauloff's regiments which had come up. Four thousand men attacked the 41st (1st Welsh) Regiment again and again, with persistent courage; and at last, the Welsh, still fighting inch by inch, fell back. Then the Guards went forward with a rush, and there was an ebb and flow of the contending forces.

The 4th Division, under Sir George Cathcart, now arrived upon the ground with 2,000 men, and of these four-fifths were distributed to stiffen Pennefather's fighting line where he thought they were most required. General Cathcart, leaving the high ground, descended the steep slopes with 400 men to attack the Russian Left. The offensive movement was taken up by the troops nearest him—Guards, 20th (Lancashire Fusiliers), 95th (2nd Sherwood Foresters). All our men who had gathered about the Sandbag battery rushed headlong like a torrent down the hill-side, following up this imaginary advantage, creating a gap, which was filled by a heavy column of Russians, who took our people in reverse and cut them completely off. "I fear we are in a mess," said Cathcart, taking in the situation; and directly afterwards he was shot through the heart. Only by desperate efforts, a series of personal hand to hand combats fought by small units courageously led by junior officers, even by non-combatant doctors, did

Inkerman,
1854

our men regain touch with their own people. They were aided by the opportune advance of a French regiment, which took the interposing Russians in flank and drove them off. Although this unfortunate adventure of Cathcart's escaped the most disastrous consequences, its effect, nevertheless, was to still further disseminate our already weakened and exhausted forces.

All this time Dannenberg had been pressing his onslaught upon our centre. Here his attacking column met the 30th (1st East Lancashire), and forced them slowly back, but presently was itself repulsed by a fresh detachment of the Rifle Brigade and driven down into a quarry. Thence it again emerged, reinforced, and moved against the Home ridge. The Russian columns on the south side of the ridge were charged by detachments of the 4th Division—the 21st (Royal Scots Fusiliers) and 63rd (1st Manchester) Regiments—overthrown and pursued. The Russian attack on the right of the Home ridge was met by the 20th (Lancashire Fusiliers) and 57th (1st Middlesex), also of the 4th Division, both regiments of glorious traditions, the 20th of Minden, and the "Die Hards" of Albuera. These two gallant regiments pushed their foes down into a quarry.

Dannenberg made another attack upon the Centre of the English position. The Russians came on, 6,000 assailants, formed, as before, in a dense column, the main trunk, flanked by others, coming up out of the Quarry ravine. Pennefather had some 500 or 600 to hold the Ridge, remnants of the 55th (2nd Border Regiment), 95th (2nd Sherwood Foresters), and 77th (2nd Middlesex) Regiments, and a French battalion of the 7th Léger, with a small detachment of Zouaves. These were inadequate, and the Russians, pushing home, crowned the crest, and broke over the inner slopes of the Ridge. The 7th Léger recoiled, but were rallied by the Zouaves, and the men of the 77th (2nd Middlesex) still led by the intrepid Egerton. By this time the main column of the enemy had swept over the Barrier above the Quarry, and the small force of defenders retired slowly behind the Home ridge.

The position was critical. But the advance of the Russians was checked by another daring charge of 30 men of the 55th (2nd Border) Regiment, under Colonel Daubenny, who ran headlong into the centre of one of the rearmost Russian


The Russians' New Effort

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battalions. This small body broke through the mass as if it were in a football scrum, using their bayonets and the butt-ends of rifles, and even their fists, fighting desperately till they "clef a path through the battalion from flank to flank, and came out at last on open ground on the east of the great main column." The noise of tumult in the rear and the vague sense of defeat shook the leading assailants, and the Russians first halted irresolutely, then turned, and retired. At this time, too, one of the flanking columns, moving up on the Russian right, encountered the 21st (Scots Fusiliers) and 63rd (1st Manchester) Regiments, and was promptly charged and driven back by these regiments, which repossessed themselves of the Barrier and held it. Then the Russian left column, shattered by our artillery and the French 7th Léger, also retired.

The enemy now made a fresh effort, coming up once again out of the Quarry ravine. The pressure on the 21st and 63rd was great, and Pennefather sent on such scanty

Inkerman,
1854



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN, NOVEMBER 5th, 1854

Inkerman,
1854

support as he could spare—fragments of the 49th, 77th, and Rifle Brigade. Great slaughter ensued in this conflict. General Goldie, who had succeeded Cathcart in command of the 4th Division, was killed, and many other officers.

The Russian artillery fire had hitherto been effective, but now it was overmatched by our guns. At an earlier hour of the morning Lord Raglan had sent back to the Siege park for a couple of eighteen-pounders, guns which were far heavier than those of the Russian field-batteries. They soon established a superiority of fire, and spread such havoc and confusion among the Russian batteries on Shell hill that the fire of the latter began to weaken.

Bosquet now sent forward his Zouaves and Algerines, and these active troops came upon some Russians who were slowly climbing the slopes, and drove them down again in great disorder. The 6th and 7th French Regiments, the earliest on the field, advanced along the road towards the Barrier, where they supported our troops.

The English were wellnigh exhausted. Lord Raglan had not a spare man, and Marshal Canrobert, who was never an enterprising leader, now wished to desist from the fight. When he learnt that the English were all but exhausted, he would do nothing more, although he had a large force of all Arms now in hand. No arguments, no appeals of Lord Raglan's moved him.

Nevertheless, Colonel Haines's 21st Regiment advanced from the Barrier on Shell hill. Lord West seconded him in this bold endeavour; a young lieutenant of the 77th (2nd Middlesex), Acton by name, also went on with a mere handful, and Colonel Horsford came on in support with the remnant of the Rifle Brigade. This demonstration, while Lord Raglan's eighteen-pounders were dealing destruction among the Russian batteries, caused Darnenberg, under severe loss from this "murderous fire"—they are his own words—to retire his whole force, and about 1 P.M. the Russians withdrew all their troops into the fortress.

The Russian losses were four times as great as those of the victors. They had 12,000 killed and wounded, a large proportion of them left dead upon the field, including 256 officers. The English lost 41 officers and 597 other Ranks killed; 91 officers and 1,760 men wounded. The French lost 13 officers and 130 men killed and 36 officers and 750 men


wounded. The enormous losses of the Russians were mainly due to the density of their columns of attack and the superiority of our musketry and artillery fire. The English infantry at Inkerman were armed with the new Minié rifle, and the two eighteen-pounder guns were very effective.

Inkerman,
1854

The Auxiliary Services, created by the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula, had been given up after the Battle of Waterloo, and in 1854 there was no arrangement for the supply of ammunition in the field, or for the removal of wounded men from it.

Our troops had much to relearn which had been forgotten in our army since Sir John Moore instituted the Training camp at Shorncliffe, in the first years of the century, and we had not even practised what was laid down in our Drill books. These enjoined that troops in presence of an enemy should send out a strong patrol an hour before daylight. This was not done on November 5th, and the Russians placed, unknown to our people, 38 guns in position before daylight, within 1,300 yards of Inkerman crest.

The attack having ceased soon after noon, all our wounded were brought in before sunset, as well as 700 Russians, who were carried by a working party of 500 Turks, ordered up from Balaclava for the purpose.



SKETCH-MAP OF THE UPLAND

CHAPTER VI

THE MILITARY SITUATION AFTER THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN

The British Army in 1854—A Soldier's Life in the Crimea—Death Rate in the Crimea—The Second Bombardment of Sevastopol.

British
Army in
1854

THE outlook for the success of the campaign was depressing, for the Army had no Reserves either in the Crimea or in England. The system of enlistment being for Long Service, the 26,000 soldiers who landed in the Crimea on September 14th, 1854, averaging 25 years of age and 6 years' service, were physically the finest troops in the world, but the Peace establishments being insufficient for War, battalions had been made up by calling for Volunteers from other regiments in England, and there were now no more complete units available, except those serving in the Colonies.

I have already mentioned that in a War student's point of view, England had no Army but only units of the Three Arms. Two miniature brigades of cavalry, batteries of artillery and battalions of infantry had been put together for the War, as had been done in the Peninsula in 1808 and 1809. There were no Auxiliary Services, which are essential for the efficiency, and health of troops. Our Allies had in November 42,000 men in the Crimea, of whom 1,700 under the command of a general officer were employed in feeding and ministering to the wants of the Fighting Services.

The numbers of British effectives had dropped to 14,000, and our position appeared to be so unfavourable that the oldest general in the Crimea, whose dauntless courage as a lad had been remarkable throughout the Peninsular War, and who lived to re-conquer India four years later, urged the Commander-in-Chief to re-embark the remnants of his Army. Lord Raglan rejected the advice, which was in effect worthless, as there was insufficient Naval Transport.

Soon after the battle the weather broke up, and on November 14th the heaviest gale experienced in Europe

The Soldier's Life in the Crimea 463

in the last 70 years, accompanied by torrents of rain, blew down every tent in camp, causing many men on duty as sentries to perish on their posts, and a number of horses to die on their picket lines. Twenty-one vessels were wrecked off Balaclava, including ships laden with munitions of war, and one of our largest transports, carrying immense stores of warm clothing for the troops, foundered. Two French men-of-war, and one Turkish 90-gun ship went down with all hands, and even in the town of Sevastopol, well sheltered from its situation, houses were unroofed by the force of the gale.

The Great
Gale, 1854

The great gale was the beginning of misery so intense as to defy any adequate description. In terribly wintry weather units were in the trenches on alternate nights. When the soldier reached his station in the Siege works, if he was not on sentry, he had to sit with his back to the parapet with his feet drawn up close to be clear of the four-foot pathway, which was often the only dry piece of ground. If not detailed for picket or for working party, he could sleep in a wet ditch. When he got back to camp in the morning, he used to lie in a puddle under a worn-out tent, through which the rain beat. The less robust men falling asleep would awake shivering, in many cases to be carried to a Hospital bell tent scarcely more weather-proof than that they had left, and thence in two or three days to the grave. It is a striking proof of our want of prevision that in spite of the repeated requisitions for upwards of a year made by the Principal Medical officer of the Army, even after the disasters were known, the first Hospital marquees were sent out only in April, 1855.

The stronger men on getting back from the trenches went to dig up roots of brushwood or vines, and then roasted the green coffee ration in the lid of the canteen, afterwards pounding the berries generally in the fragment of a shell. Those unequal to this laborious process, and they were in the great majority, would drink their rum, and having eaten a piece of biscuit, lie down in the great-coat and blanket which they had brought, often wet through, from the trenches. In the afternoon the soldier was sent to Balaclava to carry up rations, entailing a march of from 10 to 14 miles, according to the position of his camp. It was seldom that he could get a hot drink, for a ration of

Sickness
in the
Crimea,
1854-55

fuel was not issued until the last days of December, and salt pork issued two days out of seven was frequently eaten raw from the difficulty of finding fuel to cook it, and was preferred to salt beef on that account.

While human life was thus sacrificed, the horses fared even worse, for though there was always forage at Balaclava, there was no means of bringing it up to the camps.

The Regimental Medical officers being without medical comforts, medicines, or shelter, sent their patients, even in storms of wind and rain, to Balaclava as the best chance of saving their lives. The sick were generally carried on cavalry horses, which slipping up on the hill outside Balaclava, often precipitated the death of the patient.

By the end of November there were 8,000 men sick. It was impossible to treat dysentery, and the horrors of the hospital bell tents in the darkness of the long winter nights, for there were no candles available, are beyond my powers of description.

The clothing of the troops was in rags. Many were barefooted. Frost bites were common, and being often followed by gangrene, necessitated amputation. The continuous issue of salt rations caused many soldiers to be tainted by scurvy, and their gums became so sore that they could not bite the hard biscuit.

In January, 1855, there were only 11,000 men "at Duty," many of whom were unfit for it. During that month on several nights there were only 350 infantry in the whole of our trenches. On the night of the 20th, there were only 290 men. The Russian garrison in Sevastopol at that date numbered 30,000, so had our pitiable state been known to their Generals they could have easily captured our Siege works.

It is impossible to over-praise the disciplined silence of the men under privation, which in a few weeks, for example, reduced one battalion which landed from the Colonies with 1,000 effectives, to a strength of 30 Rank and File.

There is nothing in history grander than the enduring courage shown by the British soldier in the winter of 1854-55. When the men were so weak and listless at night as to vex energetic Engineer officers who were anxious to push forward the approaches towards the enemy's works, it needed only a sortie by the foe, and the inspiring shout

Second Bombardment of Sevastopol 465

of any officer whose voice they recognised in the darkness, to send a few men headlong into a crowd of Russians. Though they were weak in bodily strength, the spirit of these old soldiers never quailed, and it was a common occurrence for men about to die to deny feeling ill lest they should throw more duty on their comrades.

Death Rate
in the
Crimea,
1854-55

The culmination of our miseries is shown by the death-rate in the Front and at the Base, which rising from 700 in October was 2,000 in December, 3,000 in January, '55, and then dropped gradually to less than 600 in April, while in the following summer it was no greater on the average than in hospitals in England.

At the end of January our Allies, having taken charge of the Right flank, on Inkerman heights, released 1,500 men for work in our Right and Left Attack.

During the second bombardment, opened on April 8th, it was computed that the Allies threw 130,000 projectiles into Sevastopol, and the Russian losses were terrible, for their Reserves were necessarily kept close up to the batteries in readiness to repel the expected assault, but when the English had completely silenced the fire of their opposing batteries, our Allies ran out of ammunition, and for that, and for other, partly political, reasons, the bombardment was again allowed to peter out.

Sevastopol
Bombarded

For many weeks there had been much telegraphic correspondence between Paris and the French Army Headquarters at Kamiesh Bay, relative to a new plan of campaign, in which the Emperor, Napoleon III., proposed to take a personal part; and it seems that General Canrobert never intended to deliver the assault, for which Lord Raglan had understood that the bombardment was undertaken.

CHAPTER VII

THE CAPTURE OF SEVASTOPOL, SEPTEMBER, 1855

The Assault of the Malakoff—A Combined Attack Planned by the Allies—
Faulty Staff Arrangements—The Assault of the Great Redan—Lord
Raglan's Death—Desperate Condition of the Russians—The French
Assault of the Malakoff—The Capture of Sevastopol.

The
Mamelon
Carried

SHORTLY before sunset on June 7th the French carried the Mamelon, a work protecting the Malakoff, mounting 73 guns, in an assault marked by determined continuous resolution, but going on to assault the Malakoff against orders suffered heavily, losing in all 5,500 men. The Quarries, a field-work half-way between the British Right attack and the Great Redan, was easily carried by three detachments of 200 each, supported by 600 men. The stormers under Major Armstrong, 1st Berkshire Regiment, and Colonel Campbell, 2nd Scottish Rifles, easily captured the works by a bayonet charge, but repeated counter attacks for 10 hours, in some of which we lost the works only to regain it in a succeeding attack, left our troops so exhausted that they could be kept awake only by Colonel Campbell and Captain (later Commander-in-Chief) Wolseley pulling them on to their feet after each success. Our loss was 47 officers and 650 other Ranks. Our Generals might have easily relieved the victors, but failed to do so.

The Russian guns in the Malakoff, Redan, and in those batteries in front of the British Left attack had been silenced at sunset of June 16th and again on the 17th, and it was arranged on the morning of the 17th, in a personal interview between Pélissier, who had succeeded Canrobert in command, and Raglan, that a combined attack should be delivered, which would in the joint triumph, they hoped, soften the memories of Waterloo. The Allied batteries, mounting 600 guns, were to bombard for two hours the Russian defences, mounting 550 guns, and then when the enemy's batteries had been silenced, the troops were to go forward.

The French at the Malakoff 467

The French were to assault the Malakoff and the Gervais battery, which stood immediately on the north side of the Redan. Pélissier determined that no serious attempt should be made by the French Left attack near Kamiesh Bay. It was agreed by the two Commanders-in-Chief that Lord Raglan should send forward his columns against the Redan, and batteries in front of the Left attack, when he might think it was desirable, for it was not possible to hold the Redan until the Malakoff, which commanded its interior, should have been captured.

Sevastopol :
Assault
of the
Malakoff,
1855

During the evening of June 17th Pélissier sent over his Chief Engineer officer to state that he had changed his mind, and meant to assault at daylight. This message was framed so as to leave Lord Raglan no alternative, forcing him to agree with his colleague's plan, or to refuse to co-operate with him. The British Commander-in-Chief reluctantly assented, although he fully realised the losses which would be incurred by assaulting over a quarter of a mile of open ground the formidable batteries in the Redan before its guns had been silenced, but having sent his troops into the trenches, he, before daylight, went to the eight-gun battery in the third parallel of the British Right attack, where a flagstaff was erected, to give the signal for launching the attack.

The Allied troops were filing into the trenches at 2 A.M. when the Russian bugles sounded the "Assembly," and their troops, after nine months of heroic constancy under fire, fell in to repel the threatened attack. In all the batteries field-guns were placed so as to fire over the parapet, and on the north side of the Malakoff entrenchments a field-battery came into action in the open.

General Pélissier detailed 25,000 men for the attack, the assaulting columns for which were formed in three different commands, each of 6,000 men, and a Reserve.

The Staff arrangements were faulty. The French troops, which were to evacuate the trenches to make room for the assaulting columns, blocked the road, and thus delay ensued. General Mayran mistook a shell for the signal rocket which was to notify the advance, and went on prematurely. His column was fired on heavily in front, and on its right flank by some steamers in the dockyard creek. The General was wounded, and the column hesitated. Mayran rallied

Sevastopol : Assault of the Malakoff, 1855 : his troops, was again wounded, and when leading them on for the third time was shot dead.

When Mayran went out prematurely, General Brunet's column was not ready to advance, and when nearly half an hour later his command, formed in two columns, advanced, he was killed and none of his troops made good their footing within the Malakoff.

General d'Autemare advanced almost immediately after Brunet's attack was launched. A Chasseur battalion and some Engineers drove a Russian battalion out of the Gervais battery, and established themselves in some houses behind it, remaining there until the Allies had retired. The main column of D'Autemare's command, beaten down by heavy fire from the east face of the Redan and from the Malakoff, halted. This check occurring immediately under the position of Lord Raglan, was apparent, although the smoke hid the details and induced him to hoist the signal for the British advance.

The Great Redan

The idea of the Attack and the Staff arrangements, apparently made under the direction of Sir George Brown, were faulty. It was intended that assaulting columns should march respectively against the left or northern face of the Redan, and the right or southern face, and that the support under Colonel D. Lysons should march on the salient of the work; but each commander did as seemed good to him, and the result was not only costly in lives but unsuccessful, for nothing that could be justly called an assault with a prospect of success took place.

The Author of this book helped to carry the only scaling ladder which reached the Redan that day, and, having visited the ground in after years, his testimony therefore may be accepted so far as the Right column of attack is concerned. It is clear from the orders the intention was that Colonel Yea's column on the north side, and Major-General Campbell's column on the south, should advance against the respective faces of the Redan, being followed by a third column marching on the salient. This was an unfortunate arrangement, since the attackers to start first were moving on the most dangerous parts of the work. The orders contemplated 100 skirmishers preceding 800 men, who were to advance over 500 yards of open ground, preceded by men carrying heavy ladders 18 feet in length.

Assault of the Redan

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1855

When the right column left the trenches the Russian infantry formed four deep on the parapets of the Redan, and added the fire of their rifles to that of guns of all calibres, which poured forth a stream of missiles on us, the intensity of which it is difficult to describe. Lord Raglan, who had witnessed the conduct of the storming parties of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz, in his dispatch of June 18th, 1855, wrote, "I never before witnessed such a continued and heavy fire of grape and musketry"; adding, in a private letter, "I never had a conception before of such a shower of grape."

As the ladder-parties ran forward, various kinds of projectiles cut up the ground all round us, but yet not continuously in their fullest force, for while there was no cessation of missiles, which pattered on the stony ground like hail stones, yet every thirty seconds or so gusts of increased violence came sweeping down the hill-side, reminding one of the recurring blasts of a storm simulated behind the scenes of a theatre.

The ladder-parties, consisting of sailors, ran forward at a steady double, following the skirmishers, who started 50 yards in front of them, and some of the skirmishers certainly never stopped until they reached the abatis, for the writer spoke to them there. The storming party, 34th (1st Border) Regiment, never flinched, though as they formed in succession prior to advancing, the men were struck down like a falling pack of cards. Only one ladder-party went on, and before it had advanced 100 yards, several sailors were killed, and of the seven officers only one remained erect. When I got near the abatis there were only four ladders still being moved on, all carried by sailors, but some of the soldiers carrying wool-bags were still struggling forward.

When the party was thirty yards from the abatis only one ladder was being still carried to the front, and its carriers were reduced to two. There were a few scattered British soldiers crouching under the apparent shelter of the abatis, some firing, a great many shouting, and above them on the parapet the Russians, four and in some places six deep, were calling sarcastically to our men to come in.

There was very little chance of doing so. The abatis, about 100 yards from the ditch of the salient, was in itself

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four feet thick and five feet high, the stoutest portion of the woodwork being from six to eight inches in diameter; beyond it the ditch was 11 feet deep and 15 broad, and 26 feet from the bottom was the huge earthen rampart on which the Russians awaited us. The whole number of the storming party, 500, were now reduced to something over a hundred.

An officer, seizing a branch from the abatis, waved it over his head, and cheerily called on the men to follow, but while doing so was riddled by bullets. A young sergeant who was trying to induce the men to follow him, but in vain, losing his temper, said, "I'll tell my right-hand man to follow, and if he fails, I'll shoot him." Bringing his rifle to the ready, he said, "Private —, will you follow me?" The soldier looked deliberately up at the hundreds of Russians standing above us, and then at his comrades, as if reckoning the numbers, and replied quietly, "No, I won't." As the sergeant threw his rifle into the shoulder, with the apparent intention of shooting the man, he was struck by a grape-shot and fell dead.

Colonel Lysons took his 400 men up to the abatis, and was approaching Colonel Yea to ask for orders, when a blast of grape-shot knocked down several men around them, and Colonel Yea amongst the number. Lysons was wounded, but after ordering his men to retire, was amongst the last of the effectives who got back to the Quarries, which we had seized on June 7th. When he reported his failure in the eight-gun battery, he learnt that the detachment of his own regiment, 23rd Welsh Fusiliers, had never gone out, having been stopped by Sir George Brown, who, believing that the assault must fail, had decided to spare one battalion, the loss of which he saw was inevitable and useless.

Major-General Campbell, in command of the Assault, led to the immediate vicinity of the Redan, but many of his skirmishers halted when they had got to about fifty yards outside the trench. The colonel of the battalion was killed as he was crossing the parapet, and the Commanding Royal Engineer, Colonel Tylden, was soon knocked down. Colonel Lord West, on hearing that Campbell was dead, tried to form a fresh party of skirmishers, but no one except the sailors was willing to follow him, and Lieutenant Graham, Royal Engineers, after showing heroic

Redan Guns Silenced

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courage, had ordered the sailors carrying ladders for the Left column back into the trenches.

Colonel Lord West sent a note to Sir George Brown asking for reinforcements, but was told to re-form his own troops, which was clearly impossible. The ladder-parties suffered most of all who went out in proportion to their strength, and while the sailors of the Left column had only five men hurt out of 60, out of a similar number carrying ladders for the Right column, 19 were killed and 29 wounded.

It must be admitted that Sir George Brown, who was standing with Lord Raglan, and who was therefore responsible, sent the troops out on a hopeless task in order to maintain the good feeling which existed between the English and French armies. Later, Lord Raglan, after a consultation with Pélissier, decided to recall the troops, but before this was ordered, there were, in effect, very few unwounded men outside our trenches in front of the Redan.

On the extreme British left, a brigade under General Eyre moved down the ravine which separated the French from the left of our Left attack, with orders to seize the defensive works at the head of the dockyard creek. Eyre, a man of great courage, stimulated the ardour of his troops, addressing himself particularly to the 18th (Royal Irish). Their courage cost us dear, but the brigade carried not only the Russian works in the cemetery near the dockyard creek, but seized some houses in the enemy's main line, called the Garden batteries. This was our only success on June 18th, won at a cost of 560 casualties, of whom 30 were officers, out of a total force of 2,000 men.

When the last of the effective men had been withdrawn, the siege batteries re-opened fire, and within an hour the guns of the Redan were silenced. The British casualties that day were 100 officers, 1,441 other ranks. The French and Russian statistics are given for the 17th and 18th together. Including prisoners, the French lost 3,550 and the Russians 5,400.

It is clear that the general in command of the assaulting columns should not have gone forward with the storming party, which numbered only one-third of his command, but this custom of personally leading an advance was a legacy from earlier battles. It will be noticed that the French

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suffered severely, and from the same cause. The British generals in command at the Alma, at Balaclava, and at Inkerman had all gone forward with, or in front of, their attacking line, a practice which we applaud when it leads to successful results.

Everything went wrong. In the first place, General Péliissier, having quarrelled with Bosquet, removed him from the command of the troops which were to attack the Malakoff, and substituted a general who had lately landed, and was ignorant of the ground, which Bosquet knew perfectly. In the second place, although it had been arranged with Lord Raglan that the attack should be preceded by a two days' cannonade, the fire of June 17th was not resumed by the French on the fatal morning of the 18th, and Péliissier suddenly decided to attack at daybreak without a previous bombardment. The French columns intended to assault the Malakoff got mixed up in the trenches. The assailants, when they moved forward, encountered fierce opposition from dogged men posted behind works rapidly repaired, and the French presently retreated with considerable loss. The same misfortune met the English, because Lord Raglan, although he witnessed from the eight-gun, an advanced, battery the French failure, for sentimental reasons felt bound to also attack. Our men never got near the Redan in formed bodies; they were swept away in hundreds, as they crossed the open, by a storm of grape. Their leaders were killed—General Campbell and gallant Lacy Yea—and the remnant fell back disheartened. Only at one point, down by the Creek battery, that fiery leader, Sir William Eyre, had penetrated the defences and entered the town. But he was wounded, and the lodgment made, not being properly supported, was relinquished.

From this grievous disaster Lord Raglan, who was already in failing health, never recovered. The noble English soldier, who had long borne unmerited contumely in proud silence, content to do his duty to the utmost of his power, was now heartbroken at this defeat, and sinking gradually, he died, June 18th, ten days after it. How greatly his fine character had impressed all who were joined with him in this chanceful campaign was shown by Péliissier's intense grief at his death. The rugged, stern, intractable Frenchman had from the first evinced the highest respect

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and affection for his English colleague; and it is said that when Lord Raglan was no more, General Pélissier came and "stood by his bedside for upwards of an hour, crying like a child."

But although Pélissier could thus yield to his generous emotions, he never wakened in determination on the business in hand. Defeat only redoubled his dogged determination to succeed in his own way. This indomitable attitude at last won him the respect of his hitherto hostile superiors, and even the Emperor Napoleon, surrendering his personal projects, admitted that now every effort must be concentrated on the Siege. The affront of failure must be wiped out. Progress was still slow, but still the sap crept steadily forward, until it approached in some places the foot of the enemy's defences, while, without intermission, the war of weapons continued. We had established an overwhelming superiority of fire, and our guns worked frightful havoc in the garrison. "Losses!" said a young Russian officer who had accompanied a flag of truce; "you don't know what the word means. You should see our batteries: the dead lie there in heaps and heaps." The Russians during the last bombardment lost from 1,000 to 1,500 a day.

Yet two more months passed, and the Allies were still outside.

The final assault was still delayed, but all hope of holding Sevastopol was at an end. Since the commencement of the Crimean Campaign the Russians had lost hundreds of thousands of men in the fortress and in the field, and their condition was desperate. Preparations to evacuate the city were at last begun—the bridge of boats across the harbour, barricades and obstacles in the streets and approaches. Yet Prince Gortschakoff, with the resolution of his Nation, still hesitated, and wished at the eleventh hour to prolong the defence in spite of the sacrifices it would entail.

Eventually the French advanced trench was within 25 yards of the Malakoff, and for the last time, the guns reopened fire and continued it incessantly on September 5th, 6th and 7th, doing, as usual, infinite injury; but in the early morning of the 8th the Russians stood ready, their Reserves in hand, their guns loaded with grape. It was not Pélissier's intention to attack the Malakoff—the principal point—before noon. He had observed that at that hour

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the old guards were relieved by the new, but that the one marched out of the works before the others occupied them.

At noon exactly, MacMahon's first brigade crossed the open at speed, and found the Malakoff nearly empty; but then the Russian Reliefs came up, and a fierce hand to hand struggle began. Every traverse was taken and retaken, the Russians fighting with desperate courage; and it was not until the French had broken into the work by its eastern face that victory inclined to their side. Still, the conflict was maintained till late in the afternoon, the Russians bringing up reserves, but all to no purpose, and finally the tricolour waved over the Malakoff. The key to the fortress was won.

Elsewhere Fate had been adverse to the Allies. The French columns on the left of the principal attack had not succeeded, while the British at the Redan had failed. The troops went up undauntedly; many climbed over the huge parapet, and for some time maintained a firm front inside. Unfortunately, supports in sufficient strength were not promptly sent forward, and General Windham, who was in command, went back in search of them. This ill-advised step left the combatants, already hardly pressed, without the guidance of any leader of rank, and the unequal contest was not maintained. Had the French, it is said, turned the Russian guns they had captured in the Malakoff on to the Redan, that work would have been quite untenable, so that its assault was really unnecessary, its interior space being commanded by the Malakoff.

Thus Sevastopol—or its principal remaining part, smoking ruins and an empty shell—fell at last to the Allied forces of French and English.

PART XIV

THE SIPAHI MUTINY

CHAPTER I

ITS CAUSES: THE DEFENCE OF AND MASSACRE OF KAHNPUR

A Peaceful Political Outlook—The Main Cause of the Mutiny—Lord Dalhousie's Autocratic Rule—The Native Army—The Revolt at Mirath—The Mutineers March on Delhi—The Evils of Centralisation—British March on Delhi—Amazing Miscalculations—Henry and John Lawrence—Anxiety Felt for Lucknow—Nana Sahib's Treachery—Four Great Sieges—Lahor—Peshawur—Kahnpur—Mirath—The March on Delhi—Death of Anson.

Political
Outlook,
1856-57

FIFTEEN months prior to the outbreak of the Mutiny, when the retiring Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, was succeeded by Lord Canning, the political outlook save for a minor war in Persia, was apparently peaceful.

The unimaginative ruling British race had little or no knowledge of the existing wide-spread political disaffection in Bundelkhand, the Narbada Provinces, in Oudh, and Rohilkhand, nor of the skill of astute Hindus in fomenting insubordination in the Army. There would have been no Revolt unless the Native soldiers had been incited to rise in mutiny.

Although Mr. John Stuart Mill's dictum may be accepted—"the British Government in India is not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficial in act ever known to mankind"—nevertheless, the very virtues of the British race, with its strong desires to ameliorate the lot of the peasantry, and to govern in accordance with the system prevailing in the United Kingdom the millions of Asiatics, as numerous as are the peoples of Europe and of as many different religions, was the main cause of the Mutiny, and of the Revolt.

Our efforts for the relief of the peasantry, which could only be carried into effect by annexing vast districts because

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they were badly governed, appeared, not only to the deposed rulers but to our Native allies, to be a most scandalous oppression. Causes of the Mutiny

The earlier Mohammedan conquerors of Hindustan had allowed childless Hindu princes to nominate an heir to their throne. Lord Dalhousie, a strong and determined Governor-General, enunciated the "Right of Lapse" doctrine, and in 1849 annexed Satarah with its 100,000 inhabitants. The Rajah of Nagpore died in 1853 without nominating his successor, and the Governor-General, disregarding the Hindu custom of allowing the widow to appoint her deceased husband's successor, took over 700,000 inhabitants, and Jhansi, with 250,000 inhabitants, suffered the same fate.

The adopted heir of Baji Rao, who was deposed in 1818 from what is now the Presidency of Bombay—equal in area to the whole of the British Isles—was, under Lord Dalhousie's autocratic rule in 1851, deprived of the pension left to him by will.

Now, as no Hindu can hope for a future world unless his heir, begotten or adopted, performs certain funeral ceremonies for the deceased, the British Governor-General had terrified all Hindu childless rulers, whose families were generally in inverse ratio to their numbers of wives.

Lord Dalhousie's last annexation was the most serious in extent of country and in its results. The King of Oudh was utterly unfit for his position. The landed nobles fought continuously amongst themselves, and tyrannised over the helpless people, who suffered deplorably. The system of Government was aptly described as a "combination of anarchy and robbery." The King had, however, helped the White rulers with men and money. The Bengal infantry drew 60 per centum of its recruits from Oudh, and they all resented the absorption of their country, equal in area to the counties of Norfolk and Suffolk.

The Brahmans spread reports universally, that the Government intended to abolish Caste, and any violation of the arbitrary rule of Caste appeared to all Hindus to be but a step towards forcible conversion to Christianity. Ten years previously a similar rumour had been started, but was stayed by concessions, all prisoners in jails being allowed to cook their own food.

**Causes of
the Mutiny**

The missionaries at this time were showing increased activity. Zealous young clergymen, not content with extolling their own religion, inveighed against Hindu and Mohammedan beliefs, thus adding to the irritation induced by their advocacy of one form of religion for all in India, and that form the accepted belief of an infinitesimal minority. Very few Natives understood that the missions were financed by private individuals, and the vernacular newspapers made the most of all intolerant expressions of the clergy of the Ruling Race. While the Government maintained its principle of absolute impartiality to all religions, there were some few indiscreet commanding officers who proselytised, though outside their Regimental lines. Reports among the upper Mohammedan classes that the Government intended their forcible conversion to Christianity became so prevalent in 1856 that the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal issued a conciliatory proclamation on the subject.

Lord Canning promulgated, in 1856, a law passed the previous year for legalising the remarriage of Hindu widows; and this, an act of the purest benevolence from a British point of view, was regarded, and justifiably, as a blow against polygamy.

**Character-
istics of the
Hindustani
Soldier**

Individually, the Hindustani soldier is brave; does not hesitate to engage a European in single combat, and all survivors of Mutiny days who were actively engaged can recall instances of almost superhuman courage. When the troops under Sir Colin Campbell assaulted the Sikan darbagh at Lucknow (Lucknow), November 16th, 1857, the storming parties were momentarily stopped by rebels. They were selling their lives dearly from within a gatehouse into which they had retreated, and were closing the massive doors when the leading assailant, Private Mukurab Khan, arrived. He thrust his shield, carried on the left arm, between the doors to keep them apart. His hand was immediately badly slashed; but as he withdrew it he thrust in his right, and, although it was nearly severed at the wrist by repeated blows, held the door open until his comrades, coming up and throwing in their weight, forced both doors apart, and slew every man inside.

Brave as the individual Hindustani is, at the close of the Mutiny he would not meet us charging in serried lines with sword or bayonet. The author of this book saw, in

The Outbreak of the Mutiny 479

January, 1857, 2,000 Native cavalry rebels, formed in line, ridden through and put to flight by a squadron formed in "Rank entire" of the 17th Lancers, supported by Paget's (D) Troop Royal Horse Artillery.

Outbreak
of the
Mutiny,
1857

The introduction of the Enfield rifle, the bullet for which in loading had to be lubricated, was the immediate cause of the outbreak which so seriously imperilled our rule in Hindustan. It had originally been arranged for Sunday, May 31st, 1857, but was precipitated by the stupid acts of the officers commanding at Mirath (Meerut). In January, 1857, detachments assembled at the musketry depot, eight miles north of Calcutta, suspected, and reasonably, that the lubricating substance to facilitate the ramming down of the cartridge was composed of beef fat and hog lard, although no such cartridges were ever issued, the Government having sanctioned, on being warned of the excitement, the making up by the soldiers themselves of the lubricant. The fear of loss of Caste, and of forcible conversion to Christianity, however, spread far and wide.

There had been several outbreaks before that which culminated at Mirath on Sunday, May 16th. On April 24th, 90 soldiers of the 3rd Native Cavalry, when parading to practise the tearing off the end of the cartridge by hand instead of by the teeth, an innovation intended to allay suspicion, refused to accept the ammunition. They were tried and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with hard labour. They were placed in fetters on parade, May 9th, the degrading ceremony lasting several hours. The prisoners appealed passionately to their comrades to rescue them, and Native courtesans assembled from the bazaars taunted the troops so bitterly that the arrangement, known to some few in each battalion, for an outbreak on May 31st was departed from; and next evening, when the White troops were in march, the Native corps rose, massacring their officers. The senior officers at the station were incapable, and the mutineers, having dealt out death and destruction in the cantonments, rode off to Delhi, forty miles to the north-east, and precipitated the outbreak at the capital of Hindustan.

Mirath and
Delhi

The scenes at Delhi were repeated at many stations throughout India. There were many instances of heroic, though credulous, conduct of commanding officers of

**Outbreak
of the
Mutiny,
1857**

Native battalions, who were shot down while appealing for loyalty to years of comradeship with their men; much incapacity and indecision by the senior officers of European regiments; barbarous murders by the Natives; and terrible sufferings by White men, women, and children, relieved by many acts of devotion and kindness on the part of Natives towards Europeans to whom they were personally attached.

Centralisation had done its worst in removing all sense of initiative, and power from commanding officers. Even General Hearsey, who personally arrested a mutineer on parade at Barrackpur in the first days of the outbreak, did not venture to carry out the decision of the court martial until it had been approved by Government.

On the other hand, there were some instances of extraordinary moral and physical courage which averted local outbreaks, and I instance one because its facts are not only illustrative but are thoroughly authenticated. Major J. Macdonald, commanding the 5th Irregular Cavalry at Rohni, an isolated station 300 miles north-west of Calcutta, was sitting at tea outside his bungalow, on June 19th, with the adjutant and doctor, when they were attacked by three Natives armed with swords. The adjutant, Sir Norman Leslie, was cut down, and the other two officers badly wounded, while they fought for their lives with the chairs on which they had been sitting. A trooper later confessed that the assailants were his disguised comrades. Macdonald tried them by Court martial formed of Native officers, and confirmed its death sentence. No soldier in the regiment thought that Macdonald, their sorely wounded commanding officer, would venture to carry out the sentence until it had been confirmed by the Commander-in-Chief. He, however, with three severe wounds in his head, from which the scalp had been sliced, paraded the regiment with the prisoners in front, and himself looped the hangman's rope on a tree, and adjusted it. One prisoner called on his comrades in the name of the Prophet to rescue him, until Macdonald silenced him by pressing a pistol to his ear with the threat of scattering his brains. Three times the elephant, with its ghastly burden, by command moved on, and three times a mutinous trooper was left dangling before

the eyes of his guilty comrades. It was men like Macdonald who saved India for the Empire.

The organisers of the Revolt had selected the month of May for the outbreak of the Mutiny, counting on the difficulties of Europeans in campaigning in the hottest time of the year, and when, moreover, all the troops which could be spared would be quartered at Hill stations.

Generally, the garrison of an important place in the plains was composed of one European battalion and three or four of Native infantry. In the north of India there were 18,300 Europeans fit for duty in May, and 100,000 Native soldiers.

In 1854 a nucleus of Transport for Supplies, Ammunition, and Hospital equipment, which had been maintained for emergencies, was sold; thus, when the news of the Mirath Mutiny was received in the Himalayas, the three battalions of British troops which were marched down to Ambala had only 20 rounds of ball ammunition a man. The Horse Artillery ammunition wagons of a battery at Ambala, were at Lodian, seven marches distant.

The miscalculation of the great British officials in India was as remarkable as was their courage. The Governor-General, the impersonation of calm heroism, irritated the inhabitants of Calcutta. He muzzled not only the Native papers, which was indeed essential, but also the European Press, the tone of which, it must be admitted, left much to be desired. He ignored the well-founded apprehension of the White residents of the city; he refused for some time to accept Volunteers for the defence of the capital—a mistake which he acknowledged later. He delayed to disarm the Native brigade at Barrackpur, sixteen miles distant, which necessitated the retention of European soldiers to watch it; and this at a time when there was only one European battalion between Ambala and Calcutta, a distance of 750 miles—100 miles farther than it is from Dover to the most northerly point in Scotland—and with a railway system extending only 70 miles north of Calcutta. He declined to anticipate the departure of the mail steamer in order to send the news to England, as Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, urged him to do. It is doubtful, indeed, whether he realised the danger of the situation.

Outbreak
of the
Mutiny,
1857

Lord
Canning

Outbreak
of the
Mutiny,
1857:
The Panjab

Henry and
John
Lawrence

It is still more remarkable that Sir John (later Lord) Lawrence, the ruler of the Panjab, should have misjudged the situation after spending a long life in India, as completely as did Lord Canning after a residence of about twelve months. While the Governor-General, 900 miles to the south, was urging General Anson, the Commander-in-Chief, to make "short work of Delhi," Lawrence telegraphed from Rawalpindi, 450 miles to the north, joining in the advice. To Anson, who doubted the wisdom of attacking with the few troops then available, Lawrence declared, from his experience, based on thirteen years' residence at Delhi, that the gates would be opened, and the mutineers would disperse on the arrival of a British force. Lord Canning urged that Europeans should be sent from Delhi to Lakhnao, where 600,000 inhabitants and 20,000 recently disbanded soldiers were dangerously excited.

Sir Henry and John (later Lord) Lawrence were great men in every sense of the word, but similar only in courage. Their views were so antagonistic that harmonious work between them was impossible, so Lord Dalhousie, whose character approximated to that of John, the younger brother, removed Henry, to his intense regret, from the Panj-Ab (five rivers), sending him to Rajputana in 1853. The country Henry was sent to rule over is as big as Belgium and the Netherlands; but this did not console him for his removal, for he realised our danger. He seemed to know instinctively what a Native would feel; and so, when in 1857, as Resident in Lakhnao he heard of the outbreak at Mirath, he was able to gauge accurately its effects on the Bengal Army, and to forecast the result.

John, although a much more methodical Ruler, and with a magnanimous, great mind, could not understand the feelings of the natives. When he was discussing, January 9th 1856, a decision on the Oudh case, then daily expected from London, he wrote: "I hope for annexation; anything short of it is a mistake. Will not all the people rejoice, except the fiddlers, barbers, and that genus?" We have shown John Lawrence's mistake about Delhi, but he was equally mistaken about Oudh, as will be seen by the following quotation from a report of the late General Sir Hope Grant, who was as morally courageous as he was physically brave. Sir Hope's practical experience of the people of Oudh

differed entirely from that of John Lawrence, for after fighting many Oudh yeomen and peasants, he reported : " I have seen many brave men fighting with a determination to conquer or die, but I never witnessed anything more magnificent than the conduct of these Zamindars."

Outbreak
of the
Mutiny,
1857 :
The Panjab

Nevertheless, it was primarily John Lawrence who, with a noble, Statesmanlike, unselfish Self-abnegation, by stripping the Panjab, for which he was personally responsible, of White and all trustworthy Native troops, to send them to Delhi, rendered the capture of that city possible, and so broke the neck of the Revolt.

When the Mutiny broke out at Mirath there were eight British battalions and some European artillery scattered in different stations between Ambala and Peshawur—the distance from London to Perth. Fortunately for the safety of Lahor, the Civil and Military authorities were men of determination. The 81st (2nd North Lancashire) Regiment, with only five companies on parade, numbering 250 rifles, disarmed three Native battalions and a cavalry regiment; while the other three companies, about 150 men, marched into the fort in the city, disarmed its garrison and half a Native battalion. Similar successive and successful measures were taken at Firuzpur and Philur.

Lahor

The Civil and Military chiefs at this station were also " Leaders of men," and they acted with perfect loyalty to each other. When the 55th Bengal Native Infantry rose later at Mardan, their commanding officer committed suicide, and the battalion, except 120 men, marched off to the hills with the regimental treasure. Nicholson, who died so gloriously at Delhi, followed with local levies, killing 120, many with his own hand, and taking 150 prisoners, regaining also the Colours.

Mardan

One hundred and twenty of the 150 mutineers were sentenced to death; but John Lawrence deprecated the execution of all, and suggested that 40 only of the oldest soldiers should suffer as an example. At sunrise on June 10th the garrison paraded in presence of thousands of the Border men. Then 40 Sipahis were lashed across the guns and at the word " Fire!" were blown into pieces. The neighbouring hillmen were now convinced that the White men were still supreme. These scenes were re-enacted, as a rule, where the White men in command were true to their racial

**The Sipahi
Mutiny,
1857**

**Treachery
of Nana
Sahib**

Kahnpur

instincts. At some few stations, where those in command showed a want of decision, insubordination developed into massacre and outrage.

The story of Delhi is told later. The intensity of the fighting there was not realised, and it is certain that even in the Army not one officer in a thousand realised that the casualties in action amongst our troops exceeded those in all our forces which conquered under Havelock, Sir Hugh Rose, and Sir Colin Campbell. The explanation of this ignorance is probably due to the fact that the minds of all in India and the United Kingdom were, in the first place, shocked by the treachery of Nana Sahib, the stories, often exaggerated, but still very painful, of his massacres at Kahnpur of helpless women and children, and were then bent on the fixed resolve to take vengeance on the murderers. Moreover, the men at Delhi were soldiers whose duty it was to face death, so anxiety centred on the defence of Lakhnao, where there were a number of women and children in great danger in the Residency; and anxiety for them was deepened by the regret felt for the death of the heroic Henry Lawrence.

The city of Kahnpur is 600 miles north-west of Calcutta and 43 miles south-west of Lakhnao. Its garrison in May, 1857, consisted of 300 British soldiers and 3,000 Hindustani soldiers, commanded by Major-General Sir Hugh Wheeler, an officer of 50 years' distinguished service, to whom Lawrence wrote from Lakhnao in May: "You are a tower of strength to us at this juncture"; and Wheeler was described by a senior commanding officer of the garrison, writing on May 31st, as "very determined, self-possessed in the midst of danger, and fearless of responsibility."

The cantonment stretched over six miles of ground. The General, a good linguist, fully realised his peril, but he sent back to Lakhnao two European companies which had been lent to him, being more apprehensive for the capital of the country than for the city of Kahnpur.

Sir Hugh and the officers under him had accurate knowledge of coming events, but freely risked their lives in order to delay the Mutiny breaking out until the arrival of British soldiers expected from Calcutta. The European officers slept in the Native lines for three weeks, hoping that by

simulating a confidence they did not feel they might keep their men at duty.

**The Sipahi
Mutiny,
1857:
Kahnpur**

The Mutiny broke out, as arranged by Nana Sahib, at nightfall on June 5th. The General, who was 70 years of age, left the executive command to Captain Moore, who had 300 combatants, including 80 officers, 74 invalids, and a small party of loyal Sipahis. Soldiers' wives and 300 half-caste school children made up the total to 800 souls. The combatants stood behind a bank 5 ft. high, from which they repulsed repeated attacks in the hottest weather.

All the garrison suffered greatly. The ration was a handful of flour and split peas, with an occasional addition of meat when a horse or dog strayed inside the entrenchment. The women and children suffered terribly from thirst, for the windlass of the only potable water-well was hammered by grape-shot all day, and even by night, whenever the creaking of the woodwork was heard, the fire on it being continued until a shot carried away the chain. Then Mr. John Mackillop, of the Bengal Civil Service, hauled up water 60 feet, by hand, until he was mortally wounded. The women sucked leather to allay their thirst, but the incessant cry of the babies caused many soldiers to give up their lives in order to obtain water for the helpless infants. In a few days 250 of the besieged were dead.

The Nana, June 25th, offered a safe passage to Allahabad. General Sir Hugh Wheeler did not trust the Marátha; but Captain Moore, who had been the life of the defence, urged acceptance of the terms for the sake of the women and children, and his advice prevailed.

At daylight, June 27th, the garrison moved down to the river bank, where boats had been prepared for their conveyance to Allahabad. At 9 A.M. the Nana's General, Teeka Singh, sounded a bugle. Thereupon the boatmen, throwing out the oars, lighted the thatched roofs of the boats, and, jumping overboard, gained the shore as fire from guns and hitherto concealed infantry was poured on the Christian families. When the majority were dead, Bala Rao and Tantia Topi, who arranged the details of the massacre, sent troopers into the river to kill the survivors.

Some British prisoners, who had been confined in two small rooms, 20 feet by 10 feet—in all, five men and 206 women and children—were fed on unleavened bread and

**The Sipahi
Mutiny.
1857.
Kahnpur**

lentil soup for a fortnight, 28 dying from privation. On July 10th, when Havelock had defeated the Nana's forces to the south of Kahnpur, Balu Rao, the Nana's brother, who had been in command, returned with a bullet in his shoulder, and a Council was held to decide on future action. As to fighting another battle, there was some difference of opinion, but a unanimous decision was taken that all prisoners should be killed.

On July 15th the Nana sent for the men and had them killed in his presence, and ordered the Sipahi guard to shoot the women and children through the doors and windows of the house in which they were confined. The guard refused, some even when threatened with death. Some fired without aim, and eventually the Nana sent two butchers from the city, and two peasants, who with swords and knives slaughtered our unhappy people. Early next morning three women were still alive, and they, with three children who had escaped, being hidden by dead bodies, were thrown into an adjacent well. There was no mutilation, no dishonour attempted; but the horrible murders induced reprisals later on many hundreds of Sipahis who had never been near Kahnpur. It is useless to dwell on what some of our infuriated countrymen did; for the injury is remote, this generation is softer, and those of future ages will deprecate any calculated addition to capital punishment.

The main and abiding interest of the story of the Indian Mutiny, with all its countless episodes of tragedy and stirring heroism, is focused around sieges—the Siege of Kahnpur, the Siege of Lakhnao, the Siege of Delhi, and the Siege of Jhansi.

At Kahnpur the British were besieged and were treacherously massacred with appalling cruelty. At Lakhnao they were besieged, but ultimately triumphed. At Jhansi, as at Delhi, they were the besiegers; and there are in history but few stories of valour and endurance more stirring than that which tells how a handful of British clung for months on end to their precarious position in the Lakhnao Residency.

It was on May 10th, 1857, that the Native troops at Mirath (Meerut) mutinied, murdered all the unprotected White people they could find, and then rode away to raise the storm of mutiny in Delhi. Delhi lies some 38 miles

south-west of Mirath. It was a city with 150,000 inhabitants, and of great political importance. The maintenance of a hold on Delhi therefore was essential to the British power in India.

**The Sipahi
Mutiny,
1857:
Delhi**

When the Mutiny broke out General Anson, Commander-in-Chief, held a council of war at Ambala. His five senior officers unanimously agreed that, with the means at the General's command, the capture of Delhi was impossible. This opinion Anson endorsed. Happily, however, it was not accepted by Lawrence, who wrote to Anson: "Pray, only reflect on the whole history of India. Where have we failed when we acted vigorously? Where have we been successful when guided by timid counsels?"

On May 25th General Anson, having ordered a column from Mirath to join him north of Delhi, moved out of Ambala with all the troops whom he could muster. They included the 75th Regiment (1st Gordon Highlanders), the 1st and 2nd Bengal (Royal Munster) Fusiliers, the 1st Lancers, under Colonel Hope Grant, and two troops of Horse artillery.

Anson died of cholera May 26th, the command of the force devolving upon Major-General Sir Henry Barnard. The heat was intense, and the British soldiers suffered terribly. Nevertheless, they pushed on resolutely, and on June 5th reached Alipur, twelve miles north of Delhi. Two days later they were joined by the Mirath column, under the command of Brigadier-General Archdale Wilson.

General Barnard having defeated a Sipahi force at Badli-ki-Sera June 8th, concentrated on the Ridge 2 miles north of Delhi.

CHAPTER II

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF DELHI, SEPTEMBER, 1857

The Position before Delhi—Death of General Barnard—Wilson in Command—The British Force Stricken with Cholera and Fever—The Assault is Commanded—The Blowing Up of the Kashmir Gate—The Water Bastion—Nicholson's Death—The Cost of Capture.

Position
before
Delhi

THE position was on a sandstone Ridge, which extends for two and a half miles nearly parallel to the course of the River Jumna. The summit of the Ridge is tolerably flat, 50 feet above the level of the surrounding plain.

The lines of the British camp lay along the western slope, the crest being occupied with strong pickets.

The Left of the position rested on the river; its Centre was behind the Flagstaff tower; its Right at the south-west end of the Ridge, where the ground fell sharply towards Sabzimandi, a suburb of Delhi.

At this end the Ridge was crowned by a house formerly belonging to a Marátha chief, called Hindu Rao's house. This was the key of the position, since it commanded the grand trunk road of Karnal, along which all the British convoys from the Panjab had to pass, and it was held with great determination throughout the siege by Major Charles Reid and Gurkha battalions.

The ground between the city and the Ridge was rugged, and dotted with houses, mosques, tombs, and ruins, which were partly concealed among clumps of trees. On the south the whole country, so far as Agra, was in the hands of the enemy; the river protected Delhi's eastern face; the besiegers, therefore, could only assail the city from the north.

Barely had the little army settled down on the Ridge when the enemy began a series of almost incessant attacks. At the end of June a considerable body of reinforcements joined, including the 8th (King's Liverpool) Regiment, and troops sent by Sir John Lawrence from the Panjab. These reinforcements brought the army on the Ridge up to about

Beginning of Siege and Positions 489

6,600 men of all arms. The enemy, however, were also reinforced; and there were present in Delhi at this time 30,000 rebels.

General Barnard died of cholera on July 4th. He was succeeded by General Reed. Ten days later Reed fell ill, and, going on sick leave, handed over the command to Brigadier-General Wilson.

Siege of
Delhi, 1857

Death of
General
Barnard

On August 12th Brigadier-General Nicholson arrived before Delhi at the head of the movable column which Sir John Lawrence had organised to stamp out mutiny in the Panjab. Cholera and fever were then rife in the camp; 2,500 men were in hospital, 1,100 being Europeans, out of a total of 5,000 White men present on the Ridge. Three generals had succumbed. Both the senior Staff officers had been severely wounded; so had Major Baird Smith, the senior Engineer officer, and the General, who was entirely guided by him, was also ill. It was imperative that Delhi should be captured, but even Major Baird Smith and the dauntless Adjutant-General Chamberlain no longer advocated an immediate assault. John Nicholson insisted on vigorous action.

Arrival of
Nicholson

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Active Siege operations began on September 7th.

The Mortar batteries opened fire at sunset on the 10th; and on the 11th the breaching battery opened on the Kashmir bastion, and the curtain between it and the Water bastion. For three days the bombardment went on incessantly, the guns firing by day, the mortars shelling the breaches and parapets by night. On the 13th there were two practicable breaches in the walls.

The General detailed five columns for the assault. Of these, the first, under Nicholson, consisted of the 75th (Gordon Highlanders) Regiment, the 1st Bengal (Royal Munster) Fusiliers, and 2nd Panjabis (56th Panjab Rifles), and was to carry the breach of the Kashmir bastion.

The
Storming
Columns

The second, under Brigadier-General Jones, consisted of the 8th (King's Liverpool) Regiment, the 2nd Bengal (Royal Munster) Fusiliers, and the 4th Sikhs. This column was directed to enter the Water bastion breach.

The third column, commanded by Colonel Campbell, with 240 of his own men, 52nd (2nd Oxfordshire and Bucks Light

**Siege of
Delhi,
1857:
The
Storming
Columns**

Infantry), and 750 Native infantry, was directed to rush the Kashmir gate after it had been blown in.

The fourth column, under Major Reid, the defender of Hindu Rao's house, was to consist of the Guides and Gurkhas, a contingent of Kashmir troops, 1,200 strong, and any European pickets that might be available. It was directed to carry the suburb of Kishenganj, and, if possible, the Lahor gate.

The fifth column, under Brigadier-General Longfield, formed the Reserve. The entire force did not exceed 6,500 men, and was to attack 30,000 disciplined Sipahis, standing behind high walls.

About 3 A.M., September 14th, 1857, the first three columns and the Reserve moved down from the Ridge towards Ludlow Castle. The King's Royal Rifles, intended to act as a covering party, advanced in extended order in front of all. The whole force then lay down while the batteries reopened on the breaches, which had been partly repaired by the enemy during the night.

At 6 A.M. the Rifles sprang forward with a cheer.

Nicholson's column, headed by the ladder-party, immediately rushed towards the breach in the Kashmir bastion. But the mutineers maintained a heavy fire, and the carriers were so smitten on the counter-scarp of the ditch that some time elapsed before the ladders could be got down.

At length this was accomplished. Then the stormers slid down the slope, planted the ladders against the scarp below the breach, and began to ascend. The Sipahis fought desperately, but Nicholson's men were not to be denied; and the struggle for the mastery was furious.

Lieutenant Fitzgerald was the first to mount the ramparts. He was instantly shot dead. But others followed fast; and the British soldiers "fought with indescribable fierceness. The orders had enjoined no mercy was to be shown to mutineers in action, and every Briton had 'Kahn-pur' in his mind; moreover, in the hearts of some of the assailants there was a personal instinctive craving for vengeance, to be satisfied only in slaying or in being slain," for in the ranks of the Bengal Fusiliers were volunteers, men who had been employed in Departments in Delhi, and whose wives and children had been massacred during those awful days, May 11th-16th. These men, as they brained or

**Kashmir
Bastion**

Blowing Up of Kashmir Gate 491

bayoneted rebels, were heard to mutter, "That's for my wife!" or "That's for my children!" Nevertheless much chivalry was shown towards Non-combatants, and many Native women, we are told, "ran up to our men for protection."

Siege of
Delhi,
1857:
Kashmir
Gate

Meanwhile Campbell's men had reached the Kashmir gate. A wicket gate leading on to the drawbridge was found to be open. Through this went Lieutenant Home; and, accompanied by four sappers, each carrying a bag of powder, he scrambled over the shattered timbers of the bridge and placed the powder at the foot of the great double gates.

"Salkeld laid his bags, but was shot through the arm and leg, and fell back on to the bridge, handing the port-fire to Sergeant Burgess, bidding him light the fusee.

"Burgess was instantly shot dead in the attempt. Sergeant Carmichael then advanced, took up the port-fire, and succeeded. . . . In another moment a terrific explosion shattered the massive gate."

Ere the roar of the explosion had died away Home's orderly, Bugler Hawthorne, sounded the "Regimental call" and "Advance." The 52nd (Oxfordshire Light Infantry) immediately started forward and carried the gate.

The second column in its advance on the Water bastion breach suffered great losses, three-fourths of the ladder-party falling. Part of the column, however, got inside, but the majority of the men followed the track of Nicholson.

Water
Bastion

Nicholson's column had advanced along the Rampart road, which runs the whole circuit of the city within the walls. It rapidly seized the Mori bastion and the Kabul gate, and was pressing on towards the Lahor gate when it met with an unexpected check. The mutineers had three guns in action; two on the ramparts and one in the lane, the entrance to which was commanded by all three pieces. "Major Jacob, advancing at the head of his Fusiliers, was mortally wounded when approaching the defile. Although suffering terrible pain in his shattered thigh, he resolutely refused all aid, ordering his men, who wished to carry him to the rear, 'Let me lie; go on and capture the guns.'

Mori
Bastion and
Kabul Gate


"Captain (Lieutenant-Colonel) Southwell Greville. . . . assumed the command of the Fusiliers, some of whom were in the lane and some on the rampart immediately above

**Siege of
Delhi, 1857**

it. . . . Southwell Greville led his men forward under a heavy fire, but they captured the piece in the lane and that above it. 'Spike it!' he shouted; and after a momentary hesitation, Sergeant Jordan, Corporal Keefe, Privates Brackley and Murphy, under a shower of grape-shot from a gun a hundred yards back, did so by breaking the point of a ram-rod into the vent, and then threw down the rod to Captain Greville, who spiked the gun in the lane."

At about 12.30 P.M., while the troops were resting near the guns which they had captured, General Nicholson, who had been reconnoitring outside the walls, came up and decided on an immediate advance through the lane. By this time the roofs of houses opening on to the lane had been strongly occupied by the enemy, and a screened gun on the ramparts was still in action. Captain Seymour Blane,

Nicholson's Staff officer, suggested that the men should not try to break through the lane till they could outflank this gun. Nicholson dissented, and ordered the Fusiliers to advance. The men responded nobly, but presently recoiled under the showers of grape and musket-balls directed on them. Then Nicholson, "measuring all men by his own death-despising spirit," sprang forward into the lane, and called on the men to



PLAN OF THE SIEGE OF DELHI

follow him. It was Nicholson's last order. A moment later he fell mortally wounded, shot through the chest. He was only thirty-five years old when he died, and his death was an irreparable loss to his country, for he was a man of great achievements.

Major Reid's attempt to reach the Lahor gate by carrying the suburb in front of it ended in failure. The Major, who led gallantly, had escaped scot-free in twenty-five actions since his arrival before Delhi, fell severely wounded in this his twenty-sixth fight.

By nightfall on the 14th the British had made a lodgment in Delhi. Four-fifths of the city, however, was still in the enemy's hands; and to win what had been won had cost the British columns 66 officers and 1,104 men killed and wounded—about a quarter of the entire force engaged.

The position gained was speedily entrenched and preparations were made for pushing on next day. Unhappily, the troops found plentiful stores of liquor, and, demoralised by prolonged labour in a burning climate, they drank without stint; and not until the 17th was the army in a fit state to recommence serious work. By the 20th the British were in entire possession of the city, every large building and fortified post having been captured or abandoned.

CHAPTER III

FIRST AND SECOND RELIEFS OF LAKHNAO, JUNE, 1857— NOVEMBER, 1858

The Mutiny Spreads—The Siege of Lakhnao—The Wounding and Death of Sir Henry Lawrence—General Havelock's First Attempt to Relieve Lakhnao—Major-General Sir James Outram Supersedes Havelock—Lieutenant Havelock's Bravery—The Relief of Lakhnao—Sir Colin Campbell Reaches Calcutta—Wolseley at Lakhnao—The Relieved Garrison Marches to Kanhpur—Havelock's Death.

Spread of
the Mutiny :
First
Siege of
Lakhnao

THE flame of mutiny, once kindled, spread rapidly through India. Soon it flared up in Ondh; and in one month, by June 12th, 1857, the whole province was in arms. Lakhnao alone remained in the hands of the British.

Sir Henry Lawrence, the Chief Commissioner, had for years foreseen the possibilities of a Revolt; and, when he heard of the outbreak at Mirath, realising that he could not hope for immediate support from any quarter, had promptly taken steps to ensure the safety of the British inhabitants of the city. Under his vigilant eyes preparations for a siege were made with as much secrecy as possible.

The heat was almost insupportable. Cholera, small-pox, and fever were rife among the people in the Residency. But the energy of Sir Henry Lawrence never flagged.

All this time the courts sat; business was attended to in the usual way, and some semblance to order maintained, until June 28th, when news of the surrender of Kanhpur came through, and next day a patrol reported that the rebels were advancing on the city.

Sir Henry Lawrence decided to evacuate the cantonments, and, at 6 A.M. on June 30th, led out a reconnaissance $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles on the Chinhat road to meet the enemy. The British force consisted of 36 Mounted volunteers, 300 men of the 32nd (Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry) Regiment, an equal number of loyal Bengal Infantry, and 120 Native troopers, with 10 guns and a howitzer, four of the guns being manned by Europeans. The mutineers, who had

Sir Henry Lawrence Wounded 495

been erroneously reported to be merely an advance-guard, numbered fully 15,000 men with 12 guns.

First
Siege of
Lucknow,
1857

When more than half of his men had been killed, Sir Henry Lawrence ordered a retreat, and the troops fell back in some confusion, closely pursued by the mutineers, until the column reached the iron bridge over the river. Here Sir Henry Lawrence, hat in hand, rallied his broken troops. They had lost 311 men killed and wounded, 118 Europeans being among the slain, and four guns were left in the hands of the mutineers.

The position now occupied by the defenders was a piece of tableland 60 acres in extent—i.e. about the size of the Green Park in London—on the crown of which stood the Residency, and, speaking in general terms, on an irregular square, the sides being 400 yards long. The ground fell sharply towards the river, and along the northern face ran a low rampart, with a ditch in front, and a loop projected to the north-west in an angle formed by the Gumti river, and a canal running from it.

The
Residency

The garrison consisted of the 32nd (Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry) Regiment, 220 civilian Volunteers, 765 Natives, with 1,300 Non-combatants, including women and children.

The force of the assailants varied from day to day between 30,000 and 100,000.

The investment was closely maintained, but a loyal Sipahi, Umjur Tiwari, who evinced marvellous and persistent courage in the service of the British, passed out and returned on four occasions. Twice he was captured. Once he was tortured, but he never wavered, and received £500 for each of the journeys he completed.

The Europeans cooked their own rations, for there were but few servants in the lines; and food soon became scanty. Fortunately they had an abundance of guns, and an immense supply of ammunition.

On July 2nd, while Sir Henry Lawrence was resting in the Residency, a shell burst in his room, and completely shattered the lower part of his body. The wound was clearly fatal; but Sir Henry lingered for thirty-six hours and, despite the intense pain he suffered, gave to those who would succeed him detailed instructions regarding the conduct of the defence. Although the fire was heavy, Lawrence

**First
Siege of
Lucknow,
1857**

lay calm and unmoved. Then, feeling that death was near, he partook of the Holy Communion; and, having dictated his memorable epitaph, "Here lies Henry Lawrence, who tried to do his duty," he passed away at sunrise on July 4th, 1857.

Day after day passed with a grim and horrible monotony, alternated by determined assaults repulsed with heroic courage. Conspicuous among the many fighting private soldiers in the garrison was Bandsman Cuney, of the 32nd Regiment. "Cuney crept out of the enclosure many times, one night penetrating a battery, and spiking its guns. On his return he was made a prisoner 'for having quitted his post,' but was soon released. Wounded on several occasions, he often left his bed to take part in a fight, and was eventually killed in a sortie, after General Havelock's arrival."

**Havelock's
Relief
Column**

General Havelock's column, after much stubborn fighting, reached the cantonment of Kahnpur on the evening of July 16th. Next day the troops visited the entrenchment which Sir Hugh Wheeler had so gallantly defended, and saw the house where the fresh blood of two hundred slaughtered women and children lay in wide pools on the floor, and that awful well from which still protruded the remains of countless mangled bodies.

A few days later Brigadier-General Neill arrived with a small reinforcement, and on July 29th Havelock, leaving Neill with 300 men at Kahnpur, moved forward to the relief of Lucknow with 1,500 men and 10 guns. After a march of three miles he found the enemy strongly posted three-quarters of a mile to the west of the town of Unao. A deep swamp covered their Right. The town protected their Left. In front was a village, and a garden which had been carefully entrenched. Unable to turn the position on either flank, the General assailed it in front.

The skirmishers of the 78th (2nd Seaforth) Highlanders and Madras (Royal Dublin) Fusiliers soon drove the rebels from the garden, but were checked by the fire from the village, the enemy being well posted behind a wall.

The 64th (1st North Staffordshire) Regiment then came up, but no effective advance was made until Private Cavenagh ran forward and jumped the wall, landing in the midst of a dozen dismounted troopers, two of whom he slew

Carrying the Alambagh

497

before he himself was literally cut to pieces. His comrades then followed, and after a desperate struggle the village was cleared. After a rest of two hours the British column resumed its advance, and moved forward seven miles to Bashiratganj, a walled town, through which runs the road to Lakhnao. Here the enemy had rallied in force, but after a stern fight they were driven from the town.

Further Havelock was unable to advance. He had lost nearly 100 men on the 29th. A third of his ammunition was expended. Cholera was prevalent in his camp. Reluctantly, therefore, he retired.

The enemy were now gathering in force at Bithur, and on August 16th Havelock, to anticipate an attack, sallied forth to meet them. After a trying march a stubbornly contested action ensued. Then Havelock, having gained his ninth consecutive victory within three weeks, returned to camp, where he learnt that he had been superseded by Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., who reached Kahnpur September 15th.

Havelock and Outram were old friends, and on his arrival Outram issued an order to the effect that he considered "the strenuous and noble exertions Havelock had already made to save the Lakhnao garrison entitled him to the honour of relieving it, and that he, Outram, had decided to accompany the troops as Chief Commissioner of Oudh, serving also as a private in the Volunteers, until the Residency was occupied."

On September 23rd, the rebels were found in position at the Alambagh—a large park, devised as a pleasure ground for a favourite wife of a former King of Oudh. They had brought up 10,000 men, including 1,500 horse from Lakhnao, and had with them many guns. Their Front and Right was partly covered by a deep morass; the Centre stood across the road, the Left was in the Alambagh.

Havelock immediately moved forward to the attack. After some delay, caused by the difficulties of crossing swampy ground, the 2nd Brigade turned the enemy's Right. Meanwhile, the Centre having been heavily shelled by the artillery, Neill attacked it in front and drove back the rebels in disorder.

The Alambagh, which until then had been firmly held, was stormed and carried by the 5th (Northumberland)

First
Relief of
Lakhnao,
1857

Outram in
Command

First
Relief of
Lakhnao,
1857

Fusiliers and 78th (2nd Seaforth) Highlanders. The baggage was stored within the walls.

Havelock was now in actual contact with the assailants of the garrison in Lakhnao. The task of breaking into Lakhnao, through its tortuous lanes and massive buildings, was arduous. The General, after considering carefully all possible lines of attack, decided to carry the Charbagh bridge, and then, wheeling to the right, to fight his way into the Residency through the palaces and large houses lying to the east of the enclosure.

The troops paraded early on the morning of September 25th, and between eight and nine o'clock the 5th (Northumberland) Fusiliers led, followed by Major Maude's battery. The enemy, to defend the bridge, had a battery of six guns in position and had occupied the neighbouring houses with infantry. Meeting a storm of shot at a turn in the road, the British troops were ordered to lie down until the guns could come into action. The narrowness of the road made it impossible for more than two to be unlimbered, and with these Maude had to contend against the enemy's six.

For a long while the unequal fight continued. Gunners fell rapidly. Infantry soldiers replaced them; still no impression could be made on the enemy. Lieutenant Havelock urged General Neill to rush the bridge. Neill declined to advance without orders. Havelock then rode away; but, having rounded a bend in the road, waited a minute and then came back at a gallop. Pulling up his horse on its haunches, he saluted Neill and said, as though bringing an order from his father: "You are to carry the bridge at once, sir!"

Immediately the order was given, Lieutenant Arnold and a few of the Madras (Royal Dublin) Fusiliers charged forward on to the bridge, accompanied by Colonel Tytler and Lieutenant Havelock. The first blast of the enemy's guns swept down all the officers, Havelock excepted, and he, with Corporal Jacques, were the only two effectives on the bridge, but Havelock, waving his sword, called on the Fusiliers to follow him. The men responded nobly, and, dashing forward, carried the bridge, bayoneting the gunners before they had time to reload.

Daylight was now failing, and Sir James Outram suggested halting for the night. Havelock, however, was eager

First
Relief of
Lakhnao,
1857

to complete the work that day. So Outram, having voluntarily subordinated himself, assented, and undertook to show the road. Havelock then ordered an advance, and the Highlanders and Sikhs, who were now leading the column, dashed out through an archway into the main street that led to the Bailey Guard. While regulating the passage of the troops through the archway, General Neill was killed by a shot fired by a Sipahi on the roof.

The distance from the archway to the Bailey Guard was only a quarter of a mile. But every inch of the way was under fire, and, to add to the soldiers' difficulties, the road had been cut by deep trenches. Neither musketry nor trenches, however, could check the Highlanders. With Generals Havelock and Outram riding at their head, they struggled resolutely onward, until finally they burst through the Bailey Guard and joined hands with the gallant Lakhnao garrison.

The remainder of the column, guided by Lieutenant Moorsom, 52nd (2nd Oxfordshire) Light Infantry—a brave and accomplished young officer—passed along a parallel and comparatively sheltered street, and arrived outside the gate only a few minutes later than the Highlanders.

Hearing the shouts of the approaching troops, Lieutenant Aitken sallied out to meet them with a party of loyal 13th Bengal Infantry. In their excitement the Highlanders mistook Aitken's men for the enemy, and unfortunately bayoneted three of them before they discovered their mistake. One of them, when bleeding to death, said to his comrades: "It's of no consequence; I die for the Government."

The scene of excitement and rejoicing in the British entrenchment that night is indescribable. The garrison had for eighty days lived under the shadow of death, cut off entirely from the outer world; and reduced by fever, anxiety, and want, had almost despaired of being relieved.

Sir James Outram, who now assumed command, having divided his forces into two parts, left Colonel Inglis in command of the lines he had so long defended, and directed Havelock to establish himself and the remaining troops in the palaces and houses on the road by which they had entered.

These arrangements were carried out in three days. And


**Second
Siege of
Lucknow,
1857-58**

the troops, in comparative safety, but poorly fed, and cut off from the rest of India, waited six weeks, until Sir Colin Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief, arrived, and removed the garrison and families.


When the news reached London that General Anson had died on the road to Delhi, Sir Colin Campbell was offered the command: embarking at once, he arrived at Calcutta on August 13th, two and a half months after the death of General Anson. Campbell was the son of a working carpenter in Glasgow, and his career covered the whole military history of Great Britain from Corunna to the Crimea. He was an experienced, hard-fighting, though cautious soldier, and was the right man to deal with the grave crisis which had arisen in India.

As soon as General Outram learned of Campbell's approach he arranged a code of signals, which he sent, together with plans of the city and its approaches, to the Alambagh, where Havelock had left a small garrison.

At 9 A.M., November 14th, Sir Colin Campbell advanced, and, passing to the rear of the Alambagh, directed the troops against the Dilkusha palace and park.



SKETCH PLANS SHOWING
POSITIONS OF LAKHNAO
AND THE RESIDENCY



PLAN OF THE SIEGE OF LAKHNAO, 1857

The Dilkusha fell without resistance, and a little later, after a short struggle, the Martinière, a large school-house for Eurasians, was also occupied. The British were now in position from the canal to the wall of the Dilkusha park; and, arrangements having been made next day for the safety of the baggage and the line of communications, Campbell, on the 16th, attacked the enemy's position in the Sikandarbagh and adjacent buildings. They formed a formidable obstacle, the Sikandarbagh, or Garden of Alexander, being surrounded by a high wall, loopholed on all sides. It was breached and carried by the 93rd (2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders), the 53rd (1st Shropshire Light Infantry) Regiment and 4th Panjabis.

Beyond the Sikandarbagh stood the Shah Najaf, a mausoleum. This, too, was strongly held, and the troops were unable to find an opening in the enclosure. The General, therefore, called up the Naval Battery under Captain Peel. For three hours the heavy Naval guns pounded at the massive walls, at 50 yards distance, but could make no impression on them; and Campbell, after

**Second
Siege of
Lakhnao,
1857-58**

**Second
Relief of
Lucknow,
1858**

personally leading an assault up to the walls, at last admitted failure and retired. This terminated the operations of the day.

While these combats were being waged outside the British entrenchment the troops under Outram had cleared part of the road between them and the Relieving force by a sortie; and, by engaging the enemy posted in the Kaiserbagh and other buildings, they materially assisted Campbell during his advance into the city.

The mess-house of the 32nd (1st Cornwall Light Infantry) and the buildings standing to the west of the Moti Mahal were the only direct obstacles now intervening between the garrison and the relieving force.

Campbell, about midday, November 17th, sent for Captain Wolseley, a distinguished young officer who, thirty-eight years later became Commander-in-Chief, and told him to lead forward two companies, 90th Light Infantry (2nd Scottish Rifles), and storm the place.

Wolseley's men, having scrambled over the wall, found the mess-house unoccupied. The gardens, however, were full of Sipahis, so Wolseley sent Captain Irby to seize the Observatory, which lay to the south-west; then, crossing the garden wall, led his men up the Residency road, and boldly made for the main gate of the Moti Mahal. This was strongly held, but after a long struggle the troops broke in, and suddenly there was a loud explosion at the western side of the courtyard. As the smoke and dust cleared off, Captain Tilling, 90th Light Infantry, appeared at the head of his company, and greeted Wolseley. Tilling's company had gone into Lucknow with Havelock, and the battalion thus became dramatically reunited, owing to the coincidence that two of its companies led the Relieving column, while another company headed a sortie of the beleaguered garrison.

Between the Chatar Manzil, and the Moti Mahal there still remained an open space of 400 yards, swept by the enemy's fire from the Badshabagh, and the Kaiserbagh. Generals Outram and Havelock, however, crossed this space unscathed, and met Sir Colin Campbell on the slope outside the Mess-house. Lucknow had been relieved, at a cost of 45 officers and 496 men.

The General's first care now was to withdraw the garri-

Death of General Havelock

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son and treasure. To carry off in safety, through a hostile force many times more numerous than his own, 600 women and children, and more than 1,000 sick and wounded men, was a difficult undertaking. Sir Colin, however, accomplished it without a casualty or loss of a gun.

Second
Relief of
Lucknow,
1858

The force, after halting one night in the Dilkusha park, with its train, reached the Alambagh without molestation, for the enemy were not aware that it had left the Residency until three hours after its departure. On November 27th Sir Colin, leaving 3,000 men and 18 guns under Sir James Outram at the Alambagh, marched with the rest of the troops to escort a train, 10 miles long, to Kahnpur.

But before the Commander-in-Chief marched away the Nation suffered a heavy loss. General Havelock, whose determined efforts to reach Lucknow had made him the pride of the Empire, passed away. On November 20th the General was seized by cholera. He was tended by his son, and declared he should die happy and contented. "I have for forty years ruled my life," he said to Outram, "that when death came I might face it without fear." He spent a restless night, and on the morning of the 24th passed quietly away.

CHAPTER IV

THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF JHANSI, MARCH-APRIL, 1858

Sir Hugh Rose Invests Jhansi—The Rani Slaughters the Surrendered Garrison—The Bravery of the Storming Party—Lieutenant Dartnell's Exploit—The Situation in India Prior to the Mutiny of the Native Army.

Investment of Jhansi

HUGH ROSE entered the Army, 1820. He commanded the Puna division at the outbreak of the Mutiny in 1857, and proceeding to Central India in January, 1858, led a small force triumphantly from the Western Ghats across Central India, to the banks of the Jumna.

Rose arrived before Jhansi, March 20th, 1858, and invested the city. Tantia Topi, with 21,000 men, attempted to raise the siege, but Rose defeated him by a daring attack, April 1st, made by 500 Europeans and 1,000 loyal natives.

Jhansi, formerly a Dependency of the Peshwar, with a population of 250,000, and area of 3,000 square miles in Bundelkhan, had been annexed by Lord Dalhousie in 1854 on the death of the last hereditary Rajah. The walled-in town was surrounded by a stone fort with a round tower as a keep. It was solidly built on a high rock of granite with three lines of defence.

Massacre of Christians

The Rani, the Rajah's widow, having failed to capture the Fort, undertook to escort all the Christians to the nearest British station: having got them into her power she had all of them butchered; assumed the government, fortified the towns, and six months later died in a personal combat with a British Hussar in an action she fought against Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn), June 17th, five miles from Gwalior.

The Assault

The bombardment having demolished a large portion of wall, the rebels entrenched the opening with a double row of palisades. These were destroyed by red-hot shot, and a practicable breach was reported on April 2nd. At daylight, April 3rd, a false attack was delivered on the western wall of the city. When the noise of the firing was heard, a storm-

ing party of the 3rd Europeans moved forward. At two hundred yards from the gateway a hail of missiles of all descriptions smote the column. Nevertheless, the Madras Native Sappers, carrying the ladders, went on, and planted them in three places.

Stage of
Jhansi, 1858

The intensity of the defenders' fire now increased, and from the lofty walls there came cannon-balls, bullets, stink-pots, infernal machines, boulders of stones, and trunks of trees. The stormers, wavering, sheltered under cover. Nevertheless, the Native sappers, animated by their heroic officers, held the ladders in position.

Another company of the 3rd European (2nd Leinster) Regiment now advanced, and running up the ladders, tried to cross the wall. Some of the ladders were too short, and three broke under the weight. Lieutenant Dick, Bombay Engineers, was the first man up, and cheered on the 3rd Europeans. Some of them responded. A private soldier, as he bent forward on quitting the upper rung of a ladder, was seized by a rebel waiting on the summit of the wall, who held the man's head and, with a slicing blow, severed his neck, and the men who were following had to press closely against the ladder to avoid being swept down by the falling body as it dropped to the ground. Nevertheless, the next man went on, but the rebels were reinforced, and the supporting of the gallant men on the wall was necessarily slow. Lieutenant Micklejohn, Bombay Engineers, who had ascended by another ladder, dropping down into a crowd of the enemy, was later literally cut to pieces. Lieutenant Bonus, Bombay Engineers, was knocked off a ladder, being struck in the face by a log of wood, at the moment when Lieutenant Dick fell to the ground a dying man. Lieutenant Fox, Madras Engineers, who slew in personal combat eight of the enemy in the pursuit across the Betwa, when Tantia Topi, April 1st, was defeated, was shot through the neck. Although the stormers were now ascending by eight ladders, the moment was critical, for the garrison fought desperately, but a gallant charge was at this time executed by Captain Brockman, 86th (2nd Royal Irish Rifles), made on the flank and Rear of the enemy, and it decided the struggle.

When the order to assault was given, Lieutenant Dartnell, of the Light Company, 86th Regiment, ran ahead and

Assault of
Jhansi, 1858

ascended the only available ladder, for the enemy had overturned or smashed the others. The top of the wall was 30 feet high, and the upper rung, which had been damaged, gave way under Dartnell's weight. He sprang at the battlement, clutched it, and obtained a footing on the wall. He was followed by three other officers, but never looking back he dropped from the top of the wall into the midst of a crowd of astonished Bundelas, who were so close around him that they were unable to hit him without injuring each other. He fought hard for his life, but before his friends could reach him, he was flung to the ground wounded in five places. One Bundela sliced seven inches into his upper arm, another slashed his forearm, and a third nearly severed his wrist. Then a man fired against his waist, but the bullet striking the centre plate of the belt, was deflected and grazed the abdomen. While a fifth antagonist was striking his right arm, Lieutenant Fowler and other officers joined in the fray and saved his life.

The Bundelas fought with desperation. A remainder of the Rani fired a gunpowder train hoping to kill herself and his wife. They were only scorched, so falling on her with his sword he tried to kill her, and then took his own life. No one of the garrison asked for quarter, and practically none got it, a thousand bodies being burnt or buried in the street. Sir Hugh Rose's casualties were 36 officers and 307 other ranks.

Rose's
Later
Successes

We have not space to narrate the later successes of this indomitable soldier. His operations were carried on throughout the hottest weather without intermission. He was several times prostrated by sunstroke, being incapacitated twice in the month of May. His soldiers struggled on under burning sun until they dropped, in many cases never to rise again, in order to win a commendatory word from this incomparable fighting chief, who never spared himself or them during a fight, but who, when the battle was over, never failed to visit the sick and wounded and to ensure that the soldiers' food was sufficient and well cooked, ere he himself sat down to a meal.

Sir Hugh Rose personally conducted every reconnaissance during a march of a thousand miles in the hottest period of an abnormally hot weather season. He planned every battle; he generally led the culminating attack which

Summary of the Mutiny

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decided the victory, and was ever foremost in the pursuit, during a five months' campaign, in which he captured innumerable forts and a hundred cannon.

Sir Hugh
Rosa

No man of his force ever left the ranks for plunder; many died in trying to keep up during their long marches. His soldiers were terrible to their foes, but were seen, even in the excitement of a fight, to stop in order to place native children in safety.

1857.—Prior to the Mutiny of the Sipahis, which was followed by the Revolt of the people in the north of Hindustan, the apparent Political outlook was peaceful.

Summary
of the
Mutiny,
1857-58

The British Government in India was not only pure in intention but also beneficial to the Native race, but the very character of the Briton, with his strong desire to ameliorate the lot of the peasants and to govern, on the system prevailing in the British Isles, millions of Asiatics as numerous as the people of Europe and of as many different religions, was the main cause of the Revolt, which became possible only when the Bengal army mutinied.

The Natives had many administrative and social grievances. Twenty-five years earlier the first systematic land taxation was initiated, and its drastic effects were becoming apparent about the time of the Crimea War, 1854-5, the long duration of which affected the British military prestige.

The Brahmans, the most highly educated and influential class of Hindus, who had previously ruled the social life of Hindus, were seriously alarmed. They had exacted fees for marriages, births, and deaths. Education, Law, and Religion, and nearly every kind of business, had been in their hands. Recently European education, railways, telegraphs, and, worst of all, a Court of Appeal from their decisions, were breaking down their privileges and their power. They spread reports universally that the Government intended to abolish Caste, as a preliminary step to the forcible conversion of all Natives to the Christian religion.

The Native army was in an unsatisfactory condition; a vast number of the younger and more efficient British officers had been removed to assist in governing the territories which had been annexed by Lord Dalhousie, the previous Governor-General. The senior officers serving with regiments were for the most part too old and worn out for

**Summary
of the
Mutiny,
1857-58**

their duties. The Sipahis were conscious of their numerical superiority, for they outnumbered their White comrades in the ratio of six to one, and on the ostensible grievance of polluted cartridges were readily induced by astute Hindus to mutiny and to murder their European officers.

We have given many cogent reasons for the Revolt; but they may be summarised as the result of our attempted reforms in a thoroughly conservative race. In nearly every instance we put the aristocracy, and the peasants whom we were trying to help, in a state of hostility against the British rule. On the other hand, in the so-called Non-Regulation provinces, the personal influence of British officers bore fruits amongst the highest and lowest classes in Hindustan. Of this we give one of many instances. The Government, some years before the Mutiny, had removed the Rajah of Dilheri, the head of an aboriginal race of one and a half millions, as incapable of managing his district; the Revenue officer, Captain Turner, protested against this decree, and tried, though unsuccessfully, to soften the wording of the decision. The old Chief, on receiving it, took out of his waistcloth a gold medal he had received for his services during an outbreak in 1843. Both he and his son died before the Revolt. When it broke out Captain Turner was authorised to leave his station, but he stayed on until, one morning early in June, his house was surrounded by the clan, the chief of which said to Turner:

"When the Government confiscated my grandfather's title and our estate you befriended us, and we know that your conduct in doing so was not approved. Now we will defend you. Give us your orders." The clan remained loyal, and induced others to support the Government.

By April 1st, 1859, the mutineers were practically suppressed. In Oudh alone 700 cannon and 186,000 firearms, with over a million other weapons, were surrendered. The struggle for supremacy had been long and costly, but it had evoked the best characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon race.

The Governor-General became the Queen's Viceroy on the abolition of the East India Company. The loyal princes were rewarded, and, being able now to perpetuate their dynasties, if needful, by the adoption of an heir, are loyal and content, realising that the British Government is necessary to maintain peace in Hindustan.

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PART XV

ASHANTI, 1873-74

Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley Reaches the Gold Coast—Ashantis Across the Prah—Elmina—Colonel Wood's Attack—The Fighting at Amoaful—Sir Garnet Wolseley in Kumassi.

ON October 2nd, 1873, Major-General Sir Garnet Wolseley, K.C.M.G., and the 34 officers who had volunteered for service in Africa, arrived on the Gold Coast, after an uncomfortable passage in a steamship, dirty, and insufficiently provisioned.

Sir Garnet
Wolseley in
Africa

Sir Garnet, born 1833, and for 20 years known in popular language as "our only General," when appointed to command the expedition selected 34 Special Service officers, of whom nine lived to become generals.

From 1807 to 1827 the country adjacent to our ports and trading stations on the Gold Coast was overrun continually by Ashanti armies whenever the King of Kumassi ran short of slaves. Governor Sir Charles Macarthy was defeated January 21st, 1824, being abandoned by the Wassaws, the Ashantis killing them and his White companions.

Political
Situation,
1807-73

In 1843, it having been ascertained that the Local European authorities favoured the slave trade, the Crown reassumed the charge of our stations on the Gold Coast.

Two miles to the westward of the Sweet river is Elmina, inhabited by a small tribe, which peoples also the surrounding villages, far superior to the Fantis in courage and discipline.

The Dutch, disgusted with the trouble arising from their new subjects, especially at Commendah, and Dix Cove, transferred all their possessions to us. In 1869 Adoo Buffoo, an Ashanti general, carried off from Kreepee, east of the Volta, to Kumassi, four Europeans and one British subject, Mr. Palmer, of Accra. For these persons the King of Ashanti, Coffee Calcalli, demanded a ransom of £6,000.

**Ashanti,
1873-74**

Although it was known early in November, 1872, at Cape Coast Castle that the Ashanti army was assembling, the Government took no measures to guard against invasion.

In January, 1873, the Ashantis crossed the Prah into our territory, killing the men, carrying off the women and children, and burning the Fanti villages.

Sir Garnet Wolseley, having arrived, decided to raise two Native corps, known as Russell's and Wood's Regiments, and some Haussa gunners, who were named Rait's Artillery.

**Wolseley at
Elmina**

At 4 A.M. on October 14th, Sir Garnet Wolseley and his Staff landed at Elmina; and at 5 A.M. 180 White men and 330 Black soldiers (West India Regiments) marched from Elmina on Essaman under command of Colonel Evelyn Wood, who with 5 officers had landed there on October 2nd.

For an hour the path followed lay across a marshy plain, often covered with water; once the column had to wade knee-deep for 100 yards. After destroying some villages, at 12 noon the Head-quarters Staff and the main body halted, the day being intensely hot. Colonel Wood with 30 Europeans and 250 Natives went on some miles farther, and after a skirmish destroyed more villages. The British casualties were slight; the entire distance marched was over 22 miles.

It was our first successful fight in African bush. Not only was the experience valuable, but because, great as was the effect on the Ashantis, the moral effect on the coast was greater.

The Elminas, a brave race, were won over that day. Early in September it had been reported officially, "not a man in Elmina has taken up a gun against the enemy." On October 14th two chiefs, Esseive and Andoo, guided the troops, and never left Colonel Wood till, Kumassi being taken, he returned to England. Esseive was a remarkable man about forty-two years of age. He had a great number of children, and brought with him, to join Wood's Regiment, 22 over 5ft. 10in. in height and twenty years of age, whom he cuffed and kicked impartially when they did not advance to the Colonel's satisfaction.

From this time the operations were carried on in dense forests of gigantic trees, often 200 feet high, laced together

Forest Fighting

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with creepers supporting foliage so thick as to shut out the sun. There were few flowers inland, but, except around villages, the undergrowth was not so thick as near the coast. It was, however, close to villages that most of the fighting occurred, where the system of African cultivation afforded good cover to our enemies. Clearing the ground by fire, they sow in the ashes, and when the soil is exhausted they abandon the spot for another clearing. On these deserted fields there rises lofty vegetation, impenetrable save to naked savages, who crawl through it on their faces.

Ashanti,
1873-74

During the last week in October there were some skirmishes, and the Ashantis made a feeble attack on Abrahakampa on November 5th, defended by Major Baker Russell.

Abrahakampa,
Sutah, and
the March
to Faisowah

Colonel Wood occupied Sutah on November 26th, the Ashantis having quitted the village on November 25th. Next morning 300 men, 100 being Haussas, 23 2nd West India Regiment, and the remainder Wood's Regiment, left Sutah for Faisowah, where, as it was believed, stragglers only would be found. It happened that Amanquatsia's Rear-guard of 4,000 men had been reinforced on the 25th by 5,000 troops from Kumassi, who had been sent down with orders to retake the offensive.

After an engagement the Fanti company of Wood's Regiment arriving as a Reinforcement, became panic-stricken without coming under fire. Throwing down their loads, they fled, and this so unsteadied the greater part of the Kossos company and Haussas that they hurried along eleven in a row, overlapping the path, which, as the troops advanced, was broad enough for one man only. The Elmina company only, composed of Ashantis under Lieutenant Richmond, kept its ranks, allowing others to rush by it in headlong flight.

Lieutenants Gordon (98th), Woodgate (4th Regiment), and Pollard, Royal Navy, held some men together, and kept back the Ashantis, who pursued the little force for three miles, where it stood at sundown. The difficulties of this march were much increased by the path being in many places knee-deep in water, which extended in one part over 900 yards. That night the Ashantis, fearing that a large force was pressing on them, retired by torchlight, and on November 29th began to cross the Prah. In the words of an official document, penned by the Major-

**Ashanti,
1873-74**

General when the results were well known: "Colonel Wood's attack caused the whole of the Ashanti army to retreat in the utmost haste and confusion, leaving their dead and dying everywhere along the path."

• • • • •

**Prahsu,
1874**

Road-making and bush-cutting now were carried on vigorously, and on December 16th Wood's Regiment began the clearing at Prahsu, 74 miles from the Coast, being joined a week later by Russell's Regiment.

Sir Garnet Wolseley and his Staff arrived at Prahsu on January 2nd, 1874, and about this time learnt that Aman-quatsia's army had been disbanded at Kumassi on December 22nd.

**March to
Amoaful**

On January 1st, 1874, the disembarkation of the Europeans was commenced. Half a battalion was to move forward each day, the first being due at Prahsu in eight days; but on the fifth day, hundreds of the carriers deserting, not only near the Coast, but along the line, it seemed that our advance must come to an end.

The British soldiers, White and Black, were behaving very differently. The West India and Wood's Regiments became carriers, marching 16 miles a day, carrying a load half the distance. The White soldiers evinced a noble spirit. One regiment did actually carry loads for a day or two till the General, hearing of it, though fully appreciating such efforts, forbade the exertions, which in such a climate would have destroyed our fighting power in a week.

The Royal Engineers had constructed in each encampment huts for the officers and men, all provided with comfortable beds, filtered water, pumps, washing places, latrines, cooking places, sentry-boxes, commissariat stores, hospital, and surgery. Major Home and his officers had made a smooth road, varying from 8 to 12 feet wide; had put up 237 bridges; had laid down corduroy over innumerable swamps, some of which required three tiers of fascines, and one bit alone, between Sutare and Faisowah, stretched 800 yards. No officers ever worked harder, or with more unsatisfactory labourers.

Amoaful

On the evening of January 30th the Ashanti army was drawn up south of Amoaful, with its main body on a swampy stream which crosses the main path, 600 yards

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SIR GARNET (later Lord) WOLSELEY

Action at Amoaful

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north of Egginassie. The Black brigade, consisting of Ashanti, Russell's, Rait's, and Wood's Regiments, was at Quar- 1873-74: Amoaful man, 1,000 yards south of Egginassie, and the White men were in and about Insanfoo.

The study of previous actions, and the experience gained in the minor actions of the previous four months, showed plainly that the Ashanti tactics are ever the same. The centre is refused, while sweeping turning movements are made on the flanks. There is for naked and hardy warriors in thick forests little of the danger which in Europe would be incurred by such tactics; for unclothed, without baggage, they can always retreat on their hands and knees through the tangled underwood and re-form, almost unmolested by Europeans.

The troops were divided into four commands.

The Front Column

Two 7-pounder guns, } Brigadier-General Sir A. Alison,
The 42nd Highlanders, } Bart., C.B.

Right Column

100 men Naval Brigade, } Lieut.-Colonel Evelyn Wood,
Wood's Regiment, } V.C.
Two rocket detachments, }

Left Column

100 men of the Naval Brigade, }
Russell's Regiment, } Colonel McLeod, C.B.
Two rocket detachments, }

Reserve

One company 23rd Regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Mostyn.

Rear Column

2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, Lieut.-Colonel Warren.

The Front column, on meeting the enemy, was to extend, if possible, 300 yards on either side of the path, on which the guns were to move. The Flank columns were to cut paths diagonally outwards, and then to advance parallel with the main path, keeping up the connection with the 42nd if feasible. The Rear column was to maintain the Line

Ashanti,
1873-74,
Amaofo

of Communications, guard the ammunition and wounded and reinforce any point if necessary.

The Front Column only carried out its task. The Right Column had cut its way only 300 yards through dense bush when Colonel Wood was shot in the chest at the head of his column, and no further progress was made until 1.30 P.M. when the enemy was driven off. The casualties were practically all in the 42nd, and in the Native Regiments. A European officer counted 163 bodies buried in one trench on the plateau of Amaofo, but considerable surprise was felt that more bodies were not seen in the bush, till next morning an officer moving out to the flank, came on several rows of dead men laid out in a dell, whose bodies had evidently been carried out of the fight for burial.

That night head-quarters were at Amaofo.

March to
Kumasi

Arrived at Agemum the British position was one of great difficulty. The troops had but four days' rations, and Kumasi was known to be still 16 miles distant; there was a large river in front, and it was quite certain that the Ashantis would make another effort to defend the capital. Most generals would have hesitated in such a conjuncture, but with a happy audacity Sir Garnet Wolseley pressed on, and the result proved the wisdom of his decision.

The troops accepted joyfully four days' food for six days, and carrying nothing but ammunition, they bivouacked on the evening of February 3rd on the Ordah, the Black brigade crossing to protect the Engineers, who during the night made a good firm bridge.

The native regiments were composed of four or five different races, no company understanding the language of that working near to it, and no men speaking the language of their officers, who were in the proportion of one to every 40 men.

Russell's and Wood's Regiments had taken all the Light infantry duties, but the latter especially were never drilled for want of time. Wood's Regiment marched incessantly from its formation till it was disbanded, leading the advance for 75 miles, that is, up to the Pra river. After being at the head of the road for six weeks, the day it was relieved to teach the men how to fire off their rifles, the whole regiment instead of being drilled became carriers. Thus the Bonny company of Wood's Regiment, which led

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
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


SKETCH MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE ASHANTI CAMPAIGN



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART

(ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2)



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Rochester, New York 14609 USA
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Ashanti,
1873-74:
Advance to
Kumassi

the advance at Ordahsu, had never realised the advantage to be gained by placing a rifle in the shoulder before charging it.

Colonel Wood had been carried back wounded to hospital two marches south of Amoaful on January 31st. He left bed at 10 A.M. February 3rd, and, marching that day throughout the night with the Bonny company of Wood's Regiment, overtook Head-quarters at 4 A.M. and led the advance. He was followed by two companies of the Rifle Brigade and a 7-pounder gun.

Wood's men were scarcely in motion when the Ashanti pickets fired, and in ten minutes the advance company was hotly engaged. Though the Ashantis never pressed close as at Amoaful, some brave savages were ambushed close to the path, a few being killed within four yards of us whose presence we never detected till they fired, so easily were their dusky bodies concealed.

About 9 o'clock the village of Ordahsu was carried by the Rifle Brigade with but little resistance. About noon Colonel McLeod, relinquishing the command of the Black brigade, rejoined the Black Watch, which was ordered to press forward to Kumassi, disregarding flank attacks. At first, while the opposition was considerable, the skirmishing companies passed through each other, gaining 50 yards at a time. When the village whence the King had issued his orders was carried all resistance ceased, and the 42nd pressed on to the capital.

The whole force moved on, and at 6 o'clock Sir Garnet Wolseley, taking off his helmet in the market-place at Kumassi, called on the Black Watch, formed in dress ranks on parade, to give three cheers for Her Majesty.

I now quote some sentences from a lecture I gave in June, 1874, in the United Service Institution, the Secretary of State for War being in the chair.

"In conclusion, I would briefly recall the first general aspect of the campaign as contrasted with its results.

"The failures of the past threw a deeper shadow on the untrodden gloom of the forest. There were no moments of achieved victory to encourage the successors of Macarthy. Our small army had to hew its way through density deep as death, and redolent of its decay, to the charnel-house called Kumassi. Malaria fought in the

of the Ashantis, and the sickening feeling of debility, which must be felt to be understood, made a formidable and sympathetic alliance with a covert and subtle enemy. Ashanti, 1873-74

"We should not forget the cloud of evil auguries under which the expedition sailed. Success was deemed impossible; the officers who were insured had to pay premiums of 43 per centum. The Secretary of State for War declined to allow my soldier servant to accompany me, as the climate at that season was too bad to risk a private's life.

"The success was due to the courage of the troops and in part to the directing power of the master workman, of whom may be said, as was said by Scott of Napoleon, 'He was a Sovereign among soldiers.' It is true of Sir Garnet Wolseley as was written of Pitt: 'Few men made fewer mistakes, nor left so few advantages unimproved.' To all his other great qualities he joined that fire, that spirit, that courage, which, giving vigour and direction to his soldiers, bore down all resistance."

PART XVI

THE ZULU WAR, 1879

CHAPTER I

THE CAUSE AND FIRST OPERATIONS

Commission Appointed to Report on the Border Question—Great Britain Declares War on Cetywayo—The Zulu Army—Colonel Wood Asked to Raise Volunteers—Pretorius Sees Colonel Wood—The Advance into Zululand—Luneberg—Colonel Wood's Espionage System—The Boers Refuse to Help.

Frontier
Disputes,
1878

IN 1877 Great Britain, by annexing the Transvaal, morally accepted the onus of the frontier disputes which had long existed between the Boers and the Zulus. These disputes had become so serious since the accession to power of King Cetywayo, that in February, 1878, a Commission was appointed to report on the Border question.

The Commission made its report in July, which was almost entirely in favour of the contentions of the Zulus, but Sir Bartle Frere, who in the meanwhile had become High Commissioner, deemed the decision to be unfair to the Boers. If the land in dispute were handed over to the Zulus, the Boers, he maintained, should be given compensation.

Moreover, being convinced that peace could not be preserved in South Africa till the power of Cetywayo had been curtailed, Sir Bartle, when making his award, insisted that the Zulu military system should be remodelled; that Cetywayo should undertake to allow missionaries to work unmolested, and accept a British Resident in his dominions, and should agree not to mobilise his troops without the consent of the Council of the nation and on the British Government.

These demands were formulated on December 11th, Cetywayo being required to give a definite reply to them before the end of the month. Cetywayo returned no answer.

The Zulu Army

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Therefore, at the beginning of 1879, Great Britain went to war with him. **War Declared, 1879**

Ever since the days of Chaka, who reigned from 1810 to 1828, the Zulus had been essentially a warlike people; and their military power, although it declined somewhat after Chaka's death, had been raised by Cetywayo to an even higher standard.

Chaka's great innovation had been the introduction of the stabbing assegai, a weapon shorter in the shaft than the old light assegai, and fitted with a longer, heavier blade, so that it could be used as a bayonet—in other words, he favoured "shock tactics." Cetywayo, while continuing the use of this weapon, succeeded also in equipping many of his regiments with some firearms, and enforced the strictest discipline throughout the army, preserving intact the elaborate military system of his predecessor. **The Zulu Army**

The regiments were kept apart in military kraals, the members of each individual regiment being men of the same age; and warriors were not allowed to marry till they had distinguished themselves in action or were 40 years of age. Then they might be transferred to one or other of the royal regiments, and accorded the highly prized privilege of taking wives to themselves from among the daughters of the men belonging to some regiment specially selected by the King. So strictly was this marriage prohibition enforced, that in 1876 Cetywayo had a number of girls massacred for no other reason than that they had married men of their own age instead of older men in a regiment for whom the King had designated them.

The Zulu regiments were each commanded by an Induna, or chief, and varied in strength from 500 to 2,000 men, on mobilisation food for four or five days being carried by women. The latter were nearly as strong as the men, and could walk 40 miles when carrying Supplies to the army. Herds of cattle were driven by lads too young to bear arms. Hospitals were unknown among the Zulus; nor was any provision made for the care of the wounded.

The numerical strength of the army at the beginning of the War of 1879 totalled from 45,000 to 50,000 men.

In October, 1878, Colonel Evelyn Wood, who had marched half his battalion, 90th Light Infantry, and a battery—both of which had been under his command throughout the Gaika

**Zulu War,
1879**

War—from King William's Town, Cape Colony, to Utrecht in the Transvaal, some 500 miles, took over command of the other half-battalion which was at Newcastle, in Natal, and Utrecht.

**Colonel
Wood's
Volunteers**

General the Honourable F. Thesiger, Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, asked Colonel Wood to raise a volunteer civilian force to hold Luneberg, a German settlement, from which King Cetewayo had sent orders that the Colonists were to depart. Witch doctors were going round all the kraals doctoring the warriors for war.

There had been a dispute between the Zulus and the Dutchmen, who had for many years encroached on Zululand in the winter, that is from April till October; for when the pasture on the high veld in the Transvaal died down, the Dutchmen used to drive their cattle into northern Zululand. Now, under pressure of threats, they had withdrawn their cattle, and the Zulus had destroyed all the homesteads on what was known as the Zag Pad, or hunting road, which runs from east to west, from Luneberg to the Buffalo river, the boundary of Natal.

Luneberg

Luneberg was, however, outside the district in dispute and Colonel Wood, realising the impossibility of raising any civilian force in the sparsely populated district, and knowing the importance that the High Commissioner, Sir Bartle Frere, attached to the Germans being adequately protected, took two companies of his battalion out of the three then at Utrecht over the mountains to Luneberg.

In addition to the political importance of retaining the German settlers on their farms, Luneberg was also strategically important from it being on the direct track to Swaziland, the inhabitants of which were British allies, and a year later joined us in an attack on Sekukuni, who for some years had defied the Boers, repulsing them from his mountains on two different occasions.

Colonel Wood, preceding the two companies of his battalion, rode out unarmed with a Black interpreter to interview Manyoba, the representative of Cetewayo, who had conveyed the King's order, given under threat of extermination, for the Germans to leave their settlements. Colonel Wood persuaded Manyoba, who, although escorted by 100 armed warriors, was at first very nervous of being arrested, that the detachment brought to the settlement

Colonel Wood and the Boers 521

was for defence and not for defiance, and six weeks later the Zulu King sent the Colonel a message apologising for having ordered the Germans to depart, alleging that he did not know when he gave the order that Luneberg was in the Transvaal.

Zulu War,
1876 :
Colonel
Wood's
Command

Colonel Wood, November 14th, rode to Wessylstroom for the double purpose of purchasing ox transport and to endeavour to induce the border Dutchmen, who were interested in the question of the frontier dispute, to join his command in the event of a Zulu war breaking out. The Dutchmen in that district declined to do so. The Colonel rode northwards a few days later, after giving due notice of his intended visit, in order to gain over Pretorius, an influential Boer.

The Boer Leader had collected several of his neighbours, who received the Colonel so rudely that Pretorius apologised for their attitude and want of hospitality, which he attributed to the intense hatred that they felt for all Englishmen. He gave a definite refusal of any help. The purport of Pretorius's reply was, although he realised the imminent danger to his countrymen from Cetywayo, whose forces, as he believed, would annihilate the British troops, yet he had promised that his countrymen would take no steps leading to amity with the British until the return of Messrs. Joubert and Kruger, who had gone to England to see the Secretary of State for the Colonies, hoping to get the annexation of the Transvaal annulled.

Colonel Wood, a fortnight later, induced a burgher named Piet Uys, whose parents had been massacred with other Boers at Weenen, 1838, to join his column with 39 burghers.

The Colonel had established a system of espionage in Zululand, the members of which gave him accurate information during the war except on one occasion. He learnt that Cetywayo had promised Sirayo that he would refuse the High Commissioner's demand to give him up to the Governor of Natal for trial. This refusal was one of the ultimate causes of the war. Colonel Wood, the year after the war, learnt from Sirayo and from one of his sons, Melokazulu, all the circumstances of the case, in which Sirayo was accused of murder. The chief was a middle-aged man, whose district marched with the Natal

Zulu War,
1879:
Colonel
Wood's
Command

frontier, separated only by the Buffalo river. Like all important and wealthy natives he had many wives, and two of the younger women, tiring of the tie to an elderly husband whom they seldom saw, absconded with two young Zulus who lived in Natal, just across the Buffalo river.

Melokazulu followed them with an armed party, and taking the women across the frontier on to Zulu soil, they shot them. Colonel Wood asked him, "Why did you not shoot the men as well?" And he replied, "Oh, that would not have been right, for my father never bought them, and I had paid money for the wives." "Did your father know that you had gone for the women?" "No." "Did he approve of your having shot them?" "I don't know, for when I told him he made no remark." From the Zulu point of view Melokazulu's action was perfectly justifiable.

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CHAPTER II

ISANDHLWANA AND RORKE'S DRIFT

Zululand Invaded—The Disaster at Isandhlwana—Rorke's Drift—The Arrival of Reinforcements—The Commissariat—The Position at Kambula.

LORD CHELMSFORD (so designated for convenience, though then General Thesiger) arranged that three columns, each about 3,000 strong, should invade Zululand—from the lower Tugela, Rorke's Drift, and Utrecht respectively—and advance with the object of concentrating at Ulundi, the Royal kraal. The frontage from Utrecht, by Rorke's Drift, Greytown to the Lower Tugela Drift was about 200 miles. The intervening country was mountainous, roadless, with many rivers, none of which were bridged, and many were unfordable. The General's original plan of a 4th Column starting from Derby, 80 miles to the east of Utrecht, was abandoned on Colonel Wood's recommendation.

invasion of
Zululand

Early in January the British troops entered the enemy's country unopposed. On the 17th of the month the centre column, 1,600 Europeans and 2,500 natives, under Lord Chelmsford, began to move forward, advancing from Rorke's Drift—where was left a small garrison composed of men from the 24th Regiment (1st South Wales Borderers)—to Isandhlwana Hill.

In the previous November Lord Chelmsford had issued instructions to the effect that, when in the enemy's country, a defensible camp should be formed at every halt. Despite this, nothing was done to fortify either the camp at Rorke's Drift—a post of vital importance to the safety of the column—or in his own camp at Isandhlwana; nor were adequate steps taken by this column to ascertain the position of the enemy. The General and his Staff appear to have underestimated the dangers confronting them, and to their lack of foresight is due the disaster which followed—a disaster greater than any that ever befell British soldiers in Africa.

Zulu War,
1879:
Isandhlwana

Early in the morning of January 22nd Lord Chelmsford moved southwards with part of his force to support a reconnoitring party which he had sent out two days previously, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Pulleine in command of the camp, then occupied by six companies of the 1st-24th, one company of the 2nd-24th, two guns, a few mounted soldiers, and four companies of the Natal Native Contingent. At 12 o'clock, when the troops in camp were preparing for dinner, the enemy appeared, 12,000 to 14,000 strong; and, advancing the horns of his army, succeeded before 1.30 P.M. in enveloping the British camp.

Surprised, outnumbered by more than six to one, in a position in no respect prepared for defence, and with ammunition boxes fastened up, the defenders were eventually overpowered and annihilated.

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Daylight was fading fast when Lord Chelmsford approached Isandhlwana on his return in the evening of January 22nd. The country in the immediate neighbourhood of the camp was silent and deserted, for the enemy had finished his deadly work and had departed, leaving the place tenanted only by the dead. The Zulus had, according to their custom after a battle, returned to their regimental kraals, but four regiments, forming the Right horn, which had been but little engaged in the battle, crossed the Buffalo river and attacked Rorke's Drift.

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Rorke's
Drift

The garrison at Rorke's Drift, in the command of Lieutenants Chard, R.E., and Bromhead, 24th Regiment, although it numbered only 139 men, of whom 20 were sick, managed to keep the enemy at bay, repelling a series of determined assaults by a force of 3,000 Zulus.

The attack began at about 4.30 P.M., January 22nd, and was continued till 4 A.M. next morning. On six occasions the Zulus got within the retrenchments of mealie-bags and biscuit tins hastily improvised by the garrison, but each time they were driven back at the bayonet's point; and at dawn they finally withdrew, leaving behind 350 dead. The British losses were 17 killed and 10 wounded.

At about the time when Lord Chelmsford began his forward movement, the Right column, under Colonel Pearson, advanced from the Lower Tugela, and by January 23rd had reached Etshowe. Here steps were immediately taken to build a fort, with the view of forming a depot.

Colonel Pearson received news of what had occurred at Isandhlwana, but thinking that Lord Chelmsford would soon be in a position to renew his advance, decided not to relinquish his position at Etshowe; he sent his Mounted men and Native troops back to Natal, and remained with a garrison of 1,300 Europeans and natives. By the middle of February this force was hemmed in by the enemy, and cut off from communication with the Base.

Colonel Wood reported to General Thesiger on January 11th that he had received reliable intelligence that Cetuyayo intended the first attack should be made on No. 3 column, which, entering Zululand by Rorke's Drift, was moving towards Isandhlwana. That day Colonel Wood, who had entered Zululand January 2nd with the 13th and 90th Light Infantry, four seven-pounder guns, and a body of Horsemen, which varied from five to eight hundred men, met the General, who became rather later Lord Chelmsford, a few miles from Rorke's Drift, having ridden on in advance of his column, which, owing to the wet state of the ground, could only accomplish a few miles daily, the wagons being necessarily hauled by men assisting the oxen. On the 17th the Colonel reported to the General that the Zulu army had left Ulundi to attack No. 3 column.

No. 4 column moved in a north-easterly direction, and on the 19th Colonel Buller, in command of the mounted men, was driven back on to the infantry by a strong body of Zulus. During the night, 20th-21st, the column made a long march, climbing the Zunguin Mountain before daylight, and driving back about 2,000 Zulus, who offered only slight resistance. January 24th the column attacked and defeated easily, soon after daylight, the Makulusi and part of the Nodwengo and Udloko corps, about 8,000 men in

Just as an attack was being made by the 90th Light Infantry, advancing in line, and the Zulus were retreating as fast as they could go, a messenger rode up bearing a brief note telling of the disaster which had occurred at Isandhlwana two days previously.

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula
Hill
Position

General Theisiger gave Colonel Wood a free hand to retreat from Zululand. He was now in a difficult position, because although he had built a stone fort at Tinta's Kraal, on the Umvolosi river, there was no firewood in the neighborhood. He had, moreover, placed in the fort 110 tons weight of supplies, which he was unwilling to sacrifice. Piet Uhlir and his burghers, who had very lightly loaded wagons, each the head of a family having a wagon to himself, loaded them up each to 8,000 lb. weight, 3,000 above the average, and by making very short journeys the column eventually took up its position under the Ngaba Ka Hawane Mountain, a hill called Kambula, with all its supplies. The mountain, standing about two miles behind Kambula Hill, was clothed with trees, which provided ample firewood for the column for the next three months.

This dominating position was not reached, however, for a week. The wagons carrying 110 tons more than their full load, the oxen could make but very short marches, and it became necessary to put 50 men on to haul each wagon over the wettest valleys. The column had, from entering Zululand January 2nd, laagered every night, and had moved each day prepared to draw up in a defensive formation, which was constantly practised, until Colonel Wood was satisfied with the celerity with which an attack could be met.

The two Light Infantry battalions led the column in march on alternate days, and when "the alarm" was given by bugle sound, "Look out for cavalry," groups of wagons laagered without further orders, and without actually closing up. The camp was formed in an oblong of wagons, inside which the horses and oxen were kraaled. The advance-guard of two companies drew up their wagons so as to form a bastion at the angles of the oblong nearest to the enemy, the company commanders acting on the usual system when the order to encamp had been issued.

These automatic defensive arrangements gave confidence to the troops besides relieving the senior officers from issuing daily orders on the subject. Colonel Wood was thus enabled to ride far ahead of the column, following his friend, Colonel Buller, who commanded all Mounted Troops and thus received the earliest intelligence of the presence of the enemy, or the assurance that the front was clear.

This information enabled Colonel Wood to arrange for

the daily issue of fresh bread, an issue peculiar to No. 4, later "The Flying Column," while all the other troops lived on ship's biscuit, which was issued on one day only in Colonel Wood's command of seven months' duration, in Zululand.

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula
Hill
Position

In the wet soil the main difficulty was to heat the ground sufficiently to make the bread rise, and the following system was adopted. If the column marched, say, on a Monday morning, a squadron of mounted men preceded the proposed line of march by ten or twelve miles, dropping messengers from time to time to report that the front was clear. The Commissariat bakers, with the ovens, composed of large iron plates like a turtle, were carried on mule wagons with the advanced-guard, and immediately the camping ground was selected, the bakers set to work to excavate the site of the ovens, to heat which a quantity of dry wood was carried on the wagons. It generally took six hours before the first batch of sponge could be laid. The bakers worked all night, taking out the last batch sometimes two hours after the Rear-guard had moved off, being in such cases protected by a Mounted escort. On arriving in camp on Tuesday, about midday, they slept until the camp was moved on Wednesday, baking sufficient every other day for two days' full rations.

When the final position was selected on Kambula Hill, a ridge running south-south-west, north-north-east, two miles to the south of the Ngaba-Ka-Havam Mountain, a redoubt for two companies was constructed on an eminence 280 yards in front of the laager, with a command of 20 feet over it, its main lines of fire being in an easterly and westerly direction; 150 yards to the right front of the main laager was a cattle laager, into which 2,000 oxen could be crammed in case of necessity. All the wagons being chained in front and rear, they could not be moved without great difficulty, and the result was that during the battle, March 29th, although a company inside the laager which drained into the main valley of the Umvolosi was necessarily withdrawn, the company retreating into the main laager, yet the Zulus could not move in it, as the cattle stood so closely wedged together that movement inside the laager, except on top of their backs, was impracticable.

There was a clear zone of fire from the main laager for

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula
Hill
Position

over half a mile north, east, and south, except where it was obstructed by the redoubt. On the east side the ravine of the Umvolosi admitted of cover to within a hundred yards on one place, but generally there was a clear range of for something under three hundred yards. The disadvantage of this feature was not overlooked, but, on the other hand, it was necessary to be close to a good water supply which was found in the sources of the Umvolosi, a short distance to the right rear of the main laager.

This position is fully described because at Kambula laager not only was the Zulu army beaten, but the nation was cowed.

CHAPTER III

ETSHOWE, AND THE ATTACK ON THE INHLOBANE, MARCH 28th, 1879

Ginginlovo and the Relief of Etshowe—The Attack on the Inhlobane—An Order is Misunderstood—The Death of Captain Barton—Buller Wins the V.C.—The Losses in the Retreat from the Inhlobane.

THE disaster which had occurred at Isandhlwana was not made known in London till February 11th, direct telegraphic communication with the Cape not then having been established. On the day it was received the Cabinet resolved to send a large body of reinforcements to South Africa. Zulu War,
1879

During the months of February and March the Right and Centre columns remained inactive, but the mounted men of the Left column harassed the Zulus daily, capturing enormous numbers of cattle. Meanwhile, reinforcements had arrived daily at Durban; and by the end of March Lord Chelmsford, having assembled on the Lower Tugela a force consisting of the 57th (1st Middlesex) and 91st (1st Argyll and Sutherland) Regiments, some companies of the 60th (3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps), 99th (2nd Wiltshire) Regiment, and the Buffs, together with Mounted troops, volunteers, and two battalions of a Native Contingent—in all, 3,390 Whites and 2,280 Natives—undertook the Relief of Etshowe.

The march began March 29th, but the column moved forward very slowly, progress being exceedingly difficult owing to the heavy rains which had recently fallen. In order to guard against a disaster like that at Isandhlwana, an entrenched camp was formed every night.

On April 1st the column encamped near the Ginginlovo stream, fifteen miles from Etshowe. Next day, at 3 A.M., a Zulu force, mainly of local tribes, came in sight, and within a short time the defenders in the laager were engaged. Relief of
Etshowe

The enemy pushed forward resolutely, despite fire from Gatling guns. At some points a few men got within twenty

**Zula War,
1879**

yards of the wagons' shelter trench, and then realising that the struggle was one in which the assegai would be useless, slowly recoiled.

The action lasted about one and a half hours, and resulted in a complete victory for the British, who lost 10 men killed and 52 wounded. The enemy's losses amounted to nearly 1,200.

On the following day, Lord Chelmsford relieved Etshowe. The garrison, who had been beleaguered for ten weeks, had recently been suffering owing to the wet weather and the cramped position.

**The
Kambula
Position**

Before setting out to relieve Etshowe, Lord Chelmsford requested Colonel Wood to make a diversion from Kambula to distract the Zulus' attention from his column.

From the end of January, when the Kambula position was taken up, till the middle of March, Colonel Buller with his Mounted men harried all the military kraals within two days' long distance ride of Kambula, his destruction of the Makulusi Kraal being felt by the Zulus as a great humiliation.

Luneberg

On March 12th, Luneberg, held by a small garrison corps, had been reinforced by four companies of the 80th (2nd South Staffordshire) Regiment, and was about to receive a fifth company coming from Derby. When only five miles from Luneberg, the Intombe river rising suddenly, prevented the company crossing, and an hour before daylight, March 13th, in a thick mist, all the company was destroyed except 12 men. They were encamped on the west bank, nearer to Luneberg, and under Sergeant Booth, who behaved admirably, though closely pursued by Zulus who swam the river like otter hounds in their desire for blood, retreated for three miles until supports came out from the garrison.

On March 13th, Uhamu, Cetywayo's half-brother, arrived in Kambula camp, under arrangements made by Captain Norman McLeod, who was acting under Colonel Wood, and his Assistant for political affairs in Swaziland. Next morning Uhamu asked the Colonel if he would be kind enough to fetch out from Zululand his wives, of which he did not know the number, but estimated them to be about three hundred. The Colonel started next day, escorted by

Uhamu's Wives

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Colonel Buller, with 350 horsemen, and 300 of Uhamu's men, who had fought against us at Isandhlwana. The distance in a straight line to Uhamu's head kraal near the sources of the Mkusi river, is 45 miles in the heart of Zululand, the goat tracks over mountains necessitating slow movement. It was known that there were four regiments, about 10,000 men, assembled at Ulundi, only a long day's march from where Uhamu's wives were located, and it was necessary to trust to the loyalty of the tribe that they should not convey the intelligence of the coming of the British force.

Zulu War,
1879

Next day, between 1,000 and 1,100 women and children were brought out and marched 30 miles before sunset, some of the children being only five and six years of age. March 23rd, the Commander of the column and the Mounted troops proceeded to Luneberg to raid the kraals, and destroy crops of Umbelini, a renegade Swazi chief, and returned on March 26th; for the Commander-in-Chief for South Africa had written to Colonel Wood asking him to make a demonstration against the enemy in the north of Zululand, while he led a column to relieve Etshowe.

Luneberg

Colonel Wood, reporting to Lord Chelmsford that he would attack the Zulus on the Inhlobane Mountain, March 28th, mentioned that his last news from spies at Ulundi showed that the bulk of Cetywayo's army was leaving March 27th to attack Kambula, and that regiments comprised of Coast tribes only had been sent to oppose the march of British troops to Etshowe.

The
Inhlobane

This information was accurate at the moment it was dispatched from Ulundi, but for some unknown reason the Zulu King, although his army had not been "doctored," ordered it to march two days earlier, and its main body left "The Great Place" early March 25th.

Colonel Wood had arranged for the troops to attack the Inhlobane in two forces, the western force under Colonel Russell was to assemble to the south-west of, and climb to the lower plateau of, the mountain, 150 feet below the summit. It was to make a demonstration only, while 500 mounted troops, under Colonel Buller, made a real attack at the north-eastern extremity of the mountain. Colonel Russell's force consisted of Regular Mounted infantry, some Germans (under Colonel Schermbrucker, from Keis-

Zulu War,
1879:
The
Inhlobane

kamahoeke, King William's Town, who originally enlisted for the Crimea War), and the first battalion of Wood's Native Irregulars, 1,000 strong, and 300 of Uhamu's tribesmen.

Colonel Wood foreshadowed in his orders the possibility of the troops being surprised when on top of the mountain and ordered both attacking forces to send scouting parties forward towards Ulundi.

The two columns left Kambula at midday, March 27, the western column bivouacking five miles from the southern western extremity of the mountain, while Colonel Buller bivouacked to the south of it, changing his position twice during the night to guard against surprise. Colonel Wood joined the bivouac of the western column at nightfall, March 27th, with his Chief Staff Officer, Captain the Honourable Ronald Campbell, Coldstream Guards, Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Light Infantry, aide-de-camp, and Mr. L. Lloyd, Political Agent and interpreter, with the Colonel's personal escort, ten 90th Mounted Light Infantry, and half a dozen mounted Zulus, under Umtonga, who was half-brother of Cetuywayo and to Uhamu. The Colonel there met Piet Uys, who, with his Burghers, was to guide Redvers Buller up the mountain, and Mr. Potter, commanding the 1st Battalion Wood's Irregulars, who had often been to the top of the Inhlobane. Colonel Wood discussed with these two South Africans the possibility of retreating over the Ityenteni Nek in the possible, though improbable, event of the Zulu army appearing under the mountain while the British troops were on top of it, and he was satisfied from the statements that a retreat over the north face of the range was feasible.

Colonel Buller at the break of dawn clambered up the goat path, guided by Piet Uys, and gained the summit with slight loss, Lieutenant Baron von Stettercron being the two men only being killed. The surprise was complete and the Makulusi were swept off the summit, hiding on the nearly precipitous faces in caves and under rocks on the north and south sides of the mountain.

Colonel Wood rode eastwards at 3 A.M. from the bivouac of the Western Column, and just before daylight met a squadron of Irregular horse, which had lost touch with the remainder of Buller's men during their change of bivouac during the night. The squadron was proceeding

Assault of the Inhlobane

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1879:
The
Inhlobane

westwards, and Colonel Wood, ordering it to counter-march, directed it to march to the sound of firing, which was now audible to the north-east of the mountain; just as the day was breaking the outlines of men of Colonel Buller's leading squadron were visible, as they passed up a path on the mountain.

The squadron had been directed to trot out, but when it got under fire its progress became so slow that Colonel Wood with his Personal Escort passed and preceded it by two hundred yards.

The track, which had hitherto been well marked by trodden-down grass and the bodies of horses, now passing over hard rock was difficult to distinguish. Colonel Wood, coming under close fire, instinctively led directly towards the rocks whence the bullets came, thus missing the easier gradient up which Buller's men had ridden. The ground was now steep and very rugged, so the Colonel dismounted his White and Black escort, putting their horses in a sheep kraal, the walls of which were about two and a half feet high.

The Colonel led up the face of the mountain, pulling his horse after him, and accompanied by Lieutenant Lloyd. The squadron behind, except some few men who followed Colonel Wood, dismounted, and opened fire. A Zulu, rising from behind a rock close at hand, aiming at the Colonel's body, shot Mr. Lloyd through the backbone, and while Captain Campbell was carrying him down the mountain, the Colonel advanced higher up, until a Zulu, firing at close range from under a rock, killed his horse, which, in falling, knocked him over.

Colonel Wood now decided that the face of the mountain above him was unclimbable, and retraced his steps to the horses, directing Captain Campbell to order the Irregulars to clear out the Zulus, who were, he believed, but a few, from the rocks and caves where they had shot the Colonel's horse. Captain Campbell having failed to induce the Irregulars to advance, himself ran forward, accompanied by Lieutenant Lysons, Privates Fowler and Walkinshaw, the latter being the Colonel's bugler, and two other 90th men. The Colonel called Walkinshaw back, requiring his help to support Mr. Lloyd, who was then dying.

Captain Campbell led the small party up a narrow pas-

Zulu War,
1879:
The
Inhlobane

sage only two feet wide for several yards, between rocks
feet high, and was looking down into a cave when he was
shot dead by a Zulu. Lieutenant Lysons and Private
Fowler, passing over the body, fired into the cave, from
which the Zulus fled by another exit.

Bugler Walkinshaw, entirely unmoved by the danger, assisted Colonel Wood to place the bodies of the two officers across the Colonel's bat pony, while the escort sheltered from a fire which in a few minutes killed four out of the 28 ponies belonging to the officers, and the Colonel's White and Black escorts.

The bodies of the two officers were buried 200 yards lower down, where some soil permitted a grave to be made by using the blades of assegais. The Colonel read the Burial Service from Mrs. Campbell's Prayer Book, which he had borrowed from Captain Campbell. It was in his wallet under the dead horse higher up the mountain, but Walkinshaw, climbing the steep rise, under close fire, had brought down the saddle.

The squadron of Irregulars now regained Colonel Buller's track, without further casualties; it had lost only six men killed, and seven wounded, in the half-hour that it was under fire. Colonel Buller had by this time cleared the enemy from the top of the mountain, and Colonel Wood marched back westwards, taking with him a wounded man, whom he saw lying on the grass, and his escorts, the Natives driving flocks of sheep and goats. The track which he had followed, on his outward journey, led up the southern slopes of the Inhlobane, having on its left a high hill, farther to the southward.

Colonel Wood, although he believed the Zulu army was still twenty-four hours distant, as a matter of precaution sent Umtonga up the height to the south. Umtonga dismounted just short of the crest, and waved his hand energetically as to indicate danger; and the Colonel, coming up, saw below him five dense columns of Zulus, moving across a valley, and heading for Kambula.

The sheep and the goats were now abandoned, the wounded man, given in charge of one of the persons of the escort, 90th Light Infantry, was sent direct to Kambula camp, about twenty miles distant, where he arrived safely on Colonel Wood's bat pony.


The Zulu Army Advances

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The Colonel sent his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Lysons, to the officer commanding the western column, with the following written order: "Below the Inhlobane, 10.30 A.M., 28-3-79.—There is a large army coming this way from the South. Get into position on the Zunguin Nek.—E. W."

The plateau forming the top of the mountain, which Colonel Buller's force had cleared of the enemy, was 150 feet higher than the lower plateau on which the western column was demonstrating, but each commanding officer had seen the advancing Zulu army an hour and a half before Colonel Wood caught sight of it, he being then on a track 1,000 feet below the crest of the mountain. Colonel Buller was engaged at the moment in covering the descent of Captain Barton, Coldstream Guards, who was taking a party of 25 Frontier Light Horse down the eastern slope, by which he had ascended, in order to bury Baron von Stettercron and two men, killed before the squadrons gained the crest. Barton was already half-way down when Buller saw the advancing Zulu army, then at least five miles distant, and sending word to Barton to "retire by the right of the mountain," meaning over the Ityen-

Zulu War,
1879:
The
Inhlobane



PLAN OF THE SKIRMISH AT THE INHLOBANE MOUNTAIN, MARCH 28th, 1879

Zulu War,
1879:
The
Inhlobane

teka Nek, drew off his troops to the western end of the summit, overlooking the lower plateau, which had been hitherto occupied by the column making the demonstration. The officer commanding it had by this time received Colonel Wood's order.

The Zunguin Nek is a saddle-back feature, which connects the Zunguin and Inhlobane Mountains, and in that direction, which was the nearest line of retreat to Kamula camp, many captured cattle had been driven by Wood's 1st Regiment Native Irregulars.

The officers commanding the western column, mistaking the position of the Zunguin Nek, trotted five miles to the west, and thus lost the opportunity of assisting Colonel Buller's retreat, and that of the 1st Battalion Wood's Irregulars, who were making for the nek, under Major Leet, 13th Light Infantry. His men, with some of Uhamu's, stuck to the cattle, which they were unwilling to abandon. Captain Potter, a Colonial officer, and Lieutenant Williams, 58th (2nd Northamptonshire) Regiment, and about 80 of Uhamu's men, were killed; they stood bravely by their White officers, one of Uhamu's Indunani or head men, being killed alongside Captain Potter. The Makulusi, and part of the Nodwengu Regiment, who had been attached to the Makulusi for the defence of the Inhlobane Mountain. It was these men who inflicted all the loss at the western extremity of the Inhlobane, for the main body of the Zulu army, exhausted by a long march, never got into action, halting on a stream near the site of what is now the town of Vryheid.

When Colonel Buller fell back to the western end of the upper plateau of the mountain he selected some good shots, and sending all the other men down a precipitous goat path, held back the Makulusi, who, seeing the oncoming army, had emerged from their caves, and were attacking to recover their cattle. Piet Uys and his sons remained with Buller until the bulk of the men had got nearly down to the lower plateau, and then descended. The track was so steep that when Colonel Wood revisited the mountain, fifteen months later, he drove, as an experiment, six ponies loose down the track, and only one reached the bottom without a fall of heels over head.

Several Zulus reached the lower plateau before Colonel

Zulu War,
1879:
The
Inkhlobane

Buller and Piet Uys. The latter was actually on the lower plateau when, seeing his youngest son could not get his pony down, Piet went to his assistance, and though he succeeded in getting the pony down, he was himself killed by a Zulu. Redvers Buller was the last White man to leave the summit, and when near the lower plateau he twice went back into a crowd of Zulus, each time rescuing a White man. He and Colonel Wood met on the Zunguin Nek late in the afternoon, reaching camp at sundown, for both had remained out in hopes of saving stragglers.

The squadron, which had been engaged near Colonel Wood in the early morning, and Captain Barton's 25 men, Frontier Light Horse, were nearly all killed. The squadron had remained under the eastern end of the mountain, where it was overtaken by some mounted men and active Zulus of the Ngobamakosi Regiment, and fought till the last man was killed at the top of the Ityenteka Nek.

When Captain Barton got Colonel Buller's warning message, having buried his comrades who had fallen in the capture of the mountain at daybreak, not appreciating that in military language "Retire by the right" meant right hand as the attack was made, he rode westwards around the track followed by Colonel Wood an hour earlier. When nearly as far as the western end of the lower plateau, but 80 feet below it, he was headed by the Right-hand column of the on-coming Zulu army, and endeavoured to fight his way through it.

After losing some men, seeing the dense masses in front of him, he retraced his steps, and although several of his men were killed by the Ngobamakosi Regiment, he and Lieutenant Poole, with about twelve troopers, got down the Ityenteka Nek, a continuation of the Inkhlobane, and three miles to the eastward of it, and nearly reached the Manzana river. Lieutenant Poole's horse being exhausted, Captain Barton took Poole up behind him on the saddle. His horse also being nearly exhausted, began to fail, and the two men dismounting, walked in different directions. Lieutenant Poole was killed immediately.

Chicheeli, a mounted officer of the Ngobamakosi brought up at a mission station, recognised Barton from his noble bearing as an officer, and having already killed seven White men, now remembered Cetywayo's order to bring

Zulu War,
1879:
The
Inhlobane

some officers to Ulundi as prisoners. Laying down his assegai, Chicheeli made signs to Captain Barton to surrender, and he, putting away his pistol and raising his hat, advanced towards the Native, when a Zulu shot Captain Barton in the back, and then Chicheeli, who intended to take Barton prisoner, unable to control his savage instincts, ran in and assegaied him. These details were given by Chicheeli to Colonel Wood fifteen months later, when he pointed out the body for burial.

Soon after 9 P.M., during a violent rain and hail storm, Colonel Buller, hearing that some stragglers were a few miles east of Kambula camp, rode out with led horses and brought them in. Buller well deserved the V.C. he won for his conspicuous bravery that day.

The losses sustained on the 28th were heavy. Of the 400 Europeans engaged, 92 were killed and seven wounded. 200 of Wood's Regiment were killed in the retreat from the Inhlobane.

CHAPTER IV

THE BATTLE OF KAMBULA, MARCH 29th, 1879

Colonel Wood's Military Precautions—The Burghers Leave the Column—
The Zulu Advance—The Spirit of the Zulus Crushed at Kambula.

THE Dutchmen in Kambula camp, when they went to sleep on the night of March 28th, were depressed, for in such fighting as they had seen, or heard of, with Native tribes a loss of more than one-fifth of the White men engaged had never occurred, and there were practically no wounded, all who fell being ripped up according to the Zulu custom. This is not done from a savage instinct, but from superstition. Bodies exposed to the hot South African sun naturally swell up, and the Zulus believe that unless they open out the entrails of the man they have slain, their own stomachs will swell in proportion as does that of their victim.

Colonel
Wood's
Plans at
Kambula

Colonel Wood was urged to "stand to arms" all night: thus he declined to do, but he visited the advanced sentries twice during the night. He had done nightly without fail since January 2nd. He had always practised in the column Wellington's system of the Peninsular War, which he had followed throughout the Gaika War of 1878 in the Cape Colony, and in Zululand up to that date. In his column all troops stood to arms, and ammunition boxes were opened one hour before daylight, and on any "Alarm" by day without warning the tents could be struck, and every man who was in camp be on his post within one and a half minutes from the bugle being sounded. Colonel Wood replied to his dissatisfied advisers that no one could move 25,000 men to attack by night over a roadless country.

During the night, 28th-29th, both battalions of Wood's native Irregulars, 2,000 in number, and Uhamu's 300 men, disappeared, the only Blacks remaining in camp being the six border Zulus per company of the two British battalions, who had been attached since the force crossed the border.

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula

Soon after daylight the burghers, except 10, who have hired wagons to the column, did not like to leave their property, came to Colonel Wood and asked leave to go home. They had been brought out with the Column and kept with it entirely by the influence of Piet Uys, the Commandant, and now that he was dead they were utterly dispirited. They trekked immediately they had shaken hands with Colonel Wood, and the mist, fortunately for them, screened their wagons until they had got far enough away to be out of sight of the Zulu army.

All the horses in camp were suffering from overwork for the Mounted troops and the Staff had ridden far, and sometimes fast, daily since March 13th, when they went to Luneberg, the Staff returning the same day, a distance of 90 miles. On the following day the horses went 45 miles into Uhamu's country, taking a day and a half for the return journey. On the following day they were taken on a raid to Luneberg, and had been under the saddle from 11 A.M. March 27th, to 7 P.M. March 28th.

Nevertheless, in spite of the state of their exhaustion it was necessary to locate the Zulu army, lest it might move towards Utrecht as soon as the mist cleared, so Colonel Raaf, with a small patrol, went out at 9 A.M. when the fog seemed to be lifting, and at 11 A.M. he was joined by one of Uhamu's men, who, having been overtaken the previous day when retreating from the Inhlobane, hid his British head badge, joined and bivouacked with Cetwayo's army. Next morning, on seeing Raaf's patrol under pretence of fetching water, he ran to the Commandant and reported that the Zulu army was about to advance and would attack the camp at Kambula at the soldier's dinner hour.

Cetwayo's army, under command of his Prime Minister, Nmyamane, and Tyingwayo, came fully in sight at 11.30 A.M., when still seven miles distant: they advanced generally in a north-westerly direction, and when having surmounted the plateau they extended to their attack formation; they covered a frontage of 12 miles.

The main laager of the camp of No. 4 column was held on the Left front and flank by the 90th Light Infantry. Half the front and the Right flank was guarded by the 13th Light Infantry, the Mounted men holding the re-

The Zulu Army Assaults Kambula Hill 541

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula

face of the laager. The redoubt was held by a company of each of the battalions, the cattle laager on the Right front being occupied by a company of the 13th. Two guns were mounted in the front face of the redoubt, and the other four came into action on the ridge on which the redoubt stood, between it and the main laager; when the Left front and flank were heavily attacked the teams were unhooked, and put inside the laager. The officers were instructed that when the Zulus came up close in masses, the gun detachments were to retire to the shelter of the wagons, but in the result the guns were fought and the gun detachments stood in the open throughout the battle.

The Zulu army approaching presented a magnificent sight, the 23,500 men moving towards the laager in regular order, and in the normal Zulu attack formation: two horns in advance of the flanks, and a dense mass back in the centre.

The main body was still three miles distant when Colonel Buller suggested that he should go out and goad it into making an isolated and premature attack. Cantering out in a south-easterly direction at 1.30 P.M., he dismounted his men when half a mile from the Zulus, on whom he opened a brisk fire. The Nokenke Regiment continued its march, the leading companies making for some cattle, grazing behind the laager, but the Umbonambi and Umcityu Regiments, 9,500 strong, losing patience under the galling fire of Colonel Buller's men, charged impetuously forward, when Colonel Buller, remounting, retired a quarter of a mile and again on three separate occasions repeated his firing, and retreating tactics. When the Zulus were within a quarter of a mile of the camp Colonel Buller brought his men at the gallop inside the laager, taking up the defence of its rear face.

The Zulus advanced with all the courage of brave men who had never been beaten, and who, moreover, had had no experience of the effects of modern firearms. The 90th Light Infantry, on whom the attack of the two Zulu corps fell, fired only by word of command, aiming low and very steadily; as did the 13th Light Infantry later when the right front and flank of the position was attacked; indeed the expenditure of ammunition throughout the engagement, including the pursuit, six hours' fighting in all, averaged only 33 rounds per man in the whole column.

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula

The Umbonambi and Umcityu Regiments came under a most destructive fire when they were within 400 yards of four guns standing on the ridge, under command of Lieutenants Bigge (Lord Stamfordham) and Frederick Slade (the late Major-General). These poured case-shot into the advancing mass, which was smitten by the fire of the 90th in front and by the two guns under Lieutenant Nicholson in the redoubt, as well as by the two companies in the work which enfiladed the Umcityu advance. The continuous storm of missiles made success for the Zulu attack on that front impossible. The brave savages charged straight forward without attempting to use the few rifles they had taken at Isandhlwana. When a chief fell men ran to his assistance, but practically no Zulu who got within 400 yards of the main laager remained alive. No formed body got to within 50 yards of the wagons at any time, though isolated Zulus managed to run up nearer; but the bulk of these grand savages were shot between 200 and 400 yards distance.


Colonel Wood, relieved of all anxiety as to the attack of the Left flank, was enabled to give his undivided attention to that which he saw was now impending from the ravine, the springs in which are the source of the Umvolosi river. One company of the Ngobamakosi, moving up the ravine above the river's source, occupied some rubbish-heaps on the plateau on which the main laager stood. The refuse from the Horse lines, an accumulation of two months, from the hot sun acting on the heavy dew which fell nightly, had caused a rich crop of mealies to sprout forth about four feet high, thus giving the company of Zulus so much cover as to render them immune from the fire of the Rear face of the laager. It was this company which somewhat later inflicted the loss on the two companies of the 90th when returning from their successful charge across its front.

The Colonel was obliged to withdraw the company of the 13th posted in the right rear of the cattle laager, as Zulus were all round the men, and from where he stood he could see at some distance higher up the ravine masses of the Ngobamakosi, whom the leaders were trying to induce to leave the ravine and rush the laager. Some 30 men did climb forward, and Colonel Wood, in consequence, sent Captain Maude, Captain Campbell's successor as Chief

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**Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula**

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(By permission from "From Midshipman to Field-Marshal," by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C. (Methuen)

**Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula**

them to charge up to the laager. Colonel Wood shot a man dead, and his place being taken by another, killed him with a third shot; then a third chief, picking up the flag, waved it, while kneeling on one knee, the Colonel killed him with a fifth bullet in succession of fire.

Just at this moment Major Hackett's two companies appeared and, led by him with Lieutenant Strong so far in distance in front, the two being guided by Captain Wood, advanced 20 yards in advance (killed at Spion Kop, January 1900), ran straight at the Zulus, who were driven back into the ravine. The companies retired at once, as ordered, but the Zulus, firing from the manure heaps mentioned above, mortally wounded Lieutenant Arthur Bright, and killed Colour-Sergeant Allen of his company, who, having been wounded on the opening of the attack on the Left flank, had been bandaged up, and had insisted on going with his company in the charge. Major Hackett, the best company officer in the battalion, lost both his eyes.

At 5.30 P.M. Colonel Wood, seeing that the vigour of the Zulu attack was lessening, sent Captain Thurlow and Waddy's companies of the 13th to the right rear of the cattle laager, whence they drove out some Zulus who were amongst the oxen, and he took Captain Laye's company from the Redoubt to the edge of the ravine, where all the day did great execution with the bayonet amongst the Umfelozi Regiment, who were now absolutely demoralised. Colonel Wood had sent a note to Colonel Redvers Buller at 5.00 directing him to take out the mounted men, which he did, pursuing until nightfall, killing mainly men of the Mafikadu lusi tribe, who had been his foes, and had killed 100 of the men twenty-four hours earlier. When the Ngobamakhulu left the ravine to strike the nearest line in retreat back to the Zunguin Nek, they moved in masses so dense as to be cut out from the hill-side all signs of green grass, and suffered terribly from the case-shot of the guns and the fire of the infantry in the Redoubt. The bodies of Zulus lying dead close to the laager as to necessitate burial for sanitary reasons numbered 884. The enemy was pursued for several miles, losing between 2,000 and 3,000 men. The column of 1,800 rifles all told, lost 70 officers and men killed and wounded.

As the results of incidents in the two days' fighting

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COLONEL WOODS

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then, according up to the target. Colonel Weir would lead his place being taken by another soldier, then a third chief, picking up the third chief, and then the fourth chief, and then the fifth chief in succession of fire.

Just as the residents of Major Little's neighborhood were helped by their well-attended, organized, and well-guided funeral procession, so were the residents of the Spanish Bay neighborhood of the town, who were drawn to the funeral by a procession of 100 people, as the *Journal* reported on the day after the funeral.



Photo: Bannan

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR EVELYN WOOD, V.C.

The Victory at Kambula

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Colonel Redvers Buller; Major Leet, 13th Light Infantry; Lieutenant Lysons, 90th Light Infantry; and Private Fowler, 90th Light Infantry, received the Victoria Cross. Bugler Walkinshaw received the Distinguished Conduct Medal, and would have been recommended for the Victoria Cross had not Colonel Wood called him back from Captain Ronald Campbell's party to help Lieutenant Lloyd, who was dying. Major Leet, 13th Light Infantry, who commanded both battalions of Wood's Irregulars, had dislocated his knee a week earlier at some camp athletic sports, and as he could not even hobble, Colonel Wood suggested that he should remain in camp with the other battalion, which had not been detailed for the assault on the Inhlobane. The Major managed to ride both up and down the mountain, and when on the lower plateau and away from the mass of pursuing Zulus, seeing Lieutenant Smith, Frontier Light Horse, about to be killed, he rode back, rescued him, and putting him up behind the saddle, brought him away in safety on his horse.

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula

It was impossible in the heat of the action to spare any wounded Zulus who could still fire their guns, as they were as savage as wild cats; one man of the Undi corps, who, although severely wounded, was sitting up, firing at Colonel Wood at two yards distance, killed a 90th man who was following him on the hill-side outside the redoubt.

The feeble attack of 12,000 Zulus on our square at Ulundi 4 months later indicated how the spirit of the army had been crushed at Kambula Hill.

At nightfall the Colonel, assembling all the Border Zulus attached to companies of the infantry battalions, offered a stick of tobacco for every live Zulu they would bring into camp, and at daylight, March 30th, there was a collection of splendid specimens of humanity, from the more intelligent of whom the names of Corps, regiments, battalions, and commanding officers, were recorded, showing that there were 23,500 present in the battle. It is remarkable that these grand savages, who charged with such heroic determination at the opening of the battle, became so demoralised after five hours' fighting as to allow themselves to be killed during the pursuit without offering any resistance.

It is not often that the narratives of victors and vanquished agree, but the Governor of Natal, on April 21st. re-

Zulu War,
1879:
Kambula

porting to the High Commissioner, wrote: "The Zulu accounts, in conversation with our natives, of the two days' fighting with Colonel Wood agree with the published accounts in every respect. The Zulu losses on the first day are stated to have been severe, the Europeans who fell selling their lives very dearly."

When the Flying Column rejoined the 2nd Division on June 16th, having been back to Natal, it escorted 60 wagons, and having deposited their loads at a fort which had been constructed by the 2nd Division, it resumed its position in front, which it maintained until after the Battle of Ulundi.

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CHAPTER V

THE BATTLE OF ULUNDI, JULY 4th, 1879

Lord Chelmsford Advances on Ulundi—Defeat and Capture of Cetywayo—
General Sir Garnet Wolseley Supersedes Lord Chelmsford—Zululand
Annexed.

LORD CHELMSFORD met with little opposition as he advanced through Zululand with General Newdigate's Division and the Flying Column. None the less, elaborate precautions were taken to ensure against surprise, the Flying Column, which moved in advance of the 2nd Division, scouting through the country in every direction. On July 1st the troops reached the banks of the White Umvolosi, within five miles of the Royal kraal of Ulundi. Here laagers were formed, and on the following day the 2nd Division closed up to the Flying Column.

Advance on
Ulundi

On July 3rd Colonel Buller, with the Mounted men of the Flying Column, crossed the river and, reconnoitring towards Ulundi, advanced to within three-quarters of a mile of Cetywayo's kraal. Here they came upon a Zulu force, and were compelled to retire hurriedly. Colonel Buller had, however, gained valuable information regarding the nature of the ground between the Umvolosi and Ulundi.

At 6.45 A.M., July 4th, the main body of the British force began to cross the river, leaving the camp garrisoned by the 1st-24th Regiment, a company of Engineers, and a Gatling gun. The Flying Column led the advance. Later the whole force was formed into a hollow square, the front half composed of the Flying Column, the rear half of the 2nd Division. The ammunition wagons, etc., were placed in the Centre of the square. In this formation the troops advanced to a ridge of ground which commanded the adjacent country.


Large numbers of the enemy were seen coming from the surrounding kraals, and shortly before 9 A.M. the cavalry on the Right and Left retired inside the square. The Zulu

Zulu War,
1879.
Ulundi

advance was made with determination by some corps, but the regiments came on in a hurried, disorderly manner which contrasted strangely with the methodical, steady order in which they had advanced at Kambula on March 29th, for now not only battalions, but regiments, became mixed up before they came under fire.

Individual men managed to get within 30 yards of the rear face of the square, but everywhere else the attack was checked by artillery fire and the steady volleys of the infantry, which proved so effective that in less than half an hour the enemy wavered and gave way.

Then the 17th Lancers and Buller's mounted men charged, the 17th Lancers scattering the routed Zulus in



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF ULUNDI, JULY 4th, 1879

one direction, Buller's men pursuing them in the other. But even in retreat some men fought with courage.

The losses of the Zulus were estimated by Lord Chelmsford to be 1,000 men killed. The British force, which numbered 4,062 Europeans and 1,103 natives, lost 18 killed and 85 wounded.

The defeat of the Zulus was now complete, their confidence having been shaken at Kambula. After the battle their army dispersed, Cetywayo hid in a cave, and many of the leading chiefs tendered their submission.

General Sir Garnet Wolseley, whom the Home Government had sent out to supersede Lord Chelmsford, arrived at Port Durnford, General Crealock's head-quarters, on July 7th, and assumed command of the British forces.

On August 27th Cetywayo was captured and sent as a prisoner to Cape Town; then, Sir Garnet, having formally proclaimed the deposition of the Zulu King, drew up a new scheme for the governance of the country.

Peace, however, was not satisfactorily established until 1887, when Zululand was definitely annexed.

Zulu War,
1879:
Ulundi

PART XVII

THE ARMY IN EGYPT, 1882-98

CHAPTER I

KASSASSIN, AUGUST 28th, AND TEL-EL-KEBIR, SEPTEMBER 13th,
1882

Arabi Pasha—Bombardment of Alexandria—Wolseley Commands the British Army—The Disposition of Arabi Pasha's Forces—Wolseley's Strategy—The Desert March—The Battles of Tel-el-Kebir and Kassassin—The Capture of Arabi.

Arabi
Pasha

ARABI PASHA, whose father was a peasant, had risen to the rank of colonel in the Egyptian army of the Sultan of Turkey's Viceroy, the Khedive Tewfik. Arabi was an advocate of the policy of "Egypt for the Egyptians," and induced the troops to mutiny.

Bombard-
ment of
Alexandria,
1882

Great Britain, at the request of the Khedive, resolved to put down the mutinous officer, who threatened the British fleet. He was told that if he placed more guns in position he would draw upon the batteries the fire of Sir Beauchamp Seymour's ironclads in the bay. The English and French Governments had worked together up to this point, but the Republic declined to join in an act of overt hostility; its fleet left Alexandria. Arabi disregarded the warning, and, on July 11th, Sir Beauchamp's war-vessels opened fire on the batteries, silencing all before sunset.

Wolseley in
Command

The British Government, deciding to support the Khedive against his mutinous officers, sent out an army under command of Sir Garnet (afterwards Viscount) Wolseley, a force of 40,000 men, gathered from many different stations, reaching Egypt simultaneously.

Arabi had about 60,000 fighting men at his disposal, some at Kafr Dowar, in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, some at Cairo, and some at Tel-el-Kebir, a commanding hill on the railway between Ismailia, on the Suez Canal, and the capital.

Cavalry Charge at Kassassin 551

The 2nd Division landed at Alexandria, and made demonstrations against the Egyptian position at Kafr Dowar; the flotilla of troopships carrying the 1st Division and escorting ironclads steamed away to Ismailia, on the Canal, midway between Port Said and Suez, and here, on August 20th, it began to disembark.

The Freshwater Canal runs through the arid desert from the Nile to Ismailia alongside of a railway line, and, to secure the canal from being cut by the enemy, 2,000 men were sent forward about 20 miles, as far as Kassassin, where there was a lock, under General Sir G. Graham.

The Egyptians made a demonstration on the 28th, but retired early on being fired on. At 4.30 P.M., when the intense heat had lessened, the demonstration was renewed, but was never serious: when Sir G. Graham was counter-attacking, he sent a verbal message to Major-General Sir Drury Lowe by an officer, who conveyed the impression that Graham was "hard pressed and only just able to hold his own." Lowe attacked by moonlight the enemy's Left flank, rode over Infantry, and 11 guns, which, however, were not spiked, and were removed by the Egyptians during the night. The Cavalry loss was slight.

The entrenched lines of Tel-el-Kebir (Arabic: The Great Hill) ran along a ridge of rising ground, on a frontage of four miles, held by 26,000 men and 60 guns. Sir Garnet advanced on these lines with 13,000 men and 42 guns, guided absolutely straight by Lieutenant Wyatt-Rawson, Royal Navy, by a compass bearing on a star, who after completing his task was killed in the assault.

The night (September 12th-13th) was unusually dark, and it took some time to form up the army. On the Right marched the 1st Division, the leading Brigade consisting of the Royal Irish, Royal Marines, York and Lancasters, and Royal Irish Fusiliers. Behind them, at a distance of 1,000 yards, was the Brigade of Guards (Grenadiers, Scots, and Coldstream). The Left of the attacking line was occupied by the 2nd Division less the 4th Brigade, watching an Egyptian Division at Kafr Dowar. The Black Watch, Gordon Highlanders, Cameron Highlanders and Highland Light Infantry in front; in the interval between the two Divisions 42 guns. Behind them marched, as a Reserve, Ashburnham's Brigade of the King's Royal Rifles

Kassassin,
1882

Tel-el-
Kebir

Tel-el-
Kebir

and Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. On the extreme Right Rear flank of the assaulting force were the cavalry; on the extreme Left of the British line, on the other side of the Freshwater Canal, followed the Indian contingent, consisting of the Seaforth Highlanders, three battalions of Native infantry, Bengal Cavalry and some Mountain guns, intended to turn Arabi's Right flank, which rested on the canal.

The army halted when still 5 miles from the enemy's position. Silence and formation were well preserved, and smoking was permitted. An hysterical soldier's shouts were silenced by chloroform. Once the Highland Brigade lay down to rest for twenty minutes, and this was the occasion of some confusion which might have ended in a calamity. For the order thus given in the Centre of the Highland line did not reach the outer flanks, by reason of its being too silently passed from mouth to mouth, till some time later. The flanks continued to step out while maintaining touch with the recumbent Centre, and lost their direction and circled round in such a manner that the brigade finally halted in a crescent-shaped formation with the Right and Left almost confronting each other. When the line marched off again, but for the intelligence and efforts of the officers, these opposing flanks, mistaking each other for enemies, might have caused disaster.

"Just as the paling of the stars showed dawn to be near, but while it was still as dark as ever, a few scattered shots were fired in our front, then a single bugle sounded within the enemy's lines. Yet a minute or two of dead silence elapsed, and then the whole extent of entrenchment in our front, hitherto unseen, poured forth a stream of rifle fire. Our bugles sounded the charge, and, responding with cheer, the ranks sprang forward."

Not a single shot was fired from our lines, but with fixed bayonets they moved on to the ditch. This was 6 feet wide and 4 feet deep, and beyond was a parapet 10 feet high from the bottom. The first man to mount this parapet was Private Donald Cameron, of the Cameron Highlanders, from the braes of Athole, but he fell back among his comrades with a bullet through his brain.

The Highland Brigade, which formed the Left of the attack, had got in front of the rest of the line, so that

Victory at Tel-el-Kebir

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was the first to enter Arabi's entrenchments. "Five or six times we had to close on them with the bayonet, and I saw those poor men fighting hard when their officers were flying before us." When the Black Watch had reached the crest of the works and were re-formed to attack some other guns in the interior entrenchments, a battery of the Scottish Division of the Royal Artillery swept past them, shouting out "Scotland for ever!"


The Royal Irish on the extreme Right went straight at their portion of Arabi's works, carrying them with the bayonet and turning the flank of his position.

The Egyptians, abandoned by Arabi and the colonels, who had a train ready for their escape, fell in scores. At the bastions stormed by the Highland Brigade the enemy corpses lay in hundreds. The total losses of the British army at Tel-el-Kebir amounted to 339, 243 of them being in the Highland Brigade.

On the opposite side of the canal, the Indian contingent came up in time to complete the rout.

The British cavalry, on the following day, after a march of about 40 miles under a blazing sun, entered Cairo on the evening of September 14th, and captured Arabi himself, who was tried and exiled to Ceylon.

Tel-el-Kebir,
1882



PLAN OF THE BATTLES OF TEL-EL-KEBIR AND KASSASSIN

CHAPTER II

ABU-KLEA AND ABU-KRU, 1885

Wolseley Ordered to Relieve Gordon—Situation in Sudan—The Mahdi—The
Corrupt Egyptian Government—Colonel Valentine Baker Pasha Rout
—Lord Wolseley's Scheme—Sir Evelyn Wood Appointed to Command
Lines of Communication—Wolseley Chooses the Nile Route—Gordon
Difficulties—The Square at Abu-Klea—Death of General Sir Herbert
Stewart—The Action near Metemneh—The Fall of Khartoum
Miscalculations.

Situation in
Sudan,
1873-85

THE British Cabinet sent Colonel Charles Gordon to Khartoum to withdraw the garrisons then in the Sudan, and an expedition, under command of General Lord Wolseley, was ordered to relieve Gordon.

In order to understand why Colonel Charles Gordon, a Royal Engineer, the heroic, magnanimous, Christian gentleman, was sent to Khartoum in 1883, it is necessary to go back to the history of some years.

Said Pasha Khedive declared slavery to be abolished. His successor, Ismail, supported Sir Samuel Baker in his efforts to attack the monstrous iniquity at its sources in the Equatorial Provinces. Charles Gordon succeeded Sir Baker in 1873, being nominated Governor-General of the whole Sudan four years later. He came into collision with powerful slave-traders, who since 1869 had defied the Egyptian Government—to which they had previously paid tribute—and destroyed a force which was marching to Darfur.

Some years later the slave-dealers invaded Darfur. The Egyptian Government supported the Sultan, sending with their troops Zebehr, a slave-trader. The Sultan was killed, but Darfur was annexed. Zebehr, when refused the Governorship of the province, instigated his son, Suleiman, to seize the Bahr el Ghazal province. Gessi, a trusted Italian, employed by Colonel Gordon, after hard fighting suppressed the rebellion, and executed Suleiman and ten other of the chief ringleaders.

Baker Pasha Defeated

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Colonel Gordon was succeeded in 1879 by Raouf Pasha, whose troops were frequently beaten by the followers of the Mahdi, a religious impostor, 40 years of age. Raouf was superseded by Abd-el-Kadr, who, after some successes, demanded reinforcements in October, 1882. Some time after the victory of the British troops at Tel-el-Kebir, 10,000 soldiers who had fought under Arabi were sent up to the Sudan, and were annihilated in October, 1883, about 60 miles to the south-west of Duem, their Commander, Hicks Pasha, a retired India General Officer, and all his subordinates being slain.

Situation in
Sudan,
1873-85

Mohamed Ahmed, who called himself the Mahdi, a religious fanatic, previously, with a small rabble of followers, had, by the autumn of 1883 taken 21,000 rifles and 19 guns, and was then supreme of all the country south of Khartoum.

The Egyptian Government of the whole Sudan, except where Europeans were in power, was corrupt. The Hadendawa, a peaceful tribe which did the Government carrying trade from Suakim to Berber, where it was shipped on the Nile, were constantly defrauded of their camel hire by subordinate officers of the Egyptian Army. This treatment made them ready to join in a revolt against their oppressors, and a leader soon appeared in the person of Osman Dikna, a trader who had been ruined by the suppression of slavery.

Colonel Valentine Baker Pasha with 3,600 men, including two battalions of Gendarmerie, drawn from the army which had been disbanded after Tel-el-Kebir, landed near Tokar on January 28th, 1884, and was routed, leaving 2,500 men and 3,000 rifles on the field. The whole of the Eastern Sudan rose in a state of revolt, and in August, 1883, Dikna had demanded the surrender of Suakim in the name of the Mahdi. The Governor of that seaport then at Sinkat, a hill station, summoned Dikna to his presence. He came, but with 60 followers, and attempted to carry the little fort by assault. He failed for the moment, but soon afterwards annihilated the Governor who was marching back to Suakim with all his followers, women and children.

Baker Pasha
at Tokar,
1884

The British Government, after Baker Pasha's rout, sent General Graham with 4,000 British soldiers to Tokar. He was attacked while in squares, February 29th, 1884,

**Sudan
Evacuated,
1884**

when he killed 2,500 Dervishes with comparatively trifling loss, and slaughtered 2,000 more on March 13th, the Hadendowa tribesmen running on to our bayonets with the greatest intrepidity.

The British Government decided that the Egyptian Government must abandon all but the seaports of the Sudan, and recalled General Graham, who re-embarked his force, leaving a garrison of Royal Marines at Suakim.

Mr. Gladstone's Cabinet had always intended, after the victory of Tel-el-Kehir, to let the Egyptians govern all the country, but the continuous losses incurred by the strenuous opposition of the inhabitants of the Sudan bore in on the minds of the British Cabinet that Egypt could not govern the Sudan, and the Egyptian Government was directed to withdraw all its garrisons from the country, which were then stationed mainly on the Nile, and nearly to the Equator.

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**Wolseley's
Plans**

As early as the first week in April, 1884, Lord Wolseley, Adjutant-General of the Army, had submitted schemes for the dispatch of an Expeditionary Force to assist Colonel Gordon in carrying out the orders of the British Government, to bring away the Egyptian garrisons from the Sudan. There was much discussion, and even more hesitation, but eventually Wolseley's scheme for a voyage up the Nile in whale-boats based on his successful Red River Expedition of 1867, was approved, and Parliament voted in August £300,000 for the evacuation of the Sudan garrisons.

Lord Wolseley, arriving in Cairo on September 9th, superseded the General in Command, Sir Frederick Stephenson. Lord Wolseley had telegraphed during his journey to Egypt to the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, Sir Evelyn Wood, who was then at Wadi Halfa, appointing him to the command on the lines of communication of the Expeditionary Force.

The Sirdar at once purchased a large number of Native boats, plying on the Nile, and with them placed at Disbala European rations for 1,000 men for six weeks, and before any White troops had advanced southward beyond Wadi Halfa. The Sirdar bought also 3,760 camels through officers of the Egyptian Army at an average price of

The Gordon Relief Expedition 557

each before he was ordered to stop. In all 8,000 were purchased, but that number proved to be insufficient.

The Nile
Expedition,
1884-85

The Chief of the Staff, unaware of the difficulties, preferred hiring, and some few days after Lord Wolseley's arrival in Cairo the Sirdar was instructed not to purchase any more boats or camels. Later the error was realised, and Lord Wolseley, when in Dongola in November, personally ordered the Sirdar to purchase immediately 500 camels, paying if necessary up to £50 a camel. The Sirdar replied that for the object in view the authority granted was too late, because owing to the scattered and far distant locations of the camel-owning tribes, such a number was not procurable within three months. The Commander-in-Chief then asked the Mudir of Dongola to purchase them, who gave six months as being a more probable time.

Lord Wolseley, who had decided in favour of the Nile route, using 800 whale-boats sent out from England, offered a prize of £100 to the battalion which should make the quickest passage in its whale-boats up to Korti, a prize won by the Royal Irish, the Gordon Highlanders coming in second, and the West Kent men third.

By the middle of December the force was concentrated at Korti, and Wolseley divided his force into two columns—commanded by Major-General Earle, and by Brigadier-General Sir Herbert Stewart. The former, or the River Column, of about 2,200 men, was to advance on to Berber, thence to co-operate with Stewart in the relief of Khartoum.

Stewart was to march across the Bayuda desert to Metemneh, most of the men carried on camels. Between Korti and Khartoum the Nile makes a great sweep to the eastward, thereby lengthening the journey by water.

The force at Stewart's disposal consisted of bluejackets, one squadron 19th Hussars (on horses); the Guards Camel Regiment, composed of men from the Guards and from the Royal Marines; the Heavy Camel Regiment, composed of men from the three Household and seven other cavalry regiments—in all about 1,000 men; a Light Camel Regiment, composed of men from nine cavalry regiments; the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment, composed of men from various regiments; a detachment of Royal Engineers; half

**The Gordon
Relief
Expedition,
1884-85:**

a battery Royal Artillery; 400 men of the Royal Sussex one company of the Essex Regiment; a bearer company a movable field-hospital, and Transport details, making total of 2,000 combatants!

Various communications from Gordon had reached Lord Wolseley. On November 14th a message, dated November 4th, was to the effect that Khartoum could hold out for another forty days, but that "after that it would be difficult." A second letter delivered at Korti read: "Khartoum. All right. C. G. Gordon. 14 Dec., 1884." This sanguine-looking statement did not tally with the verbal information which the messenger had also been ordered to give to Lord Wolseley, and of which the general effect was expressed in one sentence: "We want you to come quickly." On the day this messenger left Khartoum Gordon had written to a friend in Cairo: "All's up! I expect a catastrophe in ten days' time."

Abu-Klea

Sir Herbert Stewart, starting with the Camel Corps on December 30th, had occupied the wells of Gakdul, and leaving the Guards and stores, returned to Korti for another load. On January 12th the column again reached the wells of Gakdul, which lie in a rocky, crater-like amphitheatre of the desert.

On the 14th the column, sending back the Light Camel Regiment to Korti for another load, and leaving a detachment of men to hold the wells, left Gakdul for the Nile, and on January 16th bivouacked inside a zariba composed of stone brushwood, baggage, and boxes of stores. It was fired on at dawn next day. Some Arab horsemen approached, but were dispersed by a few rounds of shell; and General Stewart marched, leaving a small force behind to hold the zariba.

At 9 A.M., formed in square, the troops marched down the valley towards a row of banners, 1,500 officers and men at the front, with four guns. In the Centre were the camels, carrying water, ammunition, and hospital equipment. The square halted repeatedly to return the Arab fire and avoid having its Rear face forced out by the sluggish camels.

When it reached a point about five hundred yards from the Dervish banners it was again halted for the purpose of being "dressed," when a mass of 5,000 of the enemy advanced at a quick run, in a serrated line, headed by horse-

men, and charged down towards the left front corner of the square.

"When the enemy commenced the advance," wrote an officer, "I remember experiencing a feeling of pity mixed with admiration for them, as I thought they would all be shot down in a few minutes. . . . As they advanced, the feeling was changed to wonder that the tremendous fire we were keeping up had so little effect. When they got within eighty yards, the fire of the Guards and Mounted Infantry began to take good effect, and a huge pile of dead rose in front of them. Then, to my astonishment, the enemy took ground to their right rapidly, but in order, as if on parade, so as to envelop the rear of the square. The next moment I saw a fine old sheikh on horseback plant his banner in the centre of the square, behind the camels. He was at once shot down, falling on his banner. Directly the sheikh fell, the Arabs began running in under the camels to the front part of the square. Some of the Rear rank now faced about and began firing. By this time Herbert Stewart's horse was shot, and as he fell three Arabs ran at him. I was close to his horse's tail, and disposed of the one nearest to me, about three paces off, and the others were, I think, killed by the Mounted Infantry officers close by. . . .

"I was much struck with the demeanour of the Guards officers. There was no noise or fuss; all the orders were given as if on parade, and they spoke to the men in a quiet manner, as if nothing unusual was going on."

Changing their direction the Arabs came down on the left rear corner with lightning speed. They had quickly recognised the square's vulnerable point, which was where it had been bulged out by the camels. The last hundred yards were crossed in a few seconds, although during this brief space numbers fell before the fire of the "Heavies" and the Gardner gun, which the Naval Brigade had run out about twenty yards outside the left rear face. But the number of rifles was insufficient to annihilate the masses of Arabs who came rushing on, and in a few seconds the left rear corner was pressed back by sheer weight of numbers. Unfortunately, too, the Gardner gun jammed, and this caused the loss of nearly half the Naval Brigade, who stood by it until they were slaughtered or swept into the square by the rush of Arabs.

The Gordon
Relief
Expedition,
1884-85:
Abu-Klea

The Gordon
Relief
Expedition,
1884-85.
Abu-Klea

"The crush was so great that at the moment few on either side were killed, but fortunately this flank of the square had been forced up a very steep little mound, which enabled the rear rank to open a tremendous fire over the heads of the front rank men; this relieved the pressure, and enabled the front rank to bayonet or shoot those of the enemy nearest them. The enemy then, for some reason, turned to their right along the left flank of the square, and streamed away in numbers along the rear face of it. In very few minutes the terrific fire from the square told on the enemy."

The onrush of the Arabs was compared, by one present, to the rolling of a vast wave of black surf. About 12,000 of them were estimated to have been on the ground, though only about 5,000 of these took part in the actual attack. 5,000 against 1,500! Setting their feet apart for better purchase, our Guardsmen refused to budge one inch; they put our Rear rank about, and they shot down or bayoneted every Arab that came near them.

The camels, which had hitherto been a source of weakness to the square, now became a source of strength; for when the rear face was also forced in, the camels formed a living traverse that broke the Arab rush, and gave time for the right and front faces to take advantage of the high ground on which they stood and fire over the heads of the enemy engaged in a desperate hand to hand struggle on the square masses of the enemy behind. The centre of the square became the scene of a most desperate conflict—camels, horses, men, all involved in one sanguinary welter. The Arabs were only inside the square for some few minutes, when the little band of 1,500 British soldiers "had by strength of pluck and muscle killed the last of the fanatics who had penetrated into their midst."

When the inside of the square was at last cleared, the outside assailants drew off. The struggle had been as bloody as it was brief—1,100 dead Arab bodies were counted in immediate proximity to the square; their numbers in wounded was exceptionally heavy.

Our casualties were nine officers and 65 other Ranks killed; nine officers and 85 other Ranks wounded.

From this scene of carnage the square was moved a few hundred yards to re-form and dress the wounded.

Action at Metemneh

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Hussars being sent forward to find the wells. The men were suffering acutely from thirst, but said nothing. The column bivouacked for the night at the Abu-Klea wells.

The Gordon
Relief
Expedition,
1884-85,
Abu-Klea

Next morning (18th) a small fort was built for the protection of the wounded, and left under a guard; and in the afternoon the column again moved off for Metemneh, on the Nile, about 23 miles distant. At dawn, 6 A.M., January 19th, the column was about five miles west of the river, and the same distance south of Metemneh. It had taken the force fourteen hours to traverse the distance from Abu-Klea (18 miles)!

At 7.30 A.M., from a gravel ridge the Nile, with Shendy and Metemneh, appeared in sight, with a large force of Arabs standing between the column and the Nile. The column breakfasted under fire, and Sir Herbert Stewart was mortally wounded, the command of the column devolving on Sir Charles Wilson. The square, moving on, followed rather a zigzag course, so as to keep on open ground; while every now and then it halted to send a few volleys in the direction of the white smoke-puffs issuing from the long grass. Whenever the enemy showed in force, the guns in the zariba, which had been formed when the troops breakfasted, opened upon them with shrapnel.

Metemneh

When the Arabs were seen approaching the square was halted to receive the charge, and the men gave vent to their feelings in a spontaneous, hearty cheer. Then they opened fire as they would have done at an Aldershot field-day. At first the fire had little effect, and the bugle sounded "Cease firing," the men obeying the call. The momentary rest steadied them, and when the enemy got to within about three hundred yards, on the call "Commence firing," all the leaders with their fluttering banners went down, and no one got within fifty yards of the square. It lasted only a few minutes: the whole of the Front ranks were swept away, and then we saw a wild backward movement, followed by the rapid disappearance of the Arabs in front of and all around us. We had won, and gave three ringing cheers.

Our casualties were 23 killed, 88 wounded.

After the action near Metemneh, three small steamers under command of a loyal chief of Gordon's Force, named

**The Gordon
Relief
Expedition,
1884-85
Fall of
Khartoum**

Khashm-el-Mus, sent from Khartoum, joined Sir Charles Wilson. He had heard rumours of the enemy being in force near Shendi, and was told by Khashm-el-Mus that he had seen a column of the Mahdi's troops marching down stream on the Left bank. Wilson reconnoitred towards Shendi the morning in a steamer, and sent the squadron, 15 Hussars, to reconnoitre up stream. When he returned in the afternoon he was satisfied that there was no enemy in the immediate neighbourhood. The steamer, however, was reported to be in need of repair, and he only left at 3 p.m. the next day for the southward. Progress was very slow for the steamers frequently grounded, and in twenty-four hours, from the 25th to the 26th, only three miles' progress to the south was made.

At 3.30 A.M., January 26th, Khartoum had been taken, the heroic Gordon and 4,000 of the garrison being killed. Wilson, with the three steamers, approached Khartoum and was told by successive Natives standing on the bank of the river of the catastrophe, but he went on under fire, which was occasionally severe, until he was satisfied, from there being no flag flying on Government House, that the news he had heard was accurate.

The Chief of the Staff, Sir Redvers Buller, had notified Cairo in September that laden camels should accomplish thirty miles a day, but the author of this book, having marched when in charge of camels during the India Mutiny 5,000 miles in one year, considered that the estimate, even under favourable conditions of forage and water, and with adequate veterinary attendance—neither of which existed in this Expedition—was unduly sanguine.

The Chief of the Staff's miscalculation is apparent when we recall the casualties in three months, between Korti and Metemneh: 2,200 camels went across the desert in the first trip, December 30th; all but 300 perished from overwork and want of food and water before the end of March. The Commander-in-Chief expected Saleh, Chief of the Kahab, to meet him at Korti, bringing many camels, but he did not appear until two months later, when he supplied 300 camels for local use.

When the Mounted troops, 1,800 men, with 2,900 camels, left Gakdul on January 14th to march towards Metemneh

the camels being exhausted, they made only ten miles; one Unit, the Light Camel Regiment, being sent back to Korti, to make another Transport trip, missed the flight at Abu-Klea.

If all the Mounted troops had been able to march for Metemneh on December 30th, 1884, when they left Korti, instead of marching backwards and forwards the 100 miles of intervening desert, they would have reached the river near Metemneh without opposition, for the Mahdi's troops were at that time besieging Omdurman, a suburb of Khartoum, which surrendered on or about January 6th, 1885. The successful Mahdiah then marched northwards, and intercepted the Mounted column at Abu-Klea on January 19th.

The itinerary programme of the Infantry was carried out punctually to a day, the first battalion landing on December 15th, and the last on January 22nd. Lord Wolseley, in his General Order dated November 30th, 1884, declared "General Gordon cannot hold out many months longer." The Commander-in-Chief sent Sir Herbert Stewart, with the Mounted Corps, across the desert, with instructions that after occupying Metemneh, he was to send Sir Charles Wilson, by steamer, to Khartoum to confer with Colonel Gordon, returning himself to Gakdul to perform Transport work.

Lord Wolseley's courage in sending forward the Mounted troops to capture Metemneh, 180 miles distant, is a remarkable instance of confidence in the prowess of the British soldier, who has often been invited to achieve, and has succeeded in achieving, apparent impossibilities.

CHAPTER III

OMDURMAN, SEPTEMBER 2nd, 1898

The Mahdi Master of the Sudan—Khalifa Abdullahi Succeeds the Mahdi—Dongola Captured by Anglo-Egyptian Army—Preparations Made for an Advance on Khartoum—The Dervishes Shelled by Gunboats—Omdurman—The Charge of the 21st Lancers—The Attack on Donald's Brigade—The Sudanese Regiments Stand Firm—The Sudan surrenders to the Sirdar.

KHARTOUM fell during the night of January 25th and 26th, 1885, and the baffled Gordon Relief Expedition retraced its steps.

The Mahdi
and the
Khalifa,
1885

The Mahdi then became absolute master of the Sudan but dying in June, 1885, appointed the Khalifa Abdullahi as his successor. He ruled for thirteen years. He located 7,000 of the Baggara, his own tribe, in Omdurman, ousting the original inhabitants to make way for them and enriching them by the plunder of less-favoured clans. He exterminated his rivals, and his power was absolute over the enormous tract of country extending from Tokar, on the Red Sea, to Wad Halfa, on the Nile, on the north; to the east, beyond Kassala and Galabat; on the west, to the boundaries of Darfur; and on the south, to Wadelai.

Dongola,
1896

In September, 1896, the Anglo-Egyptian army captured Dongola. In April, 1898, a formidable zariba on the Atbara river was stormed by British and Egyptian Army troops. The Khalifa's Emir, Mahmud, being captured. Preparations were then made for an advance on Khartoum.

The date for the attack on Omdurman was determined by the fact that the Nile between Berber and Khartoum would be at its highest about the end of August, and the beginning of September. The Sirdar, by advancing about the middle of August, would be able to make the fullest use of the Nile for transport by water of troops and supplies in the early stage of the advance, and for the operations of his gunboat flotilla in the actual fighting, although at this time the climate would be very trying for Europeans.

There were two infantry divisions, the British, composed

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
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
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SIR HERBERT (later Earl) KITCHENER

The Advance on Khartoum 565

Omdurman,
1895

of two brigades, and the Egyptian of four. Reconnaissances were made by Mounted Troops and by the River flotilla on August 31st, while the army bivouacked at a small ruined village about a mile and a half south of Kerreri. The camp was shaped like a capital D, the straight side of it being along the Nile bank, and the curved front facing the desert.

Major Stuart-Wortley with some friendly natives marched along the eastern river bank. A number of mounted Dervish scouts retired towards Haliya. The gunboats sent a shower of shells into the villages. Then Stuart-Wortley moved up and got into the Dervish position. There was a short fight with spear and sword, and the enemy were driven out, losing some 300 men, including several of their Emirs.

The enemy having been disposed of, the howitzer battery and its escort were landed. Stuart-Wortley and the range-finders, with an escort of fifty of the Friendlies, searched for a good position for the guns on the Nile bank. Major Stuart-Wortley and Lieutenant Buckle, R.A., were approaching the river bank with 10 dismounted Friendlies, followed by Lieutenant Wood, Staff officer (a son of the first Sirdar), when 30 Baggara horsemen, who had rallied from the Dervish rout, returned to the scene of the fight at a wild gallop. So fierce and sudden was their onset that the Friendlies bolted in confusion. While Wortley was getting 10 Friendlies on to their knees to fire, the Baggara leader charged Lieutenant Wood and his Syrian interpreter. The Baggara's spear missed Wood's ear, who, putting his revolver into the Baggara's face, blew his head off. Then the Friendlies rallied, and the remnant of the Baggaras galloped away. The howitzers meanwhile were sending their shells curving high in air over the gunboats and dropping them into the city beyond. Gaps wide enough to drive a carriage through were torn in the riverside wall, the masonry being fairly blasted away by the explosion.

The Khalifa Abdullahi determined to come out and fight in the open, leading between 40,000 and 50,000 men. There were about 10,000 riflemen, but the cartridges, manufactured in the Khalifa's workshops, were defective, and loaded with bad powder; the riflemen had never had any target practice, and regarded the sights of their Remingtons as useless appendages.

Omdurman,
1898

The night before the battle was clear and bright, and to give additional security to the riverside camp, the gunboats, moored close to the Nile bank, swept its flanks and front with the broad white beams from their electric searchlights.

The position of the British army was a mile and a half long, its flanks thrown back so as to rest on the Nile, its shape a flattened curve. There was a mile along the river bank from tip to tip of this bent bow formed by the fighting line, the broadest point between the curve and the river being about a thousand yards. In the space thus enclosed were the mud-walled huts of the village of Agaiga, under the shelter of which the field hospital had been established. Near the river bank the Transport animals were massed, some 3,000 camels and 1,000 mules.

The Left of the line was formed by the British Division. In the Centre were Maxwell's and Lewis's brigades of the Egyptian army, and on the Right, facing northwards, with its flank resting on a creek that ran into the Nile, was Macdonald's Sudanese brigade. The 4th Egyptian Brigade, under Collinson, was in Reserve inside the line on the Right. The front held by the British Division was covered by a zariba hedge of desert thorn bushes.

At 5 A.M. the enemy advanced to attack the camp. The Khalifa's first line was formed of five great masses of rifle and spearmen, on a front of between two and three miles. In the rear of it there was a second line, of much less strength. Under a rain of bursting shells and Maxim and Lee-Metford bullets the Dervishes came on: their losses must have been enormous, but still they advanced, until their front line, torn by bullet and shell, was within 80 yards of the camp.

The Left attack, directed by the Khalifa's son Osman, poured over the slopes of the Kerreri Hills, its objective being the Right of the Sirdar's line. It came in contact with the mass of the mounted troops which were retiring northwards along the Nile. At first Broadwood moved his squadrons slowly, but his small force was so hard pressed by the thousands of Dervishes, that he had at last to leave the Camel Corps to be covered by the devastating fire of two gunboats on the river bank, which absolutely crushed the Dervish attack.

Colonel Broadwood, with the cavalry, had retreated to the northward, the cavalry acting sometimes by carbine fire dismounted, sometimes by charging the Dervish horse when it pressed closely on his Horse battery in action. When the pressure on his force lessened, he turned, and, marching along the Nile, worked his way back towards the main battlefield. Broadwood's fight had a useful result on the fortunes of the day; for a moment it had diverted at least 10,000 of the Khalifa's troops from the attack on the main position.

Let us now turn to the main battle-field.

The Dervishes pressed on recklessly, wave upon wave, mostly to fall as they came within 500 yards' range, or to limp back disabled. For half an hour, through the hail of bullet and shell, the Dervishes came on. The Khalifa's Black Standard, a flag about six feet square, flying from a long bamboo lance ornamented with silver, was in front of the array that bore down upon Maxwell's brigade. Man after man was seen to fall while carrying it. But it was hardly down when it was flying again in the hands of another warrior.

So rapid was the fire from the British front that the rifles became too hot to hold. They were carried by the leather slings back to the companies waiting in reserve behind the firing line, who handed their weapons to their comrades standing at the zariba hedge. Occasionally Reserve men were called up to fire, while the men who had already been in action rested, and refilled their cartridge pouches. By half-past seven the dash of the Dervish onset began to diminish visibly. Hundreds of their bravest had fallen. There for a full mile along the desert lay the dead and dying, stretched in ghastly rows.

At half-past eight it looked as if the battle was over. The enemy had withdrawn over the slopes of the Kerreri Hills on one side, and of Jebel Surgham on the other. The Sirdar determined to push on at once for Omdurman, about five miles distant, so as to reach it before the Dervishes could rally for its defence. This was a tactical error, for the Khalifa still had over 30,000 undefeated men west of Jebel Surgham.

The force was ordered to advance in direct Echelon of brigades from the Left, which moved on the Nile bank. Each

Omdurman,
1898

Omdurman,
1898

brigade was in a line of columns at deploying intervals. Distance was lost, firstly, because the European Division moved southwards without waiting, while General Hunter's infantry moved westwards to get into Echelon; and, secondly, because that experienced officer held back his most reliable brigade, under Brigadier Hector Macdonald, to move on the outer, i.e. exposed flank of the Echelon.

Along the river bank and farther back came the Camel Corps and the Egyptian cavalry. Collinson's brigade formed up to escort the Transport train along the Nile bank, and serve as a Reserve to the whole.


The Sirdar sent orders to Colonel Martin to take the 21st Lancers out in front of the British Division, over the long slope that runs down from Jebel Surgham to the river, but he ordered the infantry to advance without awaiting the result, and practically simultaneously. Passing round to the south-east of Jebel Surgham, Colonel Martin saw scattered Dervishes retiring landwards. About half a mile south of the ridge, the ground scouts reported that about 200 of the enemy were hiding in a hollow that ran down to the river. Beyond the hollow could be seen some thirty Dervish horsemen. The impression conveyed by this report, and by what could be seen from the ground the regiment occupied, was that a small party of the enemy who had taken part in the attack on the camp were waiting for a chance to escape. Colonel Martin decided to get between the enemy and their line of retreat landwards, so the Lancers moved to the westward of the hollow and formed up for attack.

When the regiment was 300 yards from the enemy the men could see that the scouts had made a mistake, and that there was no mere handful of beaten Dervishes in the front, but a dense crowd of Rifle and Spearmen, packed together in the rocky khor. Colonel Martin, in front of the centre squadron, rode straight for where the broad Sudan spears bristled most thickly. A minute more and the Lancers were into the mass of Dervish infantry, dashing through a storm of bullets and leaping down a draw into the hollow, where the enemy stood twenty deep. In one minute 320 troopers had ridden over and through at least 1,500 foemen. In those brief moments were crowded many deeds of devoted heroism. In less than two minutes

the Lancers had more than 70 casualties. Hardly a man or horse escaped without some injury. Omdurman, 1895

While the Lancers were charging the Dervishes on the other side of the Jebel Surgham ridge, the leading British brigade, Lyttelton's, marching due south, was just topping the sandy ridge between Surgham and the river, and Wauchope's brigade had drawn up nearly level with it. The Sirdar and his Staff were riding close to them when the approach of some riderless horses at 9.30 A.M. indicated the 21st Lancers' charge.

The brigades of Generals Maxwell and Lewis were somewhat in Rear, marching south-west towards Jebel Surgham; General Collinson's brigade and the Transport were moving southwards on the Nile bank. The Field hospitals were being packed, but 150 wounded were still on the ground, the only troops at hand for their protection being a few Europeans, and three companies of an Egyptian battalion. There was a gap of nearly half a mile between Lewis's Right and Macdonald's Left; the latter having 18 guns, and eight Maxims. At this time, screened by the hills that looked down on the



PLAN OF THE MOVEMENTS OF INFANTRY AT OMDURMAN

Omdurman,
1898

morning's battle-field, the Khalifa was gathering his army for another great effort. The warriors engaged in this second attack had, for the most part, taken no share in the earlier one. The Dervishes were massed in two huge columns, which were to make a converging attack on the Egyptian Right and Right Rear.

Macdonald's brigade, about 3,000 infantry, was accompanied by three of the Egyptian batteries of Quick-firers and 8 Maxim guns. As he deployed his brigade in line facing south-west, Yakub's column poured down upon him, wave upon wave, from the hills. The Khalifa's Black Flag was followed by 15,000 devoted fanatics charging the isolated brigade. The Dervish onset was met by a hail of bullets and shells from 18 guns and 3,000 rifles, the Sudanese firing independently, and too fast for effect, the Egyptians in steady volleys.

The Sirdar "changed position to the Right," and when the movements were executed, this brought the army from its front to the south in Echelon with its Left on the river, and its Right out in the desert to the westward, to a position facing west in line with its Left in the desert, and its Right nearly on the Nile, which there makes a bend inwards.

Yakub's warriors came on against Macdonald as bravely as any men ever ran to meet death on a battle-field, but the great wave of jibba-clad Dervishes was mowed down by the fire of rifles, and guns under Macdonald's, besides those of Maxwell's and Lewis's commands, which were now within range.

Many of the bravest Dervish leaders fell dead, and the attack slackened. Yakub and his bravest subordinates, disdaining death, perished where they stood beneath the Black Flag, and, though we are anticipating, we may now say that when their conquerors reached it the flag waved only over dead men.

Meanwhile Macdonald, after withstanding for nearly half an hour the onslaught of Yakub's devoted soldiers, had to meet a still more serious attack launched against the Right and Right Rear of his brigade. He was facing south-west when he met Yakub's onslaught, and just as its vigour was lessening, two heavy columns attacked his Right flank and Right Rear, led respectively by the Emirs Ali Wad Helu and Osman Sheikh Ed Din. Macdonald, leaving the 2nd Ba

Surrender of Omdurman

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talion of Egyptians under command of Major Pink facing south-west, executed an old drill-book formation, "Prolong the line from the Left in succession by the rear to the Right," and so the 9th, 11th, and 10th Battalions now steadily changed their front, and from facing south-west formed a line facing north-west.

The change was effected only just in time, assisted a good deal by the remarkable steadiness of the 9th Battalion of Sudanese, which had been held in support behind the other three. The Black soldier born in the Sudan has many fine qualities, but at the time of which we write he had not learnt the advantage of effective fire control. At the final charge each man had only three rounds left in hand; but, on the other hand, the Blacks awaited with grinning faces the oncoming masses of Dervishes, with whom they wished to deal with the bayonet.

At this moment the Lincoln (10th) Regiment, which was the nearest of the four battalions of Wauchope's brigade, came up breathless, but at a steady double on the right of Macdonald's brigade, standing close to the 10th Sudanese, whom they termed "their Black brothers." The steady volleys of the Lincoln Regiment materially thinned the ranks of Osman's oncoming masses, but not before some of his bravest followers were near enough to the Line to throw their spears and wound some of our people.

It was now, however, apparent, even to our heroic enemy, that the attack from the Kerreri Hills was half an hour too late. If it had been delivered simultaneously with that of Yakub's, Macdonald's brigade must have gone down, although they would probably have died where they stood.

Five hundred Dervish horsemen formed up a quarter of a mile from Macdonald's brigade. Many carried no weapons, but all, urging the horses to their utmost speed, rode without hesitation to certain death.

The battle was now over. The Dervishes, leaving 9,000 dead and vast numbers wounded, fled in utter confusion, pursued by the 21st Lancers and Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps.

The Sirdar accepted the surrender of the city that evening. The British Division had 175 casualties, including 14 officers; the Egyptian army 273, including 10 officers; and the Dervishes lost 9,700 killed, and 10,000 to 15,000 wounded.

PART XVIII

THE WAR IN AFRICA, 1899-1902

CHAPTER I

THE SITUATION PRIOR TO THE WAR AND THE BATTLE OF MODDER RIVER

Sikukuni Repulses the Transvaal Boers—The Zulu War—The First Boer War—1880—The Jameson Raid—Kruger's Ultimatum—The British Expeditionary Force Lands in South Africa—Lord Methuen Arrives at Orange River—The Boer Defeat at Enslin—The Modder River—The Boer Treachery—General Pole-Carew Attacks—The End of the Battle.

Political
Situation
1854

IN 1854 Paul Kruger and Andries Pretorius tried to unite the Free State and Transvaal by force, and after the attempt had failed the Free State asked to come under Great Britain. This request the British Government refused. In 1869 diamonds were discovered in Griqualand West, and the rush of diggers must have caused collision between the Free State population and the Cape Colonists. Had not the British Government annexed the country.

In 1876 the Transvaal Boers were repulsed by Sikukuni, a Swazi chief, after repeated attempts made to subdue him. The Zulus, two years later, drove the Boer farmers away from the borders of Zululand, over which they had encroached, and would have probably exterminated the Boers in the southern part of the Transvaal had not Great Britain intervened, and crushed Cetywayo's army of 40,000 Zulus in 1879.

First Boer
War

In 1877 the Pretoria Treasury was empty, and the British officials accepted the assurances of Boers trading in a country from Pretoria, and misapprehending the wishes of the great mass of people, annexed the country. Messrs. Kruger and Pretorius went to London twice. They consulted with Liberal politicians, but failed to obtain by peaceful means the abrogation of the Act of Annexation. They therefore rose in rebellion December, 1880, and after several military

The Kimberley Relief Column 573

successes, in 1881 obtained the retrocession of the country from the Liberal Government.

Political
Situation,
1878-99

In 1882 the Boers began to restrict the franchises of British Colonists. In 1884 they raided Native locations. In 1886 gold was discovered at Johannesburg, and this changed the financial situation of the Transvaal from poverty to affluence. In 1890 Anti-British Colonist Laws were passed, and in 1896, following the Jameson Raid, more repressive legislation was enacted against British inhabitants.

Mr. Kruger, who had been President four times, called out the Boer commandos September 27th, 1899, and within three days 10,000 burghers were concentrated. He handed to the British Resident at Pretoria an ultimatum, calling on the British Government to withdraw troops from the frontiers and to refrain from landing any more in South Africa. At that time there was a battalion near Mafeking, about 4,000 men near Dundee, Natal, 50 miles from Lang's Nek, and 6,000 troops were on the high seas between India and Durban.

Queen Victoria authorised the calling out of the first class Army Reserve, October 7th; the first transports sailed October 20th; and eleven days later 27,000 men, 3 600 horses, and 42 guns were on the sea. By December 4th 47,000 men had landed in South Africa.

Major-General Lord Methuen arrived at Orange River November 12th, 1899, and organised a column to advance to the Relief of Kimberley, 60 miles distant, then invested by the Boers.

Kimberley
Relief
Column,
1899

The General arranged that stores and baggage should be cut down to a minimum, and that no tents should be carried. Despite the discomfort of bivouacking in a country where a tropical day is often followed by a cold night, he set the example to his force, which numbered 8,000 men, of sleeping in the open, wrapped in a cloak.

He delivered a frontal attack early on November 23rd on Boers at Belmont, whom he dislodged, the Boers riding away unmolested. Our troops lost 50 killed and 200 wounded, mainly of the Guards and Northumberland Fusiliers. Little tactical skill was shown. Methuen again defeated the Boers at Enslin 10 miles farther north, having 200 casualties.

Kimberley
Relief
Column,
1899.
Modder
River

November 27th broke clear and cloudless as Lord Methuen's force approached the Modder River. He felt convinced that the handful of men on his Right front formed the whole of the force which had been reported as holding Modder River bridge, and that they, having accomplished their purpose of covering the main retreat on Spytfontein, were now retiring towards Jacobabad, and on this assumption he made his dispositions.

The Guards were to advance in widely extended order and, if possible, envelop the retiring Boers. On the Left of the Guards the men of the 9th Brigade were to be similarly extended. The whole line was to cover a front of between five and six miles, and it was arranged that when the troops had crossed the river—which is about as wide as the Thames at Oxford—they should assemble at Modder River station for breakfast.

"At eight o'clock," wrote Sir H. Colville, "I found Lord Methuen and his Staff looking at a clump of trees some 1,500 yards to our front, which he said was on the Modder River. It had been reported that this was held by the enemy, but he thought they had gone. He, however, ordered me to extend for the attack. As we watched the Scots Guards moving ahead to the Right, Lord Methuen said to me, 'They are not here.' " The Guards at this time were within 1,000 yards of the Boer trenches. Yet nothing could be seen save a peaceful landscape. There was no movement of men, no smoke—when suddenly a continuous hail of bullets came from an apparently empty river bed 4 miles in extent.

Had the Boer riflemen obeyed orders and reserved their fire till the British were within 400 yards, the result would have been disastrous. Even at 700 yards the fire was deadly.

The Scots Guards, in accordance with orders, attempted to deploy to the right. But they found the Riet flowing between steep, wooded banks—wide, muddy, and unfordable.

Colville sent Colonel Codrington, commanding the 1st Coldstreams, hitherto held in Reserve, to try to find a ford. Partly by wading, partly by swimming, Codrington made his way across the river with a few troops. It soon became apparent that it would be impossible to get a sufficient force across there, and on the Right the battle came to a standstill.

To advance was impossible. Retire—the men would not. So there they crouched, hungry and thirsty, on the ear-

Pole-Carew's Attack

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Modder
River, 1899

behind ant-heaps or such other cover that was available, and lying on the barrels of their rifles to keep them cool enough for use; while the sun beat down upon their backs, blistering the Scotsmen's legs, and the storm of bullets raced overhead, hissing "in solid streaks like telegraph wires."

move resulted in death or mutilation. Even a hand reaching to pass a water-bottle to a wounded comrade was enough to give the Boer marksmen a target.

At the first opening of fire the 18th and 75th Field batteries unlimbered in the Centre at 1,000 yards.

The Boer guns were outmatched, and suffered heavily in men and horses. During the day the 75th battery fired nearly 1,100 rounds, an achievement which reflects credit on the ammunition column.

Led by General Pole-Carew, the 9th Brigade, after some fighting, drove off the Boers on their extreme western flank after wading through the river. Lord Methuen led a company of Highlanders in one of the charges. Fortunately he escaped unhurt; and shortly afterwards two companies of the Yorkshire Regiment rushed the farm; whilst, at the same time, the North Lancashire Regiment, making a spirited advance, drove back the Boers on the Left.

Pole-Carew's attack was materially assisted by the fire of the 62nd Battery, Major Granet, which came into action half a mile south of the dam, after a march of 55 miles in 28 hours.

The Free State troops on the southern side then all fell back across the river. Encouraged by this, a mixed body of men from the 9th Brigade, led by Pole-Carew, advanced to the water's edge and prepared to fight their way across. This movement was supported by a section of the 18th Battery, under Captain Forestier-Walker, who later pushed his two guns up to the extreme left of the British position and shelled the village of Rosmead.

The Free State men on the right of the Boers' position, demoralised by the shell fire now brought to bear on them, gave way and abandoned their position. Pole-Carew, who by this time had collected more men, pushed on, and occupied the village of Rosmead. If he had been supported he might easily have routed the retreating Boers.


The Battle of Modder River consisted in a number of detached engagements, fought on a wide front, and lacking

**Modder
River, 1899**

in cohesion. Lord Methuen attributed this state of affairs to the great difficulty which was experienced in conveying orders across the open plain. The General, at 4.15 P.M., wounded in the thigh, was compelled to leave the field. The lack of general direction then became even more marked. As darkness set in, therefore, the firing ceased. At 10 P.M. the Boers retreated; and when at early dawn the British guns re-opened fire, there was no reply.

The British losses amounted to four officers and 66 men killed, and 20 officers and 393 men wounded.

It is impossible to understand why more accurate information of the enemy's position was not obtained. There was a famous Cavalry Regiment, three Mounted Infantry companies, and a troop of Colonial Scouts in the command. Lord Methuen removed the officer commanding the Cavalry Regiment after the action, but the officer commanding the Mounted Infantry was capable and very brave. Yet the General was apparently ignorant of the course of the rivers, and unaware of Bosman's Drift (neglected by the Boers) across the Riet, 2½ miles up stream of the bridge, in spite of the well-defined track leading to it. The Boers, moreover, moved across his front within 10 miles, unreported, a convoy of ox wagons.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MODDER RIVER, NOVEMBER 28th, 1899


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FIELD-MARSHAL THE RIGHT HON. EARL ROBERTS

CHAPTER II

THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN

Cronje's Command—The Military Genius of De La Rey—The Boer Leaders Anticipate Lord Methuen's Attacking Point—General Wauchope Leads the Night Attack—Wauchope's Death—The Position is Dangerous—Lord Methuen Retires.

EARLY on November 29th, 1899, the British column crossed the river unopposed, being then within twenty-five miles of Kimberley.

* * * * *

After the action at Modder River the Boers fell back to Jacobsdal, and were joined by the Mafeking contingent; that afternoon Cronje began to entrench a position along the summits of the hills. He had now nearly 8,000 men under his command, twice as many as he had at Modder River.

Cronje's
Command

De la Rey—to whose military genius the enemy's brilliantly conceived dispositions at Modder River were due—urged Cronje, therefore, to take up a more advanced position at Magersfontein. With some reluctance Cronje yielded to the suggestion, and on December 4th the Boers abandoned their northern lines, and began, in full view of the British camp, to entrench a new position. The most remarkable feature of their defences was a line of trenches 3 to 4 feet deep, and narrow as a protection against shrapnel fire, extending, not along the summit but along the foot of the hills, on a level with the plain.

The Boer position extended over a front of twelve miles, in the shape of a large semicircle, extending from a point a mile and a half to the north-west of the railway at Merton Siding to Moss Drift on the Modder River, six miles east, or up-stream, of Modder River station. When the British advance recommenced, Dec. 10th, the defences at the extremities were incomplete, they being an after-thought to guard against a turning movement. The Boer leaders an-

Magersfontein, 1899

anticipated that Lord Methuen would attack, as he did, the Centre and Key of the position.

During the twelve days' halt, since the Modder River fight, Stores and Ammunition had been received in the British camp; and General Wauchope arrived with the 2nd Black Watch and the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders.

Lord Methuen was impressed with the advantages of an advance by night.

At 3 P.M., December 10th, the Highland Brigade under General Wauchope to whom Lord Methuen entrusted the Night attack, moved forward to a slight rise, four miles north of the camp, concentrating a heavy fire from the greater part of the artillery on the slopes of Magersfontein Hill. For an hour and a half large boulders were hurled 50 feet into the air by the bursting lyddite; whilst the hail of shrapnel threw up the red earth on the hill-side in what looked like jets of flame. The Boers being well covered in their deep, narrow trenches, only three were wounded.

The Highland Brigade, with the cavalry covering its Right flank, was to move off after midnight for the attack; then, just before dawn, to deploy and rush Magersfontein Hill. General Wauchope expressed his doubts of the chance of success to Lord Methuen.

Soon after 12.30 A.M. the Brigade advanced, guided by Major Benson, R.A. It was a rough night. Rain had been falling heavily all the evening; and just after the column started a terrific thunderstorm broke over it, the vivid flashes of lightning serving to intensify the darkness. At 3.30 A.M., when the blackness of the night began to turn to grey, some distance still intervened between the column and its objective.

Major Benson suggested that the time had come to deploy the brigade, then "in Mass," i.e. each battalion in column—all behind the front one. General Wauchope, anxious to keep the troops as long as possible in a formation which enabled him to control them, moved on.

Death of General Wauchope

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
Half a mile farther on the order to deploy was given as the leading battalion came on a line of thorny bushes. To deploy there was difficult, and the General decided to advance the brigade past the obstacle before it deployed.

Daylight was already showing above the hill-tops as two leading companies of the Black Watch began to deploy; and a moment later an appalling hail of lead struck into the serried ranks of the Highland Brigade, fired from trenches within 400 yards range.

General Wauchope hurried forward, and, taking in the situation at a glance, sent back his cousin with orders to Colonel Coode for the Black Watch to extend to their Right. Young Wauchope gave the order; then returned to the General's side, only to find him dead. A moment later the devoted aide-de-camp fell also. Colonel Coode, too, as he gallantly led his men to the Right in compliance with the order was killed immediately.

Colonel Hughes-Hallett, the only commanding officer

Magersfontein, 1899



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN, DECEMBER 11th, 1899

Magersfontein, 1899

now unscathed, promptly doubled out the Seaforth Highlanders to the right, in the wake of the Black Watch. The men of the two regiments soon became inextricably mixed up, and small detachments, breaking through a gap in the Boer trenches at the eastern extremity of the hill, gained a footing on the lower slopes. They were forced back, however, being caught between the rifles of the enemy on their Right and the shrapnel of the British guns which had just opened fire behind them.

The situation became like that at Modder River. To advance was impossible, but the troops would not retire. Day had only just broken when the guns opened fire, and they did good work in keeping down the enemy's fire.

After the Right attack had failed, the position of the exposed Right flank became dangerous. General Babington, seeing that the Boers were threatening the flank brought up the 12th Lancers and the Mounted Infantry under Lord Airlie and Major Milton, dismounted them and sent them into the firing line on the right of the Highlanders. Later the Coldstream and Grenadier Guards came up and relieved the pressure at this point.

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Lord Methuen directed Sir H. Colville to take the Guards due east towards a low, bushy ridge facing the extreme left of the Boer position, in readiness to cover, if necessary, the retirement of the whole force.

From 6 to 11 A.M. the battle remained stationary, Methuen intending his men to hold on till night. At 1 A.M. Lord Methuen, seeing that the centre of the line was wavering, sent forward six companies of the Gordon Highlanders, under Colonel Downman.

The Gordons advanced in widely extended order, and by a series of well-conducted rushes, despite the fire which greeted them, got within 400 yards of the enemy trenches. It was a fine effort, but useless.

At 1.30 P.M. Colonel Hughes-Hallett, Seaforth Highlanders, threw back his Right to check the Boers, who were making an effort to enfilade the scattered brigades. Colonel Downman, who at the time was lying in the front of the firing line, more than two miles away, saw the Right come back, and, knowing that Hughes-Hallett

The Retreat

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was acting as Brigadier, ordered his men to retire towards the guns; and the whole of the line conformed to the movement. Just as the brigade was rallying the Boer shells burst in the midst of the crowd. A moment later, the sorely tried men were in full retreat across the plain, and the brigade, as such, was not re-formed until after dusk.

Magersfontein, 1899

Lord Methuen at noon retired on Modder River Camp.

The British casualties at the Battle of Magersfontein amounted to 971.

The Boer losses were about 250.

It has not been explained why a frontal attack was made. Kimberley, only 20 miles distant, had six weeks' food. A Cavalry Regiment and Mounted Infantry battalion were available to cover a turning movement.

Night operations are proverbially difficult and very hazardous. Most soldiers will, therefore, hold that the General's persistence under very unfavourable weather conditions was an error. And the blunder was the more unfortunate in that it had the effect of breaking up temporarily the Highland Brigade, whose oft-proved courage has been the envy of all the armies of Europe.

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF COLENZO

Sir Redvers Buller's Position—The Boer Position—Buller's Change of Plans—The British Bombardment—Colonel Long and the Field Batteries in Action—The Advance of the Irish Brigade—Attempts to Cross the River—Attempts to Withdraw the Batteries—Buller's Courage and Lack of Judgment—Withdrawal of the Troops—Loss of the Guns—Hlangwane Hill—British Losses—Buller's Message to Sir George White—"No Intention of Surrendering"—Lord Roberts Sent to South Africa—Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff.

The
Bombard-
ment of
Colenso

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, V.C., with 21,000 men, 16 naval guns, and 5 Field batteries, on December 10th was ready to advance against the Boers who lay beyond the River Tugela, covering the investment of Ladysmith, in a strongly entrenched position on either side of the railway at Colenso.

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The Boer position was on a ridge of hills in the shape of a semicircle six miles in diameter, and was of great natural strength. The hills in themselves were formidable, and the river, fordable at only a few points, added considerably to the difficulties of an attacking force. The position, however, had one weak point. From Hlangwane Hill, on the British side of the Tugela, the defences could be enfiladed. The hill, moreover, was not at all easy to defend, and Commandant Louis Botha, who, in the absence of General Joubert, was in command of the Boers, had the utmost difficulty in persuading any of his men to occupy so advanced and isolated a position.

For three days, December 10th to 13th, Hlangwane Hill remained unoccupied. Neither the threats of Botha nor remonstrances from Pretoria could induce any of the burghers to occupy it. Eventually 800 men volunteered to hold the hill; and this force, though really inadequate for the purpose, sufficed, since Buller failed to realise the importance of Hlangwane in relation to the enemy's position.

A Futile Bombardment

583

Sir R. Buller, judging that the Boer position was impregnable to a frontal attack, resolved to turn it by one of the drifts on the Upper Tugela. Colenso, 1899

At dawn, December 12th, Barton's brigade advanced to a rise, 7,000 yards in front of the village of Colenso, as a containing force while the remainder of the army moved across the enemy's Right. After the movement had begun, Buller changed his plan, and decided to deliver a frontal attack on the enemy's position.

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The British artillery fired for three hours on the Colenso kopjes without visible result. The Boers lay quiet, and nothing was ascertained regarding their dispositions. The General, having spent most of the day examining those apparently unoccupied hills across the river, ordered General Hildyard's brigade to force the passage of the river opposite to the Colenso kopjes. Hart's brigade to cross 3 miles higher up stream. Generals Lyttelton and Barton were to remain in Reserve. General Lord Dundonald was to occupy the Hlangwane Hill.

At 5.30 A.M. December 15th, the Naval Battery opened fire, at 5,000 yards' range, on the southern kopjes, immediately to the east of the railway. Although huge boulders were thrown into the air and large chunks of earth torn from the hill-side, the Boer artillery remained silent.

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The 14th and 66th Field Batteries and six naval guns had been detailed to support General Hildyard's attack on the Centre. Colonel Long, the Senior Artillery officer, accompanied these guns. He was a firm believer in the theory of pushing guns well to the front and so securing an overwhelming short-range fire. At 6 A.M. he led his command across the plain towards Colenso, "at the Trot," without escort—for he outstripped the infantry—coming into action within 700 yards of the river.

At that moment a gun was fired from the Colenso kopjes, and barely had its echo died away when musketry fire fell on the two batteries. The naval 12-pounders, being drawn by oxen, were far in the Rear. Officers and men of the two Field batteries fell fast. Nevertheless the discipline maintained was perfect, orders being carried out with the

Colenso,
1899

methodical precision of annual practice at Okehampton. For a while the British gunners held their own, but two batteries could not cope for long with the concentrated rifle fire of a thousand invisible men.

At 6.30 Colonel Long fell, shot through the body by a shrapnel bullet. "Abandon!" he cried, in reply to a remark, as they carried him away from his batteries. "Abandon be damned! We never abandon guns."

For another half-hour the guns remained in action. At the end of that time there was hardly a gunner left to work the guns, and nearly all the ammunition had been expended. The order was then given, "Cease firing. Take cover in the donga till ammunition is brought up." The survivors fell back, retiring as though on parade, and carrying with them as many of the wounded as they could.

Colonel Long's advance had been intended to cover the attack of General Hildyard's brigade. But at 7 A.M. the attack had not begun!

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The Irish Brigade, the Dublin Fusiliers leading, left camp at 4.30 A.M. and, under the guidance of a Kafir supplied by the Intelligence Department, advanced towards a bridle drift.

The leading battalion moved forward in "fours from the right of companies at deploying intervals," but the rest of the brigade, although advancing in broad daylight across an open plain, followed in mass of quarter-column. General Hart would not listen to suggestions of deployment. He believed in keeping his men well in hand, holding the view that open order was a fallacy.

At 6.30 A.M., when the head of the brigade had arrived within 300 yards of the river, the Kafir guide announced that the drift lay not straight ahead but some distance to the Right, at the top of a great bend in the river which receded into the Boer position.

The Irishmen deployed. This movement Hart at first endeavoured to restrain, but common sense and human nature prevailed; then, leaving the Border Regiment to line the bank of the river, Hart directed his three Irish regiments to press forward into the loop and find the drift which the Kafir guide had indicated.

Colenso,
1899

The Brigadier had apparently only one thought—to get his men across the river; gallantly he led them forward, with a reckless disregard of danger. He infected his command with his own romantic bravery. From Front and Flank came a hailstorm of fire. Not a Boer was visible. The men fell fast, but their advance never faltered. "Fix bayonets, men," cried a sergeant, "and let us make a name for ourselves." The men fixed bayonets; and on they went.

No trace of a drift could be found. A few swam into the river and tried to gain the farther bank, but the weight of their rifles and ammunition dragged them down.

The greater number then threw themselves on the ground and waited.

At 7 A.M. General Buller, who had been watching the attack from high ground in rear, rode down, and in person gave Hart the order to retire, at the same time directing Lancelton's brigade to cover the movement. The attack had lasted barely forty minutes, but it had cost over 400 casualties.

Sir R. Buller rode away to superintend Hildyard's advance, but on learning that Long's guns were out of action, ordered Hildyard to make a demonstration only towards Colenso village. It was gallantly and skilfully done, the Devonshires gaining the river bank in front of the abandoned guns and the Queen's occupying the village.

When Sir R. Buller reached the donga in the rear of Long's batteries, where he remained in the open under heavy fire, he instructed Captain Schofield, R.H.A., his aide-de-camp, to endeavour to withdraw them. Captain Schofield called for volunteers. Corporal Nurse with two teams of the 66th Battery, Captain Congreve, of the Head-quarters Staff, and Lieutenant the Hon. F. S. Roberts, aide-de-camp to General Clery, went forward. Lieutenant Roberts was killed; Congreve wounded, but Schofield and Corporal Nurse brought back 2 guns.

A little later Captain Reed, of the 7th Battery, which had been supporting Dundonald on the right, made another gallant but unsuccessful attempt to withdraw the guns. He had farther to go than Schofield, and before he reached the guns had lost 13 horses out of 22, and 7 men out of 13, he being badly wounded.

Colenso,
1899

Captains Congreve, Schofield, and Reed, Lieutenant Roberts, Corporal Nurse, and Major Rabbie received the Victoria Cross.

All must admire the personal and physical courage of General Sir Redvers Buller, but the historian must record his lack of judgment and of resolution, both at the Battle of Colenso, and the following day, when he heliographed to General Sir George White, the defender of Ladysmith, informing him of the repulse, and suggesting that he might have to surrender Ladysmith.

When Buller had witnessed the failure of the second attempt to withdraw the remnants of the two batteries he ordered all the troops to return to their camps.

The army had marched but a short distance, and although the day was oppressively hot there were 12 battalions which had not come into action. If any two had lain down within range of the guns, the enemy could not have removed the pieces, and at nightfall they might have been withdrawn without loss, for the Boers had not sufficient military training to undertake aggressive Night operations, and were still on the north bank of the unfordable Tugela, which they could cross only at the bridge and by certain fords.

Brigadier-General Lord Dundonald, for the actual attack on Hlangwane, had South African Irregulars, who represented a fighting strength of 600 rifles. The men did well, and, although the enemy entrenched on the hill outnumbered them by three to two, pressed home the attack. They succeeded in advancing some distance up the lower slopes of the hill before they were brought to a standstill. They then held the ground which they had won, and waited for reinforcements. No reinforcements came. Dundonald several times appealed for help to General Barton, but he had been instructed not to commit his brigade, so refused to send even two companies.

By 2.30 P.M. the whole force, with the exception of a few isolated detachments, had been withdrawn.

The Boers crossed the river to pick up stragglers and carry away Long's abandoned batteries at 5 P.M.

The British casualties at Colenso amounted in all to 1,127, including 7 officers and 138 men killed. The Irish Brigade sustaining in an hour and a half 523 casualties.

Out of this number 216 occurred among the Dublin Fusiliers. The Boer losses were insignificant. Colenso, 1899

Next morning, December 18th, Sir R. Buller sent a heliographic message to Sir George White, "suggesting that the surrender of Ladysmith, which he could not now hope to relieve, might become necessary." When Sir George White first read the message he imagined that the Boers must have got hold of the British cipher.


But on the following day the message was repeated; and repetition removed all doubts.

"How long can you hold out?" asked General Buller. "I suggest you firing away as much ammunition as you can, and making the best terms you can. I can remain here if you have alternative suggestion; but unaided I cannot break in. . . . Whatever happens, recollect to burn your cipher, decipher, and code books, and all deciphered messages."

General Sir George White replied that he had no intention of surrendering, and by his determination saved our country from humiliation and disgrace.

The Government acted promptly: instructed Sir R.

Buller either to persevere with his efforts to effect the relief of Ladysmith, or to hand over the command to one of his subordinates, and sent Lord Roberts to command in South Africa with Lord Kitchener as Chief of the Staff.



PLAN OF THE BATTLE OF COLENSO, DECEMBER 15th, 1899

CHAPTER IV

THE ASSAULT ON WAGON HILL

The Investment of Ladysmith—The Key of Ladysmith—Major-General Sir Ian Hamilton's Command—Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill—Boer Attacks Repulsed at Cæsar's Camp—Shelling Wagon Hill—Capture of the Hill—Losses in the Battle.

Investment
of
Ladysmith

THE Boers had closed round Ladysmith early in November, 1899. They greatly over-estimated the power of their artillery, two 6-inch Creuzot and four 4.7-inch Krupp howitzers.

The key of Ladysmith was the great table-topped ridge to the south. This ridge—the eastern half of which is known as Cæsar's Camp, the western as Wagon Hill—extends in a south-easterly direction for three miles, rising to a height of 300 feet above the surrounding plain. The summit is a plateau, varying in width from 400 to 200 yards. It commanded Ladysmith at a range of 3,000 to 5,000 yards.

The enemy delivered a feeble attack at 6 A.M. November 9th, and the defenders had no difficulty in maintaining their position. The Boers, as the result of inactivity, became discontented, and the leaders found it increasingly difficult to keep the commandos present in the laagers.

A force of 5,000 men of the Transvaal and Free State commandos was therefore detailed to take part in the main operation against Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill, seizing the crest line of the hill before daybreak.

Major-General Ian Hamilton, commanding 1,500 troops on Cæsar's Camp and Wagon Hill, had built a chain of forts so placed that their fire commanded the front and swept the ground between them and the forts on either side, with a frontage of four miles.

After the attack on November 9th, Wagon Hill and also Wagon Point—a smaller plateau, covered with stunted trees, at the western end of Wagon Hill, and divided from it by a narrow gully—were occupied.

The enemy's advance began between 1 and 2 A.M. Many

of the Transvaalers who were to form the eastern section of the storming party, thinking the Klip River too deep to ford, refused to make the attempt, and went back to their laager; others waited till dawn.

Wagon Hill,
1899

The frontal attack on Cæsar's Camp was easily checked, but a party of Boers at 4.15 A.M. emerged on the summit, having overpowered, after a short but fierce struggle, the extreme Left of the pickets. They fought with grim determination, but the Boers were too numerous for them, and slowly pushed back the two companies.

Captain Carnegie, Gordon Highlanders, supported by Major Abdy's guns, led his men forward and outflanked the Boers. The sight of cold steel proving too much for the enemy's resolution, they turned, and a moment later were scrambling over the small boulders, hotly pursued by the Highlanders. Carnegie, who had shot four Boers with his carbine, had himself been badly wounded in two places. But, though weak from loss of blood, he still pressed on at the head of his company; nor did he give up the pursuit until the Boers took refuge behind a rocky buttress at the south-east corner of the hill, from which they could not be dislodged.

On Wagon Hill, when Ian Hamilton arrived there at 4.30 A.M., a body of Free State men held the summit at the south-west corner. At 7 A.M. the reinforcing companies of the 60th (King's Royal Rifles) came up from the garrison, under Major W. P. Campbell. Hamilton then renewed his attempts to clear the crest. But these later efforts likewise proved fruitless. Officers displayed the most devoted courage, but could not induce the men to rush that fire-swept space.

Meanwhile, in rear of the hill, Major Blewitt had brought into action the 21st battery, R.F.A. These guns, shelling Mounted Infantry Hill at a range of 3,400 yards, held back the enemy's supports; and the gunners, though exposed to fire from Telegraph Hill, worked their pieces with the same determination which Major Abdy's men had shown.

There was then a lull, and the Boers surprised our men

Wagon Hill, 1899, eating at noon by a rush of a small body of picked men, but were driven back within 5 minutes.

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Sir George White growing anxious that the crest of Wagon Hill should be cleared at all cost, sent up three companies of the Devons.

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A terrific thunderstorm burst over Caesar's Camp and Wagon Hill. Just before the Devons arrived below the crest, General Hamilton asked Colonel Park if his men could clear the hill, from which the Boers had defied all previous efforts to dislodge them. "We will try," Park answered, and at the head of his men charged across the plateau.

The Boers instantly sprang to their feet, and emptied their magazines into the charging line, but the Devons, cheering, ran steadily on; and, though "struck down like driven grouse," swept right on to the clump of boulders which the enemy had held all day. The Boers then turned, and fled down the hill, but only until they reached another ledge of rock. Here they stopped, and for more than half an hour inflicted losses on the Devons.

Encouraged by the success of the Devons, the British troops then moved forward all along the crest, but the enemy clung on to the rocky ground till nightfall. Several of the Boers who escaped the bullets of the British infantry were drowned in Fourie's Spruit, which the thunderstorm had swollen into a raging torrent; others were struck by the shrapnel of the 42nd battery, in action on the hill, while trying to find a drift.

The Boer losses were returned as 64 killed and 119 wounded.

The British casualties amounted to 18 officers killed and 24 wounded, 150 men killed and 225 wounded; total 417.

CHAPTER V

SPION KOP

Inactivity of the Army—The March to the Little Tugela River—Buller's Plans—The Position of Spion Kop—The Four Fords—The Boer Positions—Sir Charles Warren's Attitude—Lord Dundonald's Plans—Acton Holmes Farm—Clery's March towards Tabanyama—Three-Tree Hill—Disconnected Operations—Casualties—Colonel Kitchener's Advance Stopped by Clery—Divers Plans—General Woodgate's March—Boer Reinforcements—The Summit—Woodgate Mortally Wounded—Boer Cannonade—British Reinforcements—Capture of Twin Peaks—Thornycroft's Charge—A Critical Situation—Supersession of Coke—Surrender of British on the Right—The Middlesex Advance—Boers Shell the Crest—Holding the Position—The Retirement—British Casualties—Boers Reoccupy the Summit—A Succession of Mistakes—The Successful Campaign of Lord Roberts—Peace.

THE troops under command of General Sir Redvers Buller, after their disastrous defeat at Colenso on December 16th, 1899, remained inactive for some weeks in their camps to the south of Colenso.

March to
Little
Tugela
River,
1900

The force, numbering 23,000 men, including 2,000 Mounted troops, January 10th, 1900, marched westwards, towards the sources of the Little Tugela River.

Incessant rain for twenty-four hours delayed the move; what were ordinarily insignificant brooks had swollen into torrents which had to be bridged for the passage of guns. They sunk to their axles on the unmetalled ox-wagon tracks, often requiring the teams to be trebled to pass through rather than over the deep ground.

Sir Redvers Buller at first proposed to cross the Tugela by the fords (drifts) from 20 to 16 miles to the westward of Colenso, and then by advancing in a north-westerly direction to turn the right flank of the Boers, who were on the high ground to the west of Ladysmith, and facing southwards.

These operations were entrusted to General Sir Charles Warren, into whose charge was given the greater part of the force. Sir Neville Lyttelton's brigade remained on the south bank of the Tugela.

Spion Kop,
1900

General Sir Charles Warren, from Trichardt's Farm, January 17th, proposed to occupy Spion Kop (or Look-Out Hill), three miles north-east of the ford. General Sir Redvers Buller demurred to this suggestion, wishing Warren to seize Bastion Hill—which stands some 800 feet above the plain, three and a half miles due west of Spion Kop—but did not insist on his view being adopted.

"Spion Kop," a remarkably shaped hill, about 1,400 feet high, is about two miles in extent from east to west in its higher features. At its eastern extremity there are two points, called by us the "Twin Peaks," which are 200 feet lower than the main hill, and from these peaks the ridge bends to the north-east, then descending gradually. There is another chain of hills standing back to the eastward at some distance, called Brakfontein, 14 miles to the north-east of which lies Ladysmith.

The highest features of Spion Kop are peculiar, and its occupation in a fog so dense as to prevent its configuration being appreciated led to disastrous results. The top contour has the shape of a triangle with a flattened nose towards north-north-east, and its base runs 300 yards east and west; but to the eastward of this top contour, and 75 feet lower, there is a saddle-back projecting north-east, terminated by a rocky knoll covered by aloe trees. Until late in the fight the British troops made no effort to occupy this knoll, and from it on January 24th many of our soldiers were shot lying in a trench, which was so completely enfiladed that 70 men who were firing in a north-westerly direction were shot in the right side of the head by Boers concealed in the aloes.

On the west end of the main hill there is a flat, narrow plateau jutting out 1,200 yards in a north-westerly direction. The main hill descends on its southern side by a gradual slope for two miles to Wright's Farm, which is half a mile north of Trichardt's Drift.

Two miles westwards of Spion Kop is Three Tree Hill, the south-eastern crest of the Tabanyama range, and two miles farther westwards, and half a mile farther to the north, is Bastion Hill, which is the south-west crest of the range.


The four fords used in the operations, January 19th to

24th, were Trichardt's (20 miles), Kaffir Drift, or Twin Peaks Drift (18 miles), Potgieter's, and Schiet's (12 miles), west of Colenso.

This topographical description is necessary for one who wishes to follow the tactical operations, which were grievously mismanaged.

Most of the casualties our troops suffered on the hill were due, as we stated above, to the faulty position taken up when the Boer pickets fled from the summit in a dense fog. There was a balloon available, but without it a sketch might have been easily made, for a well-trained cavalry brigade was at hand.

Many disadvantages to the public service accrued from the Commander-in-Chief having deputed to General Sir Charles Warren the command of the striking force of the army, but the first and very unfortunate instance was the fettering by that General of his cavalry Brigadier. Spion Kop might have been easily accurately sketched, for Lord Dundonald could have occupied it January 18th or 19th with little or no loss; but Sir Charles Warren preferred to keep his cavalry close to the infantry, and he had not approved



PLAN OF THE GROUND NEAR SPION KOP

**Spion Kop,
1900**

of Dundonald's initiative in proceeding from Springfield Bridge on to Spearman's Hill, overlooking Potgieter's Ford, on January 10th.

Lord Dundonald reported that Acton Holmes Farm and the west end of the Tabanyama range was weakly occupied, and, begging for reinforcements, intimated that when they were received he would ride into Ladysmith, about 23 miles distant.

General Sir Charles Warren disapproved of such action. He had sent several orders forbidding Dundonald to go farther forward, and to ensure fettering his advance, stopped a wagon train of Supplies which was going to the Acton Holmes bivouac.

He arranged for a moonlight attack on the Tabanyama range. Some time later he abandoned the idea; and when Lord Dundonald reported that the Acton Holmes road was now strongly held, Warren ordered the troops to counter-march.

At 3 A.M. January 20th, General Clery, to whom Sir Charles Warren had given command of two brigades, moved towards the Tabanyama range, and by 6 A.M., being unopposed, had occupied the ground up to Three Tree Hill, the south-east spur of the range.

Clery, at 11 A.M., sent General Hart's brigade forward in a northerly direction, and a mile to the westward of Three Tree Hill. At 3.30 P.M., when Hart was about to attack the Boer position, then about 600 yards distant, but with no intervening cover available, General Clery stopped the advance.

Early on January 21st Colonel Walter Kitchener, West York Regiment, in command of three battalions of Hildyard's brigade, arranged with General Hart that Kitchener should attack the Right flank of the Boers immediately north of him, while Hart attacked directly to the front of Sugar Loaf Hill. Colonel Kitchener, after several hours' firing, was advancing, confident of success, when he was stopped by General Clery, although just at this time many of the Boers against whom he was advancing abandoned their position. During these listless, purposeless operations, though nothing practicable had been done, the casualties amounted to 300.

Sir Charles Warren now proposed to cannonade the Boer

Woodgate Seizes Spion Kop 595

position due north of Three Tree Hill, and telegraphed his intention to Sir Redvers Buller, who was on Spearman's Hill, overlooking Potgieter's Drift. Spion Kop,
1900

The Commander-in-Chief rode over early on January 22nd to Three Tree Hill, and told Sir Charles Warren that he disapproved of a prolonged cannonade of the Boer position, and favoured an attack on their Right flank; but he left the decision to Sir Charles Warren, intimating, however, that unless some attack on the Boers was carried out, he intended to withdraw all the troops to the south of the Tugela River. Sir Charles Warren then elected to attack Spion Kop.

The Commander-in-Chief visited General Warren's bivouac again on Jan. 23rd, and disapproving of the nomination of General Coke, who had not recovered from an accident in which he broke his leg, to lead the assault, recommended General Woodgate for the duty. He marched with 1,700 men of his own brigade at 8.30 P.M., January 23rd, beginning the climb of the mountain at 11 P.M., guided by Colonel Thorneycroft. Progress was painfully slow, for the night was very dark, and light rain fell throughout the march; but at 3.30 A.M., when the troops reached the summit, the Boer picket on it fled, after firing one volley, leaving one man bayoneted.

The Boers in their flight carried the news to their line of outposts; many wagons were packed, the oxen inspanned, and were moved off northwards and eastwards, accompanied by their owners. Commandant Schalk Burger, in command of the Boers east of Spion Kop, sent for reinforcements. Louis Botha, galloping to Acton Holmes, moved the big Krupp guns there in position, farther to the east, one heavy Krupp piece, then in the valley immediately north of Spion Kop, to a position on the Tabanyama range, 3,000 yards from the hill which Woodgate had occupied.

At 6 A.M., January 24th, 250 Carolina burghers ascended the Aloe Knoll of the Spion Kop unseen, while Botha brought up men on the north and north-west sides of the hill.

When General Woodgate reached the summit without opposition the mist was so dense that he could not appreciate the configuration of its top contours; but 200 yards of trench were dug, the left flank facing northwards, and the right and shorter face slightly drawn back and facing north-

Spion Kop,
1900

north-east. The work was not well executed, for the ground was very hard, and the men were worn out from incessant marching and countermarching, with broken rest at night. Moreover, the sandbags which had been collected at the bivouacs had been left behind when the ascent was commenced.

When the morning finally cleared at 8.30 the Boers opened fire from Aloe Knoll, from which spot throughout the day, at from 300 to 400 yards, easy targets were found on the soldiers as they lay in the trenches, firing to the north-west. The Boer heavy guns north of Spion Kop, and on Twin Peaks, soon got the range, assisted by the directions given by a heliograph party stationed on Aloe Knoll.

General Woodgate, with the same imperturbable courage which the author daily witnessed in the Ashanti Campaign, 1873-1874, and throughout the Zulu War in 1879, walked along the trenches in which the men were lying down answering fire at close range. He was mortally wounded about 9 A.M., after dispatching a message which was received at Sir Redvers Buller's head-quarters at Spearman's Hill, reporting the situation. Captain Vertue, his Brigade-Major, who had shown a disregard of danger similar to that of his heroic General, was killed soon afterwards.

General Sir Charles Warren, who had been moving from point to point of his command underneath the hill since 3 A.M., ordered General Coke at 9 A.M. to reinforce the troops on the summit. He sent up the Imperial Light Infantry, but the officer commanding did not realise where his men were most wanted, and soon afterwards Coke ordered up the Middlesex Regiment, under Colonel Hill. At 11 A.M. General Coke, at his repeated request, was allowed to go up the hill, taking the 2nd Dorset Regiment, and at this time the greater part of his command was on the hill-top, or in Reserve immediately below it.

There were still two other generals available, and about 10,000 men, but no attempts were made to molest the Boers, who were seen moving men and heavy guns from west to east on the northern part of the Tabanyama range, in order to assail the troops on Spion Kop.

General Sir Neville Lyttelton, at dawn, January 24th, demonstrated from the banks of the Tugela towards Brakfontein, but was recalled lest he provoke a counter-attack.

Mismanagement: Spion Kop 597

Spion Kop,
1900


The 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps, under Colonel Buchanan-Riddell, leaving Kaffir Drift nearly due south of the Twin Peaks at 1 P.M., worked slowly forward in widely extended order, with but trifling loss, till Riddell was near the Peaks, when Sir Redvers Buller signalled for him to retire, and General Lyttelton twice repeated this order. Colonel Riddell with great moral courage evaded obedience by signalling that he would try to stop the advance section, but he went on until he had carried the hill, which he did at 5 P.M., and by an energetic bayonet charge driving off the Boers under Schalk Burger. The battalion held the Twin Peaks until the general retirement was ordered.

We now revert to the scene on Spion Kop. At 10 A.M. January 24th, General Sir Charles Warren learnt by signal from the summit that General Woodgate was dying and that reinforcements were required, but he still failed to appreciate the danger of the situation, nor did he realise till the end of the fight that Aloe Knoll was not held by our troops.

At 11.45 A.M. Sir Charles Warren, acting on a suggestion (heliographed) from the Commander-in-Chief, who was on the hill overlooking Potgieter's Drift, signalled to Spion Kop that Colonel Thorneycroft was appointed a Brigadier, and was to command all troops on the summit, but unfortunately he omitted to inform General Coke, who was then ascending the hill, of his supersession.


After General Woodgate fell, Colonel Crofton on the Left and Thorneycroft on the Right had striven nobly to induce the front sections, which were extended along the crest from 50 to 150 yards in front of the trench, to maintain their position under a heavy fire of artillery and well-aimed rifles; but by 10.30 A.M. Colonel Bloomfield (Lancashire Fusiliers), who had given a fine example to his men, was wounded, and those on the Right flank were driven back into the trench. The pressure on the men in front became more severe, and at 11 A.M. Colonel Thorneycroft led an heroic charge with 40 men towards the crest; many were shot, the rest lay down.

Thorneycroft, who, when he was running forward, had twisted his ankle badly in a fall, from behind a rock fired on the nearest Boers with his pistol. In spite of all his efforts, the enemy by noon had gained the crest, and the British trench then became the front line, but was choked



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**Spion Kop,
1900**

with dead, wounded, and dying men, and there were but few effective soldiers in it who were still using their rifles.

Colonel Crofton, who was working vigorously to maintain the defence on the Left of the summit, passed on a message to Colonel Thorneycroft on the opposite flank that he, Thorneycroft, had been appointed to command the troops on the hill. This was the result of the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief. Colonel Crofton's first messenger fell dead across Thorneycroft's feet ere he delivered the message. The critical situation may perhaps be the more readily realised when we explain that the actual written message taken by the signalling officer, who had read and booked it, was never delivered, and was picked up after the fight by the Boers. The officer as he was himself carrying it across to Thorneycroft, passed a group of soldiers opposite to a threatened point of the attack. He led them forward, and in doing so dropped the message, and, then, becoming involved in the firing line, which under the circumstances he could not leave without risk of the men retiring, he never saw Colonel Thorneycroft for several hours. Thorneycroft had, however, been told by another officer, but before he had grasped the significance of the message, he sent the officer who brought it away to guide reinforcements, then ascending the hill, to a point where they were most required.

At 1 P.M. some of the troops in the Right face of the trench, all their officers having been killed or wounded, surrendered, in spite of Colonel Thorneycroft's efforts, who, followed by a few resolute men, limped over to avert the shameful disaster. Thorneycroft and the Boers met for a few minutes at speaking distance, and 167 downhearted British soldiers, exhausted by many hours of grievous bad management and want of food, followed the Boers over the crest. When Thorneycroft and his few followers were hurrying back to some cover behind rocks, fire was reopened. At that moment one company of the 2nd Middlesex had reached the Left of the trench, and when Thorneycroft was limping out on the Right, Major Savile led forward a section with fixed bayonets to stop the surrender. He was too late, however. The section was driven back, and Major Savile was wounded, but at the same moment another company of the Middlesex coming up near Thorneycroft

croft, he led a cheering string of men across the fire-swept plateau, charging the Boers, who fled down the hill with their demoralised prisoners. Spion Kop,
1900

Now the Boer guns, which had ceased fire to allow, as it was thought, of the taking over of the position, reopened on Thorneycroft's triumphant little band as they stood on the crest firing on the retreating Boers, and the accurately placed shells forced Thorneycroft and his men back to cover of some rocks.

Then, the Boers, collecting some men under the northern crest of the summit, charged the centre of the trench, in which the men had been hitherto steady, and they, panic-stricken, ran back from it. Colonel Crofton, with Bugler Russell, ran forward sounding the "Advance," and the men, stopping in their flight, were about to return, when Captain Dyer (2nd Middlesex) with his company, broke through the panic-stricken crowd of soldiers, and re-occupied the trench, where Colonel Thorneycroft remained until 2 P.M., being the driving power of the men in the firing line at that portion of the defence. At 2.30 P.M. he wrote to Sir Charles Warren, describing the situation, and urging the necessity of an attack being made on the enemy's guns if the British position on the hill was to be maintained. No steps were taken to carry this recommendation into effect.

General Coke, when he was slowly climbing the hill from the lowest of three plateaux which occur in the sharp ascent, ordered the reinforcements then going up to halt on the second plateau until further orders, as he believed that there were more men on the summit than could be usefully employed.

In complete ignorance of the fight which was being waged under Crofton and Thorneycroft, he signalled to Sir Charles Warren at the moment when the men were surrendering in the front trench, the words, "Holding on well." A quarter of an hour later he received a report from Colonel Hill of the surrender of two companies, while he himself was still slowly climbing up the spur, and he now sent up nine companies.

When General Coke at 3 P.M. received a message asking for reinforcements, he had not realised the fact of his supersession, and sent on the Cameronians (2nd Scottish Rifles), of Lyttelton's brigade, who had been within

Spion Kop,
1900

call since 2 P.M. Colonel Cooke led in front of the first company, in perfect order, across the plateau at the double to the front trench, the succeeding companies as they came up going to the Right and Left of the position alternately.

Some of the men in the trench immediately to the Left of where the men had surrendered—and it should in fairness be stated that the slaughter in that part of the trench had been very severe—were now demoralised, and this induced the Boers to mount the crest again and come forward. They were charged by a company of the Cameronians, and driven back, and two companies of the battalion henceforth held successfully the left or north-west corner of the summit.

There were continuous charges on the slope and the summit, and gradually the Boers gained ground, and eventually held nearly all the second contour of the hill. At 3.30 P.M. about forty Boers, creeping forward under the east edge of the crest, got nearly behind Colonel Thorneycroft, but were then checked.

It is remarkable that though General Coke and Colonel Thorneycroft now signalled to the same effect to General Warren regarding the situation, neither of these officers appreciated the necessity of retaking the Aloe Knoll on the east and driving the Boers from the north-west crest. At 7 P.M. Commandant Oberman led a few determined men up the east slope, when he opened fire on the Scottish Rifles at 20 yards' distance, but was hotly received and driven back.

Neither Colonel Hill nor General Coke knew that they had been superseded by Thorneycroft, nor did he know that General Coke had been giving orders for some hours.

At 6.30 P.M. Thorneycroft wrote to Sir Charles Warren a brief statement of the position on the summit, ending with the words, "The situation is critical."

Throughout a long day's fighting Colonel Thorneycroft had received no communication from General Sir Charles Warren, who was in command. When the Colonel looked down the hill he had seen 10,000 men under Generals Clery and Hildyard lying inactive. He and his men had been shelled with remarkable accuracy, while the British guns, for some reason unknown to him, had ceased to fire. He was ignorant that Sir Charles War-

Spion Kop,
1900


ren, doing the work of a Staff officer, had spent the day in collecting supplies and entrenching tools at the foot of the hill, with the intention of holding it; and that he was preparing to bring up guns; and Thorneycroft now decided to evacuate the position. He had fought with unsurpassed resolution for eleven hours, but at 8 P.M., after a few minutes' consultation with the only two senior officers he had seen throughout the fight, defined his views, and expressed his determination to retire in the pithy sentence: "Better six battalions off the hill than a mop-up in the morning."

The Scottish Rifles were ordered to form a rear-guard. They carried all the wounded men they could from the summit.

At 2 A.M. General Coke reached Sir Charles Warren, who then telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief, begging him to come over; and he, arriving at dawn, carried out the retirement across the Tugela.

The Commander-in-Chief, with the Head-quarter Staff of the army, had remained on a hill south of the Tugela River, six miles from Spion Kop.

He had delegated the command of nearly all the army to Sir Charles Warren, then under Spion Kop, and did not interfere with the tactical conduct of the operations, except in one instance, when he endeavoured to recall a battalion of the King's Royal Rifle Corps, a part of the Reserve. It had crossed



SKETCH OF THE SUMMIT OF SPION KOP

Spion Kop,
1900

the Tugela in pursuance of orders, and was later seen advancing on Twin Peak. The Commander-in-Chief, apprehending that the movement was dangerous, heliographed repeated orders for the battalion to come back. Buchanan-Riddell, on a flimsy pretext, evaded obedience of the order to retire, which was, as he considered, prompted by an undue sense of caution. He drove the Boers off the hill and thus gained the only success which our troops won during a very discreditable day for the senior Generals employed.

The General commanding all the troops under Spion Kop spent a long and strenuous day, moving from point to point, doing the work of a Staff officer, and unfortunately, when moving, sometimes omitted to leave anyone to tell officers seeking him where he had gone. He remained below the mountain on top of which his leaderless battalions were struggling to maintain their foothold; and although he had 10,000 men lying unemployed on the south-west slopes of the mountain, he never attempted to molest the Boers who, attacking from the north side, were shooting down his troops on the summit.

It is interesting to recall that at the same time the Commandant Louis Botha was carrying out successfully the threefold duties of a General, Staff officer, and Unit leader.

The total British casualties from January 19th to January 24th were 87 officers and 1,860 other ranks, killed, wounded, or taken prisoners. The Boers lost about 400 men.

We may now turn to the combatants on the other side. At nightfall Commandant Louis Botha sent a messenger to Schalk Burger, on the Boer Left flank, who returned with a report that Schalk Burger and his men had fled towards Ladysmith when Colonel Buchanan-Riddell, with the 3rd King's Royal Rifle Corps, had captured Twin Peaks. Shortly afterwards Botha learnt that most of his men had left their positions, and that, moreover, in passing, they had frightened away the Burgher ox-wagons, which had been massed to the north-east of Spion Kop in a place of apparent safety.

Botha collected men from Brakfontein and a few from Acton Holmes who had not been affected by the panic felt by those who had been engaged at Spion Kop and Twin

Peaks, and he was personally determined that he would not retire. At 3.30 A.M. he learnt from Burghers who had gone up to Spion Kop to look for the body of a dead comrade that the British troops had retired from the summit, which he reoccupied at 4.30 A.M. with a few men. He fully deserved this success, for his men for many hours had fought with determined courage, the Carolina detachment on Aloe Knoll losing 62 per cent. of their number. Spion Kop, 1900

Much as all soldiers must admire Colonel Thorneycroft's indomitable personal courage, sustained for eleven hours, there are few who will attempt to justify his action in withdrawing the troops from a position for the maintenance of which he was responsible, and in the defence of which many brave men had given their lives.

This was the boldest and most successful offensive tactical operation undertaken by the Boers.

The Boers had repulsed our troops at Talana, at Modder River, and defeated them at Nicholson's Nek and Magersfontein. They had been repulsed at Mafeking and Kimberley, and defeated at Driefontein. After the capture by Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Cronje and 4,000 men in the Paardeberg Laager, February 27th, 1900, the Boers were gradually worn down by ever increasing numbers, and in spite of the great courage and tactical skill which they evinced, assisted by their knowledge of the country, and their friendly relations with their brothers in our colonies, they eventually admitted defeat, and signed a Peace, May 31st, 1902, abandoning their claim to independence.



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